Moral Status Of Animals Research Articles

Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Cloning: Practical Applications and Current Legislation

Somatic cloning is emerging as a new biotechnology by which the opportunities arising from the advances in molecular genetics and genome analysis can be implemented in animal breeding. Significant improvements have been made in SCNT protocols in the past years which now allow to embarking on practical applications. The main areas of application of SCNT are: Reproductive cloning, therapeutic cloning and basic research. A great application potential of SCNT based cloning is the production of genetically modified (transgenic) animals. Somatic cell nuclear transfer based transgenic animal production has significant advances over the previously employed microinjection of foreign DNA into pronuclei of zygotes. This cell based transgenesis is compatible with gene targeting and allows both, the addition of a specific gene and the deletion of an endogenous gene. Efficient transgenic animal production provides numerous opportunities for agriculture and biomedicine. Regulatory agencies around the world have agreed that food derived from cloned animals and their offspring is safe and there is no scientific basis for questioning this. Commercial application of somatic cloning within the EU is via the Novel Food regulation EC No. 258/97. Somatic cloning raises novel questions regarding the ethical and moral status of animals and their welfare which has prompted a controversial discussion in Europe which has not yet been resolved.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the Sociological Literature

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Animal Rights Movement in Theory and Practice: A Review of the Sociological Literature

Fish Welfare in Aquaculture: Explicating the Chain of Interactions Between Science and Ethics

Aquaculture is the fastest growing animal-production sector in the world. This leads to the question how we should guarantee fish welfare. Implementing welfare standards presupposes that we know how to weigh, define, and measure welfare. While at first glance these seem empirical questions, they cannot be answered without ethical reflection. Normative assumptions are made when weighing, defining, and measuring welfare. Moreover, the focus on welfare presupposes that welfare is a morally important concept. This in turn presupposes that we can define the capacities of fish, which is an empirical undertaking that informs and is informed by ethical theories about the moral status of animals. In this article we want to illustrate the need for a constant interaction between empirical scientific research and ethics, in which both fields of research make their own contribution. This is not a novel claim. However, the case of fish sheds new light on this claim, because regarding fish there is still much empirical uncertainty and there is a plurality of moral views on all levels. Therefore, we do not only want to show the necessity of this interaction, but also the added value of a cooperation between ethicists and empirical scientists, such as biologists, physiologists, and ethologists. We demonstrate this by considering the different steps in the process of reflection about and implementation of fish welfare.

Animal models for human disease – reflections from an animal researcher’s perspective

Neuronal ceroid lipofuscinoses (NCL) are a group of lethal inherited neurodegenerative disorders in humans and many animal species. My research on sheep and cattle with NCL raises critical questions on a range of ethical issues, specifically the claim that sheep and cattle are useful models for the disease in humans and other related moral problems. My reflections on moral status of animals and validity of animal models are outlined in this paper.

Neuroscience and the Problem of Other Animal Minds

ABSTRACTA recent argument in the neuroethics literature has suggested that brain-mental-state identities (one popular expression of what is commonly known as neuroreductionism) promise to settle epistemological uncertainties about nonhuman animal minds. What's more, these brain-mental-state identities offer the further promise of dismantling the deadlock over the moral status of nonhuman animals, to positive affect in such areas as agriculture and laboratory animal science. I will argue that neuroscientific claims assuming brain-mental-state identities do not so much resolve the problem of other animal minds as mark its resolution. In the meantime, we must rely on the tools available to us, including those provided by such behavioral sciences as cognitive ethology, comparative psychology, and ethology as well as the neurosciences. Focusing on captive animal research, I will also argue that humane experimentalists do not doubt that many of their research subjects have minds (in some substantive sense of that term). In that light, to suggest that the resolution of the problem of other animal minds would change the scientific use of animals misses the point at issue. Instead, what is required is a 'sea change' in the perceived grounds for human moral obligations to nonhumans. It is difficult to see how brain-mental-state identities could be the deciding factor in this continuing issue in applied ethics.1. IntroductionThe epistemological problem of other animal minds is a subspecies of the problem of other minds familiar to any undergraduate philosophy student (or science fiction aficionado). Given that I only seem to have direct access to my own mental states (e.g., my beliefs, desires, emotions, feelings), how do I know that others, including other nonhuman animals (hereafter animals), have minds1 or minds relevantly different than, or similar to, my own? The epistemic uncertainty implied by these questions remains even after granting minds to fellow humans. The practical implications of this problem seem clear. Animal welfare efforts in conservation biology, agriculture, scientific research, and the pet industry (and this list is not exhaustive) are predicated on understanding the needs of the relevant animals qua subjects who can fare well or badly (Dawkins 2005; Grandin 2010; McMillan 2005; Orlans 2002; Sherwin 2006; Sherwin et al. 2003). To fare well or badly as subjects presumes subjectivity and this brings us to questions (much like those above) about their minds (e.g., Dawkins 2005; 2008).A recent argument in the neuroethics literature (Farah 2008) receiving increasing notice (Allen 2010; Buchman and Reiner 2009; Fins et al. 2008; Wu 2008) (hereafter the Cognitive Neuroscience or CN Argument) has suggested that an assumed metaphysical materialism, common in the contemporary cognitive neurosciences and elsewhere, implies that neuroscientific evidence provides (note the present tense) a different kind of evidence that is in principle more informative than what traditionally grounds ascriptions of mental states to others. This evidence, which assumes certain brain-mental-state identities, can settle epistemological uncertainties about animal minds once and for all. Such a monumental event, it is argued, would dismantle the deadlock over the moral status of animals and so morally advance their treatment in such areas as captive research (e.g., the laboratory) and agriculture (Farah 2008).In what follows I will contend that neither of these claims is particularly persuasive, though not because of a skepticism of animal minds. The apparent strength of the CN Argument arises from both the assumption that certain brain states are identical to certain mental states and that evidence of such brain states provides direct evidence of minds, in contrast to the kind of indirect (largely behavioral) evidence traditionally used to justify ascriptions of mental states. I will argue that the attraction of this claim for proponents of the CN Argument is grounded in a confusion of epistemic and metaphysical considerations relating behavior, brain states, and mental states. …

Rawls, Animals and Justice: New Literature, Same Response

This article seeks to revisit the relationship between Rawls’s contractarianism and the moral status of animals, paying particular attention to the recent literature. Despite Rawls’s own reluctance to include animals as recipients of justice, and my own initial scepticism, a number of scholars have argued that his theory does provide resources that are useful for the animal advocate. The first type takes Rawls’s exclusion of animals from his theory of justice at face value but argues that animals can still be protected within a moral realm independently of justice, or indirectly through the motivations of human contractors. The second type adapts his theory in a way that enables animals to be included within a contractarian theory of justice. It is argued, though, that none of the responses offered is successful in providing a sphere of protection for animals from within Rawls’s contractarian theory. It is doubtful if Rawls’s intention was for animals to receive a significant degree of protection within a moral realm independently of justice, and equally doubtful if the contractors in the original position would be motivated to act on behalf of animals. In the case of the second, whilst Rawlsian resources can be utilised to justify the attempt to amend the veil of ignorance so as to include animals, these are not dependent on a contractural agreement. Similarly, placing emphasis on social-co-operation as a means of incorporating animals into a theory of justice is flawed, not least because, paradoxically, it works for domesticated animals whilst they are being exploited.

On the need to redress an inadequacy in animal welfare science: toward an internally coherent framework

The time is ripe for a greater interrogation of assumptions and commitments underlying an emerging common ground on the ethics of animal research as well on the 3 R (replacement, refinement, reduction) approach that parallels, and perhaps even further shapes, it. Recurring pressures to re-evaluate the moral status of some animals in research comes as much from within the relevant sciences as without. It seems incredible, in the light of what we now know of such animals as chimpanzees, to deny that these animals are properly accorded high moral status. Barring the requirement that they be human, it is difficult to see what more animals such as chimpanzees would have to possess to acquire it. If the grounds for ascribing high moral status are to be non-arbitrary and responsive to our best knowledge of those individuals who possess the relevant features, we should expect that a sound ethical experimental science will periodically reassess the moral status of their research subjects as the relevant knowledge demands. We already can observe this reassessment as scientists committed to humane experimental science incorporate discoveries of enrichment tools and techniques into their housing and use of captive research animals. No less should this reassessment include a critical reflection on the possible elevation of moral status of certain research animals in light of what is discovered regarding their morally significant properties, characteristics or capacities, or so I will argue. To do anything short of this threatens the social and moral legitimacy of animal research.

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Thought

Book review of Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Thought by Gary Steiner.

Article Review of Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals

Article Review of Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals

Animals in the Kingdom of Ends

Kant claimed that human beings have no duties to animals because they are not autonomous ends in themselves. I argue that Kant was wrong to exclude animals from the realm of moral consideration. Animals, although they do not set their own ends and thus cannot be regarded as ends in themselves, do have ends that are given to them by nature. As beings with ends, they stand between mere things that have no ends, and rational beings that are ends in themselves. I propose a broader version of Kant's kingdom of ends, in which rational beings respect the ends of all other beings that have them, including animals. The moral status of animals would still be dependent on the existence of rational beings, but our duty to take their ends into account would be a direct duty to them, rather than being a covert duty to human beings.

The ethics of natural history documentaries

Animal behaviour has been a favourite subject for film-makersand photographers since the invention of the first cameras (Tosi1984; Bouse` 2000). In the second half of the 20th century, thegeneral public’s interest in documentaries and natural historyreportage has grown enormously. Nowadays, the depiction ofanimal life is an industry and several different professions areinvolved in it. Producing a documentarydepicting animals is one ofthe many interactions between humans and nonhuman–animals(from now on ‘animals’) and, like all the other human–animalrelationships, it raises ethical issues. Nowadays, the moral aspectsof many of these relations are being analysed and debated publicly.Such analyses and debates are filling the gap between theoreticalresearch on the moral status of animals and the daily practice ofprofessionals working with animals (Fraser 1999). None the less, itseems that little attention has been paid to it and there are fewanalytical discussions on ethical issues in the making of naturalhistory documentaries. Here we try to offer a bird’s-eye survey ofsuch issues. Our aim is to encourage debate on the moral questionsof the production of natural history documentaries.As a start, it is useful to identify our topic more precisely bypointing out what we mean by ‘natural history documentary’. A‘natural history documentary’ is a photo or audio–video reportagedepicting live animals and aimed at showing their habits andbehaviours for educational and entertainment purposes. Docu-mentaries often depict animal life by mixing photos and/or videoswith commentaries and opinions from experts. All these elementsareorganizedinanarrativeform.Therefore,ourdefinitiondoesnotinclude the raw photo/audio/video sampling that is usuallycollected during behavioural research. Of course, the production ofthis kind of sampling also raises ethical issues, but our aim is tofocus directly on natural history documentaries as a product of theentertainment industry and of other ways of communicatingscience to the general public.Some of the ethical issues of the making of documentaries aresimilar to those raised by other kinds of human–animal relations.Some problems are akin to those entailed in behavioural researchon animals (i.e. filming animals for pure research purposes) and inthe use of animals in sport and entertainment (i.e. using animals inraces; movie making with animal actors). None the less, theproduction of documentaries presents its own problems and itshould be considered a separate theme for ethical analysis. In this

Attitudes of Turkish Veterinary Students and Educators towards the Moral Status of Animals and Species Rating

Summary The objective of this study was to determine the attitude of veterinary students and educators about moral status of animals and species rating and to examine the parameters that might have effects on these matters. In this study, veterinary students and veterinary educators from Frat, Istanbul and Selcuk Veterinary Faculties were surveyed. Data were collected from 330 students and 204 educators by a paper questionnaire. Most of the participants showed a positive attitude for moral status of animals (>4). Species rating of the participants were as follows: mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and insects. As a result; it can be said that veterinary educators and students are generally sensitive on moral status of animals but differences in the factors such as academic status, gender, pet keeping and industrialization affected the level of sensitivity significantly (P<0.05). In addition to this, advanced education and increased experience are the factors that may overcome species rating (P<0.05).

Levinasian Ethics and Animal Rights

What can we say, in good faith, about the moral status of animals? This article explores the above question through the prism of Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of ethics. I begin by examining the ambiguous position of non-human animals in Levinas’ writings. I argue that Levinas’ theory is best read as suggesting that nonhumans present claims for recognition as ethical beings, but that these demands have a different character to those presented by humans. I then explore the implications of Levinas’ view of ethics for the structure of moral reasoning. I contend that Levinas’ theory yields a conception of moral reasoning as reflective, good faith engagement with primordial social judgements of ethical significance. In the final part of the article, I suggest that it is both possible and constructive to thematise the ethical claims of non-human animals in the language of rights. Indeed, from a Levinasian perspective, animal rights might properly be viewed as a model for the notion of human rights, since they capture the essential asymmetry of the ethical encounter.Que peut-on dire, de bonne foi, au sujet du statut moral des animaux? Cet article examine cette question à travers le prisme de la théorie d’éthique d’Emmanuel Levinas. J’examine d’abord la position ambiguë des animaux non humains dans les écrits de Levinas. Je soutiens que la meilleure façon d’interpréter la théorie de Levinas, c’est qu’elle suggère qu’il y a des raisons de reconnaître un caractère éthique aux êtres non humains, mais que ces raisons diffèrent de celles relatives aux êtres humains. J’examine ensuite les implications de la façon dont Levinas voit l’éthique pour la structure du raisonnement moral. Je prétends que la théorie de Levinas présente une conception du raisonnement moral comme étant un engagement réflectif, de bonne foi, avec des jugements sociaux primordiaux ayant une portée éthique. Dans la dernière partie de l’article, je suggère qu’il est possible et qu’il est constructif de faire une thématique des prétentions éthiques d’animaux non humains en utilisant le langage des droits. En fait, dans la perspective de Levinas, on peut correctement voir les droits des animaux comme modèle pour la notion des droits de la personne, car ils saisissent l’asymétrie essentielle de la rencontre éthique.

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (review)

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (review)

Ethics and the Science of Animal Minds

Ethicists have commonly appealed to science to bolster their arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. I describe a framework within which I take many ethicists to be making such appeals. I focus on an apparent gap in this framework between those properties of animals that are part of the scientific consensus, and those to which ethicists typically appeal in their arguments. I will describe two different ways of diminishing the appearance of the gap, and argue that both of them present challenges to ethicists seeking a firm scientific basis for their claims about the moral status of animals. I argue that more clarity about the role of appeals to science by applied ethicists leads to questions about the effectiveness of such appeals, and that these questions might best be pursued empirically.

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (review)

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy (review)

Anthropocentrism and its discontents: the moral status of animals in the history of Western philosophy

Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents is the first-ever comprehensive examination of views of animals in the history of Western philosophy, from Homeric Greece to the twentieth century. In recent decades, increased interest in this area has been accompanied by scholars' willingness to conceive of animal experience in terms of human mental capacities: consciousness, self-awareness, intention, deliberation, and in some instances, at least limited moral agency. This conception has been facilitated by a shift from behavioral to cognitive ethology (the science of animal behavior), and by attempts to affirm the essential similarities between the psychophysical makeup of human beings and animals. Gary Steiner sketches the terms of the current debates about animals and relates these to their historical antecedents, focusing on both the dominant anthropocentric voices and those recurring voices that instead assert a fundamental kinship relation between human beings and animals. He concludes with a discussion of the problem of balancing the need to recognize a human indebtedness to animals and the natural world with the need to preserve a sense of the uniqueness and dignity of the human individual.

Aristotle and the Moral Status of Animals

Aristotle and the Moral Status of Animals

The Gladiator Sparrow: Ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues, whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal's interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.

Capacities, context and moral status of animals.

According to a widely shared intuition, normal adult humans require greater moral concern than normal, adult animals in at least some circumstances. Even the most steadfast defenders of animals' moral status attempt to accommodate this intuition, often by holding that humans' higher-level capacities (intellect, linguistic ability, and so on) give rise to a greater number of interests, and thus the likelihood of greater satisfaction, thereby making their lives more valuable. However, the moves from capacities to interests, and from interests to the likelihood of satisfaction, have up to now gone unexamined and undefended. I argue that context plays a morally significant role both in the formation of an individual's capacities, and in the determination of the individual's interests and potential for satisfaction based on those capacities. Claims about an individual's capacities and interests are typically presented as unconditional; but on closer examination, they are revealed to be contingent on tacit assumptions about context. Until we develop an understanding of how to account for the role of context within our moral theories, attempts to defend special moral concern for human beings based on their superior capacities are less firmly grounded than is commonly thought.