Moral Realism Research Articles

Actuar por una razón

What do we mean when we say we act “for a reason”? What is the connection between Reason, as a faculty, and the reasons of our actions? This article maintains that Aristotle and Kant had a similar answer to this question. Moreover: the answer they give can help us to clarify the controversy between moral realism and empiricism regarding the ontological and epistemological status of what we call the reason of an action.

Ethical Banking and Islamic Banking : A Comparison of Triodos Bank and Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited

Ethical finance and Islamic finance are the two important topics in the post global financial crisis market environment and in the context of sustainable development goals and circular economy. If Islamic finance is inherently ethical finance, then what remains the difference between the two is an interesting theme for investigation. Islamic finance is governed by universal and divine legal and moral principles and standards related to economic transactions. Contemporary Islamic financial practices are however, strongly criticized for giving precedence to legal forms over ethical substance and for the rising gap between moral ideals and practical realities. Ethical finance is a conscious human effort to reform finance and it embraces environmentally, socially and morally conscious practices. In this paper we select two banks, namely Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) and Triodos Bank. We perceive that the first is an ideal Islamic Bank and the second is an ideal Ethical Bank. We undertake an analysis of the content of balance sheet disclosures of the two banks and try to gauge the similarities and divergences in their business principles and practices. The analysis uncovers that the current practices of IBBL may far exceed other Islamic banks in terms of financial inclusion, microfinance, gender balance, SME financing and green banking while still being financially stable and profitable. However, Triodos Bank has some significant lead over IBBL regarding ethical practices since it only promotes sustainable businesses. If Triodos Bank exceeds IBBL in ethical expectations as we conclude, then it is far ahead of other Islamic banks in such comparison. The implication of our conclusion is that Islamic banking needs ethical reform and this can be benchmarked with Triodos Bank’s business model. For Islamic banks the correct approach would be to strike the right balance between ethics, moral standards, Sharī‘ah compliance and profitability. The Islamic banking model has in-built features to ensure Sharī‘ah compliance, and this can be enhanced through adopting sound ethical practices as well as dedicating efforts towards being environmentfriendly. The paper attempted to present some considerations which if present in Islamic banks would take them away from the criticism of being only forprofit in motivation. Triodos has balanced its for-profit and not-for-profit motivations letting the later to lead the first.

Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: from Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance

How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to make its metaphysical commitments explicit. I do so by building on Sharon Street’s version of “Humean Constructivism”. Instead of the realist notion of attitude-independence, the antirealist account of moral objectivity that I articulate centres on the notion of standpoint-invariance. While constructivists have been criticized for compromising on the issue of moral objectivity, I make a preliminary case for the thesis that, armed with the notion of standpoint-invariance, constructivists have resources to vindicate an account of objectivity with just the right strength, given the commitments of ordinary moral thought and practice. In support of this thesis I highlight recent experimental findings about folk moral objectivism. Empirical observations about the nature of moral discourse have traditionally been taken to give prima facie support to moral realism. I argue, by contrast, that from what we can tell from our current experimental understanding, antirealists can capture the commitments of ordinary discourse at least as well as realists can.

Parfit\u2019s and Scanlon\u2019s Non-Metaphysical Moral Realism as Alethic Pluralism

Thomas Scanlon and Derek Parfit have recently defended a meta-ethical view that is supposed to satisfy our realistic intuitions about morality, without the metaphysical implications that many find hard to accept in other realist views. Both philosophers argue that truths in the normative domain do not have ontological implications, while truths in the scientific domain presuppose a metaphysical reality. What distinguishes Scanlon and Parfit’s approach from other realistic meta-ethical theories is that they maintain that normative entities exist in a way that is different from (some) non-normative entities. Moreover, they think that the way normative entities exist helps to answer the metaphysical worries that are often thought to plague non-naturalism. To make sense of this idea, I develop their view as a version of alethic pluralism: the position that there is more than one truth property. I argue, however, that when their view is developed in this way it fails to satisfy our realistic intuitions about morality. This shows that on a plausible and initially promising reading of what it takes for a normative entity to exist in a way that is different from non-normative entities, Parfit’s and Scanlon’s non-metaphysical moral realism fails to be more realistic than contemporary versions of anti-realism.

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism, Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.

Erratum to: There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

Erratum to: There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

Old Wine in New Bottles

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) purport to show that robust moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts that we can know about, is incompatible with evolutionary explanations of morality. One of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments is advanced by Sharon Street, who argues that if moral realism were true, then objective moral knowledge is unlikely because realist moral properties are evolutionary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those properties would not be selected for. However, no evolutionary, causal explanation plays an essential role in reaching the argument’s epistemological conclusion. Street’s argument depends on the Benacerraf-Field challenge, which is the challenge to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs about causally inert moral properties. The Benacerraf-Field challenge relies on metaphysically necessary facts about realist moral properties, rather than on contingent Darwinian facts about the origin of our moral beliefs. Attempting to include an essential causal empirical premise yet avoiding recourse to the Benacerraf-Field problem yields an argument that is either self-defeating or of limited scope. Ultimately, evolutionary, causal explanations of our moral beliefs and their consequences do not present the strongest case against robust moral realism. Rather, the question is whether knowledge of casually-inert, mind-intendent properties is plausible at all.

Moral Realism, written by Kevin DeLapp

Moral Realism, written by Kevin DeLapp

No excuses for moral realism

Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral ignorance excuse. I argue that the exculpatory force of moral ignorance—or lack thereof—poses a thus far overlooked challenge to moral realism. I show, firstly, that if there were any mind-independent moral truths, we would not expect there to be an asymmetry in exculpatory force between moral and ordinary ignorance at all. I then consider several attempts the realist might make to deny or accommodate this datum, and show why none of them work.

There\u2019s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism (or moral realism as a moral doctrine), the paper highlights both their distinctness and their compatibility. In so doing, it underscores the affinities between Blackburnian quasi-realism and moral realism as a moral doctrine. Finally, this paper contends—in line with my earlier work on these matters—that moral realism as a moral doctrine points to the need for some reorienting of meta-ethical enquiries rather than for the abandoning of them.

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.

Interview with Robin Gregory

Robin Gregory is a devoted wife and mother, and student of mystical teachings. Born in Pensacola, Florida, she grew up in California, accompanied by seven siblings, and surrounded by horses, real cowboys, and the occasional rattlesnake. She has always been drawn to helping others, a trait that began, to her mother's horror, with bringing home swallow chicks stricken from their nests. She has worked as a journalist, lay minister, and infant massage instructor for mothers and babies at risk. Her studies include Literature and Creative Writing at University of California, Santa Cruz and Stanford University's Writer's Workshop. She lives with her husband and son in a Carmel cottage old enough to make you sneeze. The Improbable Wonders of Moojie Littleman, her first published novel, has won 14 awards and is shortlisted for more. More about her is available on her website: www.MadMysticalJourney.com The Improbable Wonders of Moojie Littleman was published in the USA in 2015. The novel depicts how, through kinship with otherworldly beings, a disabled boy masters miraculous powers that his adoptive father refuses to recognise. Moojie Littleman is not just another orphan with extraterrestrial friends; he is not just a kid who falls into a series of magical, mystical adventures involving love and family and watermelons. He is, above all, the most unlikely and powerful hero ever known. Moral allegory, magical realism, and lyrical prose, The Improbable Wonders of Moojie Littleman tells the story of a disabled boy who is sent to St. Isidore's Fainting Goat Dairy, where determination to ‘belong’ stirs up trouble and leads to a surprising destiny – if only he can survive one last terrifying trial.

The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.

Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics by Frederick Rauscher

Reviewed by: Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics by Frederick Rauscher Jeanine M. Grenberg Frederick Rauscher. Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xiii + 264. Cloth, $99.99. Making sense of how intelligible notions in Kant's moral philosophy make a place for themselves in the sensible, natural world is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to a Kantian moral philosopher. In this book, Rauscher takes on that question with great aplomb, by looking carefully at an impressive array of Kant's texts, and assessing the extent to which one can say Kant is a realist, or naturalist. Rauscher's intelligent and creative conclusion, in his words, is as follows: I have identified a Kantian transcendental moral idealism that is also an empirical realism, thus dissolving some of the realist/constructivist disagreement. I show, however, that Kant is himself hesitant to endorse this transcendental validity for morality and, particularly in light of the priority of the practical point of view as an agent-perspective rational ordering of nature with no ontological claims of its own, that the more appropriate conclusion is that Kant was an empirical moral idealist. (10) The category of 'empirical moral idealism,' developed by bringing the (usually) theoretical notions of transcendental idealism and empirical realism into the moral realm, is entirely Rauscher's creation. This is a complex and interesting thesis, one that only someone deeply familiar with epistemological, scientific and ethical ideas in Kant could have brought together. It is, furthermore, a thesis that moves toward realism and naturalism not by peremptorily rejecting the anti-realist constructivist position but, instead, by "dissolving some of the realist/constructivist disagreement" (10, emphasis added). This is a mature, [End Page 354] attractive philosophical position which defends Kant's transcendental idealist approach to morality as also a morality that is firmly located within nature. There are times, however, when Rauscher's naturalistic tendencies take him too far. His chapter 2 discussion of "first-person freedom," which provides a central and orienting methodological point of view for the chapters to come, provides the starkest example of this excess. While rightly prioritizing the first-personal point of view in Kant's discussion of freedom, Rauscher fails to realize the metaphysical power of that point of view when he suggests that "free acts understood from the agent perspective have no ontological status" (76, emphasis added). This rejection of all ontological import for things practical is a central methodological commitment Rauscher makes. As Rauscher puts it: "not only is there no object involved that can be said to exist [when considering freedom first-personally], there is also a priority of the agent's perspective over any theoretical understanding even of the nature of action" (76). The practical agent's perspective gains priority over the theoretical or speculative, but only by refusing it all ontological import. Rauscher is right, of course, that practical cognition cannot give us theoretical understanding of intelligible objects; that would be "fanaticism" (see, e.g. Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe 5:135–36). But to deny all ontological import to our practical point of view puts Rauscher at odds with a number of points in Kant's practical works that suggest at least a trace or hint of things intelligible being obtainable from the first-personal practical perspective. To say that there is no theoretical cognition to be accomplished from the practical point of view is not the same as saying that there is no practical cognition of things metaphysical, ontological or intelligible. Even as I find this naturalism line drawn too harshly in Rauscher's book, I still find in it many other things with which I have deep sympathy. Methodologically, I admire Rauscher's emphasis upon the first personal point of view implicit in Kant's practical philosophy. His discussion of the postulate of God, for example, in chapter 5, makes its non-realist-but-naturalist point through appeal to the first-personal practical point of view. Here is his summary of his God discussion: The postulate of God in particular . . . is supposed to have immanent reference, that is, to empirical agents' moral lives, rather than transcendent reference, that is, to a...

Schopenhauer and Non-Cognitivist Moral Realism

I argue that Schopenhauer's views on the foundations of morality challenge the widely-held belief that moral realism requires cognitivism about moral judgments. Schopenhauer's core metaethical view consists of two claims: that moral worth is attributed to actions based in compassion, and that compassion, in contrast to egoism, arises from deep metaphysical insight into the non-distinctness of beings. These claims, I argue, are sufficient for moral realism, but are compatible with either cognitivism or non-cognitivism. While Schopenhauer's views of moral judgment are not obviously consistent, I show how various passages suggest a form of non-cognitivism. This non-cognitivism, I claim, is compatible with moral realism.

THE PROBLEMS WITH MORAL SUBJECTIVISM

Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the person's belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists after all.

Le quasi-réalisme de Dworkin et la responsabilité de juger

Dworkin invented a fictional character: Hercules. Super-judge he has the capacity to reveal the hidden structure of judgments. In his famous judgment Solomon’s wisdom is recognized as divine. It is no longer sufficient for a secularized philosophical reflection. However, Dworkin’s Hercules is endowed with a capacity of unconventional coherence, which allows him to overcome the judge’s instinct. It is somehow in the position of a god. Salomon, who is called wise, has undoubtedly invented an unexpected resolution in his judgment, which is tested here in the light of the richness of the meaning of responsibility. For Salomon, as for Dworkin, responsibility is a rock. - This chapter examines in-depth his latest book, Justice for Hedgehogs, from a moral realism perspective, in order to critically analyse his narrow conception of moral realism and the various opponents of this meta-ethical theory as powerful as it is diverse.

КИТАЙСКИЙ ВЗГЛЯД НА ТЕОРИЮ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ

The article considers the main trends of the international relations theory in China, namely Yan Xuetong's “Theory of Moral Realism”, Zhao Tingyang’s “Tianxia System”, and Qin Yaqing's “Realtional Theory”. The presented theories reflect the specificity of Chinese approach to the IR theory. It is possible to identify some certain similarities between them. Firstly, Chinese scholars try to build such a world order, where China will at least have a major, if not a central, role to play. Secondly, to justify the propriety and naturalness of such an order, the scientists use traditional Chinese culture, history, philosophy. Qin Yaqing and Zhao Qingyang often refer to Confucian philosophy and Yan Xuetong focuses on the Chinese thinker Sunzi. Thirdly, these scholars actively develop their own concepts, try to join Western theories and simultaneously criticize them. Regular publications of works by the proponents of the main IR theory strands in Chinese and English allow them to hold discussions with Western theorists and improve their own concepts. The authors come to a conclusion that it is premature to talk about the emergence of an integral and comprehensive Chinese international relations theory. Today we are witnessing a continued competition among different strands in the development of the IR theory in China between those who are trying to create their own theoretical framework for research, and those who study this theory using Western methodology. Even in this competition, each side makes some contribution to the creation of such a category as the Chinese School of International Relations Theory, stimulates research on international relations, which is important, since it promotes self-awareness of every intellectual group.&nbsp

China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective, by Steve Chan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 250 pp. US$99.99 (cloth).

<i>China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective</i>, by Steve Chan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 250 pp. US$99.99 (cloth).

Neo‐Confucianism and Zhou Dunyi's Philosophy

AbstractUsing a term coined by the contemporary Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan, we could define Zhou Dunyi's thought in terms of ‘moral metaphysics’. Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), a thinker who lived in Northern Song period (960–1127), developed a philosophy that shows an ontological link between the cosmic order of the universe and the human moral reality. His contribution consists of two short works, Penetrating the Book of Changes (Tongshu) and Discussion of the Supreme Polarity Diagram (Taijitu shuo). These works played a fundamental role in creating the metaphysical structure of the neo‐Confucian thought: Zhu Xi emphasized Zhou Dunyi's contribution to the neo‐Confucian philosophy and, more precisely, he pointed out how Zhou Dunyi's ideas helped to define the conceptual framework of neo‐Confucianism. Moreover, Zhu Xi legitimized Zhou Dunyi's role as the pioneer of the ‘Learning of the Way’, or the renewed neo‐Confucian tradition. This paper aims to provide an overview of Zhou Dunyi's crucial role in the field of neo‐Confucianism. At the same time, we stress the need for further analysis in order to fully understand the value of Zhou Dunyi's philosophy in the Song period intellectual context.