Moral Rationalism Research Articles

The risk of embarrassment in buying luxury counterfeits: do face-conscious consumers care?

PurposeThis study aims to examine the role of face consciousness, materialism and risk of embarrassment in determining consumer purchase intention toward counterfeit luxury brand. In addition, the authors explore boundary conditions of these relationships.Design/methodology/approachStudy 1, a survey research (N = 321), examines the mediating role of risk of embarrassment between face consciousness on the purchase intention toward luxury counterfeits. Study 2 (N = 345), an experimental study, examines the moderating role of brand prominence of counterfeit (i.e. whether it contains prominent brand signals). Study 3 (N = 315) explores how the above-mentioned relationships are moderated by consumers’ moral rationalization (i.e. whether consumers seek rationalization when behaving unethically).FindingsFirst, this research shows that risk of embarrassment mediates the negative relationship between face consciousness and Chinese consumers’ purchase intention toward luxury counterfeits, whereas this relationship was not found between materialism and counterfeit purchase intentions. Second, this negative mediating effect holds only when the counterfeit brand is highly prominent. Third, the mediating effect depends on consumers’ moral rationalization, with a positive impact on the purchase intention toward luxury counterfeits, regardless of brand prominence.Research limitations/implicationsThis study represents a preliminary inquiry into the dynamics between face consciousness and materialism in influencing Chinese consumers’ purchase intention toward counterfeit luxury products. Unlike their Western counterparts, whose materialistic views of possessions predict their counterfeit luxury consumption (Davidson et al., 2019), Chinese consumers are more likely to be driven by the social implications of counterfeit luxury to communicate a prestigious social image to others on account of genuine luxuries’ high social recognition.Practical implicationsWhile Chinese consumers are one of the most potent global luxury buyers, they are immersed in the world’s biggest counterfeit luxury market. By digging into the core value of Chinese consumers (i.e. face consciousness), this research provides a number of managerial implications for luxury goods companies to engage in international efforts to educate consumers against counterfeit luxury.Originality/valueThis study makes at least three contributions to the counterfeit consumption literature. First, this study represents a preliminary inquiry into the dynamics between face consciousness and materialism in influencing Chinese consumers’ purchase intention toward counterfeit luxury products. Second, this research identified the complex mechanism of face consciousness as an independent variable on consumers’ purchase intention toward luxury counterfeits. Finally, the authors examined the boundary conditions of brand prominence and consumers’ moral rationalization. The findings may help luxury brand managers identify strategies to discourage counterfeit consumption.

Paul Guyer, Kant on the Rationality of Morality

Paul Guyer, Kant on the Rationality of Morality

Being a master of metaphors

Being a master of metaphors

Strategi Message Appeals Ono Harato Sebua dalam Kampanye Stop Kekerasan Terhadap Anak

Wahana Visi Indonesia for the South Nias Program Area is a non-profit organization that carries out a campaign to stop violence against children by using a strategy of message appeals with the nuances of local wisdom, namely ono harato sebua. The research employs a descriptive method using a qualitative approach. Data collection techniques are interviews, observation and documentation. The result shows that the use of message appeals of ono harato sebua in the campaign to stop violence against children, using rational appeals, emotional appeals and morality appeals. The rational appeals use visual media and socialization. Visual media using stickers written on ono harato sebua, and socialization is to convey data on violence against children that occurred in South Nias regency, accompanied by presentation on children’s rights. The emotional appeal that arises is positive emotional appeals, and the moral appeal that appears is the attitude of responsibility and changes in good and right parenting patterns. Barriers that arise during the campaign are personal barriers and environmental barriers. Personal barriers refer to public’s perception of the campaign to stop violence against children, while environmental barriers refer to the indifference and lack of cooperation between community groups in supporting the campaign.

The Green economy: implementation of "Demoethics” principles for sustainable development of environmental compliance and corporate social responsibility

Goal: Conceptual analysis of “green” economy tools through the implementation of environmental compliance and corporate social responsibility based on the concept of “Demoethics” for sustainable development. Methods: The study utilizes a general methodological approach, namely a systemic approach, which includes methods of logical, statistical analysis and synthesis, goal setting, and goal decomposition. Results: The development of a “green” economy through the implementation of effective practices of corporate social responsibility and environmental compliance should be based on the concept of “Demoethics” which is based on the idea that sustainable development of society can only be achieved through adherence to ethical rationalities that can ensure a balance between the economic, social, and environmental needs of humanity. The paradigm of sustainable development is based on ethical rationality, which includes ensuring the basic needs of people, reducing socio-economic inequality, respecting cultural values, and environmental responsibility. Conclusions: The integration of education and upbringing, a well-developed mind, acquisition of knowledge, scientific principles, and honest labor make a certain contribution to sustainable development. Therefore, democratic principles shape ethical rationality in society, and their effective implementation in corporate social responsibility and environmental compliance allows for improving the quality of life of the population and the competitiveness of society

Reviewing the Interpretation of Confucian Destiny Thought from the Perspective of Moral Luck Theory

Rationalism has been occupying an important position in the interpretation of Confucian thoughts. However, it faces many limitations from the view of recent research. The theory of moral luck comes from the reflection on moral rationalism, emphasizing that the reflection on morality should return to the living world and pay attention to the context of human life and practice. This has brought new inspiration for the modern interpretation of Confucianism, especially the modern interpretation of the Confucian concept of destiny. The Confucian concept of fate advocates that people understand the “mandate of heaven” through self-cultivation and moral practice, and bravely undertake the mission they understand. The exploration of the Confucian concept of destiny is helpful for a deep understanding of important propositions such as the relationship between heaven and man in Confucianism.

Origins of morality. Kant and modern cognitive science

The origins of morality, the role of emotions in moral behaviour and other related issues nowadays agitate philosophers as well as natural and cognitive scientists. They investigate the seemingly ‘moral’ and ‘reasonable’ behaviour of social animals, which raises the question of the nature of morality in a new perspective, and thus motivates an appeal to Kant’s moral philosophy. It is noteworthy that Kant did not connect morality exclusively with human nature. Linking moral principles with pure reason, he considered morality as an a priori condition of the moral behaviour of every rational being. In this article, I attempt to compare Kant’s moral rationalism to the ethical doctrine of enactivism. I would suggest that, despite obvious differences, these concepts are quite compatible as indicated by the empirical data of modern life sciences. The result of the combination of these conceptions can be a hybrid position based on the recognition of the necessary character of morality, due to the reasonable structure of the world. In the first section, I consider the Kantian rational interpretation of morality. The second section provides an outline of the enactivist approach. The third part focuses on the contribution that modern natural science can make to the analysis of moral behaviour. In conclusion, I recap major findings and reiterate my position.

Acknowledging the plural Weberian rationalities in clinical embryology: When moral values, habits, and/or affection prevail beyond efficiency

This paper addresses the plural forms of reasoning used by clinical embryologists when deciding the fate of the human embryos they create and manipulate in the laboratory setting through assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Our analysis draws on empirical material from in-depth interviews with 20 clinical embryologists working at public and private fertility units/clinics in Portugal. Within a bureaucratic organisation based on a high level of professional specialisation, embryologists display multiple perspectives on the criteria they use to evaluate and classify the embryo’s quality, potential and viability. Taxonomies, international guidelines and statistical data are largely used by embryologists to qualify the embryos, basing their action on an instrumental rationality (efficient means and calculated ends recognized inductively). However, beyond technical-scientific facts and theories as intellectual tools for action, some of them also mobilize alternative ethical rationalities. Namely, value-rational action based on moral valuations and legitimate rules/ends, affectual rationality governed by emotions, affects and feeling states (such as empathy with the beneficiaries), and traditional rationality based on habits and routines (embryologist’s feeling gained by experience) intervene too. Therefore, Weber’s distinctive ideal-types and theoretical contributions, namely his foundational four types of social action are relevant for rethinking professional practices within ART, especially clinical embryology.

Comparative philosophical analysis of the rational ethics of I. Kant and the spiritual and moral values of Confucianism

Nowadays, there is a growing interest in the study of various philosophical concepts. One of the relevant topics is the mutual influence or antagonism of Eastern and Western teachings about ethics and morality. One of the insufficiently studied problems is the mutual influences of I. Kant’s ideas and Confucius’ teachings. The goal of the study is to analyse the rational ethics of I. Kant and the spiritual and moral values of Confucianism within the comparative philosophical perspective, to consider their common and distinctive features. The novelty of this study is an integrated approach and a detailed approach to the study of the outlined problems. In this study, the directions for further research were outlined, which deal with a deeper analysis of certain aspects of the teachings of I. Kant and Confucius. The materials and conclusions can be used for the preparation of various courses

The Cambridge Companion to Eighteenth-Century Thought, ed. Frans De Bruyn

<i>The Cambridge Companion to Eighteenth-Century Thought</i>, ed. Frans De Bruyn

On Hare's attempt to bridge the Kantian‐consequentialist gap: A response to Forschler's rejoinder

AbstractIn a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian‐consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations.

The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories

Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority.

Is deception defensible in dementia care? A care ethics perspective.

Deception is common in dementia care, although its moral legitimacy is questionable. This paper conceptually clarifies when does dementia care involve deception and argues that care ethics is an appropriate ethical framework to guide dementia care compared with the mainstream ethical theories that emphasize abilities. From a perspective of care ethics, this paper claims that morally defensible deception is context-specific, embodied as a caring process that needs to be identified through instant, creative and interactive care procedures. According to this argument, it further analyses and concludes the moral rationality of deception in five common cases. While deception is morally justified in many situations, another concern is that it is usually not the last resort but a means of convenience. As the ability to interact, autonomy and dignity of persons with dementia (PWDs) are generally ignored; nurses need more training and education to master the essential procedures to ensure that the value of authenticity and autonomy is maintained and considered throughout dementia care.

Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit. Before and Beyond Consciousness de Donna E. West &amp; Myrdene Anderson : Donna E. WEST &amp; Myrdene ANDERSON (dir.), Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit. Before and Beyond Consciousness, Suisse, Springer, coll. « Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics », vol. 31, 2016, 434 p.

Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit. Before and Beyond Consciousness de Donna E. West & Myrdene Anderson / Donna E. WEST & Myrdene ANDERSON (dir.), Consensus on Peirce’s Concept of Habit. Before and Beyond Consciousness, Suisse, Springer, coll. « Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics », vol. 31, 2016, 434 p.. Un article de la revue Cygne noir (Sémiotique et écologie) diffusée par la plateforme Érudit.

Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense

This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.

The American Chill Pill : Tracking Demographic Changes in US Moral Rationalizations (1995-2020)

Researchers have found that defense mechanisms are linked to moral reasoning. Age and sex are associated with defense utilization, wherein older individuals use mature defense mechanisms, and females use internalizing defenses. Research has identified that morality in society is declining. The present study evaluated the association of age, sex, and wave to rationalization in a situation involving moral reasoning. Age was hypothesized to correlate negatively with rationalizations, and females were hypothesized to utilize more rationalizations. Rationalization utilization was hypothesized to increase over time. Differences were found by age, suggesting older Americans were least likely to rationalize. Rationalization utilization increased over time among all ages. An interaction was found between age and wave, wherein the combination of variables predicted a participant’s mean rationalizations. This study fills a gap in the literature by examining how rationalizations change in a nation, helping to understand how society’s views on wrongdoings change with time.

Brede moraal en brede rede

Broad Morals and Broad Reason: Reconciling inclusive ethics with psychological realism Many of today’s problems revolve around distance and proximity. Progressives argue that a universalist, inclusive ethics requires us to bridge distances in identity, space, and time. Conservatives object that such bridging is psychologically unrealistic: people of flesh and blood can only care about whom/what is close-by. Evolutionary and psychological research seems to corroborate this sobering view. Many researchers confirm that our intuitions (‘System 1’) are groupish and short-sighted, and largely deaf to the appeal of rational universalism (‘System 2’). But not all agree. We distinguish four ‘evo-progressive’ attempts to reconcile evolution and psychology with a universalist, inclusive ethics. Singer and Pinker (1), Buchanan and Powell (2), and Sunstein (3) contend that a reason-based, inclusive ethics is psychologically feasible, but that such an ethics has to be thin, solely focusing on rights and no-harm. By contrast, Haidt (4) argues that an inclusive ethics should be ‘broad’, also encompassing moral domains like sacrality, loyalty and authority. This implies for him that it cannot be reason-based. We argue that a broad form of inclusive ethics can and should be reason-based, but that this requires a rethinking of ‘reason’. We show that the evo-progressives’ conviction that a rational ethics is by definition thin, results from their theoreticistic conception of reason. But reason can also have more mimetic-embodied or mythical-narrative forms. These do allow for a broad, rational, inclusive ethics that can motivate real people to include stakeholders that are distant in identity, place, and time.

Tragic Choices, Revisited: COVID-19 and the Hidden Ethics of Rationing.

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, concern that there could be a shortage of ventilators raised the possibility of rationing care. Denying patients life-saving care captures our moral imagination, prompting the demand for a defensible framework of ethical principles for determining who will live and who will die. Behind the moral dilemma posed by the shortage of a particular medical good lies a broad moral geography encompassing important and often unarticulated societal values, as well as assumptions about the nature and purpose of health care and the consequences of long-standing choices about health care as a social good. This article explores what COVID-19 has exposed concerning values and choices around health care in the United States. Employing the lens of Catholic Social Thought, it argues for an approach to rationing that is grounded in respect for human dignity, committed to distributing social goods in light of the common good, and self-conscious about the construction of vulnerability to illness and death.

Rethinking the Ethics of Pandemic Rationing: Egalitarianism and Avoiding Wrongs.

This paper argues that we ought to rethink the harm-reduction prioritization strategy that has shaped early responses to acute resource scarcity (particularly of intensive care unit beds) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although some authors have claimed that "[t]here are no egalitarians in a pandemic," it is noted here that many observers and commentators have been deeply concerned about how prioritization policies that proceed on the basis of survival probability may unjustly distribute the burden of mortality and morbidity, even while reducing overall deaths. The paper further argues that there is a general case in favor of an egalitarian approach to medical rationing that has been missed in the ethical commentary so far; egalitarian approaches to resource rationing minimize wrongful harm. This claim is defended against some objections and the paper concludes by explaining why we should consider the possibility that avoiding wrongful harm is more important than avoiding harm simpliciter.

Motivated Reasoning and Research Ethics Guidelines

ABSTRACTThe creation of guidelines has long been a popular means of conveying normative requirements in scientific and medical research. The recent case of He Jiankui, whose research flouted both widely accepted ethical standards and a set of field‐specific guidelines he co‐authored, raises the question of whether guidelines are an effective means of preventing misconduct. This article advances the theory that guidelines can facilitate moral rationalization, a form of motivated reasoning. Moral rationalization in research occurs when individuals justify their actions with plausible reasons that cohere with their moral standards. This allows them to act as they want while believing in their own goodness. If guidelines facilitate moral rationalization, this has implications for research ethics training and for the work of applied ethicists. Research ethics training ought to incorporate reflection on conative features of reasoning, including incentives to commit misconduct, and applied ethicists ought to be circumspect about their use of ethics guidelines. Otherwise, they are feeding the fire of rationalization with the cognitive material practitioners need to accomplish their desired ends.