Moral Preferences Research Articles

Tolerant Solidarity With Violent Protesters: Evidence From a Survey Experiment

Conventional wisdom holds that violent protests alienate the public. But violence could also create tactical disagreement among protesters and weaken their unity. So, to what extent does protesters’ use of violence erode intra-movement cohesion? This article argues that protesters can preserve cohesion by falsifying their private moral preferences and restraining themselves from public denunciation, an act which I characterize as ‘tolerant solidarity’. Based on a survey experiment on participants of Hong Kong’s 2019 protests, I examine how their private and public preferences toward violence change in response to three divisive conditions: protesters taking the initiative, violence causing physical harm, and violence targeting counter-protesters. Results show while these divisive conditions make respondents more likely to morally disapprove violence, the effects are weaker in their support for public denunciation, an indication that their private preferences are partially concealed. Findings contribute to the study of contentious politics by advancing a more complex understanding of movement cohesion when protester violence is involved.

Knowledge diffusion and morality: Why do we freely share valuable information with Strangers?

AbstractThis article offers a model integrating heterogeneously moral preferences to overcome the seemingly irrational tendency of individuals to freely share data and knowledge. We build on recent literature showing that moral preferences are favored by evolution theoretically, and have a strong explanatory power empirically, to model individual sharing behavior. Our analysis highlights the limit of financial incentives and the importance of promoting a sharing culture by enhancing awareness. Shedding light on how people respond not only to financial but also moral motives, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate on the design of effective open science policies.

Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?

The distinction between consequentialism and deontologism is fundamental for moral philosophy and has also attracted attention in the economic analysis of moral decisions. We consider voting games where people can earn money by taking morally questionable decisions. Our predictions are taken from a simple behavioral game-theoretic model and depend on the underlying moral preferences. For both kinds of moral theories, we consider a strict and a moderate version. Moral absolutism prohibits certain behavior under any circumstances. Moderate deontologists face internal moral costs whenever they violate a norm but take trade-offs with consequences into account. Strict consequentialists care only about consequences. Moderate consequentialists face moral costs from violating a norm if and only if their violation yields negative consequences for others. We test our predictions experimentally for lying on the outcome of a lottery and taking money designated for donation. Our data support moderate deontologism for lying and moderate consequentialism for donation. We attribute this to telling the truth being a duty which, if violated, always leads to moral costs, while voting for taking the money yields moral costs if and only if people actually get it.

Kantians defy the economists’ mantra of uniform Pigovian emissions taxes

This paper investigates the efficiency-restoring (= Pigovian) taxation of emissions in economies with pollution damage and consumers who are morally motivated to reduce their emissions and who are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of morality or other preference parameters. If the conventional concept of efficiency is applied that relates to the maximum utilitarian welfare disregarding the consumers’ morality, we show that the Pigovian tax is consumer-type specific and smaller than the uniform Pigovian tax in economies with consumers without moral preferences. Since ‘personalized’ Pigovian taxes cannot be implemented in practice due to informational infeasibility, we also characterize the second-best uniform emissions tax. Finally, we investigate the Pigovian taxation when the emissions tax crowds out the moral consumers’ voluntary incentives to reduce emissions.

Evaluating current ethical values of OpenStreetMap using value sensitive design

ABSTRACT The crowdsourced OpenStreetMap mapping platform is utilized by countless stakeholders worldwide for various purposes and applications. Individuals, researchers, governments, commercial, and humanitarian organizations, in addition to the engineers, professionals, and technical developers, use OpenStreetMap both as data contributors and consumers. The storage, usage, and integration of volunteered geographical data in software applications often create complex ethical dilemmas and values regarding the relationships between different categories of stakeholders. It is therefore common for moral preferences of stakeholders to be neglected. This paper investigates the integration of ethical values in OpenStreetMap using the value sensitive design methodology that examines technical, empirical, and conceptual aspects at each design stage. We use the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, an existing volunteered geographic information initiative, as a case study. Our investigation shows that although OpenStreetMap does integrate ethical values in its organizational structure, a deeper understanding of its direct and indirect stakeholders’ perspectives is still required. This study is expected to assist organizations that contribute to or use OpenStreetMap in recognizing and preserving existing and important ethical values. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to evaluate ethical values methodically and comprehensively in the design process of the OpenStreetMap platform.

How virtue signalling makes us better: moral preferences with respect to autonomous vehicle type choices

One of the moral questions concerning autonomous vehicles (henceforth AVs) is the choice between types that differ in their built-in algorithms for dealing with rare situations of unavoidable lethal collision. It does not appear to be possible to avoid questions about how these algorithms should be designed. We present the results of our study of moral preferences (N = 2769) with respect to three types of AVs: (1) selfish, which protects the lives of passenger(s) over any number of bystanders; (2) altruistic, which minimizes the number of casualties, even if this leads to death of passenger(s); and (3) conservative, which abstains from interfering in such situations. We differentiate between scenarios in which participants are to make their decisions privately or publicly, and for themselves or for their offspring. We aim to answer two research questions: (1) whether the public visibility of the choice of an AV type choice make this choice more altruistic and (2) which type of situation makes it more difficult to choose altruistically: when choosing for society as a whole, when choosing only for oneself, or when choosing only for one’s offspring. Our results show that respondents exhibit a preference for an altruistic strategy for AVs and that it is reinforced when signaled to others. The altruistic preference is strongest when applies to everybody else, weaker when it reflects a solely personal choice, and weakest when choosing for one’s own child. We conclude that a public choice is considerably more likely to pressure consumers into accepting a more socially beneficial solution.

Mainstreaming blended finance in climate-smart agriculture: Complementarity, modality, and proximity

Blended finance has emerged as a novel alternative to financing the agricultural sector, which is often riddled with risks and uncertainties. However, investors and financiers are yet to consider blending as the preferred mechanism. Blended finance has not thus attained the status of a mainstream product. The extant literature indicates the problems related to actor moral preferences, but it does not sufficiently explain the mainstreaming issue. This study bridges this gap in the literature by considering the theoretical lens of governance, actor moral preferences, and institutional complexity. The case study of a climate-smart agriculture project, the Integrated Fish Farming in Odisha, India, demonstrates that actors have some reservations regarding blended finance implementation. While local banks are hesitant to embrace blended finance due to procedural restrictions, the implementing agency finds the incentive structure unappealing and feels overloaded due to frequent monitoring. On the other hand, actors collaborate owing to role complementarities and proximity. Recognizing and internalizing actor role complementarities and proximities can help promote blended finance mainstreaming.

Morality, Risk-Taking and Psychopathic Tendencies: An Empirical Study.

Research in empirical moral psychology has consistently found negative correlations between morality and both risk-taking, as well as psychopathic tendencies. However, prior research did not sufficiently explore intervening or moderating factors. Additionally, prior measures of moral preference (e.g., sacrificial dilemmas) have a pronounced lack of ecological validity. This study seeks to address these two gaps in the literature. First, this study used Preference for Precepts Implied in Moral Theories (PPIMT), which offers a novel, more nuanced and ecologically valid measure of moral judgment. Second, the current study examined if risk taking moderates the relationships between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment. Results indicated that models which incorporated risk-taking as a moderator between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment were a better fit to the data than those that incorporated psychopathic tendencies and risk-taking as exogenous variables, suggesting that the association between psychopathic tendencies and moral judgment is influenced by level of risk-taking. Therefore, future research investigating linkages between psychopathic tendencies and moral precepts may do well to incorporate risk-taking and risky behaviors to further strengthen the understanding of moral judgment in these individuals.

Self-protective and self-sacrificing preferences of pedestrians and passengers in moral dilemmas involving autonomous vehicles.

Upon the introduction of autonomous vehicles into daily traffic, it becomes increasingly likely that autonomous vehicles become involved in accident scenarios in which decisions have to be made about how to distribute harm among involved parties. In four experiments, participants made moral decisions from the perspective of a passenger, a pedestrian, or an observer. The results show that the preferred action of an autonomous vehicle strongly depends on perspective. Participants’ judgments reflect self-protective tendencies even when utilitarian motives clearly favor one of the available options. However, with an increasing number of lives at stake, utilitarian preferences increased. In a fifth experiment, we tested whether these results were tainted by social desirability but this was not the case. Overall, the results confirm that strong differences exist among passengers, pedestrians, and observers about the preferred course of action in critical incidents. It is therefore important that the actions of autonomous vehicles are not only oriented towards the needs of their passengers, but also take the interests of other road users into account. Even though utilitarian motives cannot fully reconcile the conflicting interests of passengers and pedestrians, there seem to be some moral preferences that a majority of the participants agree upon regardless of their perspective, including the utilitarian preference to save several other lives over one’s own.

Representative Bureaucracy: The Nepalese Perspective

The purpose of this paper is to reflect the issue of representation of the disadvantaged people in the bureaucracy in terms of the country’s contemporary demographic composition. It also intends to scrutinize the current trends of representation of women along with indigenous community, Madhesi, Dalit, disabled people and people from backward areas in the bureaucracy since the application of a reservation system in Nepal since 2007. Descriptive method has been used for analysis and the results are based on quantitative method used for the analysis and interpretation of the data. This article is based on the secondary data. The content and trend analysis have been made from the published and unpublished data and information in national reports, journals, thesis, newsletters and newspapers. Time series (since 2007) secondary data has been used for the study. The results of the study show that the country’s population consists of 49.50% male and 51.50% female. However, only 25.94% female are being represented and rest 74.06% males are still in dominant in the civil service system of Nepal in 2020. The data depicts that, the civil service has as high as 63.50% Khas/Arya but only 0.60% Muslim, 2.50% Dalit, 15.40% Madhesi and 19.5% indigenous people representations. Moral preference and commitment in recruitment and promotion to retirement is said to be the main reason behind the increasingly mono-ethnic involvement in the civil service of Nepal. Traditionally, males were over-represented in the civil service at all levels. However, the trend has been reconciled in recent years due to the continuing preponderance of female graduates and hence applicants for government jobs. Therefore, the concern over the representativeness of the Nepalese bureaucracy is less on class but more on gender and ethnicity representations. The growing trend of women and other class and ethnicity in civil servants in the recent years is positively expected to achieve the representativeness of bureaucracy with the national face. This article argues that the increasing ration of the representativeness in bureaucracy would ensure equitable, responsiveness, strengthen capacity and legitimacy of the government in the diverse society.

Publico – A Digital Tool for Pandemic Crisis Communication and Management

"COVID-19 vividly demonstrates the global challenges of crisis communication. A flood of pandemic-related information from various sources and highly variable quality is inundating media platforms. To counter this “infodemic”, providing high-quality information is not sufficient. Real-time feedback loops from the public to policy-makers are urgently needed to better align communication strategies, actions taken, and public perception. To achieve this, the PubliCo online platform was launched in November 2020 in Switzerland. It follows a transdisciplinary multi-stakeholder approach rooted in participatory citizen science. PubliCo (https://publico.community/en/) includes three parts: 1. PubliCo Survey, collecting quantitative data, e.g. on moral preferences, while feeding back contextualized, tailored information to users; 2. PubliCo Diaries, collecting in-depth qualitative data, which also informs efforts to adapt PubliCo Survey to the evolving situation; and 3. PubliCo Analytics, which allows policymakers and other platform users to continuously analyse the collected data. We will present the PubliCo concept, considering the following key points: 1. Ethical considerations in the development of PubliCo concerning citizen science and crisis management. 2. PubliCo as a practical tool to implement the procedural ethics concepts such as Accountability for Reasonableness. 3. Lessons learned challenges, and opportunities for the transferability of PubliCo to better manage future crises in different global contexts. With our contribution, we aim to simulate a discussion on the ethical aspects of crisis communication and the strengths and limitations of citizen participation. "

Neuro-Computational Foundations of Moral Preferences.

Moral preferences pervade many aspects of our lives, dictating how we ought to behave, whom we can marry and even what we eat. Despite their relevance, one fundamental question remains unanswered: where do individual moral preferences come from? It is often thought that all types of preferences reflect properties of domain-general neural decision mechanisms that employ a common ‘neural currency’ to value choice options in many different contexts. This view, however, appears at odds with the observation that many humans consider it intuitively wrong to employ the same scale to compare moral value (e.g. of a human life) with material value (e.g. of money). In this paper, we directly test if moral subjective values are represented by similar neural processes as financial subjective values. In a study combining functional magnetic resonance imaging with a novel behavioral paradigm, we identify neural representations of the subjective values of human lives or financial payoffs by means of structurally identical computational models. Correlating isomorphic model variables from both domains with brain activity reveals specific patterns of neural activity that selectively represent values in the moral (right temporo-parietal junction) or financial (ventral-medial prefrontal cortex) domain. Intriguingly, our findings show that human lives and money are valued in (at least partially) distinct neural currencies, supporting theoretical proposals that human moral behavior is guided by processes that are distinct from those underlying behavior driven by personal material benefit.

Better the two devils you know, than the one you don't: Predictability influences moral judgments of immoral actors

Across six studies (N = 2646), we demonstrate the role that perceptions of predictability play in judgments of moral character, finding that people demonstrate a moral preference for more predictable immoral actors. Participants judged agents performing an immoral action (e.g., assault) for an unintelligible reason as less predictable and less moral than agents performing the same immoral action, along with an additional immoral action (e.g., theft), for a well-understood immoral reason (Studies 1–4). Additionally, agents performing an immoral action for an unintelligible reason were judged as less predictable and less moral compared to agents performing the same immoral act for an unstated reason (Studies 3–5). This moral preference persisted when participants viewed video footage of each agent's immoral action (Study 5). Finally, agents performing immoral actions in an unusual way were judged as less predictable and less moral than those performing the same actions in a more common manner (Study 6). The present research demonstrates how immoral actions performed without a clear motive or in an unpredictable way are perceived to be especially indicative of poor moral character. In revealing peoples' moral preference for predictable immoral actors, we propose that perceptions of predictability play an important, yet overlooked, role in judgments of moral character. Furthermore, we propose that predictability influences judgments of moral character for its ultimate role in reducing social uncertainty and facilitating cooperation with trustworthy individuals and discuss how these findings may be accommodated by person-centered theories of moral judgment and theories of morality-as-cooperation.

Dynamic Cognition Applied to Value Learning in Artificial Intelligence

Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the development of intelligent systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance isn't done with prudence, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in the area are trying to develop a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of artificial intelligence. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research arise from the difficulty of avoiding unwanted behaviors of intelligent agents, and at the same time specifying what we want such systems to do. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop our moral preferences simply because of its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods.

Sensitivity to Moral Principles Predicts Both Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies in Sacrificial Dilemmas

When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing it (action principle), causing harm directly than indirectly (contact principle), and causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others (intention principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis (N = 1,218), we examined whether individual differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome-maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes similar to people high in other measures of moral concern.

The search for predictable moral partners: Predictability and moral (character) preferences

Across six studies (N = 1988 US residents and 81 traditional people of Papua), participants judged agents acting in sacrificial moral dilemmas. Utilitarian agents, described as opting to sacrifice a single individual for the greater good, were perceived as less predictable and less moral than deontological agents whose inaction resulted in five people being harmed. These effects generalize to a non-Western sample of the Dani people, a traditional indigenous society of Papua, and persist when controlling for homophily and notions of behavioral typicality. Notably, deontological agents are no longer morally preferred when the actions of utilitarian agents are made to seem more predictable. Lastly, we find that peoples' lay theory of predictability is flexible and multi-faceted, but nevertheless understood and used holistically in assessing the moral character of others. On the basis of our findings, we propose that assessments of predictability play an important role when judging the morality of others.

Moral Norms, Adaptive Preferences, and Hedonic Psychology

Abstract In a series of important papers published roughly twenty years ago, Professor Robert Cooter developed a comprehensive economic theory of moral norms. He explained the value of those norms, described the process by which norms are adopted, and offered a set of predictions regarding the circumstances under which an individual will choose to adopt a particular moral norm. This brief Article applies behavioral law and economics and hedonic psychology to expand upon Professor Cooter’s path-breaking theory. In particular, understanding welfare in hedonic terms — rather than preference-satisfaction terms — suggests a multitude of further situations in which individuals will justifiably seek to internalize moral norms. The hedonic approach to welfare then further suggests an enhanced role for the government to play in encouraging the adoption of welfare-enhancing norms. Cooter’s theory, combined with modern understandings of welfare and human behavior, thus offers powerful predictive and prescriptive possibilities.

Moral signaling through donations of money and time

Prosocial acts typically take the form of time- or money-donations. Do third-parties differ in how they evaluate these different kinds of donations? Here, we show that people view time-donations as more morally praiseworthy and more diagnostic of moral character than money-donations, even when the resource investment is comparable. This moral preference occurs because people perceive time-donations as signaling greater emotional investment in the cause and therefore better moral character; this occurs despite the (correct) belief that time-donations are typically less effective than money-donations (Study 1). This effect in turn is explained by two mechanisms: People believe that time-donations are costlier even when their objective costs are equated, which happens because people rely on a lay theory associating time with the self (Study 2). The more signaling power of time-donations has downstream implications for interpersonal attractiveness in a dating context (Study 3A), employment decisions (Study 3B), and donor decision-making (Study 3). Moreover, donors who are prompted with an affiliation rather (versus dominance) goal are likelier to favor time-donations (Study 4). However, reframing money-donations in terms of time (e.g., donating a week’s salary) reduced and even reversed these effects (Study 5). These results support theories of prosociality that place reputation-signaling as a key motivator of moral behavior. We discuss implications for the charity market and for social movements, such as effective altruism, that seek to maximize the social benefit of altruistic acts.

Problems with \u201cFriendly AI\u201d

On virtue ethical grounds, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson recently recommended that near-future AIs should be developed as ‘Friendly AI’. AI in social interaction with humans should be programmed such that they mimic aspects of human friendship. While it is a reasonable goal to implement AI systems interacting with humans as Friendly AI, I identify four issues that need to be addressed concerning Friendly AI with Fröding’s and Peterson’s understanding of Friendly AI as a starting point. In a first step, I briefly recapitulate Fröding’s and Peterson’s arguments for Friendly AI. I then highlight some issues with Fröding’s and Peterson’s approach and line of reasoning and identify four problems related to the notion of Friendly AI, which all pertain to the role and need for humans’ moral development. These are that (1) one should consider the moral tendencies and preferences of the humans interacting with a friendly AI, (2) it needs to be considered whether the humans interacting with a Friendly AI are still developing their virtues and character traits, (3) the indirect effects of replacing humans with Friendly AI should be considered with respect to the possibilities for humans to develop their moral virtues and that (4) the question whether the AI is perceived as some form of Artificial General Intelligence cannot be neglected. In conclusion, I argue that all of these four problems are related to humans moral development and that this observation strongly emphasizes the role and need for humans moral development in correlation to the accelerating development of AI-systems.

Against Empathy Bias: The Moral Value of Equitable Empathy

Empathy has long been considered central to living a moral life. However, mounting evidence has shown that people’s empathy is often biased toward (i.e., felt more strongly for) others that they are close or similar to, igniting a debate over whether empathy is inherently morally flawed and should be abandoned in efforts to strive toward greater equity. This debate has focused on whether empathy limits the scope of our morality, but little consideration has been given to whether our moral beliefs may be limiting our empathy. Across two studies conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 604), we investigated moral judgments of biased and equitable feelings of empathy. We observed a moral preference for empathy toward socially close over distant others. However, feeling equal empathy for all people is seen as the most morally and socially valuable approach. These findings provide new theoretical insight into the relationship between empathy and morality, and they have implications for navigating toward a more egalitarian future.