The authors begin by dispelling the misconception that Lewis took no interest in politics, which is easily done. What they call the “conventional wisdom” depends upon equivocating the word politics, confounding the passing pother of parties and elections, which Lewis indeed disdained, with the work of ordering a community towards virtue. The book continues with a pithy review over three chapters of Lewis’s arguments against metaphysical materialism, theological voluntarism, and moral relativism. In each case, nature’s status as extrinsic to human cognition, though accurately reflected there, is an important premise. Reality, including moral precepts, is not subject to human will or passions, but neither in its objectiveness is it unknowable. Reason is the link that furnishes both the order of nature and our ability to perceive it. Chapter 5 strives to link Lewis to John Locke and to find commonalities between Locke’s systematic contributions to political philosophy and Lewis’s targeted observations and limited interventions. Some of these efforts disappoint. On page 89 is adduced an essay Lewis composed in 1924 to guide his own thoughts as he prepared a course entitled “The Moral Good: Its Place among the Values.” While the work under review treats the existence of this essay as early evidence for Lewis’s high regard for Locke, consulting the manuscript in the Bodleian Library indicates that it focuses only on Locke’s empiricism and is entirely critical. Lewis and Locke certainly agree that government should be limited; the authors also seek a relation in Locke’s understanding of the state as instituted for the sake of private property (fully understood as all that is proper to a person, including liberty and life). Lewis comparably asserts that the state exists exclusively for the maintenance of the private sphere (happy households, conversing friends, etc.) and that it is not an arena for virtuous human flourishing in and of itself.
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