Moral Point Of View Research Articles

Animal Rights and Use of Animals in Biomedical Research

Experiments on animals have always been considered as necessary for scientific research, both fundamental and applied. In addition to scientific suitability criteria, this practice also must be justified from a moral point of view. This concern arises from the demand of our civilization that a certain moral value be recognized to animals. In this paper it is discussed in detail that how animals should be handled while doing research and what are animal rights and their uses in biomedical research.Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2015 Vol.6 (1):11-14

Was Sellars an error theorist?

Wilfrid Sellars described the moral syllogism that supports the inference “I ought to do x” from “Everyone ought to do x” as a “syntactical disguise” which embodies a “mistake.” He nevertheless regarded this form of reasoning as constitutive of the moral point of view. Durkheim was the source of much of this reasoning, and this context illuminates Sellars’ unusual philosophical reconstruction of the moral point of view in terms of the collective intentions of an ideal community of rational members for which the syllogism is empirically valid. The reconstruction also sheds light on the question of the status of common sense and normativity in Sellars’ naturalistic metaphysics.

Technological unemployment and human disenhancement

This paper discusses the concept of "human disenhancement", i.e. the worsening of human individual abilities and expectations through technology. The goal is provoking ethical reflection on technological innovation outside the biomedical realm, in particular the substitution of human work with computer-driven automation. According to some widely accepted economic theories, automatization and computerization are responsible for the disappearance of many middle-class jobs. I argue that, if that is the case, a technological innovation can be a cause of "human disenhancement", globally, and all things considered, even when the local and immediate effect of that technology is to increase the demand of more sophisticated human skills than the ones they substitute. The conclusion is that current innovations in the ICT sector are objectionable from a moral point of view, because they disenhance more people than they enhance.

Implicit Theories and Issue Characteristics as Determinants of Moral Awareness and Intentions

Individuals’ implicit theories that people’s character is fixed (entity theorist) versus malleable (incremental theorist) are associated with their holding beliefs that morality is primarily determined by fulfilling prescribed duties (duty-based morality) versus upholding basic rights of others (rights-based morality), respectively. Three studies provide evidence that the ability to recognize that a situation can legitimately be considered from a moral point of view (moral awareness) is interactively dependent upon the nature of perceivers’ implicit theories (and their associated schemas in the moral domain) and the extent to which the issue involves a violation that emphasizes a failure to fulfill a prescribed duty (duty-based violation) versus a failure to uphold a fundamental right of others (rights-based violation). The studies experimentally manipulated the characteristics of a hypothetical business situation to involve either a duty-based violation or a rights-based violation or no behavioral violation. In addition, Study 1 experimentally manipulated subjects’ implicit theories, while Studies 2 and 3 measured subjects’ chronically held implicit theories. Collectively, the studies provide consistent evidence that entity theorists have greater moral awareness than incremental theorists when considering situations involving duty-based violations, while incremental theorists have greater moral awareness than entity theorists when considering situations involving rights-based violations, and moral awareness is not significantly different for perceivers who are neither strongly entity nor incremental theorists, when considering situations involving duty- versus rights-based violations. Study 3 also found evidence of a moderated-mediated association between violation type and moral intentions, through moral awareness as a mediator, moderated by perceivers’ implicit theories.

Información y verdad en el uso de las redes sociales por parte de adolescentes

Uno de los retos más importantes que presenta Internet es el de la veracidad de la información en la Red. Aunque la mentira es una posibilidad inherente en la comunicación humana, Internet ha favorecido que cualquiera pueda crear un contenido falso en la Red. Por otra parte, Internet ha propiciado nuevas formas de sociabilidad y de experimentación en los más jóvenes. En este sentido, las redes sociales permiten el juego con los perfiles virtuales e incluso la creación de falsos perfiles. El presente artículo aborda estos dos temas, además de profundizar en los retos que ello presenta desde el punto de vista moral y educativo, especialmente en los más jóvenes.

Law and Morality in Modern Business

Even though business ethics seems to be almost universally accepted as a legitimate and necessary guide of business activities, still there are voices claiming that morality in business can and should be reduced to legal regulations. This paper is trying to reject this legalist approach, presenting several arguments for the notion that, no matter how important, the law cannot and should not solve all the difficult issues which currently confront business people. The very efficiency of the legal system depends on the moral attitude towards the notion of legality, since conformity with the law is not, in itself, a legal matter, but a moral obligation. Every law can be, and should be, evaluated from a moral viewpoint. The law cannot and must not regulate every aspect and each moment of our lives. Most often the law tells us how to proceed, but not what we should do. One final reason why, beyond the strict conformity with the law, ethics could be sometimes requested, is the national character of legislation, whereas ethical principles are generally meaningful. Ethical standards play a specific and irreplaceable part in the decision making process involved in a fair market economy.

Humanitarian Intervention and Moral Responsibility

This essay investigates the moral aspects of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention involves the balancing of at least three sometimes contradictory principles – the autonomy of states, the prohibition of war and the reduction of harm and human suffering – and hence requires not merely a legal and political approach to the matter but renders a moral viewpoint necessary. It is argued that P.F. Strawson’s concept Moral Reactive Attitudes MRA) contributes to analysing the moral dilemmas and priorities involved. First, MRA underlines the moral aspects of international society that are essential for dealing with the moral conflict inherent in international society. Secondly, MRA helps to balance between competing claims of justification and legitimacy in cases of humanitarian intervention.

Between Indifference and the Regimes of Truth. An Essay on Fundamentalism, Tolerance and Hypocrisy

There are two basic positions where tolerance as political strategy and moral viewpoint is rejected or made redundant. We are hostile to tolerance when we hold that we are defending an objective truth—religious or secular—which should also be defended and maintained by means of political and legal power. And tolerance become superfluous also when the affirmation of plurality becomes total, and tolerance identical to a vive la difference. As recent developments in my own country—the Netherlands—have demonstrated, the political outcome of this last position is remarkably enough not necessarily an all-inclusive relativistic tolerance. It may just as well be one of intolerance towards ‘believers’ of all kinds, in short: tolerance becomes polemical and belligerent. Turning to religious fundamentalism or ultra-orthodoxy could then become a possible (extreme) reaction to this relativistic and subjectivist position, as demonstrated in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s novel The Penitent. Between these two positions of hostility or indifference towards tolerance, we can situate that democratic attitude which may rightly be called ‘tolerance’. As ethical position, the tolerant citizen accepts the democratic disjunction between my (private) truth and the symmetrical justice between citizens. As political strategy, a tolerant democratic regime is based upon a political act of exclusion of what I will here call ‘political fundamentalism’.

La construcción de lo Público y la visión poética de la Democracia en Brasil: un análisis de A Flor e a Náusea

In the world at large, the Second World War was taking place. In Brazil, there was the Vargas dictatorship. Driven by this situation, Carlos Drummond de Andrade published in 1945 A rosa e o povo, the greatest of all his books, containing 55 poems. This work clearly has to do with social realism. As a counterpoint to Drummond's poetry, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda tries, with the work Raízes do Brasil, published in 1936, to predict our future through the analysis of our past. The work is an analysis of Brazilian society and the emergence of our economic and political structures, an innovative analysis that designed the concepts of bureaucracy and ‘patrimonialism’ in our culture. Sergio sought the roots of the problems we currently face in the colonial period. He described the Brazilian as a "cordial man", i.e., acting by feeling, preferring personal relationships to the fulfillment of objective laws. The “culture of personality” addressed by Sergio is a looseness of social ties that gives rise to forms of solidarity and orderly organization. For Buarque, the Brazilian colonization was promoted by the Portuguese adventurer culture that rejects stability and planning and supports the practice of idleness. Thus, based on the texts by Drummond and Buarque we examine Brazilian society from a political and moral point of view, confronting its historic features with the present day.

The Authority Account of Prudential Options

AbstractThe Authority Account provides a new explanation why commonsense morality contains prudential options—options that permit agents to perform actions that promote their own wellbeing more than the action they have most reason to do, from the moral point of view. At the core of that explanation are two claims. The first is that moral requirements are traditionally widely taken to have an authoritative status; that is, to be rules that morality (or more specifically some suitable agent or agency, acting on behalf of morality) imposes by right. The second is that in order for moral requirements to have such a status, morality must contain prudential options. If both of these claims are true, then they will create a (rational) pressure to think of morality as containing prudential options. And according to the Authority Account, the fact that commonsense morality contains such options is (at least in significant part) the result of this pressure.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PATIENT AUTONOMY

One of the most challenging issues in medical ethics is the nature and scope of patient autonomy in treatment process. Autonomy that it usually is defined as independence or self-government, is the respect to independence of a patient and his right to choose the treatment and other medical attentions. Autonomy has two positive and negative aspects: The negative aspect is that the patient's independent decisions should not be violated by others; the positive aspect, on the other hand, includes a respectful behavior in the presentation of information and facts, confidentiality, informed consent, and helping the patient with enough understanding and support so as to protect his independent decision making. The important question is what is the scope of the patient's autonomy? It seems that the principle of individual autonomy is not an absolute principle but it can be overturned in some circumstances. The principle of autonomy may be revoked at least by the principle of non-harming oneself or others. Although the patient has no moral right to harm himself by his decision, the main argument in the question of patient's autonomy in medical ethics is not the moral value of the decisions made by the patient, but the doctor's responsibly regarding the patient's decisions. Thus, whenever the decision made by the patient harms to him, in the case of patient insisting on his decision, other people have no right to prevent him from exercising his will. This is because of a moral point of view that the professional responsibility of the doctor towards the patient is defined in terms of benevolence. For a person who wants to observe the moral code, being benevolent is a matter of a person who asks for help in the first place, and if/ when a person refuses to receive help or benevolence, other people have no obligation towards him. Indeed, the foundations of regarding the principle of respect for patient would be respect for whatever decision the patient may make, even if the decision might seem unwise or harmful as far as the doctor is concerned.

Tolerância e neutralidade na reflexão contemporânea sobre a justiça

À luz das discussões normativas contemporâneas sobre a justiça, o artigo discute as noções de tolerância e de neutralidade e avalia, em termos éticos e político-institucionais, modelos de justificação da tolerância como "respeito mútuo". Examina-se, inicialmente em termos lógicos, o conceito de tolerância, transitando-se, em seguida, para concepções normativamente mais densas da noção. Após indicar a maior pertinência, no contexto de sociedades pluralistas, da concepção de tolerância como "respeito mútuo", insere-se na discussão a noção de neutralidade, endereçada às instituições políticas. Após rejeitar tentativas de ancorar a tolerância (e a neutralidade) em razões elas próprias neutras, do ponto de vista moral, o texto examina dois modelos de justificação - centrados nos valores da autonomia e da justificação razoável -, sugerindo-se a possibilidade de sua síntese a partir de perspectivas extraídas do liberalismo rawlsiano.

Not und die Grenzen der Moral

Abstract A philosophical inquiry into the ethics or the morals of distress has to address a distinction regarding its very own scope. On the one hand, situations of distress can be understood to involve particular moral considerations. On the other hand, distress can be understood as the presence of specific characteristics that may allow for a divergence from what is obliged from the moral point of view. The article reflects on the idea of distress as setting limits to moral reflection and obligation, considering particular examples that illustrate the meaning of integrity and personal ties and their practical relevance in situations of distress. In the light of these reflections it seems inadequate to claim that distress exempts one from relying on moral reasoning altogether, but rather that situations of distress engender specific moral considerations.

Nuclear energy, responsible risk communication and moral emotions: a three level framework

Communication about nuclear risks is treacherous territory, especially after Fukushima, requiring not only considerations about effectiveness, but also about ethical legitimacy. In this paper, a three-level framework of morally responsible risk communication is developed, focusing on the procedure, the message and the effects of risk communication. This gives rise to three conditions of ethically responsible risk communication: it requires a legitimate procedure, an ethically justified risk message and concern for and evaluation of the effects of the message and procedure. The role of emotions, such as sympathy, empathy and feelings or responsibility, is emphasized as a key to addressing and explicating moral values at these three levels. Emotions point out moral aspects of risks such as justice, fairness and autonomy. This framework can shed important new light on morally responsible communication about nuclear risks. The first condition of this framework requires that the procedure of communication is participatory, in order to include the relevant moral emotions and values concerning nuclear energy of all stakeholders. A legitimate procedure does not guarantee an ethically justified message concerning nuclear risks. For this reason, the second condition requires an ethical deliberation of the message and the values and emotions entailed in it. Finally, the third condition requires a moral evaluation of the effects of risk communication concerning nuclear energy. A successful risk communication effort triggers reflection, compassion and a willingness to take responsibility for energy-related issues. Problematic effects of risk communication can be a lack of trust or a sense of hopelessness and passivity. Evaluating all three levels from a moral point of view should be done in an iterative way, allowing possible revisions and improvements. Considering the high stakes and current stalemates in the nuclear debate, the suggested model provides a promising, constructive and morally legitimate way forward.

Jenseits der Regelbefolgung. Metaethische Konsequenzen der Legalismus-Kritik Judith Shklars

Abstract In my paper I reconstruct J. Shklar’s arguments against legalistic positions which try to reduce the moral point of view to a model of legitimizing and applying rules. I emphasize in particular the relevance of her arguments for current metaethical debates. The paper shows that Shklar’s thought comes close to some arguments of S. Cavell, who locates the problem of how to define the relation between a rule and a case at the very center of ethical reflection. Finally I discuss how Shklar’s scepticism about any objective moral point of view corresponds with two other negativistic motives of her philosophy: a) her accusation that traditional theories of justice make invisible the perspective of the victims of injustice, and b) her thesis that injustice cannot be reduced to “a prelude, a rejection, and a collapse of justice.”

Pecca Fortiter for the Sake of Morality?Making Sense of Wrong in Hegel’s System of Right

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to clarify the role ‘wrong’ plays in Hegel’s system of right, as both a form of freedom and the transition to morality. Two approaches will be examined to explore wrong in practical philosophical terms: First, one could take the transition to bedescriptivein nature. The transition describes wrong as a realized fact of the human condition that one inherits from the outset. Second, one could see it asprescriptive. Actual wrongdoing would be essential for the subject’s progression tobecoming moral. Though both are most likely the case, emphasis is given to the latter since it represents the actualization of potential. Furthermore, it will be suggested that wrong plays a similar role as that which alienation does in thePhenomenology of Spirit; both bridge the will as abstract personality with the moral point of view.

The Role of Prospect Theory in the Perceived Moral Reprehensibility of Strategic Mortgage Default

Defaulting on a mortgage is widely viewed as being immoral, but no prior study has examined the intervening roles of Prospect Theory and default intent. We find that the public is significantly more accepting of a defaulting borrower who earns a zero or negative return on his investment than one who earns a positive return. This moral viewpoint changes significantly when the default is strategic in nature. Defaulters are judged significantly less harshly by those who more so blame the lender for the current financial crisis, those who have previously strategically defaulted, and males. When asked to suggest a “morally appropriate” settlement offer to lenders to resolve the distressed debt, beyond the prospect theory and default intent remaining significant, we further find that those who more so blame the lender, those who view their home as more of an investment rather than a consumption good, those who have previously strategically defaulted, those with lower income levels, and minorities suggest significantly lower settlement offers.

Reid's moral psychology: animal motives as guides to virtue

My aim in this paper is to show that animal motives play an important role in guiding human agents to virtue, according to Reid. Animal motives, for Reid, are constituted of desires and of their objects. These desires are intrinsic desires for objects other than moral or prudential worth. However, from a rational and moral point of view, animal motives are good and useful parts of the human constitution that lead to happiness, teach self-government, create the habit of acting virtuously, and add force to rational motives. Understanding animal motives as guides to virtue provides Reid with the hybrid sentimentalist/rationalist account he seeks to offer.

OUTCOME OF ADOPTIONS: HAVE COUPLES REALISED THEIR DREAM?

Despite the wide use and success rate of ART (assisted reproductive technology) such as in vitro fertilisation, artificial insemination with donor seed, gamete donation, embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, these technologies are not an option for many couples (for technical/biological/financial reasons and ethical/moral objections). As Grinion (2007:134) states: “The irony is that, on the one hand, reproductive technologies offer hope where previously none existed, while on the other hand they introduce a series of complex, expensive, and often morally troubling treatment modalities.” After having contemplated all alternatives from either a moral, ethical, economic or all-encompassing point of view, adoption is often the only remaining alternative to couples who want a child and live the dream of being a family. South Africa has a long practice and well-researched history of adoption (De Bruyn, 1976; De Bruyn, 1989; De Vos, 1995; Lombard, 1976; Mouton, 1976; Pakati, 1984; Van Delft, 1983).

Integracyjna rola moralności

Treścią artykułu jest „integracja w moralności ludzkiej”. Założeniem badawczym jest to, że człowiek nie może się w pełni rozwijać i doskonalić, a tym samym w pełni integrować, bez właściwego rozwoju moralnego. Wszystko zaczyna się od „odkrywania” własnej, ludzkiej tożsamości i odpowiedzialności za siebie i innych. Bez tego nie może być mowy o sensownej integracji. Z moralnego punktu widzenia to moralność decyduje o nieustannej formacji ludzkich sumień w prawdzie. Sokrates określał to mianem „etosu akuszerki”, ponieważ podobnie jak w narodzinach, tak i w moralności nikt człowieka nie może zastąpić. Doskonalenie sumienia w prawdzie i zgodnie z prawdą ukazuje nam to, iż integracja nie może się odbywać „poza” życiem moralnym człowieka. I tak najpierw widzimy integrację osoby poprzez rozwój osobistego sumienia. W moralności zaś społecznej integrujemy się etycznie we wszystkich więzach rodzinnych. Możemy mówić także słusznie o integracji poprzez moralność pracy, moralność zawodową, poprzez moralność ludzi mediów itp. Najczęstszymi przejawami prawdziwego życia moralnego jest uczestnictwo ludzi w kulturze i poprzez kulturę. Podobnie jak kultura, również moralność jest sprawą na wskroś ludzką. I tu, i tu wizja człowieka odgrywa zatem rolę podstawową. Na tej też płaszczyźnie rysuje się perspektywa pozytywnego oddziaływania moralności na kulturę. Możliwości są tu poważne, bo chodzi o szerokie działanie integracyjne, a co ważniejsze, o działanie zachodzące od wewnątrz procesów rozwojowych w kulturze. Punktem wyjścia tej integracji jest uznanie niezbywalnej godności człowieka jako osoby.