Moral Particularism Research Articles

Prototype theory and the importance of literary form for moral imagination.

Prototype theory, which argues that categories have graded (and thus fuzzy) membership based on prototypes, has been used as cognitive evidence to support moral particularism because if categories (in moral rules) only have fuzzy conceptual boundaries, moral rules are not enough for moral judgment, as specific situations also need to be considered to determine how these fuzzy categories should be understood, which is what moral particularism believes. The importance of literature for ethics, especially for moral imagination, has also been extensively discussed because literature can provide vivid examples for us to imagine different moral dilemmas, the consequences of different moral choices, and the feelings of different people facing different situations. Martha Nussbaum specifically argues that the literary form is the only adequate form to imagine certain complex moral situations. By analyzing concrete literary examples as well as the related ethical discussions and empirical findings, this article argues that, building on Nussbaum's argument, prototype theory can serve as a cognitive basis for the importance of literary form for moral imagination, because the literary form's tolerance of ambiguity suits how we ambiguously categorize the world.

Zhuangzi and Particularism

Abstract The Zhuangzi rejects the use of invariant general norms to guide action, instead stressing the importance of contextual factors in determining the apt course to take in particular situations. This stance might seem to present a variety of moral particularism, the view that general norms play no fundamental role in moral thought and judgment. I argue against interpreting the Zhuangzi as committed to particularism and thus denying that dao rests on, is shaped by, or comprises general patterns or norms. Instead, I contend, the text presents a combination of contextualism about the factors that determine appropriate responses to particular situations and pluralism about defeasible general norms or standards. The target of criticism is not generalism, the view that general patterns and relations play a role in determining and explaining appropriate courses of action. It is the monolithic application of fixed norms without regard for context.

A Full-Fledged Defense of Principle-Based Ethics against Moral Particularism

A Full-Fledged Defense of Principle-Based Ethics against Moral Particularism

On the Generality of Morality: Accountability and Societal Impracticality of Particularism

This paper focuses on the debate between Jonathan Dancy and Brad Hooker regarding the validity of moral particularism and investigates whether both philosophers have overlooked any important factors in their discussions. According to Jonathan Dancy’s ideas of particularism, morality which encompasses our moral thought, judgment, and the possibility of moral distinctions, is independent of the codification of moral principles. He appeals to holism in the theory of reasons to defend his belief that the same property or feature that is a reason in one case can count morally for or against action in different circumstances. Hooker, on the other hand, takes issue with Dancy’s account by suggesting that moral particularism is socially impractical, and Dancy’s provision of premises ought to be overwhelmingly plausible. Hooker argues that moral particularism fails to provide the moral assurance that is required of a shared commitment to morality that brings about mutually beneficial practices that we can generalize in consideration of the features of contexts in which they take place within the specification of reason(s) for belief and action. By comparing Hooker’s example involving theoretical particularist Patty and the Rossian generalist Gerry with Dancy’s rebuttal, this paper propounds that Dancy and Hooker both insufficiently address the conceptual relation between moral obligation and accountability within the moral domain. Morality as accountability does not exclusively relate to the valuable consequences of creating and following rules and principles. Rather, it entails our obligations conceptually to hold ourselves mutually accountable if and only if there are existing general rules and principles that are also accessible to all members within the community bounded by such common moral knowledge.

The Portrayal of Moral Particularism in Alcoholic Beverages Investment Policy

In the beginning of March 2021, President of Indonesia annulled alcoholic beverages investment policy which he put in decree about a week before. There were debates among experts and activists about how this investment should be done. Some believe that this decree may enhance local alcoholic beverages culture while others may reject it since the drinks are convinced to bring in bad effects to human beings. There are no universal moral statements, but particular ones, in this decree since people said in economic, cultural, and religious perspectives. Then, how may moral particularism be portrayed in alcoholic beverages investment policy in Indonesia? By examining concepts, theories, and written data, further analysis will be done to answer the question. Bureaucratic law, economic advantages, cultural indications, social impacts, and religious perspectives are the main tensions of this policy. Investment on alcoholic drinks as cultural indications may bring in economic advantages covered by bureaucratic law. However, any bureaucratic law will never omit possibilities of alcoholic abuse which will bring in negative impacts socially. Moreover, religious perspectives which are seen to be best guidance for people should be put above any law including prohibition of alcoholic drink. In conclusion, alcoholic beverages investment policy is the reflection of particularism rather than universal sights of moral conditions.

Moral Dilemmas, Ethical Particularism, and Dewey’s Continuum of Normative Inquiry

Departing from hypothetical dilemmas and drawing on examples from law, this paper offers a pragmatist account of normative induction that characterizes moral particularism and generalism as stages of inquiry into ethical problems, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Pragmatism’s response to analytical moral theory lies in understanding the transformative nature of John Dewey’s social continuum of inquiry. The continuum is unrecognized in the analysis of hypothetical dilemmas, like the trolley problem, but can clearly be seen in studies of law. Real moral dilemmas represent actual conflicts, of which the dimensions emerge through experience and the solution cannot be addressed through the analysis of cleverly balanced moral puzzles. Repeated over time, real problems drive the consensual formation and revision of social practices and the predication of general moral rules and principles. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” propositionally, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” It fails to recognize that real moral problems occur in a continuum, and at first encounter a shapeless particularist context of seemingly unlimited non-moral properties. Normativity is driven by repetition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than a Dancian retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and accompanying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology.

Narrative Understanding, Value, and Diagnosis: A Particularist Account of Clinical Formulations and Shared Decision-making in Mental Health

In this article, I deploy the notions of narrative and discernment as complementary support tools in understanding the moral significance of the first-person perspective in mental health. My aim is to develop and extend moral particularism’s emphasis on the significance of context and the general problem of relevance in understanding the dynamics of practical judgement and shared decision-making as applied to comprehensive diagnosis and integrated treatment. I argue that it is a mistake to think of the values embedded in responsible integrated care and patient involvement as either determined by the individual patient’s autobiographical narrative or as determined by the ‘top-down’ conception of health as presented in the biomedical model. What is missing in accounting for the idea of clinical decision-making as a shared enterprise is a relational account of the person and the wider diagnostic treatment context in understanding the process of perspective-taking. Such reorientation of focus makes available a distinctive conception of clinical knowledge, in which claims to objective meaning in patient narratives are criticised not as false per se, but as failing to yield the insight into the problem it was the point of those claims to provide

Moral Integrity

This article outlines different attempts to define integrity, and argues, with reference to the theory of moral particularism, that definitions acquire universal applicability at the expense of their informative value. The article then proceeds to more delimitating definitions that emphasise the social aspect, and argues that their ideas of the concept, like courage, require certain situations in order to unfold. Since not every person is challenged to act with integrity, the delimitation requires a distinction between manifest integrity and dormant integrity, or dormant lack of integrity. Persons of influence, like politicians and managers, on the other hand, are challenged on a regular basis because their position requires communication of values in a public space, against which the public can evaluate their actions. A delimitating definition therefore ties the question of integrity to people in leading positions.

The Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary

Is personal moral inconsistency a challenge to overcome or embrace? This paper opts for the latter and argues for the Virtue of Encompassing the Contrary (VEC). According to VEC, an individual can balance and realize opposite values or virtues through time virtuously. This paper discusses critically various explanations given for moral inconsistency: Circumstantial Relativism, Moral Opportunism, the Consequentialist Solution, Moral Ambivalence, Kant’s Imperfect Duty and Dancy’s Moral Particularism. The paper argues that VEC fares better in answering the moral challenge of inconsistent behavior.

Etyka troski Carol Gilligan i Nel Noddings a moralny partykularyzm

Feministyczna etyka troski, której głównymi twórczyniami są Carol Gilligan i Nel Noddings, to stanowisko pod wieloma względami przeciwstawne w stosunku do dominujących paradygmatów moralnych o charakterze racjonalno-uniwersalistycznym. Etyka troski proponuje partykularyzm moralny, zarówno w odniesieniu do międzyludzkich interakcji (kwestia „ja – inny”), jak i do moralnych dylematów – tak teoretycznych, jak i praktycznych. Etyka troski podkreśla, że ujmowanie dylematów jako skontekstualizowanych, nie zaś abstrakcyjnych, sprzyja wzbudzaniu postawy empatii, łagodzi ostrość sądów moralnych, a przede wszystkim pomaga w znajdowaniu realnych, możliwych do zastosowania w praktyce rozwiązań. To właśnie może stanowić o jej przewadze w stosunku do stanowisk o charakterze uniwersalistycznym.

Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral Particularism – Addendum

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Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

Antinatalism and Moral Particularism

Imparcialidad y particularismo moral

Este artículo busca mostrar que el particularismo moral es una alternativa viable a las éticas dominantes desde la modernidad hasta nuestros días (i.e., ética kantiana y utilitarista); teorías que durante las últimas décadas han sido criticadas, especialmente, por la exigencia del requisito de imparcialidad moral. El agente en estas éticas delibera imparcialmente debido al universalismo de sus principios morales. Sugeriré que el particularismo moral, en tanto excluye la imparcialidad como un factor relevante en las deliberaciones de los agentes, presenta razones para ser una ética plausible.

Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral Particularism

AbstractBiomedical moral enhancement, or BME for short, aims to improve people's moral behaviour through augmenting, via biomedical means, their virtuous dispositions such as sympathy, honesty, courage, or generosity. Recently, however, it has been challenged, on particularist grounds, that the manifestations of virtuous dispositions can be morally wrong. For instance, being generous in terrorist financing is one such case. If so, biomedical moral enhancement, by enhancing people's virtues, might turn out to be counterproductive in terms of people's moral behaviour. In this chapter, we argue, via a comparison with moral education, that the case for the practice of biomedical moral enhancement is not weakened by the particularists’ stress on the variable moral statuses of the manifestations of our virtues. The real challenge from the particularists, we argue, lies elsewhere. It is that practical wisdom, being essentially context-sensitive, cannot be enhanced via biomedical means. On the basis of this, we further argue that BME ought to be used with great caution, for it may wrongly enhance, for instance, a terrorist financier's generosity, a robber's courage, or an undercover detective's honesty. Finally, we sketch how boundaries can be set on the use of BME, and address some potential objections to our position.

Universalizability and the Metaphysics of Moral Particularism, Specified

Universalizability and the Metaphysics of Moral Particularism, Specified

Take the Trolley Problem . . . Please! Pragmatism, Moral Particularism, and the Continuum of Normative Inquiry

Departing from hypothetical dilemmas and drawing on examples from law, this paper offers a pragmatist account of normative induction that characterizes moral particularism and generalism as stages of inquiry into ethical problems, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” propositionally, that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Real moral problems occur in a continuum, and at first encounter a shapeless particularist context of seemingly unlimited non-moral properties. But normativity is driven by repetition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than a Dancian retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and accompanying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology. This paper contends that pragmatism’s response to analytical moral theory lies in understanding the transformative nature of John Dewey’s social continuum of inquiry. The actual continuum is unrecognized in the analysis of hypothetical dilemmas, like the trolley problem, but can clearly be seen in studies of law. Real moral dilemmas represent actual conflicts, the solution of which cannot be addressed through the analysis of cleverly balanced moral puzzles. Repeated over time, real problems drive the consensual formation and revision of social practices and the predication of general moral rules and principles.

Clinical bioethics and core competencies of attributes, attitudes, and behaviors: Foundations in philosophy and literature

Summary Philosophy clearly underwrites so much of contemporary bioethics. For example, the work of John Rawls and Norman Daniels provides a foundation for conversations about justice and health care; Alan Wertheimer's conceptual analyses of coercion and exploitation are invaluable to reproductive ethics; much of research ethics relies upon the tenets of utilitarian moral theory, and the ideas of its critics; and thinking surrounding moral reasoning in bioethics draws upon philosophical work on moral particularism, virtue theory and generalist moral thought. The work of Susan Sherwin and Margaret Little has provided a foundation for feminist work in bioethics. There is an area of current bioethical discussion, though, that does not draw upon existing work in philosophy, where it could benefit from doing so. Currently, there is great interest in questions surrounding both the core competencies for healthcare ethics consultants and the appropriate training for future healthcare ethics consultants. The core competencies are currently broken down into three categories: (1) competencies of skill, (2) competencies of knowledge and (3) competencies relating to attributes, attitudes and behaviors (such as forthrightness, humility and the possession of leadership skills). My paper explores the relation between the third category of competencies and the appropriate training for healthcare ethics consultants. While training as it applies to the first two categories of competencies has been addressed, training as it applies to the third category is somewhat curiously undertreated. There may be some reason for this; for example, in contrast to certain types of knowledge, factual knowledge, attributes, attitudes and behaviors might be very challenging to teach. At any rate, I argue that a foundation on which we can rely for help with this issue – this issue of how future healthcare ethics consultants should be trained when it comes to attributes, attitudes, and behaviors – can be found in philosophical discussion about the relation between philosophy and literature. Specifically, I make use of discussion on the question of the extent to which the study of fine literature belongs within moral philosophy. This work illustrates two useful sets of points: that fine literature demands of its reader a certain moral attention (which bears a connection to the attributes and attitudes identified as core competencies for the healthcare ethics consultant) and that literature cultivates that attention as it demands it. This work provides a foundation from which we can address our question regarding the training of future HCECs and it does so in a variety of ways. For one, such work emphasizes the importance of certain attitudes and attributes to reading the moral world and builds upon them by introducing the notion of moral attention. Further, it provides groundwork for the suggestion that the reading of fine literature can inculcate certain habits of mind that I urge are important (though under-recognized) for work in clinical ethics.

Habits and Mental Perspectives: Educating Moral Particularism

Habits and Mental Perspectives: Educating Moral Particularism

A Non-Liberal Account of Development

For much the 20 th century, development aid to the deeply impoverished nations of the Global South has taken the form of humanitarian assistance. Development projects have been motivated, first, by a humanist principle that all people everywhere deserve basic human rights and freedom from want; and, second, by the widely accepted belief that the Global South is entitled to receive extensive reparations for centuries of colonial exploitation. Together, these two views have made development work the near-exclusive province of liberal humanists, and thus most development projects are designed to advance ideological positions that are popular in Western democracies: individual liberty, equal social standing, fair opportunity, and fair political representation. But while the liberal-humanist ideology is valid on its own merits, it is neither the only nor the best available normative framework to underwrite development efforts. This paper argues that development workers—especially international NGOs and transnational activists—should design projects that incorporate a communitarian, morally particularistic, and non-liberal (but not illiberal ) ethic that respects the collective determination of groups without requiring the affirmation of individual free agency. This proposal follows some recent collectivist shifts in the literature on Amartya Sen’s capability approach to justice, which is explicitly or implicitly adopted by many development projects based in the Global South. An increasing number of critics in the last decade have argued that the approach’s liberal-humanist foundations hinder rather than promote its usefulness in eradicating systemic poverty while respecting local communal values. This paper sides with these critiques and takes them a step further, suggesting that development workers who subscribe to the capability approach should commit more fully to a communitarian ethic founded on moral particularism.

Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases

I argue that John Dewey’s analysis of imagination enables an account of learning from imaginary cases consistent with Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism. Moreover, this account provides a more robust account of learning from cases than Dancy’s own. Particularism is the position that there are no, or at most few, true moral principles, and that competent reasoning and judgment do not require them. On a particularist framework, one cannot infer from an imaginary case that because a feature has a particular moral importance there, that it must have that import in an actual case. Instead, for Dancy, cases can yield “reminders,” and a person with a lot of experience (real or imagined) brings a “checklist” of features that can matter to a situation. Using the Nathan-David exchange from 2 Samuel and Martha Nussbaum’s “Steerforth’s Arm” from Love’s Knowledge, I show that this account does not explain all instances of learning from cases. Drawing on recent work on cases, I argue that cases can be educative by serving an exploratory function, probing what one takes to be known and provoking change in the background one uses in evaluating a situation. I then argue that Dewey’s work on imagination in his comments on sympathy and in A Common Faith and Art as Experience enables such a role for cases on a particularist framework. Mark Johnson’s recent work on metaphor further illuminates how Dewey’s account of art can be exploratory. I contend that this account affords an exploratory role for cases consistent with Dancy’s particularism.