Clinical bioethics and core competencies of attributes, attitudes, and behaviors: Foundations in philosophy and literature

Abstract

Summary Philosophy clearly underwrites so much of contemporary bioethics. For example, the work of John Rawls and Norman Daniels provides a foundation for conversations about justice and health care; Alan Wertheimer's conceptual analyses of coercion and exploitation are invaluable to reproductive ethics; much of research ethics relies upon the tenets of utilitarian moral theory, and the ideas of its critics; and thinking surrounding moral reasoning in bioethics draws upon philosophical work on moral particularism, virtue theory and generalist moral thought. The work of Susan Sherwin and Margaret Little has provided a foundation for feminist work in bioethics. There is an area of current bioethical discussion, though, that does not draw upon existing work in philosophy, where it could benefit from doing so. Currently, there is great interest in questions surrounding both the core competencies for healthcare ethics consultants and the appropriate training for future healthcare ethics consultants. The core competencies are currently broken down into three categories: (1) competencies of skill, (2) competencies of knowledge and (3) competencies relating to attributes, attitudes and behaviors (such as forthrightness, humility and the possession of leadership skills). My paper explores the relation between the third category of competencies and the appropriate training for healthcare ethics consultants. While training as it applies to the first two categories of competencies has been addressed, training as it applies to the third category is somewhat curiously undertreated. There may be some reason for this; for example, in contrast to certain types of knowledge, factual knowledge, attributes, attitudes and behaviors might be very challenging to teach. At any rate, I argue that a foundation on which we can rely for help with this issue – this issue of how future healthcare ethics consultants should be trained when it comes to attributes, attitudes, and behaviors – can be found in philosophical discussion about the relation between philosophy and literature. Specifically, I make use of discussion on the question of the extent to which the study of fine literature belongs within moral philosophy. This work illustrates two useful sets of points: that fine literature demands of its reader a certain moral attention (which bears a connection to the attributes and attitudes identified as core competencies for the healthcare ethics consultant) and that literature cultivates that attention as it demands it. This work provides a foundation from which we can address our question regarding the training of future HCECs and it does so in a variety of ways. For one, such work emphasizes the importance of certain attitudes and attributes to reading the moral world and builds upon them by introducing the notion of moral attention. Further, it provides groundwork for the suggestion that the reading of fine literature can inculcate certain habits of mind that I urge are important (though under-recognized) for work in clinical ethics.