Moral Nonnaturalism Research Articles

Metaethics and the Nature of Properties

Abstract This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that (1) moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard versions of resemblance nominalism, immanent realism and trope theory; and (3) the standard semantic arguments for property realism do not support moral realism. I also raise doubts about trope-theoretic explanations of moral supervenience and argue against one version of the principle that we should accept theories that maintain neutrality.

Moral Functionalism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Moral Functionalism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Criticize of George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism

Background and Aim: One of the most important ideas about the analysis of moral concepts and propositions is Non-naturalistic theory. This study aimed to analysis and criticize of the George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism. Materials and Methods: In this analytical research, after analyzing the basic concepts, the George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism is interpreted and criticized. Findings: Based on this theory, moral terms are signs and indications of the characteristics of objects, but it is not acceptable that the terms which referred to by words such as good and must can be defined based on immoral terms. According to this view moral terms can only be understood by rational intuition, not through empirical observation or metaphysical reasoning. These issues can form the theoretical foundations of bioethics. Problems such as: indefinability of simple qualities, the type of abnormal characteristics, non-experiential (a priori) and intuition led to the emergence of emotivism, in spite of two centuries of loneliness of the Non-naturalistic theory. As the main result, the birth of the emotivism could be searched in the structural and internal problems of Non-naturalistic theory. So that, in spite of presenting a new plan in the field of analyzing concepts and moral propositions, Non-naturalistic theory due to numerous epistemological and ontological problems failed to meet expectations. Conclusion: The findings showed that both of Non-naturalistic theory and the emotivism caused the readiness to develop other theories in the field of bioethics. Please cite this article as: Abdullahi MA, Shiravand M. Criticize of George Moore's Theory on Moral Non-Naturalism. Bioethics Journal 2017; 7(26): 31-41.

Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Reid on the Autonomy of Ethics: From Active Power to Moral Nonnaturalism

ABSTRACT:Thomas Reid has the unusual distinction of arriving at a metaethical position very much like G. E. Moore's via a route very similar to that employed by the Kantians. That is, Reid embraces a version of nonnaturalist moral realism by appeal not to open question-style considerations but to a particular account of agency. In this essay, we reconstruct Reid's agency-centered argument for his constitutivist version of moral nonnaturalism, highlighting its commitments. Having presented Reid's argument, we close by considering a prominent contemporary Kantian view, namely, Christine Korsgaard's, and identifying where, despite their common commitments, Reid and Korsgaard part company. The comparison, we suggest, is instructive because it allows us to see more clearly why the link between agency-centered approaches to ethical theorizing and nonrealist, constitutivist views of morality, such as Korsgaard's, is deeply contingent.

Dispositionalism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Dispositionalism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Reid on the first principles of morals

What role do the first principles of morals play in Reid's moral theory? Reid has an official line regarding their role, which identifies these principles as foundational propositions that evidentially ground other moral propositions. I claim that, by Reid's own lights, this line of thought is mistaken. There is, however, another line of thought in Reid, one which identifies the first principles of morals as constitutive of moral thought. I explore this interpretation, arguing that it is a fruitful way of understanding much of what Reid wants to say about the role of moral first principles and drawing some connections between it and recent work on moral nonnaturalism.

The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism

Our project in this essay is to showcase nonnaturalistic moral realism’s resources for responding to metaphysical and epistemological objections by taking the view in some new directions. The central thesis we will argue for is that there is a battery of substantive moral propositions that are also nonnaturalistic conceptual truths. We call these propositions the moral fixed points. We will argue that they must find a place in any system of moral norms that applies to beings like us, in worlds similar to our own. By committing themselves to true propositions of these sorts, nonnaturalists can fashion a view that is highly attractive in its own right, and resistant to the most prominent objections that have been pressed against it.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism

Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism

AbstractDespite having occupied a peripheral position in contemporary metaethics, moral nonnaturalism has recently experienced a revival of sorts. But what is moral nonnaturalism? And what is there to be said in favor of it? In this article, I address these two questions. In the first place, I offer an account of what moral nonnaturalism is. According to the view I propose, nonnaturalism is better viewed not as a position, but as a theoretical stance. And, second, I critically engage with three recent arguments for moral nonnaturalism offered by Russ Shafer‐Landau, Kit Fine, and Jean Hampton, respectively.