Metaphysics Of Morals Research Articles

Respeto y retribución: la pena jurídica en La metafísica de las costumbres

The paper offers a reading of the section of the The Metaphysics of Morals in which Kant advances a secular conception of the legitimation of legal punishment, based upon the postulation of a (meta-)principle of respect as normative premise. On this basis, the precise meaning of the characterization of penal law as a “categorical imperative” is addressed, as well as the status of the “right of retribution” as standard for the commensuration of punishment. In this way, the paper seeks to undermine the linkage of Kant’s conception with the leitmotiv of a metaphysical realization of justice, as well as its interpretation as a version of a mixed theory, which would allegedly combine a deterrence goal with a mere side-constraint of desert-based proportionality.

Martial Law And Religion

The Martial Law years as among the darkest in our history, accounting still for most of the ills that we continue to suffertoday. That darkness explains the immediate and spontaneous response of the people who poured into EDSA on those four glorious days of September in 1986. It is no accident that the EDSA Revolution was saturated, among others, with religious motifs. It was a cleric, the much loved Cardinal Sin, who used the lone Catholic radio station to call for the people to congregate at the great highway, and a sea of humanity then made history as they flooded the long street not with guns but with roses and rosaries, a bloodless revolution indeed that filled the air with patriotic songs and prayers, a virtual potluck picnic for all members of the family, which included priests and nuns and seminarians in their recognizable garbs, a true People Power Revolution which is simultaneously a religious event. Thus, the revolution became a fight between good and evil, where Religion stood as the polar opposite of Martial Law.
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Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals as guidance in a morally and legally complex world

Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals as guidance in a morally and legally complex world

Kant and the In(ter)dependence of Right and Virtue

This paper aims to clarify how Kant understood the relation between the two spheres of morals (Right and virtue). Did he, as O’Neill claims, acknowledge the need for civic virtue as necessary for maintaining a liberal state? Or did he take the opposite view (shared by many contemporary liberals) that citizens’ virtuous dispositions are irrelevant and that all that matters is the justice of institutions? Though The Metaphysics of Morals gives the impression that Kant shared the latter position, I will argue that, in fact, Kant held a position somewhere between the Rousseauian view (which O’Neill believes Kant endorsed) that the essential difficulty of politics concerns the cultivation of civic duty in citizens, and contemporary liberals’ exclusive focus on the justice of institutions, by arguing that it is the laws themselves that foster respect for the laws. In short, Kant views virtue as the felicitous by-product of legality.

Respect in Kant’s Tugendlehre and its place in contemporary ethics

The paper examines Kant’s conception of respect, especially in his work Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue (briefly Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue), the second part of his The Metaphysics of Morals, and its place in contemporary ethics. The main question it asks is this: is respect just a feeling, a particular virtue or a moral duty/right? The initial hypothesis is that, in the relevant sense, respect is so to speak a “dutright,” that is, a duty that is at the same time a right. It leads to a fundamental principle, namely respect for persons, defining ‘person’ as a bearer of rights/obligations. Leaving Kant’s metaphysical commitments aside, it shows that this is one of the most important Kantian contributions to contemporary ethics

The Metaphysics of Morals: between the a priori and a practical anthropology

In this paper, I analyze the place of the Metaphysics of morals in the Kantian system. I claim that this work is the passage between a pure part of ethics and a practical anthropology. Although this book was first conceived to be a pure moral theory - moralia pura-, it ended up dealing with principle of applications of the moral law to sensible moral beings- philosophia moralis applicata . I also hold that the Doctrine of Virtue presents some sensible elements that are important to understand how morality affects us.

Una discusión sobre la posición sistemática de la Metaphysik der Sitten de Kant y la Sittenlehre de Fichte

Resumen: La posición sistemática de la Metafísica de las costumbres de Kant y en concreto de su segunda parte, la Doctrina de la virtud, es análoga a la del Sistema de la doctrina de las costumbres según los principios de la Doctrina de la Ciencia de Fichte. Sin embargo, en dicha obra, Fichte califica la ética kantiana de “formalista” y pretende que la suya es más concreta y aplicable por su teoría de la conciliación entre el impulso natural y el impulso moral. En este artículo se explica y discute dicha postura de Fichte, mostrando que la crítica a Kant es injusta, dado que precisamente la Doctrina de la virtud ofrece, de un modo metódicamente diverso pero sólido y coherente con la ética de la autonomía, la “ética material” kantiana.

The Pending Revolution: Kant as a Moral Revolutionary

Kant controversially opposed political revolutions; yet, in morality, he clearly encouraged a revolutionary attitude. Drawing especially on the relevant texts in the Metaphysics of Morals, the Religion, the Education and the Anthropology, I explore the conceptual underpinnings of Kant’s position, arguing that Kant’s contrast between moral revolution and reform is at the basis of his twofold notion of noumenal and phenomenal virtue, which in turn explains the contrast he draws between principled versus imitative behaviour in the Education. On this basis, I defend the complementary role of political reform and moral revolution in his approach to cultural progress.

Unethical Laws and Lawless Ethics: Right and Virtue in Kant’s Rechtslehre

In this paper, I examine the relation between law and morality within the context of Kant’s late work The Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s conception of the law is based on a fundamental distinction between Right and Virtue, which respectively correspond to his legal-political theory and moral philosophy. My analysis is two part: in the first part, I examine the relationship between the Doctrines of Right and Virtue within the Kantian architectonic; in the second, I evaluate two cases of adjudication in the Rechtslehre that exemplify the distinction between law and morality explicated in the preceding section. I begin by showing that Kant’s legal and moral philosophies are normatively distinct, insofar as Right and Virtue belong to incommensurable realms of freedom and necessity. From this distinction, I derive Kant’s conception of the legal state as principally concerned with external freedoms and the preservation of the lawful condition itself. The second part of this paper analyzes Kant’s views on two cases of criminal justice, revealing his prioritization of the political over independent ethical considerations in juridical decision-making. Here, the conceptual barrier between law and morality serves as a caveat against facile recourses to Kantian ethics as means of legitimizing juridico-political decisions.

HONRA E HONESTIDADE NA METAFÍSICA DOS COSTUMES

This paper discusses some central notions of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. It claims that – although they are innate – dignity, external freedom and life are not something that ought to be granted unconditionally to individuals; rather individuals themselves should prove that they deserve to keep them, by acting in such a way that allows them to maintain their innate honesty and honour. In order to defend this interpretation, the paper analyses especially the connection between these two last concepts (in German: Ehre and Ehrbarkeit) both in the Doctrine of Law and in the Doctrine of Virtue.

Порядок и революция в политической философии Канта

Kant’s philosophy seems severely strained on the junction between the moral and the political. His “pure moral metaphysics” prescribes inner moral revolution towards gaining autonomy. However, his “empirical” political theory demands full obedience to any acting authority regardless of its moral worth. This paper contains a review of several recent attempts to reinterpret Kant’s prohibition of political revolution and an analysis of Kantian arguments to this eff ect. These arguments seemingly fall into two categories: formal, legalist ones and prudential, empirical ones. Kant’s formal arguments seem to run into a paradox, formally similar to the “barber’s paradox”: he states that any human being is in need of a master and that any master is a human being. Kant’s solution is formally similar to Russell’s “type theory”: a legislating sovereign is forbidden to be placed under the legislation to avoid what could be called self-reference. A sovereign becomes a person of another type at a meta-level, which, however, hardly suits modern political world that is lacking transcendent ontology and is ordered horizontally. If this really does create a contradiction for Kant’s argument, then his formal legalist argument (it is illegal to go against the law) loses force. The remaining prudential arguments turn on stressing Hobbesian dangers of the state of nature. They are empirical and probabilistic, so they might not seem convincing to those who do not share certain Kantian presuppositions. Thus Kant’s criticism of revolution is not itself unproblematic, and this makes it even more vulnerable to the overwhelming force of “pure moral philosophy” with its ideas of autonomy, enlightenment, human dignity and so on. In this light Kant’s reputation of a “terrorist” (Heine) and a theorist of revolution (Marx) might seem not without grounds.

Kantische Antworten auf Kants kasuistische Fragen, die vollkommenen Pflichten gegen sich selbst betreffend

The paper engages with the Casuistic questions posed in the book on the Perfect Duties to Oneself , in the Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue of the Metaphysic of Morals . It investigates whether it is possible to identify Kant’s literal answers to the casuistic questions that Kant himself poses, concluding that it is not. Therefore, Kantian answers rather than Kant’s answers are discussed. The paper’s outcome supports a rigorist interpretation of Kant’s ethics.

Una lectura del concepto de dignidad en gaudium et spes desde el imperativo categórico.

This paper aims to make a reading of the practical use in today’s world through the categorical imperative of the book The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant and the concept of dignity present in the pastoral constitution of Vatican Council II Gaudium et Spes. To do this, first the role of the Church in the modern World will be analyzed; then, the ontological foundations of man’s possession of dignity because of being children of God will be established; later, an explanation and application of the categorical imperative taken from the work of the Königsberg philosopher will be given and; finally, reflections on the importance of human action responsibility to others to build God’s Kingdom based on dignity and justice will be made.

Natureza humana e fundamento da ação moral em Kant

O conceito de natureza humana desempenha um papel crucial na empreitada kantiana de fundamentação da moral. A tematização da essência humana remete para a ambivalência do humano, por ele pertencer tanto à esfera fenomênica quanto à numênica. À luz deste pressuposto fundamental objetiva-se discutir a relação existente entre o fundamento objetivo do agir e o exercício da subjetividade, determinadora de normas e princípios morais. Focando a atenção sobre a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e a Crítica da Razão Prática tentaremos conferir se é realmente compatível, na reflexão kantiana, a liberdade/autonomia do sujeito moral com a dimensão a priori do princípio incondicional da ação humana.

Kant’s Philosophy of Communication

Kant’s Philosophy of Communication

Moral Feeling in Kant's Later Works

In the Groundwork the feeling of respect aroused by the moral law is conceived as a pure feeling; it has nothing to do with feelings empirically aroused. This is also the case in Kant’s further critical works. In the Metaphysics of Morals and the Vigilantius notes, however, there are doubts about its purity, because we do not have full insight in our deepest motives. Therefore, although in principle remaining an incentive, in practice we have now to strive to make it an incentive by optimizing its purity.

Kant on the motive of (imperfect) duty

This paper argues that Kantians face a little discussed problem in accounting for how actions that fulfill imperfect duties can be morally motivated. It is widely agreed that actions that are performed from the motive of duty are performed through a recognition of the objective necessity of the action. It is also generally held that the objective necessity of an action consists in its rational non-optionality. Many actions that fulfill imperfect duties, however, are rationally optional. Given these constraints, it is impossible that such rationally optional actions (including, for instance, many acts of benevolence) could be performed from the motive of duty. After presenting the problem as one that Kantians should find genuinely pressing, this paper offers a solution by advancing an alternative to the conception of rational necessity widely shared by Kantians. On the alternative view presented here, an action is rationally necessary if and only if the justifying reasons that speak in favor of performing the action do not depend on any empirical and therefore contingent motivational source on the part of an agent. Such actions may well be rationally optional. Moral motivation is therefore possible even in the case of rationally optional actions. Abbreviations: The following abbreviations are used for Kant’s works. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Citations are given by the abbreviation, the volume, and the page number from Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter deGruyter & Co., 1900–). G.Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals).KpVKritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason).MSDie Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals).

Reseña de Jeanine Grenberg, "Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013

In Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience, Grenberg presents a phenomenological reading of Kant’s account of ordinary moral experience in order to argue that Kant’s practical philosophy represents an attempt to ground morality on attentive reflection upon common, felt, first-personal phenomenological experience. Grenberg makes use of Kant’s mature conception of feeling in the Metaphysics of Morals in order to provide a phenomenological reading of the main arguments of the Groundwork and the second Critique. Grenberg warns us that the “tragedy of Kant scholarship” is that it has lost sight of the first intention of Kant’s project which was to ‘provide a defense of a common approach to ethics.’ (p. 1). The aim of Grenberg’s book is to rectify this oversight.

Neo‐Confucianism and Zhou Dunyi's Philosophy

AbstractUsing a term coined by the contemporary Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan, we could define Zhou Dunyi's thought in terms of ‘moral metaphysics’. Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), a thinker who lived in Northern Song period (960–1127), developed a philosophy that shows an ontological link between the cosmic order of the universe and the human moral reality. His contribution consists of two short works, Penetrating the Book of Changes (Tongshu) and Discussion of the Supreme Polarity Diagram (Taijitu shuo). These works played a fundamental role in creating the metaphysical structure of the neo‐Confucian thought: Zhu Xi emphasized Zhou Dunyi's contribution to the neo‐Confucian philosophy and, more precisely, he pointed out how Zhou Dunyi's ideas helped to define the conceptual framework of neo‐Confucianism. Moreover, Zhu Xi legitimized Zhou Dunyi's role as the pioneer of the ‘Learning of the Way’, or the renewed neo‐Confucian tradition. This paper aims to provide an overview of Zhou Dunyi's crucial role in the field of neo‐Confucianism. At the same time, we stress the need for further analysis in order to fully understand the value of Zhou Dunyi's philosophy in the Song period intellectual context.

De Quincey, Dictionaries, and Casuistry

De Quincey, Dictionaries, and Casuistry J. Mark Smith “There is nothing old under the sun.” —Thomas De Quincey, “James’s History of Charlemagne”1 In what follows, I explore Thomas De Quincey’s fascination with lexicography, glancing at several of his essays on dictionaries and on such linguistic matters as standards of pronunciation and the extemporaneous quality of conversation. All of these essays circle around the question of current usage and its sovereignty in determining what is right and wrong in speech and writing, but also around the fact that norms of usage change over the decades in ways that are mostly imperceptible to speakers of a language. De Quincey, in addition to being obsessed by perishability and ruin—by the way that the things and actions of men date themselves—was also a champion of the power of reflective judgment to recognize and savor the singular entity or phenomenon over against the infinitely complex and intricate universe of natural and human-made things. The practice of such judgment he calls casuistry; the first part of my argument wrestles with De Quincey’s idiosyncratic use of this term. De Quincey’s journalistic career over four decades coincided with, and was unquestionably touched by, the great age of European philology, a time of ever more sophisticated research into historical context. In that vein, the middle part of this essay explores the “evolution-theory” contemporaneous with De Quincey’s lexicographical essays—not in order to declare him a spirit of the age, but to show how his casuistical principles cause him to diverge from the triumphant paradigm of mutability in the crown of linguistics: from that procedure for reconstructing the branching trees of linguistic derivation that we call, after the nineteenth-century philologists, etymology.2 To better understand De Quincey’s rejection of etymology, in its eighteenth- as well as nineteenth-century forms, I glance at the dictionary of the day—Charles Richardson’s A New Dictionary of the English Language—that for all its strengths was fatally weakened by [End Page 689] the idea that usage is derivative in every instance from the primal sense of a word. De Quincey, despite his personal eccentricity and unruliness, was a principled and consistent casuist (in his sense of that word); when this prose stylist and involution-theorist ran up against the lexicography and linguistics of the day, the result was some of the most suggestive thinking in the modern era about that dimension of language known as usage. i. casuistry The word casuistry to this day carries a pejorative sense—roughly equivalent to sophistry—but can be used in a range of ways, on a spectrum (as James Chandler has put it) from “the high generality of the grammatical case form” to the historical specificity of the Catholic tradition of “ethical discipline and discourse.”3 Chandler, in England in 1819, employs casuistry as “a general term for doctrines and disciplines of decision-making that are designed to handle ‘cases’”: his interest is in the historical case of one’s own time versus the case(s) of another time.4 Chandler points to “the [word’s] root sense of ‘befallings,’ configurations of circumstances identified as such in relation to some normative domain[.]”5 He quotes a sentence from De Quincey’s “The Casuistry of Duelling” to show the relation between a grammatical and an ethical case: “[A]s a case, in the declension of a noun, means a falling away, or a deflection from the upright nominative (rectus), so a case in ethics implies some falling off, or deflection from the high road of catholic morality.”6 (An example in the field of moral judgment: De Quincey’s discussion in “Casuistry” of such mitigating circumstances as might be considered in the case of Napoleon Bonaparte’s slaughter of 4,000 Turkish prisoners-of-war at Jaffa in 1799.) David Clark, in a recent article on De Quincey, Immanuel Kant, and addiction, makes a penetrating tangential remark about the philosophical power of casuistry if it is taken seriously as a discipline of decision-making. Clark calls the “casuistical question” Kant asks himself in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals concerning opium-users and the...