Moral Intuitions Research Articles

Moral foundations and political ideology in the UK

Moral foundations theory is one of the most popularised and tested lenses of recent years, with its ability to account for differences in political ideology. For the first time using a nationally representative random probability sample, we assess how the newly refined moral foundation questionnaire may explain differences in political ideology and views on political issues in the UK. We confirm a six-factor model with robust estimates for the moral intuitions of care, equality, proportionality, authority, loyalty, and purity. We then use moral intuitions to predict (a) economic left-right and socially liberal-conservative ideology and (b) the relationship between political ideology and views on salient political issues. We find moral intuitions mostly play a unifying role across a series of issues, with the exception of feelings toward patriotism and Brexit.

The Influence of Group Identification and Morality in Support for Defunding the Police

There is very little research regarding what factors drive support for defunding the police. Using the theoretical framework of the Group Engagement Model and the Moral Foundations Theory, this study explores if and how race, group identification, and morality shape support for defunding the police. Results indicated that increased superordinate identification and binding moral foundations reduced support for defunding the police among White respondents. For Black respondents, increased subordinate identification explains their increased support for defunding the police. Attachment to one’s racial group and concerns for its welfare coupled with moral intuitions driven by care and fairness toward victims of police brutality who are disproportionately Black explains why Blacks Americans began and support calls to defund the police.

Biology and Culture: Evaluating the Reliability of Moral Intuitions Through Utilitarian Ethics

Biology and Culture: Evaluating the Reliability of Moral Intuitions Through Utilitarian Ethics

THE Moral Intuitions in Moral Decision-Making

Moral intuitions are strong, stable, immediate moral beliefs. Scholars have put forward many theories about the origin of moral intuition from different perspectives. Based on many scholars’ theoretical analysis of moral intuition, this paper takes Kant’s moral philosophy as the basic framework. It further introduces caring ethics and utilitarianism as supplements to analyze the role of moral intuition in moral decision-making. This essay argues that while moral intuitions can serve as valuable initial guides, they must be critically examined and refined through a Kantian framework that integrates the categorical imperative with reasoned emotions and utilitarianism, enhancing their trustworthiness by aligning them with rational moral principles.

The WEIRD Trio: The Cultural Gap between Physicians, Learners, and Patients in Pluralistic Societies.

Physicians are shaped by sociological and philosophical factors that often differ from those of their patients. This is of particular concern in pluralistic societies when navigating ethical disagreements because physicians often misunderstand or even dismiss patient perspectives as being irrational. This paper examines these factors and why many physicians approach ethics as they do while elucidating various patient perspectives and demonstrating how they make sense when considered from a different cultural worldview. Many physicians are trained in contexts that are WEIRD: Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic. These sociological characteristics tend to go hand in hand with the trio of individualism, secularism, and existentialism. These then shape an approach to ethics that focuses on the individual patient, makes no reference to the divine, and focuses on a patient's personal desires. This contrasts significantly with many patients who are collectivistic or religious, and then make rational decisions based on other values. The social fact of pluralism implores physicians to temper confidence in their own cultures while considering others to promote mutual understanding and improved care. This paper concludes with a discussion of how bridges can be built across cultures without sliding into relativism, beginning with recognizing and communicating our shared moral intuitions.

Legal provisions on medical aid in dying encode moral intuition.

In recent decades, many jurisdictions have moved toward legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide, alongside a near-universal increase in public acceptance of medical aid in dying. Here, we draw on a comprehensive quantitative review of current laws on assisted dying, experimental survey evidence, and four decades of time-series data to explore the relationship between these legislative transitions and change in moral attitudes. Our analyses reveal that existing laws on medical aid in dying impose a common set of eligibility restrictions, based on the patient's age, decision-making capacity, prognosis, and the nature of their illness. Fulfillment of these eligibility criteria elevates public moral approval of physician-assisted death, equally in countries with (i.e., Spain) and without (i.e., the United Kingdom) assisted dying laws. Finally, historical records of public attitudes toward euthanasia across numerous countries uncovered anticipatory growth in moral approval leading up to legalization, but no accelerated growth thereafter. Taken together, our findings suggest that the enactment of medical aid in dying laws, and their specific provisions, crystallize patterns in moral intuition.

Exploring the relations between ethical reasoning and moral intuitions among Chinese engineering students in a course on global engineering ethics

ABSTRACT Research in engineering ethics has assessed the ethical reasoning of students mostly in the US. However, it is not clear that ethical judgements are primarily the result of reasoning or that conclusions based on US samples would be true of global populations. China now graduates and employs more STEM majors than any other country, but the moral cognition and ethics education of Chinese engineers remain understudied. To address this gap, a study examined the relations between ethical reasoning, intuitions and education among engineering students in China. It found that (1) ethical reasoning is positively related to an emphasis on care and fairness and (2) global ethics education results in significantly higher levels of ethical reasoning, as well as a greater concern with fairness and loyalty. The relation between ethical reasoning and intuitions in China is like that of students in the US, but ethics education affects students in China differently.

Fifty years of killing and letting die: On the limits of philosophical bioethics.

In 1975, The New England Journal of Medicine published James Rachels' article 'Active and Passive Euthanasia'. The argumentative method that Rachels introduced, the Bare Difference Argument (also known as the Contrast Strategy), became one of the most widely used tools in ethical reasoning. The argument, however, fails to show active euthanasia being morally permissible. It fails because Rachels takes the intuitions from the case where letting die is morally impermissible and applies the intuitions to cases where letting die is morally permissible. While it is possible to create thought-experiments that are more analogous to euthanasia, in this respect, than Rachels' cases, they too are disanalogous to euthanasia with some of the relevant features. Creating the perfect analogy, however, would be a mistake too. Such a case would be too analogous; people would simply be divided on what kind of moral intuitions they would have. The problem thus highlights a methodological limit in philosophical bioethics and raises questions related to the roles of philosophical ethicists in the context of assisted dying.

Trusting Our Instincts: Evaluating the Evolutionary and Rational Foundations of Moral Intuitions

This paper delves into the nature and reliability of moral intuitions, building upon Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model, which suggests that moral judgments stem from instinctive reactions followed by rational justifications. By examining Haidt’s experiments, which reveal the primacy of intuitive responses over rational deliberation, this paper seeks to address whether we have valid reasons to trust these moral intuitions. Drawing from evolutionary psychology, it argues that moral intuitions have historically contributed to the survival and success of the human species, thereby providing them with normative value. However, given the rapid advancements in technology and societal changes, these intuitions may sometimes lead to nonoptimal or disastrous outcomes. The paper proposes a rational test to determine the reliability of moral intuitions: we should trust an intuition if its generalized application benefits the human species. Potential counterarguments, such as the historical misuse of evolutionary logic in eugenics, are addressed to underscore the validity of this test. The conclusion emphasizes that while moral intuitions are generally trustworthy due to their evolutionary roots, rational thought must intervene when intuitions become outdated in the face of contemporary challenges.

X-Phi and Theory Acceptance in Political Philosophy

AbstractWhat is the relevance of experimental philosophy (X-Phi) to theory acceptance in political philosophy? To answer this question, the paper distinguishes between four views, to wit: (i) X-Phi as a systematic method to avoid or reduce biases in our moral intuitions—The De-Biasing View; (ii) X-Phi as a tool for assessing the fruitfulness or consequences of various concepts—The Fruitfulness View; (iii) X-Phi as the best way to unearth the kind of moral principles we are interested in as political philosophers—The Unearthing Principles View; and (iv) X-Phi as a way of testing the coherence of principles with folk intuitions—The Defeasible Reason (or Squatters’ Rights) View. The paper argues that the first two views and the last—subject to some clarifications—describe important X-Phi contributions to theory acceptance as this is traditionally understood within contemporary political philosophy. In contrast, the third view goes too far in suggesting that X-Phi can supplant more traditional, in part non-empirical, methods.

Psychological and Brain Responses to Artificial Intelligence's Violation of Community Ethics.

Human moral reactions to artificial intelligence (AI) agents' behavior constitute an important aspect of modern-day human-AI relationships. Although previous studies have mainly focused on autonomy ethics, this study investigates how individuals judge AI agents' violations of community ethics (including betrayals and subversions) compared with human violations. Participants' behavioral responses, event-related potentials (ERPs), and individual differences were assessed. Behavioral findings reveal that participants rated AI agents' community-violating actions less morally negative than human transgressions, possibly because AI agents are commonly perceived as having less agency than human adults. The ERP N1 component showed the same pattern with moral rating scores, indicating the modulation effect of human-AI differences on initial moral intuitions. Moreover, the level of social withdrawal correlated with a smaller N1 in the human condition but not in the AI condition. The N2 and P2 components were sensitive to the difference between the loyalty/betrayal and authority/subversion domains but not human/AI differences. Individual levels of moral sense and autistic traits also influenced behavioral data, especially on the loyalty/betrayal domain. In our opinion, these findings offer insights for predicting moral responses to AI agents and guiding ethical AI development aligned with human moral values.

Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Very Similar Sets of Foundations When Comparing Moral Violations

Applications of moral foundations theory in political science have revealed differences in the degree to which liberals and conservatives explicitly endorse five core moral foundations of care, fairness, authority, loyalty, and sanctity. We argue that differences between liberals and conservatives in their explicit ratings of abstract and generalized moral principles do not imply that citizens with different political orientations have fundamentally different moral intuitions. We introduce a new approach for measuring the importance of the five moral foundations by asking U.K. and U.S. survey respondents to compare pairs of vignettes describing violations relevant to each foundation. We analyze responses to these comparisons using a hierarchical Bradley–Terry model which allows us to evaluate the relative importance of each foundation to individuals with different political perspectives. Our results suggest that, despite prominent claims to the contrary, voters on the left and the right of politics share broadly similar moral intuitions.

Why should we punish and how? The role of moral intuitions and personal worldviews for punitiveness and sentencing preferences

ABSTRACT This research investigated the role of moral foundations and broader worldviews in judgments about why and how criminal offenders should be punished. In Study 1, Swedish law students (N = 103) and social science students (N = 130) evaluated how harsh the punishment for crimes that varied across three crime categories and five contexts should be. In Study 2, Swedish adults (N = 161) evaluated eight sentencing goals and thirteen sentencing methods. Humanism and individualizing intuitions were associated with higher punitiveness for crimes that involved a selfish motive or harm inflicted upon the victim and with increased focus on rehabilitation and counseling. Normativism and binding intuitions were associated with higher punitiveness when the damage was primarily material, less leniency when there were mitigating circumstances, and more focus on retribution, deterrence, restoration, incapacitation, denunciation, and imprisonment. The moral foundations predicted preferences concerning sentence goals and methods better while the worldviews predicted punitiveness better. The results show that we need to take both people’s moral foundations and their broader worldviews into consideration to understand why and how they think criminals should be punished.

EXPRESS: CEO Moral Foundations and Firms’ Environmental, Social, and Governance Performance

We examine the impact of CEOs’ moral foundations (MFs) – innate source of moral intuitions – on firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Using a linguistic technique on unscripted texts spoken by 1,860 CEOs of S&P 1500 firms over five years, we found that CEOs with higher binding MFs (i.e., focus on expectations of key stakeholder groups) are associated with lower ESG performance. In contrast, we found that CEOs with higher individualizing MFs (i.e., focus on well-being of individuals in general) are associated with higher ESG performance. Our study contributes to the upper echelons theory by providing evidence that CEO morality matters for ESG outcomes. We add to MFs theory by showing that a bi-dimensional lens on CEO’s morality (i.e., binding vs individualizing) reveals nuances on ESG outcomes.

On the intrinsic value of diversity

ABSTRACT Diversity is an important ethical concept, but it is almost exclusively studied within two domains: biodiversity and diversity of sociological attributes such as race and gender. We provide a general study of the intrinsic value of diversity. We survey prior literature on the intrinsic value of biodiversity and sociological diversity in search of insights relevant to the intrinsic value of all types of diversity. We then present three thought experiments designed to clarify intuitions about the intrinsic value of small amounts of diversity, large amounts of diversity, and diversity as compared to other intrinsic values. We find that many types of diversity are intrinsically valuable at both small and large amounts, but that diversity may be a weak intrinsic value in comparison to others. Noting that diversity can be defined in many ways, we propose that, for purposes of moral evaluation, diversity should be defined to include both a diversity of individual elements within a group and a diversity of the overall patterns or structures of the group. Some of our findings about the intrinsic value of diversity are tentative, indicating that moral intuitions about diversity are sometimes ambiguous and would benefit from further study.

The Reliability Challenge to Moral Intuitions

The Reliability Challenge to Moral Intuitions

Aligning artificial intelligence with moral intuitions: an intuitionist approach to the alignment problem

Aligning artificial intelligence with moral intuitions: an intuitionist approach to the alignment problem

The Right to Mental Autonomy

A number of moral philosophers and legal scholars have now recognized that we possess a natural, or moral, right to mental autonomy. This right is standardly characterized as our right against significant, nonconsensual interference with our minds. However, the precise scope of this right remains under-theorized: what makes some ways of influencing someone’s thinking—rational argumentation, say—permissible, but other ways—pharmacological manipulation—impermissible? Here I argue that the right to mental autonomy should be analyzed as the right to form attitudes in light of reasons. Once understood this way, we can see how this right protects us against all “nonrational” interventions on our thinking—including, but not limited to, nonconsensual neurosurgery, pharmacological manipulations, science fiction mind control, subliminal messaging, and non-reason-giving advertising or nudging. Rather, the only fully permissible ways to seek to influence someone’s thinking are through methods that seek to engage their rational faculties. This result, I claim, accords with our moral intuitions concerning the matter.

Impossible Ethics: Do Population Ethical Impossibility Results Support Moral Skepticism and/or Anti‐Realism?

AbstractIn this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the anti‐realist challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the skeptical challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results do not in fact support any anti‐realist or skeptical conclusions.

The relationship of rights and obligations: questions of theory

It is indicated that, in the modern period of conflicting legal norms, one of the means of ensuring the implementation and observance of constitutional obligations is the responsibility and sanctions of the norms of the current legislation. It is noted that in the modern world, with the rapid development of society, the issue of compliance with law and morality is becoming more and more necessary and relevant. That is why considerable attention should be paid to the consideration, analysis and research of these two concepts. Today, law and morality depend on each other. Norms of morality and law are the most widespread and quite important for society. They are intertwined in the process of social regulation, their demands coincide in many respects: what law allows or prohibits, and morality encourages or condemns. The interaction of morality and law in society is a very complex and diverse process. Strongly influencing morality, law contributes to its intensive implementation in the minds of all members of society, at the same time, under the influence of moral requirements, law constantly improves and elevates its role as a social regulator of social relations. The author emphasizes that the attitude to rights and duties in the context of a person’s legal status creates a rather complex problem for ethics and morality. On the one hand, theorists fix such qualities of moral demands as universality and a high level of commonality. Ethical theory in the sense of attitude to rights and duties inevitably uses as one of its bases the moral ideas of “ordinary man” or “ordinary human mind”. It cannot simply ignore moral intuitions, although it can make attempts to discredit some of them, especially if they contradict the main body of moral convictions and are not accompanied by absolute certainty. However, moral duties to have a different character. They are an integral component of the normative system of universal morality and have an almost axiomatic character for the “ordinary person”.