X-Phi and Theory Acceptance in Political Philosophy

Abstract

AbstractWhat is the relevance of experimental philosophy (X-Phi) to theory acceptance in political philosophy? To answer this question, the paper distinguishes between four views, to wit: (i) X-Phi as a systematic method to avoid or reduce biases in our moral intuitions—The De-Biasing View; (ii) X-Phi as a tool for assessing the fruitfulness or consequences of various concepts—The Fruitfulness View; (iii) X-Phi as the best way to unearth the kind of moral principles we are interested in as political philosophers—The Unearthing Principles View; and (iv) X-Phi as a way of testing the coherence of principles with folk intuitions—The Defeasible Reason (or Squatters’ Rights) View. The paper argues that the first two views and the last—subject to some clarifications—describe important X-Phi contributions to theory acceptance as this is traditionally understood within contemporary political philosophy. In contrast, the third view goes too far in suggesting that X-Phi can supplant more traditional, in part non-empirical, methods.