Moral Imperfection Research Articles

О позитивном смысле негативной этики (в ответ и благодарность профессору Ма Иньмао)

The article was written in response and gratutude to Chinese Professor Ma Yin­mao in connection with his article ‘On the Academician Abdusalam A. Gu­seynov’s “negative ethics” and its borders’. It consists of three parts. In the first part, the author examines the question of why negative ethics is at the same time the beginning of a positive moral program of human activity. Proceeding from the belief that philosophy is an ethical project and an act is its first principle, he shows that the path of man as a living rational individual to being lies through denial. The act is deployed in two opposite directions: as a fact, it goes into the individual and is in the zone of his exclusive responsibility, and by its content it is included in the social being, its rationally organized cultural space. The con­tradictory integrity of the act is considered in the context of the concept of non-al­ibi in being introduced by M.M. Bakhtin. The second part is devoted to two main arguments against an expansive understanding of negative ethics. The first is that it does not take into account the existence of people with pure moral intentions. According to the second, the positive normative content of public morality falls out of the field of negative ethics. The third part discusses the moral paradoxes that the consciousness of one’s own moral imperfection is an indicator of one’s perfection and that good deeds should be done in secret.

Why not anarchism?

Recent debates over ideal theory have reinvigorated interest in the question of anarchy. Would a perfectly just society need—or even permit—a state? Ideal anarchists such as Jason Brennan, G.A. Cohen, Christopher Freiman, and Jacob Levy argue that strict compliance with justice obviates the need for a state. Ideal statists such as David Estlund, Gregory Kavka, and John Rawls think that coercive political institutions serve indispensable functions even in ideal conditions. This paper defends ideal anarchism. Our argument begins by describing a camping trip inspired by Cohen that illustrates why an anarchist form of cooperation is more intrinsically desirable than the statist alternative. After detailing Rawls's ideal theory and Estlund's “nonconcessive” moral theory, we argue—contrary to Rawls, Estlund, and Kavka—that large-scale societies without moral imperfection do not need a state.

Irony, Disruption and Moral Imperfection

Irony has a suspicious moral reputation, especially in popular media and internet culture. Jonathan Lear (2011) introduces a proposal which challenges this suspicion and identifies irony as a means to achieve human excellence. For Lear, irony is a disruptive uncanniness which arises from a gap between aspiration and actualisation in our practical identity. According to Lear, such a disruptive experience of ironic uncanniness reorients us toward excellence, because it passionately propels us to really live up to that practical identity. However, Lear’s understanding of irony is idiosyncratic and his proposal overlooks that disruption often results from value incompatibility between different practical identities. The disruption which follows from value incompatibility does not inherently reorient us toward excellence. The point is exactly that achieving excellence in one practical identity is sometimes incompatible with excellence in the other. Pace Lear, I do not identify this disruptive experience as a central example of irony. Instead, I consider irony a virtuous coping strategy for such disruption, because it introduces the necessary distance from our moral imperfection to sustain practical deliberation and maintain good mental health. Such virtuous irony negotiates a golden mean between too little disruption (complete insensitivity toward one’s imperfection) and too much disruption (a complete breakdown of practical deliberation and mental health). I argue that ironic media in popular culture provide a rich source of such virtuous irony, which I demonstrate through analysis of satirical examples.

Making Peace with Moral Imperfection


 How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly resolve the problem of temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection, and I defend an alternative response, centered on our personal attachments and our biographical identity.

Interaction of economic interests in society: a retrospective analysis of achievements of economic science

The article is devoted to the identification of theoretical and methodological problems that occur while studying the harmonization of economic interests. On the basis of the analysis of the evolution of the views of scholars of the past and present on the interaction of economic interests insociety, the existence of a wide amalgam of thoughts, ideas and conceptual approaches that were introduced in this field by representatives of different directions of economic science has been established. In the course of the study, four basic logic-theoretical lines were identified, which were formed in the process of scientific search for conditions and mechanism of harmonization of economic interests. The first line is the formation of ideas about the existence of interconnection and interdependence of economic interests, which posed the problem of finding a mechanism for their coordination. The second line is the question of creating such a mechanism. In this direction, the approaches are either emphasized according to which the interests are considered to be harmonized by the action of objective economic laws and directly through the market mechanism of self-regulation, or else the impossibility of harmonization in the automatic mode is pointed out. Psychological features of people, their moral imperfection, tendency to affective and illogical actions can not be regulated by the market. In order to solve this problem, an external force is involved, which, according to various researchers, acts as a moral, state, law, socio-cultural institutions. The third line is a solution of the question about the state's ability to effectively influence the harmonization of interests. In this regard, scientists have quite different positions - from confidence in the effectiveness of state influence on the conditions of realization of economic interests to the detection of «failures» of the state. The fourth line is intuitive ideas of scholars about the reproduction of economic interests, which is manifested in the constant repetition of the situation of income and product movement, which occurs in society under the pressure of the desire for the welfare of each social class. The practical importance of the idea of existence of reproduction of economic interests is shown, which allows to establish the conditionality of realization of interests by objective social factors.

Tragedy and the constancy of norms: towards an Anscombian conception of ‘ought’

This paper presents an Anscombian alternative to the traditional deontic conception of ought. According to the Anscombian conception of ought developed here, ought is general as opposed to ‘peculiarly moral’, norm-referring instead of law- or obligation-referring, and ‘heroic’ in the sense that it does not presuppose that individuals can do or be as they ought. Its connection to matters of fact can, moreover, be clearly stated. In the first part of the paper, I describe some significant logical characteristics of this conception, and argue that it provides a more suitable account of the oughts of ethics as compared to the deontic conception. One particular strength of the Anscombian conception of ought is that it does justice to the possibility of tragedy in human life, where tragedy is understood as the possibility that a thoroughly well-intentioned individual might sometimes ensure her own moral imperfection, precisely by doing what is morally right or best at every step along the way. To motivate this feature of the view, I sketch a corresponding picture of responsibility for actions in terms of ownership of one’s deeds. This conception of responsibility allows that what one ought to do is not always constrained by what one can do, while saving the intuitions about fairness and the practical scope of moral norms that principally motivate ‘ought implies can’. To illustrate and motivate the overall account I discuss a number of cases, including the character Winston from George Orwell’s 1984.

The 'Orthodoxy' of Orthodoxy: On Moral Imperfection, Correctness, and Deferral in Religious Worlds

The 'Orthodoxy' of Orthodoxy: On Moral Imperfection, Correctness, and Deferral in Religious Worlds

Towards a Theology of Disability Sport: A Misconstrued Game Plan

Effort devoted to exploring a theology of disability sport is not only misdirected but counterproductive to the interests of athletes with a disability. A theology of sport, in a generic sense, has emerged in the context of theologies addressing areas of specific interest and it is this expansive process that could promote a theology of disability sport. This prospect is not surprising, and is perhaps seen as being caring and inclusive. Athletes with a disability do need and deserve special attention, recognition and support. In general, people with a disability are often regarded as disadvantaged, sometimes as inferior, not only physically, but socially, and even spiritually. From a spiritual point of view, this reaction has led to disability being linked to moral imperfection, as a punishment for sin, as a test of faith, or as an opportunity for redemption through suffering (Eiesland & Saliers, 1998; Yong, 2011). In response to such concepts there have been calls to explore a theology of disability but this, and I think quite rightly, may be rejected in favor of an inclusive theology of humankind. To pursue a theology of disability sport is to reinforce a familiar reaction towards people with a disability. For the athletes involved, a theology of disability sport may not only be unwelcome but unintentionally discriminatory.

Disability from a Christian Gospel Perspective

In response to the needs of people with a disability, the contemporary Christian church has adopted policies and programmes directed towards acceptance and inclusion in the mainstream environment. At the same time, there has been a candid acknowledgement that there remain not only architectural and financial challenges but also barriers based on attitude, misconception and even theological grounds. With regard to people with a disability, texts of the Christian gospels can be interpreted as carrying mixed messages. While there are passages of comfort and acceptance, there are others which seemingly link disability with moral imperfection, as punishment for the sins of parents or simply as a test of faith in God. It is instructive to examine such gospel references from the perspective of people with a disability. Reactions can sometimes be surprisingly bitter with people with disabilities referring to themselves as humiliated and victims of fear and prejudice. At the very least, it would be helpful to recognize that the potential exists for mixed messages to be drawn from passages referring to people with a disability and that there are negative connotations to be addressed.

God as portfolio manager

Theologians and laymen forever ponder and speculate about God's motivations, His demands on mankind, His decision-making process, and sometimes of course, His very existence. I shall not discuss the latter question; rather I shall assume that He exists. Instead, I plan to explore the question-how does God decide who shall be rewarded and who shall be punished? But first, I must explain that whenever I shall refer to God's or evaluation I will not really mean and evaluation. Being omniscient, God never analyzes or evaluates-He knows all at all times. Therefore, the discussion will not present a model of analysis that God uses, but a model of analysis that may simulate how God knows. Firstly, we must establish that God has a cardinal unit of having negative, zero and positive values. It must be a cardinal unit of moralityallowing us to state, for example, that action A is assigned ten morals, while action B is assigned 11 morals. Cardinality enables us to state that action B has ten per cent more moral content than does action A. Many people will surely object to such a nonrelativistic moral code. They may contend that God has different standards of behavior for different societies, so that a given practice, such as cannibalism, may rate negative ten morals in the western world and rate zero morals in the jungles of New Guinea. The model I am hubristically constructing can accommodate the relativistic point of view through the introduction of morality tables. Each of these tables assigns a unique moral value to a given action, depending on the society in which the action is executed. God, of course, does not refer to such tablesfor He is omniscient. However, the concept is useful in helping us understand how He might judge us mortals. I assert that God seeks a minimum rate of return on each of his investments (human beings). Of course, there is just as much logical basis for the contrary assertion-that God has no such rate of return expectation for each of us. I, however, choose to believe in the latter more purposeful cosmic structure. At this juncture a serious philosophical dilemma cannot be ignored, for it may be asserted that God can guarantee any moral rate of return that He desires; in fact, that if He wanted to guard against moral imperfection in mankind, He would have created perfectly moral humans. His omnipotence and omniscience make man's attempts to meet His moral expectations a travesty, a charade.

Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman

In Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection, Holly S. Goldman argues for the following principles governing ought-statements:' G*1. (A) S ought at t, to perform A, at t, if and only if (1) S has the ability at t, to perform A, and (2) The sequence from t, which would follow A, is better than any sequence from t, which would follow any alternative to A,. (B) If S ought at t, to perform Ai at ti, then S ought at t, to perform an immediate successor Bi to Ai at t1 if the sequence from t. which would follow B. is better than any sequence from t1 which would follow any other immediate successor to Ai [p. 473]. These principles are designed to capture a claim I find quite dubious: is the sequence of acts which actually would follow a given action, rather than the best sequence of acts which might follow it, that influences its moral status (p. 469). In defense of it, Goldman relies on the assumption of determinism (p. 452), plus a view of oughts-taking ought-statements as dated differently from their objects and as holding or failing to hold from different temporal standpoints-which I have proposed elsewhere.2 In what follows, I would like, very briefly, to dissociate the time-bound view from what I take to be Goldman's bizarre but interesting transformation of our moral reasoning. What Goldman's argument really purports to show, I think, is that a sincere and thoroughgoing belief in determinism would in fact require a transformation of our moral reasoning. I believe we can see this (Section I)-and a way around it (II)-by considering a simple example.

Erratum: Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection

Erratum: Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection

Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection

T HIS paper has two purposes. First, I argue that Iris Murdoch's character is correct in urging us to heed our moral limitations and choose when necessary to perform the lower rather than the higher act. Second, I investigate the moral principles required to accommodate the fact that a moral statement's truth value may vary over time. The second project may initially seem unconnected with the first, but reflection indicates that one cannot adopt such principles without deciding whether or not the view expressed by Murdoch's character is correct, and I shall argue that it is. I begin with the question of dated rightness, which will occupy the first five sections of the paper.

The Morality of Imperfections [Second Installment

THE MORALITY OF IMPERFECTIONS [Second Installment] III. THE LAw OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION AFINAL and even more decisive argument against the positive moral imperfection can be constructed upon St. Thomas's ideas of the law of Christian perfection. It takes up where the preceding argument leaves off and pursues the reaches of finality upon the much loftier plane of divine grace and charity. In the course of its presentation and development many problems will be suggested which lie outside the direct line of our purpose. Questions like the exact relationship of nature and grace, the possibilities of a purely ethical order, the regency of charity over all other virtues, and the relative pre-eminence of intellect or will in beatitude must be put to one side. The argument focuses directly upon the obligation of Christian perfection here in this life. Hence, certain preliminary nations of the essence kinds, and possibilities of Christian perfection are indispensable. To begin, therefore, with the essence of Christian perfection, we note with SL Thomas that charity lies at the very roots of tpe wayfarer's spiritual growth and stature during this present life. The reason for this assertion is simple and profound. Everything, the Angelic Doctor tells us, is said to be perfect according as it realizes its proper end which is also its ultimate perfection. But charity conjoins us to God, the ultimate end of human life. Therefore, the essence of Christian perfection for the wayfarer consists in charity, that is, primarily in charity towards God, secondarily in charity towards neighbor. Hence Christian perfection in this life will be measured according to our observance of the two great precepts of charity.1 2 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 1: " ... unumquodque dicitur esse perfectum inquantum attingit proprium finem, qui est ultima rei perfectio. Caritas autem est quae unit nos Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis: . . . Et ideo se649 650 J. C. OSBOURN As to the kinds or grades of perfection, St. Thomas usually places at the head of the list that perfection which he styles absolute. It belongs to God alone and consists in a simple and uninterrupted act of love infinitely perfect both on the part of the act and on the part of the object loved. God is infinitely lovable and loves His infinite goodness without end or measure.2 Over against this absolute perfection of God St. Thomas sets a relative perfection of charity which pertains to intellectual creatures. This sort of perfection comprehends a vast and widely varying range of subjects according to which St. Thomas stakes off the following subdivisions. In the first place, there is the perfection of the blessed in heaven. This kind of perfection mounts up to a lofty height or totality of love on the part of its possessors inasmuch as their utmost powers of loving are ever bent to full capacity upon the object of their love. Still, this perfection retains a definite cast of the partial and finite about it since the charity of the blessed, however intense it may be, can never exhaust or sound the depths of the divine goodness and loveliness in which it is absorbed continuously.3 Secondly, we have the perfection of the wayfarer still journeying towards his goal. This sort of perfection too is rather sweeping in extension but St. Thomas contents himself with the traditional division into a threefold heading which has long since been consecrated by the approval of spiritual writers. First, there is the perfection of the beginner which concerns itself primarily with the resistance of evils deadly to charity. cundum caritatem specialiter sttenditur perfectio vitae Christianae." Ibid., a. ~: "Per se quidem et essentialiter consistit perfectio Christianae vitae in caritate: principaliter quidem secundum dilectionem Dei, secundario autem secundum dilectionem proximi, , . . " There is some discussion here among the Thomists on the precise significance of the term "specialiter." Cajetan contends that it is synonymous with " essentialiter ," as St. Thomas most certainly implies in the second article. Sylvius, however, thinks it should be contrasted with the term " gemeraliter " to indicate that Christian perfection consists generally in the other virtues but specially in charity. This difference of opinion has no direct bearing on our problem. • Ibid., q...