Moral Goodness Research Articles

Inspiring or annoying? A new measure of broadening and defensive self-regulatory responses to moral exemplars applied to two real-life scenarios of moral goodness

ABSTRACT I present a new model of the self-regulation of virtue that integrates perspectives on emotion, cognition, and motivation. Across three vignette-based studies in US/UK (N = 1,540), I developed through exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis a multi-item measure of broadening and defensive responses, the Self-Regulation of Virtue Inventory (SRVI). I applied that measurement model to two new scenarios portraying prototypical moral exemplars (selected from a set of 12) and fitted structural models that identify key antecedents: motivational dispositions (regulatory focus and hedonic orientation) and moral comparisons (opinion- and ability-based). The findings were consistent with network analysis, providing initial evidence of their robustness. By integrating literatures on motivation, emotion, social cognition and comparison within a self-regulation framework, I provide initial evidence to advance theory on moral self-regulation and moral education, with practical implications on how to maximise the upsides of virtue while mitigating or channelling its possible drawbacks.

A Dilemma for Theistic Non-Naturalism

Non-naturalism is the view that there are sui generis, non-natural moral properties. This paper poses a dilemma for theists who accept this view. Either God explains why non-moral properties make sui generis, non-natural moral properties obtain, or God does not explain this. If the former, then God is unacceptably involved in the explanation of his own moral goodness. If the latter, then God’s sovereignty, stature, and importance are undermined, and an unacceptable queerness is introduced into the world. This paper concludes that theists have good reasons to reject non-naturalism on account of the unacceptable consequences of accepting either horn.

Hip to Be Square: Moral Saints Revisited

I defend the continuing importance, and attraction of, moral saints. The objective of this paper is twofold; firstly, to critique Wolf’s definition of sainthood, and secondly, to argue against her view that one should not desire to be a moral saint, nor emulate them. In section 1, I argue that moral saints are highly complex moral agents, and that Wolf’s definition does not capture this complexity. My second argument is that Wolf’s account that there are two kinds of saints, loving and rational, leads to a tension. Either: (1) the distinction between loving and rational saints is justifiable; but then arguments against the benefits of sainthood ought to be directed independently against each kind of saint which, Wolf does not do; or (2) the distinction is not justifiable, in which case the division is explanatorily impotent. In section 2, I will present Wolf’s argument for why one should not want to be a moral saint, nor even know one. I counter that Wolf over-emphasises non-moral values, to the point that these values have a monopoly on what constitutes a well-rounded life. Wolf must provide a more definitive scope for non-moral values, as the distinction between moral and non-moral values is ambiguous. Finally, I argue that moral saints can serve as moral exemplars and visionaries. By admiring and emulating them, we can adapt our own moral behavior, and by example, moral saints can discover new and better ways of pursuing moral goods.

Google is Free: Moral Evaluations of Intergroup Curiosity.

Two experiments investigated how evaluations of intergroup curiosity differed depending on whether people placed responsibility for their learning on themselves or on outgroup members. In Study 1, participants (n = 340; 51% White-American, 49% Black-American) evaluated White actors who were curious about Black culture and placed responsibility on outgroup members to teach versus on themselves to learn. Both Black and White participants rated the latter actors as more moral, and perceptions of effort mediated this effect. A follow-up preregistered study (n = 513; 75% White-American) asked whether perceptions of greater effort cause greater perceptions of moral goodness. Replicating Study 1, participants rated actors as more moral when they placed responsibility on themselves versus others. Participants also rated actors as more moral when they exerted high versus low effort. These results clarify when and why participants view curiosity as morally good and help to strengthen bridges between work on curiosity, moral cognition, and intergroup relations.

Karol Wojtyła’s dispute with Max Scheler over the concept and role of conscience in morality

The article, following Karol Wojtyła’s study of Max Scheler’s ethics in his habilitation dissertation, reveals the above-mentioned phenomenologist’s overly narrow view of ethical experience and, for this reason, a narrow and erroneous account of conscience and its role in morality. Scheler’s narrowing of his analyses of ethical experience down to the emotional experience of values and insight into their essence led, as a consequence, to the exclusion of the causality of the real subject of action, i.e. to the exclusion of the objective desire for good, which is an act of self-determination guided by the fact of moral duty and the categorical normativity of conscience. Scheler equated “wanting good” with “the emotional feeling that I am good”. However, the emotional, passive experiencing of values alone is not the causation and performance of an act. The performance of an act is about good as such, permeated by value and moral duty along with the categorical imperative of conscience. The moral goodness of an act internally permeates the entire dynamism of its performance. The explanation for this kind of personal fulfilment in the act is the potentiality and realization of the nature of the human person. Thus, in the ethical experience, we are dealing not only with the emotional experience of value, but with the experience of moral duty, with the experience of the norm, including the one closest to us, that is, the imperative of conscience, with the involvement of our will towards the performance of a valuable and morally commanded act, as the apex of personal fulfilment.

How Moral Goodness Drives Unethical Behavior: Empirical Evidence for the NGO Halo Effect

With the occurrence of high-profile scandals in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector, scholars and practitioners alike have questioned why “good” organizations behave badly, yet little empirical research has explored this topic in depth. The present study examines the NGO halo effect, a conceptual framework that proposes three mechanisms to explain how NGO moral goodness can lead to NGO unethical behavior, that is, moral justification, moral superiority, and moral naivety. Through an analysis of 34 interviews with NGO staff and volunteers, we identify 151 unique cases and 17 different types of unethical behavior. We find that 92% of these cases are related to the halo effect, with 22% through moral justification, 25% through moral superiority, and 45% through moral naivety. This study provides empirical support for the NGO halo effect as a factor for understanding NGOs’ unethical behavior, with implications for future research.

Attention Span and Tech Autonomy as Moral Goods and Societal Necessities

In this paper, we argue that attention span should be protected and cultivated as a societal and moral good and that individuals should have the autonomy to choose where they direct their attention without technological impediments. Attention span allows people to devote their attention to meaningful tasks and to focus on tasks or topics that require and deserve deeper concentration. Technology often diverts attention from the meaningful to the less so and changes how we cultivate attention span. We explore the concept of distraction technology, referring to technologies that divert attention and harm attention span. While recognizing the many benefits of information technology, it is important to be aware of and address the negative impacts of distraction technology on attention span and tech autonomy. Artificial intelligence has improved technology, enabling it to personalize and deliver information more likely to engage the user. Rather than giving in to technology that needlessly interrupts, scatters thoughts, and invades spaces where people once concentrated, we argue that there is a moral duty to protect attention span and tech autonomy. Apps, computers, and smartphones have allowed faster, efficient research and communication at the expense of some depth. Ethicists and the responsible tech ecosystem should support policies that preserve attention span and limit distraction. Technology developers should make design decisions that aim to keep people on task, rather than distracting them. Legislators, regulators, and the tech industry should work toward responsible technology that aligns with human interests.

Sensitivity to moral goodness under different aesthetic contexts

ABSTRACT Does context influence our appreciation of beauty? To answer this question, two experiments were conducted to determine the effect of contextual aesthetics on the recognition of moral behavior. Experiment 1 demonstrated that individuals in a high-aesthetic context had a quicker recognition time for moral behavior than those in a low-aesthetic context. In a low-aesthetic context, individuals recognize immoral behavior more quickly than in a high aesthetic context. Individuals showed greater recognition rates for moral behavior in a high aesthetic context and higher recognition for immoral behaviors in a low aesthetic context for behavior with unclear information. Experiment 2 revealed that individual fixation counts were smaller under the conditions of high aesthetic context and moral behavior than under the conditions of low aesthetic context and moral behavior, indicating a correlation between low aesthetic context and immoral behavior. This study shows that high aesthetic context facilitates the recognition of moral behavior, which has implications for moral education.

The vices of naturalist neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics

AbstractWhile the modern revival of virtue ethics largely looks back to Aristotle, most, if not all, versions of this trend continue to be much indebted to and/or based upon specific mid‐twentieth‐century neo‐naturalist and descriptivist critiques of prevailing antinaturalist trends of that time: specifically, upon Anscombe's critique of the ethics of duty and utility and of the so‐called modern moral ought, and Geach's robust defence of the descriptive character of moral and other goodness. However, in the wake of further critical attention to these neo‐naturalist claims, this paper argues that there can ultimately be no reliable or secure logical or empirical grounding of the virtues of inherently normative human moral life and conduct in the goods or virtues of effective or even beneficial natural function.

Men Becoming Gods in “Style”

Men Becoming Gods in “Style”

MENJADI GENERASI UNGGUL DAN BERKARAKTER UNTUK MENGGAPAI KESUKSESAN

The superior generation is a generation that has intelligence and good character within itself, always has a positive impact on oneself, others and creatures around their environment. Education that can give birth to a superior generation is education that can also strengthen the will so that everyone who knows moral goodness really wants to live according to the knowledge they have. The superior generation is the product or result of the habituation of character values ​​originating from spiritual intelligence. is the ability to "feel" one's diversity. Spiritual intelligence (SQ) is intelligence related to transcendent things, things that "overcome" time. It transcends the present and human experience. He is the most important part of humans and science (neuroanatomy and neurochemistry), proving that SQ is based on the human brain.

What You're Rejecting When You're Expecting.

I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for their actual future offspring, that justification is preserved only if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for their potential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or subjective valuation of the opportunity is of the relevant type and valence to justify not assisting needy children and (b) the agent sincerely values the opportunity. Fifth, I argue that (a) is unsatisfied and that while (b) is satisfied in most cases, it entails that most agents are obligated to desire or be behaviourally disposed to pursue procreation for themselves (i.e., SPN). Thus, I conclude that both actual procreation and procreative potential are either insufficient justifications for not assisting needy children or that they entail obligatory pro-reproductive attitudes or behaviours.

Zhuangzi's Conception of Human Nature ( Xing 性)

Zhuangzi's understanding of human nature has not been extensively discussed in the English literature. The Chinese discussions of it, though many, largely tend either to be carried away into the Confucian conventional debate on the moral goodness and badness of human nature or to explain it away by overemphasizing Zhuangzi's stress on the uniqueness of the human individual. In this article, with the intention to pin down what is really meant by human nature in the Zhuangzi, it will first be examined what the word xing connotes for Zhuangzi and then argued that Zhuangzi characterizes human nature in terms of the heart-mind (xin 心), understood both functionally as what animates the body and essentially as a universally significant power that enables the human being to behave in a way similar to the way that the Dao 道 acts in the universe.

《알리타: 배틀 엔젤》을 중심으로 고찰한 포스트휴먼과 호모 사피엔스의 신체

With the rise of artificial intelligence, ICT technology, and the ability to combine humans and machines to overcome previously incurable maladies and physical limitations, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is ushering in a new era that no one has ever before experienced. Above all, the human body is on the verge of an unprecedented transformation, and we are now entering an era in which portions of our bodies will be combined with or replaced by machines. This is what we call the Posthuman era, and the bodies that humans will have in the Posthuman era will be completely different from the bodies that Homo sapiens have had as a result of the evolution of life. During the transition to the Posthuman era, the human body may be liberated from disease and physical limitations, and even death, the ultimate annihilation of the body. On the other hand, the proliferation of mass-produced, standardized, and so-called modular bodies may usher in a bleak era in which the human body and its organs are completely subjugated by the neoliberal logic of capital. This paper explores the nature of “moral goodness” and “human values” that humans should possess as they transition from homo sapiens to posthumans and analyzes the future of the human body in the Posthuman era from multiple perspectives. In particular, we will compare and analyze the physical features of the posthumans and humans portrayed in Alita: Battle Angel. In doing so, it will reveal, beyond their physical characteristics, the most human values of posthumans and homo sapiens, as well as the thought algorithms that preserve them.

Autogovernança Esportiva: Uma revisão ideológica dos fundamentos da comunidade esportiva em relação ao Estado.

This article is a contribution to the explanation of the hegemonic sports discourse as an external reality of politics and the State. To do so, the philosophical, ethical and historical principles are expounded, which propose the existence of internal goods in the practice of sport, enunciating sporting objectives as a political translation. Firstly, an explanation of the basic principles of Broad Internalism is given, whose task is the essential definition of sport, which is found in its exposition of moral and physical excellence in terms of Aristotelian virtuosity. Furthermore, it chooses to relate the principles of modern sportsmanship to Thomas Arnold, Aristotelian Christianity in order to establish the basis of sporting moral internal goods. Finally, the political and legal fit of sport and its connection to the approaches described above is presented.

Ответ Р. Суинберна на критику статьи «Моральная благость Бога»

This paper is a response to the critiques in Filosophia Religii 2022 and 2023 of my paper, “God’s Moral Goodness” (in Filosophia Religii 2022). I argue for the preferability of Aquinas’s way of arguing to God’s nature from the most general observable features of the world, over Anselm’s way adopted by Mark Murphy of drawing out the consequences of God being a “most perfect being”. I claimed against Vladimir Shokhin, that my probabilistic argument leads to the simplest and so most probable kind of God. To Igor Gasparov’s claim that an even simpler kind of God would be one who has no un-realised potentialities, and so one in which his one property of divinity includes all his activity, I argued that on the contrary, such a God would have no free will, and so not be truly omnipotent. To Mark Wynn’s claim that Christianity holds that God does not choose arbitrarily between equally good alternatives, but has preferences which do not merely track the relative goodness states of affairs, I answer that to postulate a God with such preferences simply moves the arbitrariness of God from his actions to his nature, and so postulates a less simple God than I postulate. I argue also against Vladimir Shokhin’s claim that humans do not have the power to discover God’s reasons for permitting horrendous evils, by drawing attention to some features of my own theodicy, which might begin to make it plausible that we do have this power. I reject Mark Wynn’s claim that on my theodicy no possible balance of evil over good observable by humans on earth could constitute evidence against the existence of God, and that in consequence nothing observable by such humans could constitute evidence for the existence of God. Kirill Karpov pointed out that there are vast disagreements about which world states are good and which are evil, and so we are in no position to judge whether my requirement for a cogent theodicy that every evil state is a logically necessary condition for some comparable good state, is satisfied in our world. I argued against him, that the mere existence of moral disagreement does not show that none of us can discern moral truths; and that on the contrary, many moral disagreements are resoluble by the method of “reflective equilibrium”. To Mark Murphy’s claim that God does not have “requiring reasons” to conform to the “familiar welfare orientated” morality, which humans are obliged to follow, I reply that the same very general principles of morality apply both to God and to humans, but their application varies with the degree of power, knowledge and freedom possessed, and the causal power exercised, by humans and by God. To Murphy’s claim that God as “the ultimate source” of the goodness of created beings cannot be constrained by what constitutes their goodness, I object that what constitutes moral goodness is determined in part by paradigm examples of moral goodness, including promoting, and preventing setbacks to, the well-being of created beings. To Vladimir Shokhin’s endeavor to support his view that God is too great for humans to understand his ways, by various quotations from Scripture, I adduce quotations from Scripture which suggest the contrary. None of the contributors expressed a view on my claim in the earlier paper that God is not merely a “best acting” God, but also a “best feeling” God, except for Vladimir Shokhin who agreed with me; and so I welcome this conclusion to our symposium.

Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology, RobertSokolowski, Catholic University of America Press, 2022 (ISBN 978‐0‐8132‐3518‐9), xiv + 326 pp., pb $34.95

Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology, RobertSokolowski, Catholic University of America Press, 2022 (ISBN 978‐0‐8132‐3518‐9), xiv + 326 pp., pb $34.95

The Reasonableness of Theology: Recent Pontifical Approaches in Response to the Critique of Emmanuel Levinas

This article responds to Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of reason in the Western philosophical tradition, contrasting it with a continuity of approach taken by recent Bishops of Rome, including Francis, Benedict XVI, and John Paul II. Levinas provides an important corrective to aspects of the way reason has been deployed, especially with regard to violence and war. It will be argued that Levinas helps refine and humble theological reflection, but his argument is not altogether applicable to theology. A Catholic tradition of theology relies on philosophy in terms of ‘naming names,’ an activity responsive to Levinas’s critique, and counters it in terms of moral goodness. Responding to Levinas helps to confidently articulate theology as an intelligent participation and performance of the good in a thoroughgoing reasonableness.

Remarks on James Liszka’s Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences

Peirce held a convergence theory of moral truth, as James Liszka persuasively argues in Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences (2021). Here I emphasize: (1) that Peirce's convergence theory follows from the application of the maxim of pragmatism to the concept of moral goodness or rightness; (2) that in connection with Peirce's account of the ethical summum bonum, morally right action can be understood as action that conforms or contributes to the growth of concrete reasonableness; and (3) that, for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness seems to be a movement or development toward "God". While I broadly agree with Liszka's approach, I highlight some disagreements. As do many readers of Peirce, Liszka seems to regard the convergence of beliefs and habits as necessarily a convergance among the "indefinite community" of distinct persons or inquirers; however, there is sufficient evidence that Peirce came to think that, if any given person were to live long enough, they would come to the same conclusions or rest in the same habits on their own. With respect to morality, even the most evil person would eventually come around to the moral truth.

Power and Play

Power and Play