Moral Expertise Research Articles

Chinese Teachers’ Professional Identity and Beliefs about the Teacher-Student Relationships in an Intercultural Context

This paper presents a qualitative study of immigrant Chinese teachers’ professional identity and beliefs about the teacher-student relationship in an intercultural context. Theoretically, this study takes its departure from a sociocultural perspective on understanding professional identity. The empirical analysis in the study drew mainly upon ethnographic interviews with a group of Chinese language teachers in Denmark concerning their life experiences, perceptions, and beliefs. The results of this study suggest that teachers’ beliefs about their roles as teachers and about student-teacher relationships are shaped by both their prior experiences and backgrounds and the current social and cultural contexts in which they are situated. Changes of context (e.g., from China to Denmark) often lead to a transformation of their professional identity and beliefs. Being a teacher in an intercultural context often exposes them to the confrontation of diverse challenges and dilemmas. On one hand, teachers in this study generally experienced a transformation from being a moral role model, subject expert, authority and parental role to being a learning facilitator and culture worker. On the other hand, they developed diverse individualized coping strategies to handle student-teacher interactions and other aspects of teachers’ professional identity.

Rethinking Moral Expertise.

We argue that the way in which the concept of expertise is understood and invoked has prevented progress in the debate as to whether moral philosophers can be said to be 'moral experts'. We offer an account of expertise that draws on the role of tacit knowledge in order to provide a basis upon which the debate can progress. Our analysis consists of three parts. In the first part we highlight two specific problems in the way that the concept of expertise has been invoked in the moral expertise debate, namely the understanding of expertise as an exclusive concept and the conflation of expertise with the idea of 'authority'. In the second part we suggest an alternative way of approaching the concept of expertise. This is based on Collins and Evans' sociological theory of expertises. This theory provides a valuable analytical framework for thinking about claims to expertise and for drawing the kinds of distinctions which allow for different kinds of moral expertises and competencies. In the final part, we show how the application of this theory helps to avoid some of the problematic conclusions which theorists have arrived at to date and provides a common platform for debate. Ultimately, it permits the argument to be made that moral philosophers could be considered specialist members of an expert community of moral decision-makers.

From meaning well to doing well: ethical expertise in the GIS domain

There is evidence to support the idea that moral action can be thought of in terms of expertise in a domain. This paper reviews work on the development of moral expertise across five levels, from novice to expertise. It addresses the role of habit in expertise and self-regulation strategies that signal when habitual action is not working and that respond with consciously guided action. It suggests moral skills one might need to acquire, both general and specific to the domain of GIS. It suggests how an expertise approach builds on current pedagogy while adding skilled practice.

Ethics expertise in political regulation of biomedicine: the need of democratic justification

This study addresses the problem that democratic polities call for expert advice on normative issues and argues for the need of democratic justification of political use of ethics expertise in regulation of biomedicine. Ethics expertise, expertise in the systematic analysis of moral problems, must not be conflated with moral expertise, expertise in providing the right moral. However, by asking ethics expertise for advice, political decision-makers impose bioethics councils to provide consensus decisions on value questions, which is detrimental to democracy. The article demonstrates how consensus seeking transforms ethics expertise into alleged moral expertise, which precludes the fundamental democratic value of equal respect of all citizens’ right of normative self-determination and to have an equal say in common matters. To be democratically justified, it is necessary that ethics expertise uses its clarifying expertise and provides different possible moral positions for the public and democratically accountable decision-makers to deliberate and decide upon.

Moral expertise

We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.

Dying with Dignity in Québec: Palliative Care, Moral Expertise, and the Debate on Euthanasia

On March 22, 2012, the Select Committee on Dying with Dignity of the National Assembly of Québec released its final report recommending the adoption of “medical aid in dying” in the province of Québec, Canada. The majority of palliative care physicians, professed experts in end of life care, rejected the committee’s conclusion. And yet, the recommendation of the committee, in framing euthanasia as “medical aid in dying,” placed the practice squarely within the realm of their putative expertise.The objective of this project is to examine the role of palliative care physicians in the Dying with Dignity debate in Québec and to answer the following question: why were palliative care practitioners unable to influence the outcome of the debate?My methods include a detailed analysis of the committee proceedings of the Select Committee on Dying with Dignity and a review of the sociological literature on committees and on expertise, the philosophical literature on euthanasia, and the historical literature on palliative care.I draw broad conclusion about: (i) committees, and the way in which committee formation and format prioritize certain societal values; (ii) medical expertise, and the devaluation of certain forms of knowledge in the evidence-based medicine framework; (iii) moral expertise, and its presumed absence in Western democratic society.

A Defense of Moral Deference

Everyone agrees, I think, that there is something fishy about moral deference and expertise, but that's where consensus ends. This paper has two aims – the first is to mount a defense of moral deference, and the second is to offer a (non-debunking) diagnosis of its fishiness. I defend moral deference by connecting the discussion of moral deference to the recent discussion of the appropriate response to uncertainty. It is, I argue, morally obligatory to minimize the risk of one's wrongdoing (at least when all other things are held equal), and this moral requirement entails that deferring to a moral expert is sometimes not just morally permissible but also admirable, and indeed morally required. If moral deference is often justified, why is it fishy? I offer an explanation in terms of the emotions moral judgments are often related to, and their nature (roughly speaking) as directed at the good or bad, right or wrong, de re rather than de dicto. The combination of this vindication of moral deference and diagnosis of its fishiness nicely accommodates, I argue, some related phenomena, like the (neglected) fact that our uneasiness with moral deference is actually a particular instance of uneasiness with opaque evidence in general when it comes to morality, and the (familiar) fact that the scope of this uneasiness is wider than the moral as it includes other normative domains.

Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate

In this article, I provide a guide to some current thinking in empirical moral psychology on the nature of moral intuitions, focusing on the theories of Haidt and Narvaez. Their debate connects to philosophical discussions of virtue theory and the role of emotions in moral epistemology. After identifying difficulties attending the current debate around the relation between intuitions and reasoning, I focus on the question of the development of intuitions. I discuss how intuitions could be shaped into moral expertise, outlining Haidt’s emphasis on innate factors and Narvaez’s account in terms of a social-cognitive model of personality. After a brief discussion of moral relativism, I consider the implications of the account of moral expertise for our understanding of the relation between moral intuitions and reason. I argue that a strong connection can be made if we adopt a broad conception of reason and a narrow conception of expertise.

The Global South in Environmental Negotiations: the politics of coalitions in redd+

During international environmental negotiations developing countries have commonly employed a unified strategy through the G-77 and China (G-77/China). Compared with other negotiations, such as those on trade and security, this strategy has been relatively successful in securing financial and technical benefits. Unity among developing states is not, however, a characteristic of all environmental negotiations. This paper analyses the case of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus conservation ( redd +), where unity has been absent. It argues that the negotiation positions, strategies and coalition politics from 2005 to 2013 have been a result of identifiable power asymmetries among developing states (shifting over time). Some states with vast forest resources have held an effective veto, while others have had considerable moral influence and expert authority. Coalitions have courted such relevant and reputational leaders. At the same time some developing states have had enough diplomatic capacity and economic power to stand alone in negotiations. Taking a broad, historical view of the diverse forest interests and power asymmetries among developing states helps to explain the recent stagnation in negotiations to establish an international redd+ mechanism to mitigate climate change.

MORAL EXPERTISE: JUDGMENT, PRACTICE, AND ANALYSIS

AbstractThis essay defends moral expertise against the skeptical considerations raised by Gilbert Ryle and others. The core of the essay articulates an account of moral expertise that draws on work on expertise in empirical moral psychology, and develops an analogy between moral expertise and linguistic expertise. The account holds that expertise is contrastive, so that a person is an expert relative to a particular contrast. Further, expertise is domain specific and characterized by “automatic” behavior and judgment. Some disagreements in the literature regarding moral expertise are diagnosed as being due to failures to adequately distinguish different ways in which someone can be a moral expert. For example, expertise in action does not imply expertise in judgment or analysis.

Deferring to moral experts

Deferring to moral experts

Moral Expertise and Democratic Legitimacy

Abstract In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.

Moral Expertise

Abstract This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than they are because of their focus on moral expertise regarding all-in judgments about rightness. We reject this emphasis on all-in judgment in favor of an account of moral expertise as typically multi-stranded and domain limited. This account of moral expertise is better able to address the problem of how to identify those who have expertise. It also offers a more nuanced picture of the contrast between accepting a moral claim on one's own and accepting it on testimony.

Comment on Karen Jones and François Schroeter

Abstract In this comment I defend my account of moral understanding and its role in morally worthy action and claim that a fully virtuous person would have moral understanding. This means that deference to moral experts is not always appropriate. But there is still room for a social moral epistemology, whereby moral experts pass on moral understanding.

How to Identify Moral Experts? An Application of Goldman's Criteria for Expert Identification to the Domain of Morality

Abstract How can laypeople justifiably distinguish between reliable experts and unreliable experts? This problem, usually called the 'problem of expert identification', is highly debated in recent social epistemology. A great amount of work has been undertaken in order to find satisfactory criteria for identifying experts in different branches of the empirical sciences, but hardly in the domain of moral knowledge. This asymmetry between social and moral epistemology is the motivation behind my paper. I reconsider the epistemological problem of identifying moral experts by applying identification criteria developed in general social epistemology to the area of morality. As I will show, all of these criteria turn out to be inappropriate for identifying moral experts. This result seems implausible, because it conflicts with the observation that moral experts play an important role in public and scientific discourse, in ethics committees and boards. But this is not a real contradiction as I will illustrate by explaining which tasks these experts can, in my view, fulfill.

Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts! A Reply to David Archard

In his article 'Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts' David Archard attempts to show that his argument from common-sense morality is more convincing than other competing arguments in the debate. I examine his main line of argumentation and eventually refute his main argument in my reply.

Mapping Our Practice? Some Conceptual “Bumps” for us to Consider

There are several important conceptual issues and questions about the practice of healthcare ethics that can, and should, inform the development of any practice standards. This paper provides a relatively short overview of seven of these issues, with the invitation for further critical reflection and examination of their relevance to and implications for practice standards. The seven issues described include: diversity (from the perspective of training and experience); moral expertise and authority/influence; being an insider or outsider; flexibility and adaptability (for local contexts of practice); the relative weighting of procedural and normative aspects of ethics practice; making mistakes or errors; and conflicts of interest in practice.

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi’s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another’s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?

Expertise for Teaching Biology Situated in the Context of Genetic Testing

Contemporary genomics research will impact the daily practice of biology teachers who want to teach up-to-date genetics in secondary education. This article reports on a research project aimed at enhancing biology teachers’ expertise for teaching genetics situated in the context of genetic testing. The increasing body of scientific knowledge concerning genetic testing and the related consequences for decision-making indicate the societal relevance of an educational approach based on situated learning. What expertise do biology teachers need for teaching genetics in the personal health context of genetic testing? This article describes the required expertise by exploring the educational practice. Nine experienced teachers were interviewed about the pedagogical content, moral and interpersonal expertise areas concerning how to teach genetics in the personal health context of genetic testing, and the lessons of five of them were observed. The findings showed that the required teacher expertise encompasses specific pedagogical content expertise, interpersonal expertise and a preference for teacher roles and teaching approaches for the moral aspects of teaching in this context. A need for further development of teaching and learning activities for (reflection on) moral reasoning came to the fore. Suggestions regarding how to apply this expertise into context-based genetics education are discussed.

Inside Baseball and Ethics Consultation: A Comment on “Ethics Been Very Good to Us”

In response to the article by Scofield, I consider the that, how, and why of ethics consultation, moral expertise, and the rules of the game. The question still to be engaged is, how does all of this work out for patients and families?