1. IntroductionEpistemic-based democracy, as advocated Robert Talisse, is philosophical structure in which it is argued that democracy and its institutions can be validated as required context for, and presumed effects of, kinds of basic epistemic in which we all engage. Utilizing writings of Charles S. Peirce, Talisse argues that epistemic which undergird individual inquiry are universal, such that whereas there is fact of reasonable concerning moral comprehensive doctrines, there is no corresponding with regard to our basic epistemic (Talisse 2007b, 55).Though precise contours and implementations of these basic epistemic commitments tend to shift within workings of Talisse's argument, explicit presentation of his is fairly simple and straightforward; he writes that by taking epistemic action we reveal that we uphold principle that beliefs ought to square with we have and that we as believers ought to track evidence (Talisse 2009a, 5). These epistemic require free exchange of ideas, such that only in democratic political can one be proper epistemic believer (Talisse 2007b, 67).One of Talisse's goals is to differentiate his epistemic-based democracy from tenets of John Dewey. Talisse objects to Deweyan path, claiming that Deweyan view is driven distinctive of human flourishing (Talisse 2007b, 44) which promotes a substantive of democracy that cannot countenance fact of reasonable pluralism (Talisse 2007b, 41). Talisse, instead, attempts to derive his impetus for democracy from purely epistemic bases. What emerges is epistemology based on our everyday practices of debating, reasoning [and] arguing (Talisse 2009a, 85). According to Talisse, folk does not propose any philosophically controversial conception (Talisse 2009a, 85); rather, it is claimed, basic tenets of our inherent epistemological attributes lead to, and require, democracy since the folk to which we are already committed entails commitment to certain social epistemology, which in turn requires democratic political and social order (Talisse 2009a, 6). Thus, Talisse presents linear, unidirectional connection between his and democracy such that former naturally undergirds, and develops into, latter.I argue, however, that simplified, naturalized tenets of inquiry for which Talisse explicitly argues do not coincide with ways in which Talissean epistemic structure itself functions. Though Talisse presents rhetorically compelling argument, workings of his epistemological structure rely on unacknowledged rhetorical and strategic maneuvers which simplify and universalize its particular of inquiry. Talisse writes repeatedly of need to engage all differing viewpoints, claiming that there is epistemic obligation to expose oneself to dissenting and unfamiliar views (Talisse 2007b, 66, italics in original); however, his structure elides such engagements. The structure does not explicitly exclude differing viewpoints; rather it rhetorically repositions critics, and reconceptualizes their arguments, in ways that are amenable to structure. The effect is that universality of Talissean is never challenged.The ease at which Talisse is able to re-position his critics onto his own terrain of inquiry illuminates precariousness of critiques which attempt to undermine theoretical/political conceptions while replicating, and reifying, their basic tenets. My approach to Talissean structure is deconstructive in nature. I make no claims as to whether Talisse accurately mirrors outer world of politics or internal universe of individual, nor do I posit an alternative as better fulfilling those criteria. …