Moral Decision-making Process Research Articles

Is the Concept of Conscience Found in Judaism?

Is the Concept of Conscience Found in Judaism?1 Gilbert S. Rosenthal (bio) Introduction Is the concept of conscience found in Judaism? If so, what are its parameters and implications in Jewish law and ethics? This is, in my view, an important and timely issue—one that has really been given short shrift by scholars of Judaism. There are those who claim that conscience is irrelevant because all that matters is what the Torah requires and what halakhah—Jewish law—demands of Jews. But there are others who insist that the ideal and goal of Jewish law is to nurture and develop in humans a sense of conscience. Some scholars maintain that in Judaism, all ethics and laws are theonomous—divinely inspired and ordained. And since conscience is an autonomous source of behavior, it is irrelevant. Others insist that heteronymous ethics, defined and legislated by society, are what matter—not autonomous ethics that are so personal and subjective.2 In this study, I propose to examine the sources that seem to prefigure the notion of conscience in the Bible, rabbinic literature, and medieval Jewish writings, and I shall endeavor to draw from the sources meaningful lessons relevant to a modern understanding of the role of conscience in Jewish individual and group behavior. What Is Conscience? I should start by defining conscience and citing several important and instructive scholarly reflections on this concept. The word comes from the [End Page 3] two Latin words that mean “knowing with.” Conscience is the authentic awareness of the self that makes decisions with regard to values. Its chief concerns are good and evil. It represents the totality of the human’s cognitive and judging faculties. It is generally thought of in a negative sense: it is the faculty that reminds us, by stimulating feelings of guilt and shame, that we are doing wrong. The troubled heart is a sign of conscience. Paul seems to have used the Greek term syneidesis to denote conscience.3 In the thirteenth century, Aquinas thought of conscience as “that which witnesses or binds, incites and also accuses, stings, or rebukes,” and he argued that “it must bind even in error and have all authority.”4 Sigmund Freud suggested that conscience is the product of what he called the superego. He defined conscience as that which gives our impulses “direction towards what is right,”5 further writing that “conscience is that internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us.” He connected it to the savage’s attitude to taboo and a “fearful sense of guilt.” It is “the higher side of human life; it incarnates ideals, moral decencies, as well as spiritual currents we’ve absorbed into ourselves,” and it both judges and directs humans.6 Lawrence Kohlberg suggested that conscience stands at the final stage of moral development; what is right is defined by the decisions of conscience: “At heart, these are the universal principles of justice, regarding reciprocity and equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.”7 Erik Erikson wrote that conscience is the development from a child’s reaction to an adult’s autonomous values of reality and ideals and what selection to make of authoritative statements. That, he suggested, is autonomy in the moral decision-making process.8 Milton Konvitz argued that “each man has a heart, but each man is not a law unto himself.” He wrote, “The heart of conscience is not a voice that speaks out of man; it is a hearing agency given to man so that he may hear the voice of God.” He defines two aspects of conscience: the judicial aspect, which passes judgment on acts committed; and the directive aspect, which guides the person before the action has taken place. Konvitz adds that it is the role of legislation to nurture conscience, and the genius of Judaism was to translate conscience into legal principles.9 Martin Buber described conscience in these words: “Conscience is that court within the soul which concerns itself with a distinction between the right and the wrong, and proceeds against that which has been determined as wrong.”10 Abraham [End Page 4] Joshua...

The Development of Moral Emotions and Decision-Making From Adolescence to Early Adulthood: A 6-Year Longitudinal Study

Adolescents' emotions in the context of moral decision-making repeatedly have been shown to predict actual behaviour. However, little systematic information on developmental change regarding these emotion expectancies has been available thus far. This longitudinal study investigated anticipated moral emotions and decision-making between the ages of 15 and 21 in a representative sample of Swiss adolescents (N = 1,258; 54 % female; M = 15.30 years). Anticipated moral emotions and decision-making were assessed through a semi-structured interview procedure. Using Bernoulli hierarchical linear modeling, it was found that positive feelings after a moral transgression (i.e., "happy victimizer" responses) decreased over time, whereas positive feelings after a moral decision (i.e., "happy moralist" responses) increased. However, this pattern was contingent upon the moral scenario presented. Systematic relationships between anticipated moral emotions and moral personality characteristics of sympathy, conscientiousness, and agreeableness were found, even when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and cognitive ability. Overall, this study demonstrates that the development of anticipated moral emotions is not limited to childhood. Furthermore, our findings suggest that moral emotions serve as an important link between moral personality development and decision-making processes that are more proximal to everyday moral behavior.

YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: COMPARING JUDGEMENTS IN TROLLEY PROBLEMS INVOLVING ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL HARMS, INJURY AND DEATH

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms.

A 21st-Century Framework for Character Formation in Sports

The value of athletics in character development has been anecdotally touted for centuries, but the reality is that sporting environments have regularly failed to achieve the potentials of moral education. The shared physical and mental demands of sports combined with the intensity with which much of society approaches competition makes the playing field a unique venue for both the observation and teaching of dynamic, virtuous behavior. Considering modern findings in the fields of cognitive science, social psychology, and behavioral neuroscience in conjunction with rich philosophical thinking of the past provides insights to drive sports-based character education into this century. In this article we present a framework for character education in sports that examines the sociocultural influences, emotional and cognitive responses, and self-regulation skills throughout the moral decision-making process on the playing field. Each level of this model provides insights for athletic educators navigating both prosocial and antisocial behaviors in sport. Beyond considering sport as a venue for character development it is also valuable to acknowledge the potential for character to improve athletic performance. This interacting relationship not only adds value to character education initiatives but also provides additional opportunities for creating a strong community belief system around character. Creating impactful student-athlete character education environments is challenging, yet sport educational environments that are consciously shaped and consistently supportive can succeed.

The challenges of journalism ethics in the Democratic Republic of Congo

This article pinpoints the various obstacles that prevent the emergence of genuine media pluralism in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and aims to clarify the sense and/or senselessness of journalistic practices across the Congolese media landscape. The contrast between norms and actual practices constitutes a ‘crisis’ of Congolese journalism. It is argued that these practices are essentially ‘transgressive’, in that that they violate conventional, professional ethical norms. ‘Transgressive’ journalism practices are seen as a more or less regulated means of contravening the profession's official canons. This article identifies the principles and values that intervene in the moral decision-making process of journalists.

How we used moral imagination to address ethical and methodological complexities while conducting research with girls in school against the odds in Kenya

This article presents a reflection on the ethical and methodological complexities experienced when conducting research in schools in Kajiado district, Kenya, which sought to understand why some girls were in school in spite of the socio-cultural and economic problems they faced. Three complexities are discussed (positionality and power between the teachers, girls and researchers, confidentiality of girls’ information, and researchers personal involvement and advocacy). A framework of moral imagination is used to deconstruct the process of moral and ethical decision-making that took place in response to these complexities. This involves the researcher taking a position that strives, not simply to ‘do no harm’, but to go one step further and to ‘do good’, within a context of social justice. The article is drawn from an ongoing longitudinal study on girls ‘against the odds’. In the pilot study reported here, four primary schools were involved and interviews were carried out with 24 girls, alongside observations of the surrounding environment and informal conversations with eight teachers.

Simulating murder: The aversion to harmful action.

Diverse lines of evidence point to a basic human aversion to physically harming others. First, we demonstrate that unwillingness to endorse harm in a moral dilemma is predicted by individual differences in aversive reactivity, as indexed by peripheral vasoconstriction. Next, we tested the specific factors that elicit the aversive response to harm. Participants performed actions such as discharging a fake gun into the face of the experimenter, fully informed that the actions were pretend and harmless. These simulated harmful actions increased peripheral vasoconstriction significantly more than did witnessing pretend harmful actions or to performing metabolically matched nonharmful actions. This suggests that the aversion to harmful actions extends beyond empathic concern for victim harm. Together, these studies demonstrate a link between the body and moral decision-making processes.

Rethinking paternalism: an exploration of responses to the Israel Patient's Rights Act 1996

Questions of patient autonomy have formed an important part of ethical debate in medicine from at least the post-war period onwards. Although initially important as a counterweight to widespread medical...

Last Resort and Preemption: Using Armed Force as a Moral and Penultimate Choice

This article argues that using armed force in peace enforcement operations (PEO) need not be reserved for a Last Resort even while preserving the integrity of Just War theory. It aims to deepen the ethical discussion regarding the relevance of Last Resort as a consideration for the use of armed force, specifically in PEO. Armed force in such operations can interrupt barbarism or genocide and may even be utilized to preempt or prevent possible war. Using armed force in humanitarian interventions is not the moral equivalent of launching war, but the choice to enter such disputes must be subject to intense ethical scrutiny. Such operations are undertaken in an effort to prevent a bad situation from deteriorating. The ethical framework of Just War theory provides criteria for moral deliberation related to the use of military force in such actions. The possibility exists that applying armed force before reaching a point of Last Resort may be just in a humanitarian operation if it accompanies other efforts. Preemption remains an inherent part of US strategic thinking, while PEO are normally viewed as a preventive measure. 1 Persistent ethical questions regarding preemption are directly linked to Just War theory, particularly when it comes to the standard of war as a Last Resort. Analysis of this criterion generally follows the trend of categorizing war as a Last Resort based on the judgment that war is the worst prudential and moral option due to the associated death and civil destruction. Peace enforcement operations may be a higher moral option and perhaps even a moral duty. Strategic thinkers are challenged to probe these questions and provide insight in their efforts to strengthen the moral decisionmaking process.

With Hope and Imagination: Imaginative Moral Decision-Making in Neonatal Intensive Care Units

Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature, points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research, we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination aids medical practitioners demarcating moral categories, tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions. We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with hope and imagination.

Can Business Ethics be Trained? A Study of the Ethical Decision-making Process in Business Students

The purpose of this paper is to examine the various guidelines presented in the literature for instituting an ethics curriculum and to empirically study their effectiveness. Three questions are addressed concerning the trainability of ethics material and the proper integration and implementation of an ethics curriculum. An empirical study then tested the effect of ethics training on moral awareness and reasoning. The sample consisted of two business classes, one exposed to additional ethics curriculum (experimental), and one not exposed (control). For the experimental group, ethics exercises and discussion relevant to each topic were completed. Findings suggested gender differences such that, relative to other groups, women in the experimental group showed significantly improved moral awareness and decision-making processes. An explanation of the underlying cognitive processes is presented to explain the gender effect.

Using dimensions of moral intensity to predict ethical decision-making in accounting

Many ethical decisions are based on the intensity of the moral conflict. Embezzling large sums of money is seen as more unethical, by most people, than stealing a pen or a piece of paper from one's workplace. This study examines the importance of the underlying characteristics of moral issues and how they directly affect accounting students' ethical decision-making process (moral sensitivity, moral judgment and moral intentions). A four stage model presented by Rest (1986) and expanded by Jones' (1991) was used to measure the moral decision-making process. The study highlights the results of a sample of 110 accounting majors in a small business college in the USA. The research suggests that moral intensity appeared to have two dimensions: “perceived corporate concern” and “perceived involvement effect”. These dimensions did not significantly predict moral sensitivity. However, when they were combined with moral sensitivity they did significantly predict the students' moral judgment. Likewise, moral judgment and the dimensions of moral intensity significantly predicted accounting students' moral intentions. The findings presented here extend current understanding of the influence of the moral intensity components on the moral decision-making process. The results can also be used to enhance ethics coursework and training programs in educational and industrial settings.

Influence of bodily harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision-making

Moral decision-making is central to everyday social life because the evaluation of the actions of another agent or our own actions made with respect to the norms and values guides our behavior in a community. There is previous evidence that the presence of bodily harm—even if irrelevant for a decision—may affect the decision-making process. While recent neuroimaging studies found a common neural substrate of moral decision-making, the role of bodily harm has not been systematically studied so far. Here we used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how behavioral and neural correlates of semantic and moral decision-making processes are modulated by the presence of direct bodily harm or violence in the stimuli. Twelve participants made moral and semantic decisions about sentences describing actions of agents that either contained bodily harm or not and that could easily be judged as being good or bad or correct/incorrect, respectively. During moral and semantic decision-making, the presence of bodily harm resulted in faster response times (RT) and weaker activity in the temporal poles relative to trials devoid of bodily harm/violence, indicating a processing advantage and reduced processing depth for violence-related linguistic stimuli. Notably, there was no increase in activity in the amygdala and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) in response to trials containing bodily harm. These findings might be a correlate of limited generation of the semantic and emotional context in the anterior temporal poles during the evaluation of actions of another agent related to violence that is made with respect to the norms and values guiding our behavior in a community.

Differences in the Perceptions of Moral Intensity in the Moral Decision Process: An Empirical Examination of Accounting Students

The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of the impact of moral issues on the moral decision-making process within the field of accounting. In particular, the study examined differences in the perceptions of the underlying characteristics of moral issues on the specific steps of the moral decision-making process of four different accounting situations.

Moral Decision Making: Changing Models in Twentieth-Century Catholic Thought

The author investigates the way descriptions of the moral decision-making process have changed since the middle of the twentieth century in Catholic thought. He proposes a model that incorporates the best features from the past with insights from more recent research, such as the importance of holism, and the restoring of the human will to its traditional position.

An ethical decision-making process for computing professionals

Our comments focus on the ACM Code of Ethics and situate the Code within a general ethical decision-making process to specify the five steps which logically precede human action in ethical matters and determine that action, and the individual difference traits in these five steps which bear upon the resolution of an ethical problem and lead to morally responsible action. Our main purpose is to present a cognitive moral processing model which computing professionals can use to better understand their professional rights and duties. It is clear that the Code provides substantial guidance in the areas of intellectual property rights, unauthorized entry into computing systems, and privacy. In other areas, such as obscenity on bulletin-board systems, the Code is silent. An interactive software program which allows the user to see the ways in which the Code is integrated and instructive in the six-step moral decision-making process is accessible via the internet. Our secondary purpose is to reformulate the Code as a set of questions which allow the computing professional to see practices which diminish the human person as unethical and those which enhance the human person as ethical.

The Moral Significance of Collective Entities

The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern. Collectivities are defined in terms of irreducibly corporate action and distinctive conditions of persisting identity. Their lack of sentience does not preclude moral concern, and their raison d'êtremay render moral concern for them appropriate. Recent attempts by Pettit, McMahon, and Broome to limit the moral realm to individuals are considered. They are rebutted on the grounds that they rest heavily on pre-existing moral intuitions; they ascribe a stronger thesis than is necessary to the sponsors of the moral significance of non-individuals; and they wrongly assume that what has value for individuals must have value becauseit has value for individuals. Collectivities can have moral importance even if they lack the intrinsicmoral importance attaching to human beings, and substantial consequences follow from that fact. In particular, routine appeals to the distinctness of persons become more problematic when collectivities, themselves composed entirely of persons, have independent moral significance which needs to be taken into account. That will affect both assessment of moral consequences and the process of moral decision-making.

Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment

There is a powerful tradition that views emotions as harmful to the process of moral judgment and decision-making. Stemming from the writings of Kant and others, who viewed emotions as undependable forces that are largely outside of our control, this view has had a large influence on moral psychology. It is argued that this tradition is based on a definition of emotion that is no longer tenable given recent evidence concerning emotional processes. Rather, emotions are often reliable reflections of moral beliefs, and are open to conscious regulatory control, enabling the individual to use emotional responses to serve moral goals. In support of this, evidence is reviewed demonstrating the features of emotion-specifically the empathic response-that make it advantageous for the process of moral judgment. These features are then organized into a theoretical framework of moral judgment that describes the dialectic between affect and moral reasoning, thus allowing emotions to re-enter the arena of the study of moral reasoning and moral judgment.

Using Gilligan's Framework to Analyze Nurses' Stories of Moral Choices

The manner in which nurses address and eventually solve ethical and moral questions and institutional problems is not yet well explained. This is a qualitative descriptive study examining the moral decision-making processes used by 24 nurses. The work of Carol Gilligan provides the framework for this study. The perspectives of the nurses was explored and a determination was made as to whether the justice or caring orientation prevailed in the situation. The method described by the Gilligan group is explained. Three stories are presented to serve as exemplars of the various orientations and of institutional forces that were active in the nurses' stories. The caring orientation was clearly present, as was the justice orientation to a lesser degree. Other issues such as power and financial security also were apparent.