Moral Consensus Research Articles

Five problems for the moral consensus about sins

A number of Christian theologians and philosophers have been critical of overly moralizing approaches to the doctrine of sin, but nearly all Christian thinkers maintain that moral fault is necessary or sufficient for sin to obtain. Call this the “Moral Consensus.” I begin by clarifying the relevance of impurities to the biblical cataloguing of sins. I then present four extensional problems for the Moral Consensus on sin, based on the biblical catalogue of sins: (1) moral over-demandingness, (2) agential unfairness, (3) moral repugnance, and (4) moral atrocity. Next, I survey several partial solutions to these problems, suggested by the recent philosophical literature. Then I evaluate two largely unexplored solutions: (a) genuine sin dilemmas and (b) defeasible sinfulness. I argue that (a) creates more problems than it solves and that, while (b) is well-motivated and solves or eases each of the above problems, (b) leaves many biblical ordinances about sin morally misleading, creating (5) a pedagogical problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that (5) places hefty explanatory burdens on those who would appeal to (b) to resolve the four extensional problems discussed in this paper. So Christian thinkers may need to consider a more radical separation of sin and moral fault.

On formal ethics versus inclusive moral deliberation

In this article, I will advocate caution against a formalization of ethics by showing that it may produce and perpetuate unjustified power imbalances, disadvantaging those without a proper command of the formalisms, and those not in a position to decide on the formalisms’ use. My focus rests mostly on ethics formalized for the purpose of implementing ethical evaluations in computer science–artificial intelligence, in particular—but partly also extends to the project of applying mathematical rigor to moral argumentation with no direct intention to automate moral deliberation. Formal ethics of the latter kind can, however, also be seen as a facilitator of automated ethical evaluation. I will argue that either form of formal ethics presents an obstacle to inclusive and fair processes for arriving at a society-wide moral consensus. This impediment to inclusive moral deliberation may prevent a significant portion of society from acquiring a deeper understanding of moral issues. However, I will defend the view that such understanding supports genuine and sustained moral progress. From this, it follows that formal ethics is not per se supportive of moral progress. I will illustrate these arguments by practical examples of manifest asymmetric relationships of power primarily from the domain of autonomous vehicles as well as on more visionary concepts, such as artificial moral advisors. As a result, I will show that in these particular proposed use-cases of formal ethics, machine ethics risks to run contrary to their proponents’ proclaimed promises of increasing the rigor of moral deliberation and even improving human morality on the whole. Instead, I will propose that inclusive discourse about automating ethical evaluations, e.g., in autonomous vehicles, should be conducted with unrelenting transparency about the limitations of implementations of ethics. As an outlook, I will briefly discuss uses formal ethics that are more likely to avoid discrepancies between the ideal of inclusion and the challenge from power asymmetries.Please check and confirm that the authors and their respective affiliations have been correctly identified and amend if necessary.I confirm.Author names: Please confirm if the author names are presented accurately and in the correct sequence (given name, middle name/initial, family name). I confirm. Kindly check and confirm the country name for the affiliation [1] is correct.I confirm.

Global Gandhi

Gandhi is regarded as something of a global saint, and his non-violent methods of satyagraha have been employed around the world—these alone would make him a figure relevant to the global age. But what is even more significant about his thinking is the applicability of satyagraha in situations of a diverse multicultural milieu. The satyagraha methodology of conflict resolution assumes that although there is a truth to be found in conflicting perspectives, there is no one side that is necessarily correct, there is no moral standard. Gandhi’s approach to conflict requires an engagement of contending sides to see what elements of their positions are truthful and to build a new syncretic view of truth based on this engagement. It is an approach to moral consensus and conflict resolution that is particularly relevant to the multicultural situation of globalised societies in the contemporary world.

'Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude': The Constitutional and Persistent Immigration Law Doctrine

For over a century, American immigration law has provided that an alien is deportable for “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMT). For nearly as long, observers have lamented the persistence of the phrase, complaining of its antiquarianism and imprecision. These criticisms have ripened in recent years into the argument that the phrase is so vague as to be unconstitutional. Defenders of the phrase are scarce among judges and nonexistent in the scholarly community. This Article offers a defense of the CIMT provisions, built upon a more thorough understanding of their history. It demonstrates that Congress has acknowledged objections to the CIMT provisions but ultimately rejected these criticisms. The recent void-for-vagueness precedents cited to support the invalidation of the CIMT provisions are, for the most part, inapposite. Furthermore, the argument that the CIMT provisions are indeterminate, because there is no moral consensus in American contemporary society, is overstated. The Article concludes that the CIMT provisions reflect and highlight the differences between criminal law, which punishes discrete acts, and immigration law, which sets a minimum moral threshold for inclusion in a political community. The CIMT provisions invest executive officials with a measure of discretion, channeled by precedent, that allows them to achieve the goals of immigration law.

A Christian college in a food truck? Christian study centers and moral formation

The task of moral formation has long been an important purpose of higher education in the United States. However, pluralism and lack of moral consensus within secular universities present significant challenges to accomplishing this task. One possible solution is Christian study centers, which offer thick moral cultures that can form students at secular universities within the Christian tradition. Anselm House’s Fellows Program at the University of Minnesota illustrates such a context and suggests avenues for future research.

Utopias of OneLiterary Primitivism

Utopias of OneLiterary Primitivism

Speaking of the Holocaust

Albert Friedlander’s writings were part of a generational struggle to find a language in which to speak of the experience of the Holocaust. This struggle was, in part, a response to the ‘unspeakability’ of the Holocaust, the silence and denial of its perpetrators. As such, in the postwar period, the perpetrators of the Holocaust also struggled to find the words to speak of what they had done. This short article goes on to speculate on the implications of the unspeakability of the Holocaust and other genocides. It suggests that this unspeakability is beginning to break down as desires are spoken of more openly. As such, it is possible that current and future generations will have to embark on a different struggle to that of Albert Friedlander. While he could count on an assumed moral consensus that the Holocaust was wrong, current and future generations may no longer be able to rely on this assumption.

Three Rival Versions of Theological Genealogy: Catholicism, Left Hegelianism and Post-Secularism

In this paper I would like to discuss three rival versions of theological genealogy that are popular today. In doing so I seek to offer a few examples of how the most recent scholarly turn to theology is ultimately being driven by disparate political ideologies. The first one I describe as new Catholic modernity critiques, which often emphasize the breakdown of moral consensus brought on by Protestantism, theological nominalism, etc. The second are proponents of what I describe as a Left Hegelian project of detheologization—scholars on the political Left who in recognizing the theological origins of modernity seek to overcome theology in order to advance a progress project (Roberto Unger and Samuel Moyn). Finally, I will discuss the so-called post-secularists (Jürgen Habermas, Hans Joas, Charles Taylor) who see modernity neither as morally incoherent, nor theology as a bad thing; rather, these scholars argue that secularism and “the Judeo-Christian tradition” developed together and therefore can mutually enrich each other.

Implications of John Kavanaugh's Philosophy of the Human Person as Embodied Reflexive Consciousness for Conscientious Decision-making in Brain Death.

This article reviews the work of Fr. John F. Kavanaugh, SJ (1941-2012), on the human person as embodied reflexive consciousness (RC). It then analyzes the implications of his work for the subject of brain death. Case studies are reviewed which suggest that RC persists unchanged in the setting of substantial brain trauma. RC is posited as an immaterial endowment, rather than a material phenomenon, which is fully present so long as a person is alive and becomes absent when a person is truly dead. As the endowment which makes possible ethical action and is common to all human persons, RC becomes the foundation of human equality. Empirically ascertaining the presence or absence of RC may not be possible-its demonstration may be precluded by physical immaturity or damage. Therefore, until the human person (and not only the brain) has wholly and irreversibly died, RC should be assumed to be present. The current criteria for brain death are incapable of ensuring that the entire brain has permanently and irreversibly ceased to function. Therefore, RC may still be present in those whose organs are harvested after meeting the criteria for brain death. As such, a human person would still be present, albeit a wounded human person. Based on this, a healthcare provider could (and likely should) in good conscience oppose the use of brain death criteria for purposes of harvesting vital organs. On a societal level, utilizing brain death criteria to declare a person dead has the potential in any given case to violate the dead donor rule, and as such conflicts with the widely held moral consensus that organs should only be harvested from those who are dead. Healthcare providers should advocate for medicolegal frameworks consistent with their informed consciences.

A Critique of Hobbes’s State of Nature

In this essay, I analyze Hobbes’s formulation of what a state of nature would be like and assess whether or not that formulation is compelling. In doing this, I review his three principal reasons for conflict within the state of nature. I argue that his mechanistic reduction of human behavior and motivation is over-generalized and focus on the emphasis he places on instrumental power. I then review his description of zero-sum mentality in relation to trust between individuals and attempt to articulate a phenomenology of trust that appreciates the complexity of human interactions. Finally, I assess the validity of Hobbes’s claim that moral consensus would cease to exist in a state of nature in the absence of a state apparatus. I attempt to refute his reasoning by making an appeal to human empathy and its moral dimensions in relation to glory-seeking behavior that Hobbes stipulates.

The Impact of State-Society Relations on Anticorruption Agencies in Southern Africa

Corruption remains a fundamental and intricate issue in public administration to date. It is featured constantly as one of the foremost discontents that societies around the globe have with the administration of public service and the resulting socio-economic problems.1 While anti-corruption law is extensively adopted in Southern Africa, the implementation of law has encountered deficiencies and challenges in tackling, especially grand corruption. This paper focuses on Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) and their efficacy in controlling corruption in Southern Africa. It argues that the inability of ACAs to arrest corruption in Southern Africa is embedded inter-alia in the precarious state-society relations in the region which perpetuate the ambiguity for corruption and impede the formation of a moral consensus on anti-corruption law. The state, which is regarded generally as a trustworthy custodian of social progress is viewedby most domestic constituents as apathetic to social welfare with its political ambitions as anti-ethical to those of citizens. The paper proposes the analytical framework of Context, Resonance & Relevance (CRR) to assess the compatibility of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in Southern Africa with domestic institutional contexts. In this model, context assesses ACA framework in relation to the domestic political environment and the extent to which it allows ACAs the capacity to function efficiently amidst competing political priorities. Resonance is concerned with the political relationship between the domestic society and the ACA and whether the operating framework sufficiently engages cultural codes specific in said society which De Sardan argues “banalise” or “justify” corruption. Relevance engages typologies of corruption in the region and whether reforms sufficiently are targeted at specific problems.

Seeing and Knowing: Sourcing Safe Food in Zhejiang

At a farm-to-table restaurant in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, high-quality food is sourced through direct relationships between restaurant staff and trusted rural suppliers. The restaurant is part of China’s growing food movement, and it shares this core principle of direct purchasing with other movement projects nationwide. At the same time, as the state responds to public anxieties over food safety, it has taken a “transparency” approach, emphasising “traceability” from field to tongue. Although such an approach may seem to follow similar logic to direct purchasing in the food movement, these two ways of pursuing safety are radically distinct. Drawing on evidence from the Hangzhou restaurant’s procurement system and Zhejiang’s “Sunshine Kitchen” food safety policies, I find that state responses to the food safety crisis misrecognise underlying moral-economic problems. By contrast, the restaurant’s farm-to-table purchasing system holds out a compelling model for (re)fashioning forms of moral consensus between growers and eaters of food.

Seksueel-ethische permissiviteit: trends in Nederland 1981-2017

Abstract In this study, we explore trends in sexual-ethical permissiveness in the Netherlands during the last decades. Using Dutch data from the European Values Study (1981-2017), we show that tolerance towards homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and suicide increased in this period. About a third of this trend can be explained by cohort replacement: because younger, more permissive cohorts slowly replace older, less permissive cohorts, the moral climate in society changes. In turn, the differences in sexual-ethical permissiveness between cohorts can be explained by differences in level of education, church attendance and religious socialization. At the same time, the results of the counterfactual analyses show that all groups in Dutch society, including the lower educated and churchgoers, have become more permissive about sexual-ethical aspects of life. Apparently, a moral progressive consensus is present in the Netherlands. Finally, our results show that the youngest cohort, born between 1990 and 1999, appears somewhat less permissive than older cohorts. If these more conservative moral convictions persist in the future and are present in new generations as well, there may be a cultural backlash.

Comprehensive Doctrines in the Public Sphere – A Case for Politicization

The problem with religious reasons is not whether they should be present in the public sphere but how they should be present. Political theorists such as Jeremy Waldron, Juergen Habermas, and Christina Lafont have favored two approaches to making religion legitimate in the public sphere. They have either tried to work out the conditions under which religious reasons can contribute to public sphere in a fruitful way or they have drawn attention to the moral content of religious principles. However, I argue that the latter approach relies too heavily on the propositional content of religious arguments to the detriment of investigating how they are politicized in the public sphere. It is my conviction that without looking at how given religious morality is politicized, a false moral consensus is manufactured, which given the motivational pull of religion can be dangerous. Furthermore, the article makes a case for a more realistic idea of a public sphere where other comprehensive doctrines such as feminism or economism are taken into account as well. Moreover, the evaluation of religious reasons should include their relationship to a given background political culture, which will increase a critical edge of a political theory.

ETHICS, COLLECTIVES, AND DRUGS

ETHICS, COLLECTIVES, AND DRUGS

An “Enchanted” or a “Fragmented” Social World? Recognition and Domination in Honneth and Bourdieu

ABSTRACT Current debates on recognition and domination tend to be characterized by two polarized positions. Where the “anti-recognition” camp views recognition as a tool for establishing and reproducing relations of power, the “pro-recognition” camp conceives it as a way for dominated individuals and social groups to lay stake to intersubjective relations that are more just. At first glance, Honneth’s normative theory of recognition and Bourdieu’s critical sociology of domination also divide along these lines. Honneth takes the pro-recognition stance, criticizing the French sociologist for adopting a “fragmented” conception of the social world that ignores the “moral consensus” underlying each claim for mutual recognition. In contrast, Bourdieu accuses the German philosopher of endorsing an “enchanted” view of the social world that misrecognizes the way that recognition perpetuates symbolic domination. However, through a close and nuanced reading of their works, this article suggests that, in spite of this difference, Honneth’s and Bourdieu’s theories nonetheless converge on the idea that recognition is neither “good” nor “bad” per se, but “structurally ambiguous” in its relations to symbolic domination.

Should Hospital Emergency Departments Be Used as Revenue Streams Despite Needs to Curb Overutilization?

This case asks how a hospital should balance patients' health needs with its financial bottom line regarding emergency department utilization. Should hospitals engage in proactive population health initiatives if they result in decreased revenue from their emergency departments? Which values should guide their thinking about this question? Drawing upon emerging legal and moral consensus about hospitals' obligations to their surrounding communities, this commentary argues that treating emergency departments purely as revenue streams violates both legal and moral standards.

Self‐punishment promotes reconciliation with third parties by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing

AbstractSelf‐punishment is a highly costly—and potentially harmful—way transgressors can respond to a wrongdoing. In this research, we propose that people might punish themselves in part because it has a communicative social function. Three studies using hypothetical vignettes showed that self‐punishment facilitates reconciliation with third party observers by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing. Specifically, self‐punishment establishes a moral value consensus and/or diminishes offender status/power, and through this, increases third party perceptions of justice and transgressor remorse, and the third party's willingness to reconcile. This effect was robust to manipulations designed to make third parties question the sincerity of the self‐punisher's intention. Self‐punishment thus serves a beneficial interpersonal function by repairing social bonds between transgressors and their peers.

The Expression "Social Justice" Before and After Quadragesimo anno

The Expression "Social Justice" Before and After Quadragesimo anno Jean-Yves Calvez, SJ (bio) and Jacques Perrin, SJ (bio) Original translation by Bro. George McKenzie, SM with emendations by Robert G. Kennedy and with the assistance of Msgr. Martin Schlag and Douglas G. Bushman Editor's Preface Following are two appendices from Église et société économique (Paris: Aubier, Éditions Montaigne, 1959), in which the eminent authors establish their thesis. "Very simply, the term social justice replaced the term legal justice, a term that was far less understood at the time." This thesis has more than historical interest. There is a hidden moral. Some, looking back, might note just another instance of too little and too late. But what of the present? Could the conspicuous absence of the term social justice in [Pope John XXIII's] Mater et magistra [End Page 116] [1961] and in Pacem in terris [1963] be indicative of its being misunderstood in our times? It has been pointed out that the underlying concept of the term is pervadingly present with even greater vigor than in preceding papal pronouncements. And commentators add that Pope John's strong pastoral approach and his avoidance of polemic preclude the use of the term. But how to explain his dominant spirit of "confident hope" in the absence of moral or political consensus? Does he see the effective solutions to problems in the "pronounced dynamism" toward change and the efforts of some, still "not many," who are "scientifically competent, technically capable and skilled in the practice of their professions" [Pacem in terris, #148] to apply the spiritual values? While these lines are not germane to the reading of these studies, they are tendered as an earnest for continued interest in papal social thought. We are grateful to the authors and the publisher for their permissions to present this approved translation, which is the work of Bro. George McKenzie, SM, of the Department of Languages of the University of Dayton. [End Page 117] George McKenzie Department of Languages, University of Dayton (OH) Robert G. Kennedy Catholic Action Reprints #196 (September 1963) Department of Theological Studies, University of Dayton (OH) Martin Schlag Catholic Action Reprints #196 (September 1963) Department of Theological Studies, University of Dayton (OH) Douglas G. Bushman Catholic Action Reprints #196 (September 1963) Department of Theological Studies, University of Dayton (OH) Appendix One: The Expression "Social Justice" before Quadragesimo anno Many authors have hesitated about the meaning they should give the expression "social justice" used by Pius XI in his encyclicals Quadragresimo anno and Divini redemptoris. As for ourselves, we have shown that the texts compel us to identify social justice with "legal" or general justice in the traditional Thomistic sense.1 Certain related questions, however, arise in this connection. Why did not the pope in 1931 resort to the classical terms of legal or general justice? At this point we should, by means of historical inquiry, give some details about the answers briefly indicated in previous discussions.2 At the same time, it is not without interest to show the origin and the exciting history of the expression "social justice" as it finally made its way into pontifical parlance. Briefly, we give here the conclusion we have already presented in Chapter VI: the use of a new expression—and precisely of this one, "social justice"—seemed quite necessary because of the existence of certain notions of justice that were at once insufficient in themselves, and foreign to traditional moral theology, and because the simple use of the Thomistic expression "legal justice" would not have succeeded, in the context of recent controversies, in removing all ambiguity. First Appearances We shall first of all indicate a few of the sources of the expression "social justice." It was doubtless Taparelli d'Azeglio who first introduced it into the vocabulary of Catholic writers. He used it, moreover, in a context that clearly indicates the influence of the thought of St. Thomas. And this is so true that we can well wonder whether he was not already using "social justice" to designate precisely legal or general justice in the Thomistic sense. [End Page 118] Like St. Thomas, Taparelli establishes a close link between the idea of...

The contest for the tall forests of south-western Australia and the discourses of advocates

After over 50000 years of interaction between Aboriginal people and changing climates, south-western Australia’s tall forests were first logged less than 200 years ago, initiating persistent conflict. Recent conservation advocacy has resulted in the protection of 49% of these tall forests in statutory reserves, providing an opportunity to implement and benefit from a growing moral consensus on the valuing of these globally significant, tall forest ecosystems. We analysed a cross-section of literature (63 papers, 118 statements) published on these forests over 187 years to identify values framing advocacy. We differentiated four resource-oriented discourses and three discourses giving primacy to social and environmental values over seven eras. Invasion sparked initial uncontrolled exploitation, with the Forests Act 1918 managing competing agricultural and timber advocacy. Following the Colonial and Country Life eras, industrial-scale exploitation of the karri forest region resulted in reaction by increasingly broad sectors of society. Warming and drying in the 21st Century emphasises the importance of intact tall forest and the Indigenous Renaissance discourse. Vesting for a more comprehensive set of values would acknowledge a new moral consensus.