Moral Enhancement Research Articles

Against Aggression? Revisiting an Overlooked Contender for Moral Bioenhancement

In moral bioenhancement (MBE) discourse, aggression has been identified as one potential target of biomedical intervention. Early suggestions that aggression might be modulated to improve moral outcomes were met with strong opposition from those claiming it is impossible to modulate aggression without harming traits of distinct social and agential value. If we are to preclude (or endorse) particular paths to moral enhancement then we ought to establish sound reasons for doing so. However, in paying due consideration to contemporary aggression studies we will see that current efforts to rule out aggression as one such path are untenable. I argue that the rejection of aggression-reduction as a viable target of MBE is a mistake, and that this arises from a rudimentary view of aggression which is incompatible with current scientific consensus. Drawing on contemporary psychological views I argue that it is necessary to distinguish subtypes of aggression, and that once these distinctions are recognised there is a potential space for MBE to target the biological correlates of specific kinds of aggressive behaviour. Ultimately, I suggest that aggression remains a legitimate target of inquiry, and that mitigating deleterious manifestations may yet offer one prospect for MBE.

Towards a systematic evaluation of moral bioenhancement

The ongoing debate about moral bioenhancement (MBE) has been exceptionally stimulating, but it is defined by extreme polarization and lack of consensus about any relevant aspect of MBE. This article reviews the discussion on MBE, showing that a lack of consensus about enhancements’ desirable features and the constant development of the debate calls for a more rigorous ethical analysis. I identify a list of factors that may be of crucial importance for illuminating the matters of moral permissibility in the MBE debate and which could help us move beyond the current lack of consensus. More precisely, I propose three important theoretical and normative standards that MBE should satisfy if we wish to mitigate the concerns about its utter impermissibility. Systematically assessing MBE interventions across the presented categories should provide valuable conclusions about its theoretical soundness and feasibility, its compatibility with fundamental moral norms, and its compatibility with or facilitation of socio-political goals of equality and justice.

Trust and Psychedelic Moral Enhancement

Moral enhancement proposals struggle to be both plausible and ethically defensible while nevertheless interestingly distinct from both cognitive enhancement as well as (mere) moral education. Brian Earp (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:415–439, 12) suggests that a promising middle ground lies in focusing on the (suitably qualified) use of psychedelics as adjuncts to moral development. But what would such an adjunctive use of psychedelics look like in practice? In this paper, I draw on literature from three areas where techniques for moral development have been discussed: psychotherapy (e.g., Overholser 2010; Burns 1980) education (e.g., Uhl and Lütge, 2018), and AI-assisted enhancement (e.g., Lara and Deckers, Neuroethics 13(3):275–287, 17) in order to propose more concrete ways in which to use psychedelics as adjuncts to moral development. It is shown that in each of these areas, we can see that trusting relationships (e.g., Baier 1986; Hawley 2019) between the facilitator and the agent will very plausibly maximize the success of this type of moral enhancement. Finally, I appeal to literature on informed consent for use of psychedelics (e.g., Smith and Sisti, Journal of Medical Ethics, 22; Johnson et al., The Journal of Psychopharmacology 22(6):603–20, 23) and on the therapeutic relationship in psychotherapy (e.g., Dryden and Reeves 2013; Horvath et al. 2011) to outline concrete suggestions for facilitating dimensions of trust most likely to maximize the benefits of (adjunctive) psychedelic moral enhancement. The result is a newly detailed practical proposal for how we might best facilitate moral enhancement by using drugs as adjuncts to moral development

Immune moral models? Pro-social rule breaking as a moral enhancement approach for ethical AI

We are moving towards a future where Artificial Intelligence (AI) based agents make many decisions on behalf of humans. From healthcare decision-making to social media censoring, these agents face problems, and make decisions with ethical and societal implications. Ethical behaviour is a critical characteristic that we would like in a human-centric AI. A common observation in human-centric industries, like the service industry and healthcare, is that their professionals tend to break rules, if necessary, for pro-social reasons. This behaviour among humans is defined as pro-social rule breaking. To make AI agents more human-centric, we argue that there is a need for a mechanism that helps AI agents identify when to break rules set by their designers. To understand when AI agents need to break rules, we examine the conditions under which humans break rules for pro-social reasons. In this paper, we present a study that introduces a ‘vaccination strategy dilemma’ to human participants and analyzes their response. In this dilemma, one needs to decide whether they would distribute COVID-19 vaccines only to members of a high-risk group (follow the enforced rule) or, in selected cases, administer the vaccine to a few social influencers (break the rule), which might yield an overall greater benefit to society. The results of the empirical study suggest a relationship between stakeholder utilities and pro-social rule breaking (PSRB), which neither deontological nor utilitarian ethics completely explain. Finally, the paper discusses the design characteristics of an ethical agent capable of PSRB and the future research directions on PSRB in the AI realm. We hope that this will inform the design of future AI agents, and their decision-making behaviour.

Sparking Religious Conversion through AI?

This paper will take the stance that cognitive enhancement promised by the use of AI could be a first step for some in bringing about moral enhancement. It will take a further step in questioning whether moral enhancement using AI could lead to moral and or religious conversion, i.e., a change in direction or behaviour reflecting changed thinking about moral or religious convictions and purpose in life. One challenge is that improved cognition leading to better moral thinking is not always sufficient to motivate a person towards the change in behaviour demanded. While some think moral bioenhancement should be imposed if necessary in urgent situations, most religions today see volition in conversion as essential. Moral and religious conversion should be voluntary and not imposed, and recent studies that show possible dangers of the use of AI here will be discussed along with a recommendation that there be regulatory requirements to counteract manipulation. It is, however, recognized that a change in moral thinking is usually a necessary step in the process of conversion and this paper concludes that voluntary, safe use of AI to help bring that about would be ethically acceptable.

Faster, Higher, More Moral: Human Enhancement and Christianity

The three authors of this article explore the intersection of moral enhancement, ethics, and Christianity. Trothen reviews the meaning and potential of moral enhancements, considering some of the risks and limitations. Trothen identifies three broad ethical questions, which all three authors agree upon, that arise from a Christian theological perspective: what it means to be human, choice, and social justice. Trothen concludes that respect for human dignity and social justice requires rejecting a reductive view of moral improvement as purely biochemical. Buttrey then argues that biomedical moral enhancement (BME) is simply one in a series of attempts to morally improve human beings and can be compared to other efforts such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. He argues that BME cannot be simultaneously more reliable than moral education in virtue and no more restrictive of human freedom. He concludes by suggesting that tensions between BME and Thomistic virtue are even stronger due to Christian conceptions of martyrdom and radical self-denial. Finally, McQueen argues that Christianity emphasizes the common good and social justice as essential for human flourishing. Building on the foundation established by Trothen and Buttrey, McQueen insists that accurate cognitive knowledge is needed to make good conscience decisions, but emphasizes that right human action also requires the exercise of the will, which can be undermined by AI, automation, and perhaps also BME. She concludes by encouraging further attention to the true nature of human agency, human freedom, and wisdom in debates over AI and biomedical enhancement. The authors conclude that BMEs, if they become medically safe, may be theologically justifiable and helpful as a supplement to moral improvement.

CSR and CEO’s Moral Reasoning in the Automotive Industry in the Era of COVID-19

This paper assesses whether and to which extent the COVID-19 pandemic, which represents a scenario of high moral intensity, is influencing the moral reasoning of top CEOs (chief executive officers) in the paradigmatic case of the automotive industry and how this moral reasoning relates to their CSR response to the crisis and their CSR plans in the long run. To this end, we took the CEO letters before and after the pandemic outbreak of the top 15 automotive companies, and applied Weber’s method to conduct a moral reasoning categorization, along with an examination of their CSR approach and initiatives. The results show a predominant moral paralysis among these CEOs, where positive reactions addressed are philanthropic in nature and more likely to be a transient response to the crisis, rather than a sustained long-term improvement of their CSR rooted in a significant moral approach enhancement. Furthermore, CEOs at the lowest stages of moral reasoning, primarily focused on their own business and immediate stakeholders, are less likely to highlight these philanthropic initiatives. The outcome evidences the convenience of addressing CSR from the lens of moral reasoning, and it further draws the attention of the scientific community, companies and their top management, stakeholders, and society to the relevance of investigating and considering the moral reasoning of top management in large corporations and its implications.

Psychedelics and environmental virtues

ABSTRACT The urgent need for solutions to critical environmental challenges is well attested, but often environmental problems are understood as fundamentally collective action problems. However, to solve these problems, there is also a need to change individual behavior. Hence, there is a pressing need to inculcate in individuals the environmental virtues – virtues of character that relate to our environmental place in the world. We propose a way of meeting this need, by the judicious, safe, and controlled administration of “classic” psychedelic drugs as a form of moral bio-enhancement. Recent evidence shows that psychedelics can be given safely in controlled environments, and can induce vivid experiences of unity and connectedness. These experiences, in turn, can durably increase feelings of nature-relatedness and pro-environmental behaviors. Therefore, we argue that responsible psychedelic use can reliably catalyze the development of a key environmental virtue known as living in place. This is a “master environmental virtue” that subsumes the qualities of respect for nature, proper humility, and aesthetic wonder and awe. Our account advances the environmental virtues debate by introducing a relevant practical proposal, and advances the psychedelic moral enhancement debate by providing a much-needed conceptual framework.

Two internal critiques for theists who oppose moral enhancement on a process virtue basis.

Some bioconservatives reject the use of biotechnology for moral enhancement while simultaneously purporting to accept standard theism and process virtue. Standard theism holds that God is a personal, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, transcendent being. Process virtue holds that virtue can only be obtained through a specific process and not by means of biotechnological shortcuts. For example, proponents of the view may claim that the virtue of compassion cannot be achieved by taking a pill but must come about from organic life experience that involves suffering, and reflection. We describe two internal critiques that arise by combining standard theism and process virtue. The first critique arises when the process virtue view is applied to the concept of God himself. Because God is thought to have always been perfectly virtuous, it follows he did not obtain his virtue through a process. Theistic bioconservatives must either give up the notion that God has always been perfectly virtuous or give up their claim that virtue must be obtained through a particular kind of process. The second critique argues that rejecting moral enhancement on the basis of process virtue is selfish, which is a vice by the lights of all mainstream manifestations of standard theism. Process virtue is selfish because it requires prioritizing the development of one's own personal virtue over moral enhancement that will improve one's other-regarding virtues. We conclude that the combination of standard theism and process virtue does not serve as a strong basis from which to oppose moral enhancement.

What drives public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement and why it matters: an exploratory study

The paper represents an empirical study of public attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. Moral bioenhancement implies the improvement of moral dispositions, i.e. an increase in the moral value of the actions or character of a moral agent. The views of bioethicists and scientists on this topic are present in the ongoing debate, but not the view of the public in general. In order to bridge the gap between the philosophical debate and the view of the public, we have examined attitudes towards moral bioenhancement. The participants were people from Serbia older than 15, who voluntarily completed an online questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction to moral bioenhancement, seven general questions, 25 statements about participants’ attitudes towards moral bioenhancement, and five examples of moral dilemmas. The questionnaire also included questions which were used to reveal their preference of either deontology, or utilitarianism. Participants were asked to what degree they agree or disagree with the statements. The results showed that the means used to achieve moral enhancement, the level of education, and preference for deontology or utilitarianism do have an impact on public attitudes. Using exploratory factor analysis, we isolated four factors that appear to drive the respondents' attitudes toward moral bioenhancement, we named: general—closeness, fear of change, security, and voluntariness. Each factor in relationship to other variables offers new insights that can inform policies and give us a deeper understanding of the public attitudes. We argue that looking into different facets of attitudes towards moral bioenhancement improves the debate, and expands it.

Review

Review

On the uneasy alliance between moral bioenhancement and utilitarianism.

Moral bioenhancement (MBE) is often associated with a consequentialist, especially utilitarian, framework, owing to its capacity to prevent great harm and motivate acts in accordance with basic moral principles such us universal impartial altruism or benevolence. However, it remains unclear whether we could de facto justify MBE on utilitarian grounds. This article examines whether there is a plausible utilitarian case for MBE and what the obstacles for justifying MBE on utilitarian grounds could be. More specifically, it explores the relationship between MBE and basic utilitarian principles, as well as its effects on utilitarian moral judgment. It seems that MBE could modify moral agents in ways that would accord with the main utilitarian demands and facilitate the adoption and realization of utilitarian prescriptions. Although MBE would, in principle, create preconditions for achieving utilitarian ends, I argue that there are certain limits to this claim. I identify and elaborate several ways in which MBE could undermine utilitarian moral judgment.

Intelligence, empathy, and memory: Exploring moral enhancement through gene editing, training, and computer–brain interfaces

In this research article, I seek to expand the conversation regarding moral enhancement by identifying traits or capacities that if enhanced would lead to an increase in moral behaviour. I decided to focus on the three capacities: intelligence, empathy and memory. These abilities do not necessarily lead to moral behaviour on their own; however, building on a study on the relationship of intelligence and morality, I argued that enhancing intelligence and empathy simultaneously allows for moral behaviour as an emergent property. Intelligence alone is not sufficient because even though greater intelligence leads to more prosocial behaviour, prosocial behaviour is not inherently moral. Empathy alone can lead to partiality, especially favouring those who are a part of one’s in-group. The virtue of prudence, practical wisdom, relies on more than intellect or reason; it requires lived experience in order to effectively deliberate. Memory provides intelligence with that information. There are a variety of ways in which human enhancement can be pursued. I chose to focus on three methods in this study: gene editing, training and computer–brain interfaces. Turning to the existing scientific literature, I attempted to find examples or potential ways in which intelligence, empathy and memory could be enhanced through these methods. Genetic examples are difficult given the complexity of multi-gene traits, and that heritability is only a small percentage of overall variance. Training these capacities has had limited success, and there is no consensus in the literature on how effective is the training. Computer–brain interfaces appear to offer potential, but some experiments have only just begun on human subjects, whilst other approaches are still being tested on other animals.Contribution: This article ends with an appeal to prioritise moral enhancements over other forms. Doing so allows for a great impact on society and a safer overall approach to enhancements.

Shifting Perceptions of CRISPR

Shifting Perceptions of CRISPR

Systems and mechanisms to develop health volunteers for the health of immigrant workforce in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand

PurposeThis study aims to examine the systems and mechanisms at provincial level to develop health volunteers to improve health of the immigrant workforce in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand.Design/methodology/approachThis qualitative study collected data from document research and in-depth interviews with 22 concerned people who worked at policy and provincial levels to develop health volunteers to improve the health of immigrant workforce. Data were collected from May to July 2017. Then, content of the conceptual framework was analysed. The research objectives were examined and summary and induction analysis interpreted data from documents, observations and interviews.FindingsUbon Ratchathani has developed a Thai village health volunteer network to provide health care to immigrant workforce. This consisted of four systems and one supporting mechanism, namely, selection of health volunteer, knowledge management on primary health care, welfare management and moral enhancement and resource and budget support. Development is driven through the committee under the mechanisms of government agencies, i.e. the provincial public health office together with non-government organizations and network partners.Originality/valueThe findings from this study could help develop health volunteers to significantly improve the health of the immigrant workforce in the Thai health service system.

Kant and the enhancement debate: Imperfect duties and perfecting ourselves.

This essay develops a Kantian approach to the permissibility of biomedical physical, cognitive, and moral enhancement. Kant holds that human beings have an imperfect duty to promote their physical, cognitive, and moral perfection. While an agent's individual circumstances may limit the means she may permissibly use to enhance herself, whether biomedically or otherwise, I argue (1) that biomedical means of enhancing oneself are, generally speaking, both permissible and meritorious from a Kantian perspective. Despite often being equally permissible, I also argue (2) that enhancing oneself by more traditional means is, generally speaking, more meritorious (and involves the display of more virtue) than enhancing oneself by biomedical means. Nevertheless, since Kant does not fault agents for acting less meritoriously (or for displaying less virtue) than they otherwise could, I also argue (3) that those who opt for permissible biomedical enhancement over more traditional forms are not blameworthy for doing so. I also consider and reject several objections to these claims, including that biomedical enhancements (1) are too passive to count as actions by the agent who enhances herself, (2) involve a failure of the agent to treat her humanity as an end in itself or to show proper respect for her dignity, (3) might be undertaken on the basis of motives that undermine their permissibility, (4) are likely to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities in ways that do the same, and (5) in their moral form are incompatible with Kant's conception of duty and human freedom.

Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?

Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.

Revisiting Moral Bioenhancement and Autonomy

Some have claimed that moral bioenhancement undermines freedom and authenticity – thereby making moral bioenhancement problematic or undesirable – whereas others have said that moral bioenhancement does not undermine freedom and authenticity – thereby salvaging its ethical permissibility. These debates are characterized by a couple of features. First, a positive relationship is assumed to hold between these agency-related concepts and the ethical permissibility of moral bioenhancement. Second, these debates are centered around individualistic conceptions of agency, like free choice and authenticity, which hail from an atomistic tradition of autonomy. My view is that emphasizing individualistic conceptions of autonomy do not provide particularly strong foundations on which to argue about the issue of the permissibility of moral bioenhancement. This is because individualistic autonomy is not the kind of agency-related consideration we ought to value. Instead, I propose that we investigate the relationship between moral bioenhancement and a more relational kind of autonomy. Focusing on this latter relationship, on my view, clarifies the potential for moral bioenhancement to support or enhance people’s autonomy.

Modern Technology Advances with Benefits for Humanity to Demonstrate Design with Conventional Sources Islamic

There is an urgent interest among Muslims to participate in broader religious thought activities regarding the nature of modern technology in response to the refutation presented by the ideals of current technology. The impact and use on understanding modern technology cannot be limited. It is so much more pervasive because it conditions ideas, creates our goals and desires. In order to measure modern technology from within the framework of Islamic ethics and design the Islamic paradigm, this is very important by looking at psychological, spiritual, social, moral and circles of the latest postmodernist technology. For holistic insight and moral enhancement of technology, fortitude and practical appropriateness to respond to the latest (contemporary) incident produced due to technology that is holy and ethical poor. Maqashid al-syar'ah hold a useful asset. Muslims should review their traditional notions of Advantage (maṣlaḥah) along with take advantage of these fundamental religious ethics. The design of technological development is beneficial for mankind, because modern technology is infused through It is having a plan all by itself regarding good activities. The intense problem of the Islamic background is which kind of human needs (maṣlaḥah) intense a religion legal discussion can deal with the set of technological values. Muslim jurists, when assessing modern technology, often make use of expressions that describe the optimistic predictions of technology when it comes to human success. This resulted in most of them interpreting human benefit (maṣlaḥah) in terms of technology and issuing fatwas. This makes them be given a particularistic technique to the effect of cutting-edge generation with out considering the effect that current era would possibly have on Muslim life. In this article, it is argued that the contextual-important philosophy of contemporary-day era describes one of the preconditions for outlining what constitutes a reputable human interest (maṣlaḥah). This may be accomplished whilst on the identical time increasing the scope of Islamic Goals (maqashid al-syar'ah) to consist of critical lectures. It links the dual hermeneutic action between the Islamic (time) conception of human goodness (maṣlaḥah) and the axiological contextual perception of the problem during the model of technological development.

Virtue Theory for Moral Enhancement

Our present moral traits are unable to provide the level of large-scale co-operation necessary to deal with risks such as nuclear proliferation, drastic climate change and pandemics. In order to survive in an environment with powerful and easily available technologies, some authors claim that we need to improve our moral traits with moral enhancement. But this is prone to produce paradoxical effects, be self-reinforcing and harm personal identity. The risks of moral enhancement require the use of a safety framework; such a framework should guarantee practical robustness to moral uncertainty, empirical adequacy, correct balance between dispositions, preservation of identity, and be sensitive to practical considerations such as emergent social effects. A virtue theory can meet all these desiderata. Possible frameworks incorporate them to variable degrees. The social value orientations framework is one of the most promising candidates.