Regionalist movements in peripheries have more limited goals than independence movements. Movements of the first kind typically stop short of outright independence and support instead some kind of decentralization of territorial power. Individuals who support independence should have transitive and monotonic preferences.' They prefer independence to decentralization to the status quo. Regionalist preferences are nonmonotonic. They prefer decentralization to the status quo, but they also prefer the status quo to independence and decentralization to independence. This is so because, for regionalists, the balance of risks/costs and benefits under independence is too unfavorable to warrant support for statehood. Regionalists want to improve their position within existing institutional arrangements between center and periphery without losing completely those components of center-periphery relationships which they value. This accounts for their preference ordering. The preferences of regionalists are interesting because they are mixed. One part of the preference relation is nationalist: decentralization is preferred to the status quo. But another part is nonnationalist because the status quo is preferred to independence. Their preferences are mixed, neither nationalist nor nonnationalist. Both of the latter have a single issue structure. Precisely because regionalist preferences are mixed, they do not have a single-issue structure. This is so despite the fact that all three preferences are single-peaked when the dimension along which alternatives are arrayed represents a nationalist (or nonnationalist) single-issue structure. A mixed preference therefore suggests the presence of some tension between conflicting subsets of an individual's interests and identities. Stated in this fashion, the problem is to determine, first of all, in what ways specific actors in the periphery benefit from center-periphery relations. Second, it is necessary to determine in what ways actors would like to change the relationship to their advantage. Third, we need to understand why regionalism might be considered as a strategy in seeking change. Finally, it should be ascertained why the limits inherent in regionalism are accepted by actors: what benefits from center-periphery relations are still available; how and why are these not threatened by regionalist politics? It is hoped that this introduction specifies a little more precisely what is interesting about political regionalism. Regionalism is not simply a distinctive pattern of national politics, such as support for politics of the right or left within a particular spatial area. This approach neglects what is essential in my approach to political regionalism: the support for territorial decentralization. I have also distinguished between regionalists and supporters of independence. It is not uncommon, for example, to see discussions of ethnic mobilization or ethnic collective action with little attention paid to the issue structures of specific movements.2 However, individuals who support independence and those who support decentralization are different kinds of nationalists. Their positions differ, not simply by