Tackling a provocative subject, Rachel F. Mo-ran explores the role antimiscegenation laws played in defining normative family relationships throughout American history. She traces social and legal challenges to antimiscegena-tion laws and their lingering effects on current definitions of family, racial identity, and social policy. Moran's analysis revolves around how racial identity structures beliefs about intimate relationships. According to Moran, these laws asserted the superiority of white familial norms and pathologized interracial intimacy, encouraging what she terms “separate but equal” families. Moran moves beyond black-white polarities, examining how and why attitudes about racial mixing affected Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans differently. She convincingly establishes the connection between past prohibitions on interracial relationships and current controversies over social policy, such as continued low rates of interracial marriage, controversy over trans-racial adoptions, and the debate over the utility of multiracial categories. For historians, however, much of Moran's discussion is well-tilled ground. She bases her conclusions on familiar case law and a limited reading of the existing historiography, failing to incorporate the more recent and nuanced analyses of race mixing and racial identity by Peggy Pascoe, Neil Foley, Kathleen Brown, Grace Hale, and others. Consequently, her recitation of legal restrictions on interracial intimacy is simplistic and occasionally troubling. At times, Moran ignores black agency. For example, she implies that the lack of stable families under slavery reflected slaves' lax moral code rather than owners' willingness to disrupt family relationships. She then attributes Reconstruction-era efforts to create monogamous black families solely to the Freedmen's Bureau and to black elites' efforts to “educate” lower-class blacks about the benefits of marriage. She disregards the well-documented, widespread, and spontaneous efforts of freed blacks to solemnize marriages and reunite families. At other times, Moran is only partially accurate. She suggests the one-drop rule was adopted in the upper South as early as the late eighteenth century, followed by the lower South in the mid-1850s. Yet legal definitions of racial identity fluctuated throughout the mid-nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Indeed, Virginia did not codify the one-drop rule in law until 1924. These problems compromise her analysis.