Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets and national regulators have received broader powers to sanction securities violations. Yet few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have impacted long standing national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, this paper provides one of the first comparative assessments of the pattern of longitudinal change since the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary sanctions have increased 40-fold since the crisis, while criminal convictions for insider trading have skyrocketed from zero before 2009 to 40 from 2009-2015. In France and Germany, by contrast, there have not been systematic changes in domestic securities enforcement patterns, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. Building on Story and Walter’s (1997) account of how France, Germany, and the UK sought to shape the rules of the single market to benefit national financial interests, and Clift and Woll's (2012) work on “economic patriotism” in open markets, I argue that longstanding industrial strategies still influence the enforcement of financial regulation, but that depending on the relationship between the crisis and the domestic regulatory system, these strategies have been adjusted to different degrees. In the UK, where the financial crisis was a direct rebuke to the “light touch” regulatory approach, financial supervision was overhauled, and more adversarial enforcement strategies institutionalized, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were not as implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement changed less dramatically; however, the crisis also created a window of opportunity for both countries to successfully push for new European-level regulation that the UK had previously blocked, leading to new centralized supervisory institutions that could eventually undermine national industrial strategies. In sum, in all three cases the enforcement response to the crisis was intended to maintain pre-existing policy regimes established to promote national financial interests within the European single market; but because the crisis had different implications for domestic regulatory arrangements, we observe different patterns of change in securities enforcement practices.