Modes Of Explanation Research Articles

The Mind–Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism

An important part of the mind–brain problem arises because consciousness seems inherently resistant to scientific explanation. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation, the personalistic, different from, irreducible to, but as viable as, scientific explanation, in terms of which consciousness can be understood. The problem of explaining why experiential or mental aspects of brain processes or things should be correlated with certain physical processes or things is a non-problem because there is no kind of explanation possible in terms of which an explanation could be couched. A physical theory, amplified to include the experiential, might be predictive but would, necessarily, cease to be explanatory; and an amplified personalistic explanation could not succeed either. There is, in short, an explanation as to why there cannot be an explanation of correlations between physical and mental aspects of processes going on inside our heads. Despite this, there are important, as yet unsolved but solvable problems of knowledge and understanding concerning such correlations. The central serious task for research is to discover how the two explanatory accounts of what goes on inside our heads, physical and personal, are inter-related.

Sraffa's Early Philosophical Thinking

This paper investigates a number of aspects of Piero Sraffa's early philosophical thinking by placing him within the historical materialist tradition of reasoning about the relation of ideas to the historical process. It first distinguishes Alfred Marshall's views about the historical development of ideas by addressing Marshall's responses to the criticisms of William Cunningham of the English Historical School. Marshall's concept of economics as a universal engine of discovery was rejected by Sraffa in his early writings. Sraffa's critique of Marshall is then argued to lead to two early philosophical commitments on Sraffa's part: that deductivist modes of explanation are inappropriate in economics and that economics aims to explain the underlying structures of causal interaction that had been the concern of the classical political economists. The paper closes with brief remarks on how Sraffa's later philosophical thinking might be approached.

Parsimony in Intuitive Explanations for Behavior: Reconciling the Discounting Principle and Preference for Conjunctive Explanations

How do people judge how much explanation a behavior requires? Attribution researchers have identified two pertinent phenomena: the discounting effect, in which participants attribute less to one cause of a behavior when informed of the presence of a strong alternative cause, and the conjunction effect, in which participants deem an explanation with two causes as more likely than an explanation with only one of these causes. Several researchers have asserted that these two effects reflect contrary modes of explanation and, consequently, that findings of widespread conjunction effects in explanation are grounds for doubting the lay person's concern for parsimony that Kelley's discounting principle implies. By contrast, we propose that discounting and conjunction effects reflect a common process of parsimonious reasoning from shared causal schemas. Experiment 1 tests our proposal concerning how these processes co-occur. Experiments 2 and 3 test unique predictions from our model about moderators of the two effects.

Constructivism and the logic of explanation

The abandonment of motivational concepts in personal construct theory paves the way for the metatheoretical principles of constructivism: a cognitivist mode of explanation, a constructivist epistemology, a view of the person as autonomous agent, and an anti-realist ontology. Each of these is unsustainable. A nonmotivational and purely cognitive form of explanation is deficient, and dependence on the idea of voluntary agency to redress this deficiency results in explanatory regress. Both the constructivist theory of indirect knowledge (which is necessarily representationist) and the anti-realist ontology it entails are incoherent and self-defeating. Taken as a general metatheory, constructivism fails. However, constructivist theory and practice are of value when taken as a psychological approach that encourages self-reflection and tolerance and that examines the structures of knowledge and their role in the determination of action.

THE INTERACTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND COMPETITIVE INFLUENCES ON STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE

Despite much debate in the strategy literatures, there is little consensus as to whether organizational capabilities or market competition are more important in shaping firms’ actions and performance. We suspect that simply comparing firm-level and industry-level influences will continue to prove fruitless for two reasons. In the first place, both organization and competition are clearly important in shaping strategy and performance. In the second place, we suspect that the inconclusive nature of much of the existing research reflects the fact that organizational capabilities, competition, strategy, and performance are fundamentally endogenous. That is, reciprocal interactions at multiple levels of analysis between the environment and the firm shape business strategy and performance, while interactions between strategy and performance, in turn, shape both organizational capabilities and competitive environments. This special issue of the Strategic Management Journal includes papers that focus attention on several dimensions of these interactions. A common theme emerges from the work concerning the sequential nature of the interrelationships. The papers suggest that firms develop organizational capabilities as they act in competitive, institutional, and cognitive environments, where capabilities arise both by design and as the unexpected by-products of firm actions. The capabilities, managers’ understanding of the capabilities, and the historical context that surrounds them then condition firms’ reactions to changes in their environment. The reactions and firm performance in turn affect the structure of the industry, and all these changes generate new information which in turn creates new learning opportunities. Thus, the papers view strategy and performance as an ongoing sequence of capabilities-conditioned adaptations by firms which in turn become exogenous events in the environments of the managers of other firms. For strategy researchers, the important question is not that of which disciplinary perspective or mode of explanation is a more appropriate one, but rather that of the conditions under which a given mode of explanation is most appropriate. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Disciplinarity and Collaboration in the Sciences and Humanities

n this essay, I examine the roles of collaboration in the sciences and humanities by focusing on the complicated relationship between syntax and semantics. I use these two categories to contrast different modes of explanation. In very different register than I pursue, Charles Taylor describes these modes in thoughtful discussion of the work of Paul Ricoeur in narrative theory. One mode of explanation, which I associate in this essay with Enlightenment thought, is what Taylor calls or governed science. Nomological science, Taylor argues, concerns form of whereby the phenomenon to be explained is completely absorbed by the law or structure which constitutes its explanation (175). In this mode of explanation, any is explained by its subsumption by atemporal structures and laws that exist once and for all. Against this nomological schema-which is parallel, in my argument, to the abstract formalism of syntacticsTaylor posits a very different type of relation between structure and event whose paradigmatic example is that of langue-parole (176). A language, he writes,

Explanation, Causation, and Evolution

For the past three decades or so, the structure of scientific theories and their modes of explanation have received considerable attention from philosophers of science. The publication of Nagel’s The Structure of Science (1961) and Hempel’s Aspects of Scientific Explanation (1965) has led most philosophers of science to address questions such as whether all sciences can be reduced to physics, what is a good scientific explanation, what is the function and scope of laws in scientific theories, and so on. And so it appeared just natural when, a couple of years later, thanks to ground-breaking works by Ruse (1973) and Hull (1974), the very same questions were raised in light of the specific challenges that biology and evolutionary theory posed to the “received view” of scientific theories. Are there laws in biology? Is biology doomed to become a chapter of physics? Or is it autonomous? What is the role of functional and teleological descriptions in biology and why don’t we find such things in physics? These were some of the questions debated at that time. Now, the first striking feature of Kenneth Schaffner’s recent book, Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine, is that it is primarily devoted to addressing most of these issues once again. Indeed, it seems to be Schaffner’s intention to revitalize the sort of problems which concerned philosophers of science thirty years ago, by giving them a new twist in light of recent approaches to these issues. In this respect, then, one cannot say that the subject matter of this book is newfangled. However, on a more innovative level, two interesting aspects of this book bear emphasis from the outset. First, its account of explanation and theory structure is supplemented with a focus on the context of discovery in the biomedical sciences. Second, against the general complaint that philosophers of biology have put too much emphasis on evolutionary theory, while neglecting disciplines such as immunology and

Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons

Territorial disputes are traditionally regarded as the most common sources of war. Yet, research focusing on the question why territorial disputes arise has been rare, and has usually relied on power-political assumptions. Typically, the emergence of territorial disputes has been explained in terms of rational strategic and economic interests and changing power relations. This article argues that these modes of explanation are severely misleading, since many of today's territorial disputes can be better explained from a normative perspective, by referring to subjective conceptions of justice and international norms. As an emotive issue, territory is loaded with a number of emotional and normative elements which today are likely to surpass its `rational' economic or strategic value. Therefore attempts to resolve territorial disputes which do not take into account the normative dimension underlying such disputes are likely to fail.

Unity and diversity in psychiatry: some philosophical issues.

The aim of this paper is to provide a defence of diversity in psychiatry and, correspondingly, to show that strict 'biologism' (or any other 'total' approach to psychiatry) is inappropriate. Arguments are developed using as a basis the writings of well known philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin, Joel Feinberg and Charles Taylor. The authors examine the concepts of explanation and causation and consider the consequences for psychiatry which might follow the acceptance of mind-brain identity. There is also a discussion of the concept of a person. If the same phenomenon is subject to explanation from diverse psychiatric perspectives, it does not follow that these modes of explanation must exclude or be in competition with each other. They may in fact be necessary to each other if psychiatry is to provide a full picture of mental functioning and human conduct. The thesis of mind-brain identity does not eliminate the variety of discourses within psychiatry, and hence it does not provide a rationale for 'biologism'. There is a need for a co-operative multidimensional approach in psychiatry.

Mediationism and the Obfuscation of Memory

Memory theorizing is going nowhere. The reason is that it is rooted in mediationism, the doctrine that memory is mediated by some sort of memory trace. Mediationism is the basic tenet of those who seek the substrate of memory; for students of memory per se it is merely a metaphor, and moreover an unfruitful one, for it cannot be penetrated by the methods of psychology. The rejection of mediationism would serve both to replace mechanistic theories with laws or other modes of explanation and to focus research on the actual experience of memory and on the context in which it occurs. The ensuing advantages are discussed and illustrated.

The: Shadow Side of Systems Theory

Systems theory, and holistic thinking in general, has become very popular as a worldview and mode of explanation in recent years because of a number of epistemological advantages it displays over positivist science and the mechanical paradigm. It has been applied to the analysis of major historical changes, the etiology of certain diseases, as well as to ecology and basic perceptions of the earth. Yet a closer look at the systemic or holistic paradigm also reveals a number of significant disadvantages: a tendency to ignore crucial social and historical contexts, as well as individual differences and aspirations; the fallacy of generalizing from specific laboratory experiments to wide-scale social metaphors; and a strong religious orientation, including unreflective thinking and a potentially authoritarian outlook, frequently justified by cultural relativism and the supposed need for a "paradigm shift." However, cultural relativism and notions of the plasticity of reality have their limits, for there is no getting around the reality of certain stubbom facts; and in the case of paradigm shifts, we need to be clear about what we are shifting to before we embrace such changes in a zealous or unreserved way. In this regard, it is significant that the systems search for "order out of chaos" corresponds so clearly to the emerging global corporate economy with its demands for worldwide political stability. Systems thinking will undoubtedly continue to be part of contemporary scientific and philosophical discussions; however, uncritically promoting it as a worldview will not serve our interests, philosophical or otherwise.

Birds, Mice and Geography: Marxisms and Dialectics

Despite being advocated for over a decade by Marxist geographers, dialectics is still little understood within geography. This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and possible value of a dialectical mode of thinking through example at a time when human sciences are said to be undergoing a 'crisis of representation'. By situating it within the wider horizons of Marxism, the work of the most vocal advocate and exponent of dialectics within contemporary human geography - David Harvey - is examined. Focusing on the specificity of Harvey's dialectical procedure, discriminating between ontological and epistemological dialectics, and approaching the latter in terms of dialectical modes of explanation, presentation and reading, Harvey's dialectics are subject to an immanent reconstruction. Some problems with this dialectical approach are then highlighted.

Hownot to demarcate cognitive science and folk psychology: A response to Pickering and Chater

Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an “independent enterprise,” with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C's case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude that P&C do not so muchdiscover ascreate the gap they find between folk psychology and cognitive science. It is an artifact of their implausible and unmotivated attempt to demarcate the two areas, and of the excessively narrow accounts they give of each.

Multiculturalism and mathematics education

Multiculturalism is shown as a new trend in education which relies upon recovering autochthonous practices of traditional cultures. Both in nations that were subjected to colonial regimes and in the central nations, where inequities still prevail, multicultural education is seen as a redeeming opportunity. It particularly recognizes mathematics as an integrating part of a culture, the same as language, arts, religions and modes of explanation. A multicultural approach to mathematics is ethnomathematics. This paper presents several historical and epistemological arguments for multicultural education and for ethnomathematics.

Generating multiple solutions for a problem: A comparison of the responses of U.S. and Japanese students

A task involving simple mathematics, yet complex in its call for the generation of multiple solution methods, was administered to about 150 U.S. students, most of whom were in fourth grade. Written responses were examined for correctness, evidence of strategy use and mode of explanation. Results for the U.S. sample were also compared to those obtained from about 200 Japanese fourth-grade students. Students in both countries (a) produced multiple solutions and explanations of their solutions, (b) exhibited almost identical patterns and frequency of strategy use across response occasions, and (c) used the same kinds of explanations, with a majority of the responses involving solution explanations that combined both visual and verbal/symbolic features. Nevertheless, Japanese students tended to produce explanations involving more sophisticated mathematical ideas (multiplication rather than addition) and formalisms (mathematical expressions rather than verbal explanations) than did U.S. students.

Naturalism and psychological explanation

Abstract This article explores the possibility of naturalized theory of action. It distinguishes ontological naturalism from conceptual naturalism, and asks whether a defensible theory of action can be either ontologically or conceptually naturalistic. The distinction between conditions for an ontology and conditions for a concept receives support from Donald Davidson's identification of two modes of explanation for action: rational and physical causal explanation. Davidson's action theory provides a naturalized ontology for action theory, but not a naturalized concept of intentional action. This article raises doubts about Davidson's basis for such one‐sided naturalism. It examines some conditions for a mode of explanation, in order to clarify whether an intentional mode of explanation might have ontological significance and thus raise problems for ontological naturalism. The article argues for the central role of certain instrumental factors in explanatory strategies, whether naturalistic or intentional...

On modes of explanation

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Process Highlighters in a Computer Simulation: Facilitation of Theory-Oriented Problem Solving

This experiment investigates whether or not process highlighters, incorporated in a computer simulation, facilitate the knowledge representation of early adolescent children. Process highlighters are perceptual cues (usually visual) that are designed to focus attention toward critical features of events and processes occurring in a problem domain. The two questions addressed in this study are: a) do process highlighters increase the percentage of subjects who employ theory-oriented explanation?, and b) do process highlighters increase the percentage of subjects who demonstrate an understanding of the concept presented in the simulation? Thirty-two twelve-year-old children from two middle schools played a computer game about light reflecting off flat mirrors, presenting the physical law that the angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection. Each child played either the game with process highlighters or the game without process highlighters for forty minutes. Three independent evaluators analyzed each subject's transcript to determine his/her mode of explanation (random, concrete, or hypothetical) and also the level of understanding (none, preliminary, or good). The results indicate that the use of process highlighters is positively correlated with the subject's level of understanding, but is less conclusive with respect to encouraging students to use theory-oriented problem solving. The results are interpreted with respect to clarifying the relationship between a student's understanding of a concept and his or her expressing that understanding in concrete or hypothetical terms.

Modes of Explanation in Duruma Divination

Modes of Explanation in Duruma Divination

The world of states: an introduction to explanation and theory

Provides both an exposition and a critique of the main explanatory modes in the field of international relations. Throughout the emphasis is on the problem of explaining human action and decisions and the analytic method is closely related to empirical examples.