Modern Virtue Ethics Research Articles

도덕교육과 행복: 교육윤리학의 관점

Ethics, to be genuinely meaningful, must thoroughly elucidate the intricate relationship between knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Educational ethics represents the perspective that this relationship can be justly addressed within a life dedicated to the pursuit of schola, or in simpler terms, a life devoted to education. An ethics that assumes virtue can be determined independently of, or prior to, the practice of moral education, a so-called philosophical ethics, leaves room for an understanding of the relationship between practice and virtue as a means―end relationship, and further imposes on life and education the covert but insistent demand that the realization of ends requires heroic effort. In philosophical ethics, happiness is a question that is always left unanswered. On the other hand, modern virtue ethics rejects the foundation assumed by philosophical ethics, thereby diminishing the significance of happiness to the level of ease and comfort that can be enjoyed in a life without that foundation. If so, the topic of happiness can be a good starting point for exploring the possibility of a genuine ethics that contrasts with philosophical ethics but does not deny the metaphysical foundation. According to Thomas Aquinas, the acquisition of virtue is not something that can be guaranteed by heroic efforts against nature. The highest virtue lies not in the human determination to ‘regulate’ nature, but in the divine determination to ‘let’ nature be the master. The life of teaching and learning knowledge is a journey into a life where nature is master.

『논어(論語)』의 덕(德)과 도(道)⋅인(仁)⋅예(藝)

In this study, the core of Confucianism was assumed to be virtue, and the meaning of virtue education was studied based on the analysis of examples of Tao(道), Ren(仁), Yi(藝) related to the virtue of the Analects. As an extension of supporting the perspective of modern virtue ethics, which maintains the pluralism of moral practice, ethical values, and the historical and cultural background of the social community, this is to emphasize the meaning of virtue education advocated by traditional education and reflect on current education. In general, Tao(道) advocates the logic of nature, while virtue is mainly discussed with humans as the subject. However, just as it is a virtue to understand and implement the Tao and actually gain it in my mind by studying, if I learn the values and directions of the public, I will be a virtuous person to enlighten the Tao. Therefore, Tao is more embodied by virtue. Ren(仁) is one of the virtues, so it falls under the subcategory of virtue in the hierarchical structure, and is discussed as the attributes and characteristics of virtue. However, if the core of the Analect is assumed as Ren, and in order to understand Ren based on specific human beings and humanity, Ren is the basis and essential element of all virtues. Yi(藝) can be understood in the sense of art or literature, but if the subject is a virtuous person who cultivates virtue by implementing and realizing specific practical virtues centered on Ren(仁), Yi(藝) is the study of Confucianism that he explores, and is the subject of moral education or subject matter centered on moral practice. The virtues of the Analects are not clearly differentiated from the specific virtues of practice, and the hierarchical structure between virtues and virtues is also not clear. Therefore, the virtue of the Analects has a multi-layered structure in terms of the relationship between the subject of practice and the object or virtue, centering on Ren(仁) and by understanding and enlightening the Tao(道), it urges continuous implementation and cultivation in daily life, such as aiming for public values and good.

Exploring Modern Virtue Ethics in the Context of Oral Healthcare

Virtue ethics is established as one of the dominant ethical theories that has application for healthcare practice, including oral health. Attributed to the ancient Aristotelian concepts of living a deeply fulfilled life, virtue ethics draws attention first and foremost, to the significance of character traits, or virtues in the process of ethical decision-making. This focus on character, contrasts with duty-based ethical theories such as deontological ethics (with a primary concern on duties) the principles of biomedical ethics (with a central focus on the principles and the obligations derived from these) and consequentialist ethics (with a primary focus on the consequences of actions).1

Character Through Outdoor Adventure Education? The (Delimiting) Hope of Modern Virtue Ethics

Background: The long-held assumption of character development through outdoor adventure education (OAE) maintains some adherents; however, growing criticism calls into question its efficacy. Yet, current social/environmental crises signal the immediate importance of moral education. Purpose: This article highlights the importance of character in moral assessment and guidance and registers the need for an account of character relevant to OAE’s social/environmental aims. It suggests a modern virtue ethical lens as a philosophical and practical way forward for OAE’s moral educational mission. Methodology/Approach: This article searches the OAE literature for substantiating evidence (rational and empirical). Then, in light of this search, a virtue ethical account of character, including its development, and relevance to OAE, is outlined. Findings/Conclusions: Evidence for character development through OAE is nearly non-existent, and semantic, philosophical, and empirical critiques loom large. If OAE wishes to continue its moral mission, then an account of character—promisingly provided in virtue ethical theory(s)—that can withstand these critiques is needed. Implications: Applied to OAE, modern virtue ethical theory provides an account of character, copes with the critiques, and supplies socially/environmentally relevant curricular and pedagogical guidance for future practice, while likely delimiting our claim to character development.

Markets and Their Virtues

AbstractThe market economy can be defended using the lens of virtue ethics. Modern virtue ethics was developed originally by the English philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. Virtue ethics rejects consequentialism and focuses on the virtues. And human nature appears to be collaborative in both language and economic relations exemplified by exchange. By adapting the concept of ‘characteristic virtues’, developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it follows that collaboration has its own particular virtues. These virtues can produce prescriptions which mitigate the costs of economic transactions and collaboration. The development of behavioural economics has shown human beings sometimes fall short of the rationality described by neo‐classical microeconomics. But virtuous action tends to correct these deficiencies.

The Soul, the Virtues, and the Human Good: Comments on Aristotle's Moral Psychology

In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all.

Neo-Confucianism and Modern Virtue Ethics: On the Contrast between ‘Self-Cultivation’ and ‘Personal Ethics

Neo-Confucianism and Modern Virtue Ethics: On the Contrast between ‘Self-Cultivation’ and ‘Personal Ethics

Kindness Ethics: A Possible Approach to Virtue Ethics

As a possible alternative approach to the modern virtue ethics, kindness ethics focuses on the specific virtue of kindness, which, essentially speaking means a person's moral capacity to be kind to life itself, not only one's own individual life. Kindness ethics, largely speaking, constitutes the core value or fundamental essence of the traditional Chinese moral doctrine of Confucianism. The general decline of the morality as well as the continuous worsening of the modern characters education have prompted us to work out a corresponding solution. Kindness ethics can possibly provide the modern people a way out.

Must Virtue Be Particular?

A resurgence of interest in virtue ethics has spawned its counterpart in legal theory. But in both legal theory and in moral theory, virtue ethics’ focus on the character of the moral agent (or the legal decision-maker) has been coupled with the view that the virtuous deliberator or decision-maker is also particularistic, striving to make the best all-things-considered decision for the particular matter at hand. The particularism of modern virtue ethics fits well with virtue ethics’ Aristotelian roots, and also with the modern interest in particularism associated with philosophers such as Jonathan Dancy. But must virtue theory’s focus on the agent’s character necessarily be coupled with particularism? In this paper, a response to a paper by H.L. Ho, I question the almost universal conjunction of virtue ethics (and virtuous legal decision-making) with particularism, and suggest that virtue need not be particularistic, and that, in some contexts, virtue, and especially the virtue of humility about one’s own decision-making capacities, may lie in non-particularism.

The Destiny of Modern Virtue Ethics

The revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics since the 1980s does not signify that it goes back to its original form; rather, it is generally manifested in three different variations: The first is a variation of what is known as communitarianism, the second is universalism, and the third is phronesis. On the social level of morality, the serious attempt of modern virtue ethics towards improving the moral spirit of society is laudable. However, its method and reasoning deviates greatly from the demands of modern society’s integration of its operating rules and regulations, and concept of values; hence all of its attempts can hardly escape the fate of becoming just a fantasy. Yet, on the level of dealing with ethic conflicts and moral paradox, modern virtue ethics—via interpreting the theory of phronesis by Aristotle—proposes the valuable thought of a balanced morality that principlism should concern itself with and nourish itself from.

Re-Imagining the Morality of Management: A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach

In this paper the problematic nature of the morality of management, in particular related to business organisations operating under Anglo-American capitalism, is explored. MacIntyre’s critique of managers in After Virtue (1985) serves as the starting point but this critique is itself subjected to analysis leading to a more balanced and contemporary view of the morality of management than MacIntyre provides. Paradoxically perhaps, MacIntyre’s own virtues-goods-practice-institution schema is shown to provide a way of re-imagining business organisations and management and thereby holds out the possibility of resolving the issue of the morality of management within such organisations. Implications for management practice are drawn out.

Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy Poses Questions to Psychology

Psychology has recently focused attention on subjective states of pleasure, satisfaction, and what is called “happiness.” The suggestion has been made in some quarters that a study of these subjective states has important implications for public policy. Sometimes, as in the case of Martin Seligman’s “positive psychology” movement, attempts are made to link the empirical findings and the related normative judgments directly to the descriptive and normative insights of ancient Greek ethics and modern virtue ethics. At other times, as with Daniel Kahneman’s work, the connection to Aristotle and other ancient Greek thinkers is only indirect, and the connection to British Utilitarianism is paramount; nonetheless, judgments are made that could be illuminated by an examination of the rich philosophical tradition that runs from Aristotle through to John Stuart Mill’s criticisms of Bentham.

Corporate Character: Modern Virtue Ethics and the Virtuous Corporation

Abstract:This paper is a further development of two previous pieces of work (Moore 2002, 2005) in which modern virtue ethics, and in particular MacIntyre’s (1985) related notions of “practice” and “institution,” have been explored in the context of business. It first introduces and defines the concept of corporate character and seeks to establish why it is important. It then reviews MacIntyre’s virtues-practice-institution schema and the implications of this at the level of the institution in question—the corporation—and argues that the concept of corporate character follows from, but is a novel development of, MacIntyre’s schema. The paper contrasts corporate character and virtues with the more familiar concepts of corporate culture and values. The constitutive and substantive elements of corporate character, including the essential corporate virtues, are then drawn out and illustrated with reference to the cases explored in Koehn (1998). Finally, the paper acknowledges and counters a specific criticism of this approach.

Humanizing Business: A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach

Abstract:The paper begins by exploring whether a “tendency to avarice” exists in most capitalist business organisations. It concludes that it does and that this is problematic. The problem centres on the potential threat to the integrity of human character and the disablement of community.What, then, can be done about it? Building on previous work (Moore, 2002) in which MacIntyre’s notions of practice and institution were explored (MacIntyre, 1985), the paper offers a philosophically based argument in favour of the rediscovery of craftsmanship by those who work in business organisations, and the exercise of craftsmanship in community.The practical implications for individuals of this way of conceptualising business, and the virtues which must then come to the fore, are discussed.

Helping motives in late modern society: values and attitudes among nursing students.

This article reports a follow-up study of Norwegian nursing students entitled 'The helping motive an important goal for choosing nursing education'. It presents and discusses a significant ambiguity within the altruistic helping motive of 301 nursing students in the light of classical and modern virtue ethics. A quantitative longitudinal survey design was used to study socialization and building professional identity. The follow-up study began after respondents had completed more than two-and-a-half years of the three-year educational programme. Data were collected using a questionnaire with closed questions, supplemented by 18 semi-structured, in-depth, audiotaped interviews. A motive such as 'desire for human contact/to help others' appeared to be highly significant. The research questions employed were: What motivates nursing students at the end of their studies to help other people? What does helping others mean for nursing students? Factor analysis revealed two factors. Factor 1 can be expressed as an altruism factor and factor 2 can be interpreted as an 'acknowledgement-from-the-patient factor' that in fact indicates an ambiguity within the helping motive itself. Findings from the interviews also reveal ambiguous helping motives. On one hand the students want to be altruistic and on the other they wish to receive positive feedback from patients when giving help. The findings indicate that this positive feedback is essential to the students in order for them to provide altruistic care.

Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics Is Not Virtue Ethics

Modern virtue ethics is commonly presented as an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian views—to ethics focused on action and obligations—and it invokes Aristotle as a predecessor. This paper argues that the Nichomachean Ethics does not represent virtue ethics thus conceived, because the discussion of the virtues of character there serves a quasi-Platonic psychology: it is an account of how to tame the unruly (non-rational) elements of the human soul so that they can be ruled by reason and the laws it imposes. This is explicitly stated in Book X, where it is also affirmed that the question of which laws reason should impose is addressed in The Politics. The Ethics and Politics can therefore be seen as a unity—as Aristotle's version of Plato's Republic—and it is the failure to recognize this that explains Aristotle's misappropriation by the modern virtue ethicists.

On the Implications of the Practice–Institution Distinction: Macintyre and the Application of Modern Virtue Ethics to Business

Abstract:After exploring MacIntyre’s (1985) practice—institution distinction, the article demonstrates its applicability to business-as-practice and to corporations as institutions. It then considers the implications of MacIntyre’s schema to ethical schizophrenia, to the claim that the market is a source of the virtues and to the opposite claim that capitalism corrodes character. A fully worked out modern virtue ethics, based on MacIntyre’s work, is then established and the claim is made and substantiated that such an understanding of MacIntrye’s work revitalises it and makes it directly applicable to business and to corporations.

The Angelic Doctor and the Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary ‘Aristotelian’ Ethics

To what extent, if any, is the moral thought of Thomas Aquinas ‘Aristotelian’? This question is not simply of historical interest, since it directs our attention to those areas of contemporary English-speaking moral philosophy where Thomas is discussed. In some quarters there is a tendency to classify Thomas as a thinker in the ‘Aristotelian tradition’, and his debt to Aristotle is thought to be apparent in his remarks on moral reasoning and virtue. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in discussions of Thomas by supporters of modern virtue ethics. In this paper, I will argue that the relationship of Thomas's ethics to Aristotle is much more complicated than these discussions assume. Despite the strong and interesting affinities that exist between the practical philosophies of Thomas and Aristotle, the sum total of their common features can never disguise nor dilute the profound differences that separate them. The paper will conclude with some suggestions as to how an appreciation of these differences can enable us to cast Thomas's remarks on virtue in a different light.

The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others

It is well-known that in recent years, alongside the familiar forms of modern ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, and rights theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in what goes by the name of “virtue ethics” — forms of ethical theory which give a prominent status to the virtues, and to the idea that an agent has a “final end” which the virtues enable her to achieve. With this has come an increase of theoretical (as opposed to antiquarian) interest in ancient ethical theories, particularly Aristotle's, an interest which has made a marked difference in the way ethics is pursued in the Anglo-Saxon and European intellectual worlds.In this essay, I shall not be discussing modern virtue ethics, which is notably protean in form and difficult to pin down. I shall be focusing on ancient eudaimonistic ethical theories, for in their case we can achieve a clearer discussion of the problem I wish to discuss (a problem which arises also for modern versions of virtue ethics which hark back to the ancient theories in their form).