In the wake of the legal realists and their successors, there has been a decline in faith in legal determinism the view that judicial decisionmaking can be based on principles and rules that originate solely from within the legal discipline. This loss of faith has led scholars to look for legitimate bases of judicial and social policymaking in nonlegal disciplines, such as philosophy, economics, and sociology. These scholars hope to derive from these disciplines (preferably neutral) principles to guide authoritative decisionmaking. Theories of and popular consensus, grounded largely in philosophy and ethics, remain suspect as principled lawmaking guides, but have proved durable in some areas of the law.1 Scholars have also debated (to death, perhaps) the contours, strengths and weaknesses of economic theory applied to law, debating both its descriptive powers and prescriptive legitimacy.2 The use of the natural sciences in the law is less well-established, at least if established can be defined as what students are exposed to in the law school curriculum. Nevertheless, in 1985, John H. Beckstrom3 showed how a sociobiological theory of human behavior (mod-