Model Of Reciprocity Research Articles

Karl Polanyi, Marshall Sahlins, and the Study of Ancient Social Relations

(ProQuest-CSA LLC: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) Questions arise whenever social-scientific models are used in analysis of ancient texts, particularly regarding feasibility of their application to social and cultural milieux different from those from which they were derived. An essay I authored that assessed command in Luke 6 to love your enemies from perspective of ancient reciprocity ethics, and that invoked Marshall Sahlins's taxonomy of reciprocity relations (general, balanced, and negative reciprocity), was queried by Zeba Crook on precisely this point, namely, whether it applied Sahlins's taxonomy to Greco-Roman reciprocity relations without adequate attention to distinctions between kinship organized tribal societies (the focus of Sahlins's analysis) and socially stratified agrarian societies characteristic of ancient Mediterranean world.1 Crook's piece was more than just a critique on that point; it raised questions about extent to which Sahlins's model has applicability to Roman world. This essay will focus on this key point and, it is hoped, will also contribute to discussion on use of social-scientific research in biblical studies. I argued that reciprocity is manifested in three genres. To summarize, general reciprocity is characteristic of intimate relationships of kinship and friendship. Its emblematic feature is generous sharing, which generates gratitude and an open-ended, diffuse obligation to make a return. Balanced reciprocity features overt concern for equivalence and timeliness of exchange. While it frames such transactions as labor exchanges among kin and friends, it is also characteristic of more distant relationships in which selfinterest and material concerns take priority over human bond itself, as in market exchange. Negative reciprocity is maximization of one's own benefit at expense of another, in its pronounced forms amounting to exploitation.2 The question arises about portability of this typology. According to Crook, Sahlins cannot have imagined that his model of reciprocity would be abstract enough to apply to all cultural and social situations, least of all to archaic, pre-modern, or modern contexts, that is, those with a state and central form of government such as existed in Greco-Roman period; moreover, the cultural and social presuppositions and context employed by work directly against any attempt to apply model unaltered across cultures.3 This is because correlated this spectrum of reciprocity dynamics with variable of social distance from kinship group, organizing principle of tribal societies. Because Sahlins's model is so closely tied to exchange relations among kin, Crook argues, it cannot translate without major modifications to stratified Greco-Roman world, where an additional factor, status distance, particularly as expressed in clientelism, is mechanism for much exchange. Because in Greco-Roman context fictive kinship was invoked to express patron-client relation, naive application of Sahlins's kinship-based reciprocity model would conflate what are in fact distinct modes of exchange. Accordingly, Crook advocates recourse to reciprocity model outlined by Ekkehard and Wolfgang Stegemann. The Stegemanns' model, Crook claims, takes cognizance of factor of status-different exchange because it significantly modifies Sahlins's reciprocity rubrics, namely, by adding a new category, familial reciprocity, to encompass kinship exchange, and then by repositioning Sahlins's general reciprocity category to subsume clientelistic exchanges characteristic of Roman world.4 In effect, Crook desires a model flexibly capable of adding categories as needed to classify all sorts of transactions, sheer variety of which will increase along with complexity of a society.5 When we turn to Sahlins's own discussion of his model, it turns out to be a bit more complex than one might have gathered from Crook's description. …

Tag-based indirect reciprocity by incomplete social information

Evolution of altruistic behaviour in interacting individuals is accounted for by, for example, kin selection, direct reciprocity, spatially limited interaction and indirect reciprocity. Real social agents, particularly humans, often take actions based on similarity between themselves and others. Although tag-based indirect reciprocity in which altruism occurs exclusively among similar flocks is a natural expectation, its mechanism has not really been established. We propose a model of tag-based indirect reciprocity by assuming that each player may note strategies of others. We show that tag-based altruism can evolve to eradicate other strategies, including unconditional defectors for various initial strategy configurations and parameter sets. A prerequisite for altruism is that the strategy is sometimes, but not always, visible to others. Without visibility of strategies, policing does not take place and defection is optimal. With perfect visibility, what a player does is always witnessed by others and cooperation is optimal. In the intermediate regime, discriminators based on tag proximity, rather than mixture of generous players and defectors, are most likely to evolve. In this situation, altruism is realized based on homophily in which players are exclusively good to similar others.

The Impact of Sex, Value Orientations and Risk Attitudes on Trust and Reciprocity

An investment game is used to generate indices of trust and reciprocity from 182 young adults. The raw data indicate that men are more trusting than women and responders return a larger share of their resources to more trusting senders than to less trusting senders. Sex differences do not account for variation in reciprocity. These results are similar to some previous studies. However, when the participants' social value orientations and risk attitudes are controlled for by including them in an explanatory model of trust behavior, they replace sex as the significant variables. When value orientations are introduced into the reciprocity model, it interacts significantly with the trust exhibited by the sender to increase the explanatory power of the model. The improved models of trust and reciprocity are now based on behavioral, rather than the physical, characteristics of the participants.

A General Model of Strategic Reciprocation

There remains a discrepancy between experimental conceptualizations of reciprocity and evidence of reciprocity in real-world negotiation interactions. This paper outlines these discrepancies and proposes a general model of reciprocity that gives a single account of the discrepancies found in research findings. Drawing on social interactionist theory and social identity theory, the model proposes that an individual's decision to reciprocate is governed by a contextual appraisal consisting of three strands: individual's attitudinal response to the situation, their evaluation of the other's likely objectives, and the situational constraints in which they find themselves. The strands constitute an individual's internal response to the situation, which combine to form their overall intention to and subsequent action to reciprocate or otherwise. The various components of the model, and the relationships among these components, is supported with research from a range of negotiation settings.

A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness

We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights.

Reflections on Culture and Social-Scientific Models

In an article published recently in this journal, Alan Kirk offered fresh insights into a long-standing problem by using an anthropological model of reciprocity.1 Kirk dissolved the tension between the seemingly reciprocal Do unto others and the more exclusive Love your enemy by showing that the texts presuppose but deliberately challenge ancient expectations of reciprocity. Kirk's article provides us with an opportunity to reflect on the importance of methodological clarity, especially in the form of constructing (and choosing) culture-appropriate models. The timing of this opportunity is good because the use of anthropological and sociological models in biblical exegesis is becoming more popular. A consistent thorn in the side of social-scientific criticism, among other fields, has been the validity of applying models cross-culturally.2 In most instances this concerns taking models developed in the modern world (e.g., honor and shame, psychoanalysis, functionalism, cognitive dissonance, rational choice theory) and applying them to the ancient world. Questions of this sort are valid and the responses complex, but we have in Kirk's article a different sort of cross-cultural application of a model. By relying on a model of reciprocity developed in primitive cultures and applied to the Greco-Roman world, Kirk forces us to consider whether all ancient (or premodern) cultures are the same, or whether their differences require alterations in the models we use to understand them. The essay by Marshall Sahlins that forms the backbone of Kirk's model of reciprocity is entitled On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange and was published in a book entitled Stone Age Economics.3 The titles here are telling. Sahlins was studying primitive cultures, which he defined as those lacking a political state, found most commonly in the form of hunter and gatherer tribes.4 In this sense, Sahlins cannot have imagined that his model of reciprocity would be abstract enough to apply to all cultural and social situations, least of all archaic, premodern, or modern contexts, that is, those with a state and central form of government such as existed in the Greco-Roman period that Kirk studies. The cultural and social presuppositions and context employed by Sahlins work directly against any attempt to apply the model unaltered across cultures. In primitive societies, Sahlins surmised that reciprocity could be understood as a linear plane at the ends of which sit two poles characterized by, respectively, selfless and selfish behavior. The basis of all premarket exchange, for Sahlins and other economic anthropologists, is the social relationship-material flow underwrites or initiates social relations.5 All forms of exchange inaugurate a social relationship of some sort. For this reason, Sahlins differentiated his types of reciprocity based on an understanding of social distance (how far from the kinship center does an exchange occur?). Modeled as a series of concentric circles, a society based on kinship has the household and immediate family at the center. Just beyond, yet still closely related to the household, sits the village. Beyond the village sits the tribe, another level removed from the family, and beyond that the greater world in which intertribal exchanges would occur. Within this social structure, reciprocity is differentiated by two factors: whether imbalance in exchange can be tolerated, and how long one is willing to wait for reciprocation. When social distance changes, these two factors change accordingly. Sahlins thus founded his three types of reciprocity-generalized, balanced, and negative reciprocity-on the combination of social distance and the allowable time line of reciprocation. Though these types of reciprocity are well known today, a brief look at them helps to clarify their cultural limitations. Sahlins's generalized reciprocity includes a broad range of exchanges, but they are for the most part united by the degree of intimacy between giver and receiver and by the relative degree of selflessness and compassion that characterizes the giving: the pure gift (such as a mother's breast-feeding), the free gift (such as hospitality), and food sharing among kinsmen within the household and village. …

Second-order free-riding problem solved?

Panchanathan and Boyd describe a model of indirect reciprocity in which mutual aid among cooperators can promote large-scale human cooperation without succumbing to a second-order free-riding problem (whereby individuals receive but do not give aid). However, the model does not include second-order free riders as one of the possible behavioural types. Here I present a simplified version of their model to demonstrate how cooperation unravels if second-round defectors enter the population, and this shows that the free-riding problem remains unsolved.

Parental human capital investment and old-age transfers from children: Is it a loan contract or reciprocity for Indonesian families?

This paper proposes two alternative models of intergenerational transfers linking parental investment in human capital of children to old-age support. The first model formulates these transfers as a pure loan contract and the second model as self-enforcing reciprocity. Both models predict neutrality of intergenerational redistribution of resources within the family, also known as the “difference in income transfer derivatives property”. Two models, however, provide different reasons for the failure of this property, and yield different policy implications for parental human capital investment and provision of old-age support. Specification tests on the Indonesian Family Life Survey data reject the pure loan model in favor of the reciprocity model. The estimated difference in income transfer derivatives for this data is found to be significantly higher than the difference estimated by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff Altonji et al. (1992) [Altonji, J.G., Hayashi, F. and Kotlikoff, L.J. (1992). Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data. The American Economic Review, vol. 82(5): 1177–98.] for the U.S. PSID data.

WHY AND WHEN COMPANIES CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETAL GOALS: THE EFFECT OF RECIPROCAL STAKEHOLDER BEHAVIOR.

Applying the model of reciprocity from experimental economics to stakeholder behavior provides an empirically based economic explanation of corporate social conduct. Depending on the strategic and institutional settings reciprocal stakeholders can translate societal concerns into economic incentives. Reciprocal stakeholder behavior explains why and under which conditions it is economically rational for firms to contribute to societal goals.

Time-matched grooming in female primates? New analyses from two species

The parcelling model of reciprocity predicts that grooming partners will alternate between giving and receiving grooming within grooming bouts, and that each partner will perform approximately as much grooming as it receives within each bout (‘time matching’). Models of allogrooming based on biological markets theory predict that individuals of lower dominance rank will exchange grooming for tolerance from high-rankers, and therefore an inverse relation will be found between grooming partners' dominance rank distance and how closely they match each other's grooming contributions within each bout. We used weighted logistic regression and weighted least-squares regression to test these predictions using data from female white-faced capuchins, Cebus capucinus, and bonnet macaques, Macaca radiata. Only 5–7% of macaque grooming bouts, and 12–27% of capuchin grooming bouts, were reciprocated. However, (1) the duration of grooming by the first groomer significantly predicted whether the groomee would reciprocate at all, and (2) when bouts were reciprocated, the duration of grooming by the first groomer significantly predicted the duration of grooming by the second groomer. Grooming was most balanced among females of similar dominance ranks. Both the time-matching and rank-related effects were weak, although significant. These results indicate that although some form of time matching may be a general characteristic of grooming in female-bonded primate species, time matching accounts for relatively little of the variation in the distribution of grooming within bouts. We also draw attention to weighted regression as a technique that avoids pseudoreplication while using all available data.

Organ trade versus reciprocity model. An ethical evaluation

We perform an ethical evaluation of two models that promise to solve the increasing shortage of organs for transplantations: firstly, the legalization of organ trade, and, secondly, the so called "Reciprocity Model". Thereby unrestricted respect for the individual human being serves as the ethical standard. We conclude that the Reciprocity Model is ethically much more acceptable that organ trade even if this trade were limited to Europe. In addition, the Reciprocity Model can easily be integrated into the current Eurotransplant system of organ allocation.

Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals

Reciprocal cooperation occurs when the overall benefits of receiving help exceed the costs of donating help (Q. Rev. Biol. 46 (197) 35). That is, individuals in good condition—for whom the pertinent costs are relatively small; donate help in order to secure reciprocity in their hour of need—when the benefits of receiving a donation are large. Consequently, reciprocity occurs among individuals who occasionally need help. In particular, such individuals will be unable to help others, no matter how deserving, when in need of help themselves— involuntary defection. This paper deals with the effects of involuntary defection in the context of a specific model of indirect reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal altruism that is directed toward all the cooperative members of the community) due to Nowak and Sigmund (J. Theor. Biol.194 (1998b) 561: Sections 2–4). In that model, the authors formulate the decision rules for conditional cooperation in the context of indirect reciprocity, and demonstrate that these decision rules can account for a long-term persistence of cooperation. Here we show that addition of involuntary defection to the decision rules formulated by Nowak and Sigmund results in indirect reciprocity that is evolutionary stable under appropriate conditions. Moreover, for a wide range of parameter values, evolutionary stability of cooperation requires a mixture of conditional- and unconditional-altruist behaviors. To recollect, unconditional altruist strategy can be viewed as conditional altruist strategy sans the ability to decide when the help-soliciting individual should be refused help. That is, given involuntary defection, stability of cooperation requires an occasional forgiveness, if only by default, of a failure to donate help. Thus, we see that evolutionary stable indirect reciprocity does not require perfection in either the ability to assess the merits of the help-soliciting individuals, or the ability to donate help when it is merited. On the contrary, we are forced to conclude that reciprocity, at least in the current case, is stable only among imperfect individuals.

On the relationship between the intrinsic hot workability parameters of DMM and PRM

A linear relationship is noticed between the dissipation efficiency parameter (η) of the dynamic materials model (DMM) and the intrinsic hot workability parameter (ς) of the polar reciprocity model (PRM). To identify unsafe regions in the processing maps, a simple stability condition is derived and validated initially by considering the flow stress data of IN 718 with microstructural observations of the deformed compression specimens. Finally, the consistency in predicting the unstable regions in the processing maps is shown by utilizing the flow stress data of titanium and its alloys.

A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness

We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights.

Earthquake‐induced hydrodynamic pressures on a 3D rigid dam–reservoir system using DRBEM and a radiation matrix

AbstractThe dual reciprocity method is applied to determine the hydrodynamic pressure distribution in a three‐dimensional dam–reservoir system subjected to earthquake excitation. The reservoir domain is idealized as a finite region of irregular geometry adjacent to the dam followed by an infinite domain of uniform cross‐section in the upstream direction. The reservoir hydrodynamic pressure response is governed by the Helmholtz equation subject to free surface, dam–reservoir interface, absorbing bottom/banks and radiation boundary conditions. A three‐dimensional (3D) dual reciprocity model is developed to determine the hydrodynamic pressure in the finite reservoir domain. A radiation matrix is developed and introduced to relate the hydrodynamic pressure and its normal derivative on the interface between the finite and infinite domains. The three‐dimensional radiation model used is developed by applying a two‐dimensional dual reciprocity formulation along the interface of the finite and infinite reservoirs together with a continuum solution in the upstream direction of the infinite domain. The model is compared for the hydrodynamic response of a three‐dimensional rectangular reservoir and found to be in excellent agreement with results obtained from a model based on the analytical formulation existing in the literature. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation

Many legal systems foster metarules of reciprocity to facilitate cooperative outcomes. This paper considers the role of reciprocity rules in various strategic environments. We start by considering the effect of reciprocity constraints in a classic prisoners' dilemma with two symmetric parties and linear payoffs. We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to (a) asymmetric players and (b) nonlinear payoff functions. Then we examine the welfare properties of the reciprocity-induced equilibrium. In many game-theoretic situations, reciprocity constraints facilitate the achievement of cooperative outcomes. Yet the reciprocity-induced equilibrium is not always socially optimal.

Analysis of a immunity system using qualitative methods

The article deals with analysis of reciprocity model of cancer cells and lymphocites, when cancer cells are restricted by cylindrical surfaces. The growth of cells is possible in the direction of radius and altitude in different speeds. The qualitative analysis of stationary values of this model is done.

Risk and reciprocity in Meriam food sharing

Foragers who do not practice food storage might adapt to fluctuating food supplies by sharing surplus resources in times of plenty with the expectation of receiving in times of shortfall. In this paper, we derive a number of predictions from this perspective, which we term the risk reduction reciprocity (RRR) model, and test these with ethnographic data on foraging (fishing, shellfish collecting, and turtle hunting) among the Meriam (Torres Strait, Australia). While the size of a harvest strongly predicts that a portion will be shared beyond the household of the acquirer, the effects of key measures of foraging risk (e.g., failure rate) are comparatively weak: Harvests from high-risk hunt types are usually shared more often than those from low-risk hunt types in the same macropatch, but increases in risk overall do not accurately predict increases in the probability of sharing. In addition, free-riders (those who take shares but do not reciprocate) are not discriminated against, those who share more often and more generously do not predictably receive more, and most sharing relationships between households (over 80%) involve one-way flows.

Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation

The concept of reciprocity gains importance where there is no external authority to enforce agreements. Many legal systems foster meta-rules of reciprocity to facilitate cooperative outcomes. This paper considers the role of reciprocity rules in various strategic environments. We start by considering the effect of reciprocity constraints in a classic prisoner's dilemma with two symmetric parties and linear payoffs. We extend the analysis to continuous strategies and then further extend the basic model of reciprocity to a) asymmetric players, and (b) non-linear payoff functions. Then we examine the welfare properties of the reciprocity-induced equilibrium. In many game-theoretic situations, reciprocity facilitates the achievement of cooperative outcomes. Yet the reciprocity-induced equilibrium is not always socially optimal.

Parental Human Capital Investment and Old-Age Transfers from Children: Is it a Loan Contract or Reciprocity for Indonesian Families?

This paper proposes two alternative models of intergenerational transfers linking parental investment in human capital of children to old-age support. The first model formulates these transfers as a pure loan contract and the second model as self-enforcing reciprocity. Both models predict neutrality of intergenerational redistribution of resources within the family, also known as the difference in income transfer derivatives property. The two models provide different reasons for the failure of this property, and yield different policy implications for parental human capital investment and provision of old-age support. Specification tests on the Indonesian Family Life Survey data reject the pure loan model in favor of the reciprocity model. The estimated difference in income transfer derivatives for this data is found to be significantly higher than the difference estimated by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997) for the U.S. PSID data.