Delegation Model Research Articles

Giving Advice Versus Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation

We generalize standard delegation models to consider policymaking when both information and authority are dispersed among multiple actors. In our theory, the principal may delegate partial authority to a privately informed agent while also reserving some authority for the principal’s use after observing the agent’s decision. Counterintuitively, the equilibrium amount of authority delegated to the agent is increasing in the preference divergence between the principal and agent. We also show that the amount of authority delegated depends upon whether the agent can observe the principal’s own private information (a condition we refer to as “top-down transparency”): this form of transparency increases the authority that must be delegated to the agent to obtain truthful policymaking. Accordingly, such transparency can result in less-informed policymaking. Nonetheless, the principal will sometimes but not always voluntarily choose such transparency.

Bargaining Over Managerial Contracts: A Note

The theory of strategic managerial delegation has recently been extended by incorporating bargaining over managerial contracts (van Witteloostuijn et.al 2007, etc). Assuming that bargaining involves only the incentive rates of managers, this line of research has shown that market outcomes (profits and social welfare) depend crucially on the intra-firm allocation of bargaining powers. In the current paper we revisit the bargaining framework assuming that negotiations involve all contractual terms (incentive rates and transfers). We show that contrary to the earlier results, the market equilibrium is independent of bargaining powers, the latter determining only the transfers. Hence the outcome of our model is identical to the outcome of the delegation model with no bargaining.

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

We develop a simple delegation model to study rules based on instruments vs. targets. A principal faces a better informed but biased agent and relies on joint punishments as incentives. Instrument-based rules condition incentives on the agent's observable action; target-based rules condition incentives on outcomes that depend on the agent's action and private information. In each class, an optimal rule takes a threshold form and imposes the worst punishment upon violation. Target-based rules dominate instrument-based rules if and only if the agent's information is sufficiently precise. An optimal hybrid rule relaxes the instrument threshold whenever the target threshold is satisfied.

Physician Time Burden Associated with Querying Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs.

Prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) enable prescribers to review patient prescription histories, and their use is mandatory in many states. We estimated the cost of physicians retrieving PDMP patient reports compared with a model where a delegate (i.e., administrative staff) retrieves reports. We performed a cost analysis with a one-year time horizon, from the perspective of physicians' employers. We obtained specialty-specific estimates of controlled substance prescribing frequency from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, 2012-2014. We defined three PDMP usage cases based on the frequency of queries: comprehensive (before every Schedule II-IV controlled substance prescription), selective (before new Schedule II-IV prescriptions and every six months for continuing medications), and minimal (before new Schedule II or III prescriptions and annually for continuing medications). The delegate model was less costly for all specialties in the comprehensive usage case and most specialties in the selective usage case, and it was similar to physician model costs in the minimal usage case. Estimated annual costs of the physician model to a large health care system (1,000 full-time equivalent physicians) were $1.6 million for comprehensive usage, $1.1 million for selective usage, and $645,313 for minimal usage. The delegate model was less costly in the comprehensive (savings of $907,283) and selective usage cases (savings of $156,216). Relying on delegates vs physicians to retrieve reports is less costly in most cases. Automation and integration of PDMP data into electronic health records may reduce costs further. Physicians, health care systems, and states should collaborate to streamline access to PDMPs.

Do Constituents Influence Issue-Specific Bill Sponsorship?

Bill sponsorship is a valuable form of legislative activity in which all legislators are free to signal priorities, stake out positions, and influence legislative agendas. However, decisions to hone in on specific issues have been mostly overlooked, resulting in drivers of issue-specific sponsorship remaining unclear. A reasonable place to look for drivers is constituent preferences, given the representational responsibilities underlying most legislative behavior. To address this question, I leverage advances in opinion estimation to generate a new fine-grained measure of constituent issue preferences at the district level. By keeping the focus on issues, this approach is preferable to other measures of constituent preferences, in that it assumes nothing about constituents’ ideology. Through numerous tests across several issues spanning the 109th to 113th Congresses, I find a largely indirect effect of preferences on sponsorship through employment proxies, yet no consistent direct impact from constituents, opposite expectations of the delegate model of representation.

How to become a Respiratory Therapist in Germany - Status quo and Development Prospects

The profession respiratory therapist is well established in Germany 10 years after the introduction. 600 participants have successfully graduated from the training facilities.Our goals are high quality interprofessional teamwork and medical assistance inclusive delegation of formerly physician activities. The duties are comparable to the work pattern of Technical Assistants in surgery. For this profession different ways of qualification are possible: primary training, advanced training and academic studies Physician Assistance. The Geman Medical Association worked up standards for a delegation model to physician assistants and relief and assictance for physicians. These standards were finalised in 2017 during the 120th german physician convention. After this decision we can estimate that the number of physician assistants will be growing up. The german respiratory society can imagine physician assistants with special knowledge in respiratory care. But we are not sure wether our previous educational courses will be completely substituted by academic studies. Temporary there will coexist different educational concepts on different levels. In one german country it is also possible for nurses to pass federal certified advanced training in respiratory care. This is why it will be hard to make a choice on this matter in the future.

Extending social networks with delegation

Despite their enormous growth, current social networks lack a systematic approach to delegate rights – when an entity authorizes another to access the resources on its behalf. This paper proposes a delegation model based on socio-technical design and theory of cooperation and collaboration that best suits the requirements of social networks. The model is formulated through formal methods, designed using ontologies and implemented through Facebook APIs. The model's expressiveness is examined for overlapping policies of multiple users, its consistency is analyzed for conflicting and redundant policies and user acceptance testing is performed for acceptability. For social validity, the model is also compared with 27 previous delegation models with respect to socio-technical validity parameters derived from social principles already accepted in the human society.

The relevance of different trust models for representation in patient organizations: conceptual considerations

BackgroundTrust within organizations is important for ensuring members’ acceptance of the organization’s activities and to expand their scope of action. Remarkably, Patient Organizations (POs) that often both function as a forum for self-help and represent patients on the health-political level, have been understudied in this respect. This paper analyzes the relation between trust and representation in POs. We distinguish between two models of representation originating from political theory: the trustee and delegate model and between two types of trust: horizontal and vertical trust.MethodsOur theoretical approach is illustrated with an analysis of 13 interviews with representatives of German POs.ResultsWe have found that the delegate model requires horizontal trust and the trustee model vertical trust. Both models: horizontal/delegate and vertical/trustee exist within single POs.ConclusionsThe representation process within POs demands a balancing act between inclusion of affected persons and strategically aggregating a clear-cut political claim. Trust plays in that process of coming from individual wishes to collective and political standpoints a major role both in terms of horizontal as well as vertical trust. Horizontal trust serves the communication between affected members, and vertical trust allows representatives to be decisive.

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer–employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent's choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds even if action-contingent monetary transfers are possible, as long as transfers from the principal to the agent are bounded from below (as in limited liability or minimal wage requirements). In fact, the optimal contract can involve a combination of both efficient monetary incentives and inefficient nonmonetary incentives through money burning. Our model delivers some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more “sensitive” to the choice of action than the agent. This is consistent with the perception that there is more bureaucratization in large organizations. Second, money-burning is more likely if the agent's limited liability constraint is tighter relative to his participation constraint. This implies that a higher minimum wage distorts employment contracts towards using socially wasteful nonmonetary incentives, leading to a Pareto inferior outcome as the agent is still held down to his reservation value through increased money burning.

Evolutionary dynamics of a duopoly game with strategic delegation and isoelastic demand

We analyze a model of strategic delegation in Cournot competition with isoelastic demand. We first consider the static game and then we address an evolutionary version of it. We show that the result for which under quantity competition strategic delegation entails output expansion and higher consumers’ welfare than at the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not necessarily true, but depends on the price elasticity of demand. Then, we study the main welfare implications of the model in order to understand whether the prevailing long-run industry configuration provides the highest welfare. We show that this may occur when both firms provide a mixed incentive and that, in this case, the model admits feasible trajectories the long-run configuration of which yields the highest welfare. Finally, we address the robustness of our results by means of an evolutionary model with heterogeneous players.

(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.

A Delegation Model of Healthcare System Based of AB-PRE in Fog Computing Environment

A Delegation Model of Healthcare System Based of AB-PRE in Fog Computing Environment

Do VAAs Encourage Issue Voting and Promissory Representation? Evidence From the Swiss Smartvote

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) are based on the idea of issue and proximity voting. The parties and candidates recommended by VAAs are those with the highest number of matching positions on a number of political questions and issues. Many of these questions are much more specific and detailed than party programs and electoral platforms and show the voters exactly what the party or the candidates stand for and how they will vote in parliament once elected. This practice can be expected to foster promissory representation and the delegate model of political representation, where promises are supposed to be kept, and no leeway is given to the candidates once they are elected. On the basis of an online survey conducted among the users of the Swiss VAA Smartvote (n = 10,252), I find evidence that issue voters have weaker party ties, are more likely to follow the recommendations issued by Smartvote and to expect elected candidates to keep their promises.

A formalized delegation model for multimedia social networks

In response to the issues of second-hand sharing and repeat delegation of the digital content in existing multimedia social networks, this paper proposed a novel formalized delegation model for multimedia social network. In accordance with this model, delegators can independently lay down delegation policies. Further, related delegation constraints and strategies were identified to solve delegation conflicts. When a conflict arises among several delegations, strategies could be used to solve the conflict. This delegation model can control the authorities and are delegated consistently until the authorization expires or is revoked. And also, the paper presented essential security policies that lead to revoking different authorities. A use case of real multimedia social network further verified the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed model.

Anonymizing popularity in online social networks with full utility

With the rapid growth of social network applications, more and more people are participating in social networks. Privacy protection in online social networks becomes an important issue. The illegal disclosure or improper use of users’ private information will lead to unaccepted or unexpected consequences in people’s lives. In this paper, we concern on authentic popularity disclosure in online social networks. To protect users’ privacy, the social networks need to be anonymized. However, existing anonymization algorithms on social networks may lead to nontrivial utility loss. The reason is that the anonymization process has changed the social network’s structure. The social network’s utility, such as retrieving data files, reading data files, and sharing data files among different users, has decreased. Therefore, it is a challenge to develop an effective anonymization algorithm to protect the privacy of user’s authentic popularity in online social networks without decreasing their utility. In this paper, we first design a hierarchical authorization and capability delegation (HACD) model. Based on this model, we propose a novel utility-based popularity anonymization (UPA) scheme, which integrates proxy re-encryption with keyword search techniques, to tackle this issue. We demonstrate that the proposed scheme can not only protect the users’ authentic popularity privacy, but also keep the full utility of the social network. Extensive experiments on large real-world online social networks confirm the efficacy and efficiency of our scheme.

Legislative Knowledge Networks, Status Quo Complexity, and the Approval of Law Initiatives

In this article, we explore the role of legislative knowledge networks (LKN) in the enactment of tax policy in Argentina. Findings show that legislative innovation follows a hierarchical (power law) structure with a few distinct issue areas dominated by key enacted bills. Taxation in Argentina is well described by three main issue areas: the VAT laws, the income tax, and the revenue‐sharing legislation. We provide evidence that complexity in the status quo, as described by a larger number of important precedent laws, reduces the likelihood of final approval. Our research departs from existing models of delegation by considering complexity in the status quo rather than complexity in the proposal. We argue that more complex status quo should be accounted for when trying to assess whether legislators draft more or less detailed law initiatives.

The Delegational Pulpit? Clergy Identifying as Congregational Political Representatives

While American clergy have been understood as political actors in some capacity, the precise understanding of their representation has been debated. Some argue that clergy may be seen as fidei defensor, representing a particular set of values and beliefs to the world—a trustee model. Others see the potential for clergy to advocate for the interests of local congregations embedded in particular communities—a delegate model. Neither approach has had concrete evidence to address this question, nor has any work explicitly documented clergy adopting a representational role. To remedy this defect, we polled a sample of clergy in order to gauge the degree to which they are functionally and explicitly considered representatives of their congregations. From these data, 70% have been contacted by congregation members with political concerns and 40% consider themselves or believe they are considered by congregants as representatives to government officials. Several factors increase the probability that clergy take on a representative role including holding a high view of religious authority. Clergy also consider carefully their relationship with the congregation and community before taking on the role of representative, supporting the delegate model.

Alternative Objectives in an Oligopoly Model: An Aggregative Game Approach

A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit and enjoy market power. Examples include the labor-managed firm, mixed oligopoly, and delegation models. These models typically retain the aggregative structure of the conventional Cournot model of imperfect competition. We exploit this fact and apply the framework recently developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005, 2011) to analyze the properties of the equilibrium in such games. We show that existing treatments often make more restrictive assumptions than necessary to generate their results. Specifically, we identify conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium, and we explore the comparative static properties of these conditions.

Demonstration of Need of Delegation with Newton’s Third Law of Action and Reaction

The article’s aims are to present the action of delegation as a need to every business, especially when they get into a process of growth or expansion of their services and the second object is to propose a delegation model. To achieve the first object, a comparison is performed between the need of delegation in a business and Newton’s third law of action and reaction, considering as “action” the applicant work force from the clients and as “reaction” the business’ capacity to perform a determined work. On the other hand, the proposed “LWPO” model is based in leadership, work, people and objectives of the organization, so it can achieve effectively its strategic. The main feature about the “LWPO” model is that you can select and train contributors in which you may delegate in the future.

Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a function of the agent’s choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds even if action-contingent monetary transfers are possible, as long as transfers from the principal to the agent are bounded from below (as in limited liability or minimal wage requirements). In fact, the optimal contract can involve a combination of both efficient monetary incentives and inefficient nonmonetary incentives through money burning. Our model delivers some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to the choice of action than the agent. This is consistent with the perception that there is more bureaucratization in large organizations. Second, money-burning is more likely if the agent’s limited liability constraint is tighter relative to his participation constraint. This implies that a higher minimum wage distorts employment contracts towards using socially wasteful nonmonetary incentives, leading to a Pareto inferior outcome as the agent is still held down to his reservation value through increased money burning.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2700851