The issues and criticisms that Virgílio Afonso da Silva, Alon Harel, and Iddo Porat raise about The Global Model of Constitutional Rights1 relate, first, to its methodology (in particular the nature of my theory as morally reconstructive, and its global character), secondly, to the role of autonomy (in particular its relation to equality, and my defence of a general right to autonomy), and thirdly, to the problem of justification (outcome-based versus excluded reasons-based ways of reasoning about questions of rights). Correspondingly, I divide this response into three sections, dealing with the methodological questions in the first, with the autonomy-related issues in the second, and with the problem of justification in the final section. Any morally reconstructive theory is Janus-headed: it looks both to fit with the practice and to moral value. Thus, a morally reconstructive theory of the global model of constitutional rights must meet two criteria: first, it must “fit” the global model sufficiently well to be rightly considered a theory “of” that practice, and second, it must be morally coherent. If, on the one hand, my theory did not have sufficient fit, then it would simply be a free-standing theory of rights—indeed it might be excellent in this regard, but it could not claim to be a theory of the global model. If, on the other hand, my theory were morally incoherent, it could not claim to be a moral reconstruction. The goal of the book is to show that the global model, which departs in so many ways from how almost all moral and political philosophers think about rights, is morally defensible. A morally incoherent theory obviously could not be used to demonstrate this claim. It is of course a possibility that a practice is morally indefensible: that it cannot be reconstructed in a way which fits the practice and shows it as morally appealing (think of Nazi law as an extreme example). Where that is the case, it must be concluded that the practice ought to be abandoned or radically changed, precisely because no theory that fits that practice sufficiently well displays moral coherence.