In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights concluded with the "Sejdić-Finci" Judgment that the provisions of the Constitution (Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement) and the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which regulate the election of members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, violate the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Electoral reform aimed at implementing this and similar judgments of the ECHR is part of the obligations placed on Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process of EU accession. However, there is still no consensus among the political representatives of the constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina on how to implement electoral reforms. In this work, we will attempt to identify a model of electoral reforms that largely respects the goals of the "Sejdić-Finci" judgment and the issue of feasibility or the possibility of achieving consensus within Bosnia and Herzegovina. To achieve this, we will analyze the content of documents relevant to this topic and conduct a comparative analysis of similar judgments and cases. We will present potential models for implementing the "Sejdić-Finci" judgment and, through an analysis of discourse and political views of political representatives of the constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as representatives of the international community and the EU, examine the issue of the feasibility of these models.