Modal Terms Research Articles

Zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Erfahrung. Eine modallogische Analyse

Abstract In Kantian philosophy, the term “condition of possibility” is central, but carries the following ambiguity. According to one reading, “condition of possibility” merely means “necessary condition”. However, it is demonstrated that a deeper interpretation of the term “possibility” proves to be more fruitful. This reading allows us to reconstruct an important background assumption of Kant: Every condition of the possibility of experience holds necessarily, provided that experience is possible. Or more generally: All conditions of the possibility hold necessarily as long as the conditioned is actually possible. This conclusion is understood through the axiomatic system S5. Therefore I argue by referencing the schematism chapter that Kant’s notion of modal terms can be formalized through S5.

Attention And Attentiveness: A Defence of The Argument for Adverbialism

ABSTRACT In recent philosophical work on attention, several authors have employed versions of an argument purporting to show that attention is not identical to any cognitive process. Others have criticised this argument. This article addresses their various criticisms and shows the original argument to be a valid one. It also shows that this argument cannot be resisted by taking attention to be the disjunction of several processes, by taking it be a genus of process that is composed of various species, or by taking it to be a process-determinable, for which particular cognitive processes are determinates. The metaphysical position that most readily accommodates this argument’s conclusion is a version of adverbialism. It should be understood as making a claim about the essence of attention. Some of the confusions in this area are seen to originate in the difficulty of glossing such a claim in modal terms.

Modal normativism on semantic rules

ABSTRACT According to Amie Thomasson's modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a “semantic rule”? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

Benatar and Metz on Cosmic Meaning and Anti-natalism

AbstractDavid Benatar argues that one important consideration in favour of anti-natalism is based on the fact that all humans lack cosmic meaning; we will never transcend space and time such that we will have an impact on the entire universe, forever. Instead of denying Benatar’s claim that we lack cosmic meaning, Thaddeus Metz recently argues that our lack of cosmic meaning is not that significant because we ought not to regret lacking a good that we could not have in the first place. He explains the principle behind this idea in modal terms: “the closer the world in which one could access a benefit, the more reasonable are attitudes such as sadness, disappointment, regret when does not acquire it.” I argue that this principle faces a serious counterexample in the form of death. The possible worlds in which one doesn’t die are incredibly distant. Yet, it is appropriate to express deep sadness, disappointment, and regret at the fact that one must inevitably face death. Metz is wrong that we shouldn’t regret lacking a good unavailable to us in the first place. His criticism of Benatar therefore fails. While it might be objected that immortality is not good, my basic point still stands when considering the fact that our lives are not significantly longer. Benatar’s claims about the significance of our lack of cosmic meaning might not be true, but not for the reasons suggested by Metz.

Epistemic Possibility, Concessive Knowledge Attributions, and Fallibilism

I argue that modal terms have an epistemic interpretation on which concessive knowledge attributions are semantically contradictory. This is compatible with the fallibilist view that the basis on which we know something need not entail it, but not with the view that what is known need not be epistemically certain or necessary. The apparent contradictoriness of concessive knowledge attributions is not due to mere implicature, nor to assertion updating the modal base. And it is contextually invariant. Concessive knowledge attributions contrast markedly with concessive assertions and Moorean conjunctions, whose infelicity is plausibly due to norms of assertion. I briefly explain why the strict fallibilism I recommend is compatible with our ordinary use of ‘know,’ and with our knowing much on the basis of perception. Its contextual shiftiness closely parallels our variably strict use of temporal and other invariant terms with strict application conditions.

Metaphysical Emergence

<i>Metaphysical Emergence</i>

D. Chalmers’ argument from logical supervenience in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness

The subject of this research is D. Chalmers&amp;rsquo; argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness &amp;ndash;sentience or qualia &amp;ndash; explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term &amp;ldquo;possibility&amp;rdquo;, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature &amp;ndash; nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.

A Study of Modality in English Versions of Chinese Government Work Reports in the New Era

In the new era, with the exchanges and communication of various countries in the world, the work report of Chinese government has become a window for the media of all countries to fully understand the social situation in China. The English translation of the government work report will help the international community to have a deeper understanding of China's social and economic construction and development, and help to establish the international image of China. This paper first introduces the research on the English translation of China's government work report, points out the current research status of the English translation of the Chinese government work report, and explores the modal language in the English version of the Chinese government work report from four aspects: modal verbs, position verbs, modal adverbs and other modal terms, so as to promote the research on the English translation of the Chinese government work report and further improve China's publicity to the outside world, creating a good image of China.

Megaralı Philon’da Koşullu Önerme Anlayışı ve Modern Mantıkta Maddi İçerme Kavramının Oluşumu

Philo of Megara (d. 3rd century BCE) is one of the first philosophers who assigned truth values to conditional propositions that can be symbolized as “If A, then B”. He determined the minimum criterion for a conditional proposition not to bear a false truth value. According to this criterion, a conditional proposition that doesn’t have a true antecedent and false consequent is regarded as a true conditional. Philon’s conception of modal terms helps us to understand his theory of conditionals. We need factual data to be able to assess the truth values of Philoanian conditional propositions. The discussion about conditional propositions regarding their truth values lost its importance after Stoics until the modern era. Frege revitalizes the subject by introducing his notation of conditionals. He presents how the “If ..., then …” form of the conditional proposition is different from physical causality. Peirce made a contribution to the notation of symbolic logic about conditionals and, explained conditional propoistions in the context of logical possibility. Russell defined material implication as distinguished from formal implication. Via the material implication, Philonian conditional proposition “If A, then B” is understood as “A implies B”.

Consistent frequency-matching calibration procedure for electromechanical shunt absorbers

Electromagnetic and piezoelectric shunt damping can be represented by an equivalent mechanical vibration absorber with a spring, dashpot, and inerter in series. A common calibration procedure for multiple electromechanical shunt absorbers is obtained by this equivalence, including a correction for the influence from residual vibration modes by additional modal terms, whose coefficients are consistently identified by frequency matching for the system with rigid absorber dashpots. The accuracy and robustness of the calibration procedure are verified numerically for an unsupported truss structure with rigid body modes.

A normative account of epistemic luck

AbstractThis paper develops a normative account of epistemic luck, according to which the luckiness of epistemic luck is analyzed in terms of the expectations a subject is entitled to have when she satisfies the standards of epistemic justification. This account enables us to distinguish three types of epistemic luck—bad, good, and sheer—and to model the roles they play e.g. in Gettierization. One controversial aspect of the proposed account is that it is non‐reductive. While other approaches analyze epistemic luck in non‐epistemic terms—either in modal terms (lack of safety) or in agential terms (lack of creditworthiness)—I argue that the non‐reductive nature of the normative account is actually a selling‐point relative to its competitors.

Chemical arbitrariness and the causal role of molecular adapters

Jacques Monod (1971) argued that certain molecular processes rely critically on the property of chemical arbitrariness, which he claimed allows those processes to “transcend the laws of chemistry”. It seems natural, as some philosophers have done, to interpret this in modal terms: a biological relationship is chemically arbitrary if it is possible, within the constraints of chemical “law”, for that relationship to have been otherwise than it is. But while modality is certainly important for understanding chemical arbitrariness, understanding its biological role also requires an account of the concrete causal-functional features that distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary phenomena. In this paper I elaborate on this under-emphasised aspect by offering a general account of these features: arbitrary relations are instantiated by mechanisms that involve molecular adapters, which causally couple two properties or processes which would otherwise be uncorrelated. Additionally, adapters work by acting as intermediate rather than cooperating causes.

Boundaries and Things. A Metaphysical Study of the Brentano-Chisholm Theory

Abstract The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish.

Kata symbebēkos in Aristotle’s Teaching on Deformity in GA

In Physics, book ii, Aristotle says that besides the four wellknown causes there is a fifth, chance (tych) or accidental (automaton) one, which is no less important. Despite the fact that Aristotle does argue about spontaneous generation and deformities in his biological works, the relationship between the accidental and the four main causes (especially the formal one) is less than clear in his teaching on embryology. The relationship between the accidental and its counterpart is usually characterized in modal terms. Likewise, in the general discourse of Aristotles teleology the accidental is contrasted with a necessity the former is a diverted implementation of something that was supposed to be a necessary step for the sake of an end. This diversion is something that is not required, but which nevertheless happens. However, the statement conveyed in The Generation of Animals, book iv, that monstrosities are per accident necessary overturns this common characterization and suggests that it could be otherwise. This study offers some insights into the problem regarding the necessity of irregular generation and ensuant deviations in Aristotelian philosophy and biology. It questions the standard interpretation of the relation between incidental occurrences and teleology and suggests a way of reconciling the two. The study of the problem of the accidental in embryogenesis leads us to the problem regarding the normativity of human nature. This allows us to broaden the picture of embryology in antiquity for the purposes of understanding human nature in the context of causes and teleology.

Fiber optic gyroscope threshold denoising based on EMD-LWT

Fiber optic gyroscope (FOG) drift data is often submerged in various noises backgrounds. It is very difficult to compensate for modeling drift signals directly. In order to better eliminate the noise mixed in the FOG temperature drift data, a hybrid EMD-LWT filtering algorithm based on empirical mode decomposition (EMD) and lifting wavelet transform (LWT) threshold denoising was proposed for gyro signals preprocessing. Firstly, the noise signal of fiber optic gyro is decomposed by EMD, and the noise term and the mixed modal term of the intrinsic mode functions (IMF) are judged according to the information entropy. Then the noise term is de-noised by LWT and the mixed modal term is denoised by wavelet transform (WT). A static test was performed on an interferential FOG to verify the effectiveness of the algorithm and compared with WT and LWT. The experimental results show that the proposed EMD-LWT filtering algorithm has better filtering effect. After processing, the root mean square error (RMSE) of the reconstructed signal is reduced by 63%, which effectively removes the noise in the FOG output.

Structural intensity analysis of the cantilevered plate under thermal load

Structural intensity of the cantilevered plate under thermal load is investigated. A hybrid method based on the modal expansions and the finite element method for controlling the vibrational energy flow pattern is presented. The structural intensity formulations of the plate under thermal load are expressed as the superposition of modal terms, and then the natural mode shapes and the natural frequencies are calculated. Finally, the modal coefficient formulations are given to determine the proper point excitation positions. In the structural intensity expansion, each modal term is a product of the function of natural mode shapes and the modal coefficient. The function of natural mode shapes determines the vibrational energy flow pattern, such as a vortex-typed pattern, a straight-typed pattern or others. Certain modal coefficient may be increased or decreased through choosing a proper point excitation position determined by the presented method, and then the vibrational energy flow pattern can be controlled. So the modal coefficient may be designed to adjust the vibrational energy flow pattern by changing the position of point excitation, and the influences of the thermal load on the natural mode shapes and structural intensity are analyzed. In particular, the streamline visualization technique is presented to obtain information on transmission paths of the vibration energy.

INDETERMINATEZZA METAFISICA E MECCANICA QUANTISTICA

The paper argues that quantum mechanics provide examples of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy that cannot be accounted for in purely modal terms. The best account of quantum indeterminacy has it that quantum systems have determinable properties without thereby having a unique determinate of that determinable.

Paradigms, possibilities, and probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016).

Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016) compared the adequacy of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning with the recent revision of mental models theory (MMT) for explaining a novel class of inferences containing the modal term "possibly." For example, the door is closed or the window is open or both, therefore, possibly the door is closed and the window is open (A or B or both, therefore, possibly(A & B)). They concluded that their results support MMT. In this comment, it is argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not adequately characterized the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity) on which the new paradigm depends. It is unclear how p-validity can be applied to these inferences, which are anyway peripheral to the theory. It is also argued that the revision of MMT is not well motivated and its adoption leads to many logical absurdities. Moreover, the comparison is not appropriate because these theories are defined at different levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks a provably consistent computational level theory that could justify treating these inferences as valid. It is further argued that the data could result from the noncolloquial locutions used to express the premises. Finally, an alternative pragmatic account is proposed based on the idea that a conclusion is possible if what someone knows cannot rule it out. This account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory rendering the revision redundant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Moral supervenience and distinctness: comments on Dreier

Jamie Dreier has argued that the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral requires explanation, and that attempts by the non-naturalist to provide it, or to sidestep the issue, have so far failed. These comments on Dreier first examine the notion of distinctness at work in the idea that non-natural properties are distinct from natural ones, pointing out that distinctness cannot be understood in modal terms if supervenience is to be respected. It then suggests that Dreier’s implicit commitment to the existence of infinite Boolean combinations of properties plays a significant role in the challenge to non-naturalism, and that the non-naturalist has some principled reasons for rejecting it. It also suggests that the real problem for non-naturalists isn’t explaining supervenience, but is rather the well-known problem of explaining our capacity to know anything about non-natural properties. That is, if the latter epistemological problem can be solved, the former metaphysical one might well disappear, at least as a distinctive problem for non-naturalist realists about morality.

Respects of Dependence

In this paper I consider respects of dependence, namely, the fact that some entities depend on other entities in some respect or another. In the first section, I provide a characterization of contemporary debates on dependence based on respects of dependence. I also single out seven desiderata a good theory of dependence should satisfy and three ways of interpreting respects of dependence. In the second section, I criticize two such ways and, in the third section, I defend the remaining option, namely, that respects of dependence correspond to different dependence-relations between entities (e.g., existence-dependence, identity-dependence, and so on). In the fourth section, I develop my theory of Respect-of-Dependence (RD ) Relations in order to distinguish between partial and full dependence and between specific and generic dependence, and to qualify RD -relations in temporal and modal terms. Finally, in the last section, I anticipate and reply to three objections against dependence pluralism.