Modal Logic Research Articles

Subintuitionistic logics and their modal companions: a nested approach

In the present paper we deal with subintuitionistic logics and their modal companions. In particular, we introduce nested calculi for subintuitionistic systems and for modal logics in the S 5 modal cube ranging from K to S 4 . The latter calculi differ from standard nested systems, as there are multiple rules handling the modal operator. As an upshot, we get a purely syntactic proof of the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski embedding which preserves the structure and the height of the derivations. Finally, we obtain a conservativity result for classical logic over a weak subintuitionistic system.

Reasoning From Quantified Modal Premises.

Quantified modal inferences interest logicians, linguists, and computer scientists, but no previous psychological study of them appears to be in the literature. Here is an example of one: All those artists are businessmen. Paulo is possibly one of the artists. What follows? People tend to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). It seems plausible, and it follows from an intuitive mental model in which Paulo is one of a set of artists who are businessmen. Further deliberation can yield a model of an alternative possibility in which Paulo is not one of the artists, which confirms that the conclusion is only a possibility. The snag is that standard modal logics, which deal with possibilities, cannot yield a particular conclusion to any premises: Infinitely many follow validly (from any premises) but they do not include the present conclusion. Yet, further experiments corroborated a new mental model theory's predictions for various inferences (Experiment 2), for the occurrence of factual conclusions drawn from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and for inferences from premises of modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The theory is therefore plausible, but we explore the feasibility of a cognitive theory based on modifications to modal logic.

Nonconservative extensions by propositional quantifiers and modal incompleteness

Abstract Propositional modal logics can be extended by propositional quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers binding proposition letters understood as variables. This paper investigates whether such an extension is always conservative. It is shown that the answer depends on the way in which propositional quantifiers are added. On a minimal approach, according to which propositional quantifiers only have to satisfy the classical principles of quantification, every classical modal logic has a conservative extension by propositional quantifiers. However, in the context of normal modal logics it is natural to require propositionally quantified extensions also to be closed under the rule of necessitation. It is shown that in this setting, there are normal modal logics whose propositionally quantified extensions are nonconservative. Nonconservativity is shown to be a special case of a number of model-theoretic notions of incompleteness. More tentatively, it is suggested that nonconservativity indicates incompleteness in a more substantial sense, concerning the intended target of capturing the logics of modalities.

Ivlev-Like Modal Logics of Formal Inconsistency Obtained by Fibring Swap Structures

Ivlev-Like Modal Logics of Formal Inconsistency Obtained by Fibring Swap Structures

On formal limitations of causal ecological networks.

Causal multivariate time-series analysis, combined with network theory, provide a powerful tool for studying complex ecological interactions. However, these methods have limitations often underestimated when used in graphical modelling of ecological systems. In this opinion article, I examine the relationship between formal logic methods used to describe causal networks and their inherent statistical and epistemological limitations. I argue that while these methods offer valuable insights, they are restricted by axiomatic assumptions, statistical constraints and the incompleteness of our knowledge. To prove that, I first consider causal networks as formal systems, define causality and formalize their axioms in terms of modal logic and use ecological counterexamples to question the axioms. I also highlight the statistical limitations when using multivariate time-series analysis and Granger causality to develop ecological networks, including the potential for spurious correlations among other data characteristics. Finally, I draw upon Gödel's incompleteness theorems to highlight the inherent limits of fully understanding complex networks as formal systems and conclude that causal ecological networks are subject to initial rules and data characteristics and, as any formal system, will never fully capture the intricate complexities of the systems they represent. This article is part of the theme issue 'Connected interactions: enriching food web research by spatial and social interactions'.

Topological product of modal logics with McKinsey axiom

Topological product of modal logics with McKinsey axiom

Many-valued coalgebraic logic over semi-primal varieties

We study many-valued coalgebraic logics with semi-primal algebras of truth-degrees. We provide a systematic way to lift endofunctors defined on the variety of Boolean algebras to endofunctors on the variety generated by a semi-primal algebra. We show that this can be extended to a technique to lift classical coalgebraic logics to many-valued ones, and that (one-step) completeness and expressivity are preserved under this lifting. For specific classes of endofunctors, we also describe how to obtain an axiomatization of the lifted many-valued logic directly from an axiomatization of the original classical one. In particular, we apply all of these techniques to classical modal logic.

Reasoning about possibilities: Modal logics, possible worlds, and mental models.

Everyone reasons about possibilities. This article explains how they could do so using mental models. The theory makes four major claims: 1. Correct inferences are necessary, referring only to facts or possibilities to which the premises refer and not ruling any of them out, for example: She left or hid; Therefore, it's possible that she left and possible that she hid. 2. A possibility such as that she hid, which is represented in an intuitive model, presupposes the possibility that it did not occur, she did not hide, which, if reasoners deliberate, is represented in the resulting model. 3. Reasoners condense consistent possibilities, such as the earlier pair, into one possibility: it is possible that she left and she hid. 4. Inconsistencies, such as she left or hid, and she neither left nor hid, refer to no possibilities whatsoever - they have an empty model - and so their only effects are local. Hence, any inference can be withdrawn with impunity if there is knowledge to the contrary. Experiments have corroborated each of these principles. They are incompatible with four essentials of standard modal logics, which concern deductions based on "possible" or "necessary". Their formal deductions correspond to valid inferences, which have no counterexamples in which the premises are true but the conclusion is false. And so the article examines the differences between the two approaches, and explores the adaptation of a modal logic to account for correct human reasoning. Its feasibility is an open question.

Decidability of Inquisitive Modal Logic via Filtrations

Decidability of Inquisitive Modal Logic via Filtrations

Characterizing contrasimilarity through games, modal logic, and complexity

We present the first game characterization of contrasimilarity, the weakest form of bisimilarity. It corresponds to an elegant modal characterization of nested trees of impossible future behavior. The game is exponential but finite for finite-state systems and can thus be used for contrasimulation equivalence checking, of which no tool has been capable to date. By reduction from weak trace equivalence, we establish that contrasimilarity is PSPACE-complete. A machine-checked Isabelle/HOL formalization backs our work and enables further use of contrasimilarity in verification contexts.

A formalization of Descartes’ causal argument for existence of God

In this paper I attempt a formalization of Descartes’ causal argument for the existence of God presented in the Third Meditation. By taking into account the philosophical setting of Descartes’ Meditations, I argue that the best logical theory to carry out the formalization is quantified modal logic where free logic is used for the first-order axioms. This fact is related to Descartes’ distinction between formal and objective reality which — to my mind — suggests both the adoption of modality (e.g. true in formal vs true in objective reality) and the possibility of using empty names (i.e. names which lack reference in “formal reality”). After presenting the formal system and the reconstruction of Descartes’ proof, I will discuss some issues related to the philosophical import of the formalization, such as the understanding of rigid designation and lack of reference. I will argue that the formalization of Descartes’ argument has an intrinsic philosophical value for it sheds light on the structure of argument, its implicit difficulties, and the use of logic itself to understand the philosophical tradition.

On the implicative‐infimum subreducts of weak Heyting algebras

AbstractThe variety of weak Heyting algebras was introduced in 2005 by Celani and Jansana. This corresponds to the strict implication fragment of the normal modal logic which is also known as the subintuitionistic local consequence of the class of all Kripke models. Subresiduated lattices are a generalization of Heyting algebras and particular cases of weak Heyting algebras. They were introduced during the 1970s by Epstein and Horn as an algebraic counterpart of some logics with strong implication previously studied by Lewy and Hacking. In this paper we study the class of implicative‐infimum subreducts of weak Heyting algebras. In particular, we prove that this class is a variety by giving an equational base for it. We also present a topological duality for the algebraic category whose objects are the implicative‐infimum subreducts of subresiduated lattices.

Truth diagrams for some non-classical and modal logics

This paper examines truth diagrams for some non-classical, modal and dynamic logics. Truth diagrams are diagrammatic and visual ways to represent logical truth akin to truth tables, developed by Peter C.-H. Cheng. Currently, it is only given for classical propositional logic. In this paper, we establish truth diagrams for Priest's Logic of Paradox, Belnap–Dunn's Four-Valued Logic, MacColl's Connexive Logic, Bochvar–Halldén's Logic of Non-Sense, Carnielli–Coniglio's logic of formal inconsistency as well as classical modal logic and its dynamic extension to shed light on the semantic behaviour of some non-classical and modal logics.

Modal reduction principles: a parametric shift to graphs

Graph-based frames have been introduced as a logical framework which internalises an inherent boundary to knowability (referred to as ‘informational entropy’), due, e.g. to perceptual, evidential or linguistic limits. They also support the interpretation of lattice-based (modal) logics as hyper-constructive logics of evidential reasoning. Conceptually, the present paper proposes graph-based frames as a formal framework suitable for generalising Pawlak's rough set theory to a setting in which inherent limits to knowability exist and need to be considered. Technically, the present paper establishes systematic connections between the first-order correspondents of Sahlqvist modal reduction principles on Kripke frames, and on the more general relational environments of graph-based and polarity-based frames. This work is part of a research line aiming at: (a) comparing and inter-relating the various (first-order) conditions corresponding to a given (modal) axiom in different relational semantics; (b) recognising when first-order sentences in the frame-correspondence languages of different relational structures encode the same ‘modal content’; (c) meaningfully transferring relational properties across different semantic contexts. The present paper develops these results for the graph-based semantics, polarity-based semantics, and all Sahlqvist modal reduction principles. As an application, we study well known modal axioms in rough set theory (such as those corresponding to seriality, reflexivity, and transitivity) on graph-based frames and show that, although these axioms correspond to different first-order conditions on graph-based frames, their intuitive meaning is retained. This allows us to introduce the notion of hyperconstructivist approximation spaces as the subclass of graph-based frames defined by the first-order conditions corresponding to the same modal axioms defining classical generalised approximation spaces, and to transfer the properties and the intuitive understanding of different approximation spaces to the more general framework of graph-based frames. The approach presented in this paper provides a base for systematically comparing and connecting various formal frameworks in rough set theory, and for the transfer of insights across different frameworks.

A study of modal logic with semantics based on rough set theory

This article presents an overview of modal logic with semantics based on structures inherited from rough set theory.

Semantics Column

I am delighted to be able to present this overview of game comonads by Samson Abramsky and Luca Reggio. Though this is presented in the semantics column, it is a bridge between the world of semantics with its focus on "structure" and the world of combinatorics and logic. Many game-based techniques have been developed to capture the expressive power of different fragments of logic, for example logics with numerical bounds on the number of quantifiers or alternations, modal logics of various kinds. These restrictions on the logics have combinatorial implications on the models such as restricting the tree width.

A correspondence theorem for interpretability logic with respect to Verbrugge semantics

Abstract Interpretability logic is a modal logic that can be used to describe relative interpretability between extensions of a given first-order arithmetical theory. Verbrugge semantics is a generalization of the basic semantics for interpretability logic. Bisimulation is the basic equivalence between models for modal logic. The Van Benthem Correspondence Theorem establishes modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic. In this paper we show that a special type of bisimulations, the so-called w-bisimulations, enable an analogue of the Van Benthem Theorem for interpretability logic w.r.t. Verbrugge semantics.

What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?

Brauer (Philos Stud 179:2751–2763, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7, 2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer’s argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer’s argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer’s argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer’s argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer’s argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound.

Numerical expressive power of logical languages with cardinality comparison

Abstract In this paper, we investigate the numerical expressive power of various logical languages, encompassing fragments of Presburger Arithmetic (PbA), monadic second-order logic with counting with respect to finite domains (MSO$^{\phi }(\#)$) and shallow second-order graded modal logic with counting with respect to image-finite frames (SOGML$^{\textsf{s},\phi }$(#)). We show that in their respective existential fragments, the $1$-free fragment of PbA, the =-free fragment of MSO$^{\phi }(\#)$ and the graded modality-free fragment of SOGML$^{\textsf{s},\phi }$(#) possess equivalent numerical expressive power, specifically defining strongly semilinear sets. When adding universal quantifiers or adding $1$, = and graded modality to these three languages, the resulting definable sets become semilinear sets.

Axiomatization of modal logic with counting

Abstract Modal logic with counting is obtained from basic modal logic by adding cardinality comparison formulas of the form $ \#\varphi \succsim \#\psi $, stating that the cardinality of successors satisfying $ \varphi $ is larger than or equal to the cardinality of successors satisfying $ \psi $. It is different from graded modal logic where basic modal logic is extended with formulas of the form $ \Diamond _{k}\varphi $ stating that there are at least $ k$-many different successors satisfying $ \varphi $. In this paper, we investigate the axiomatization of ML(#) with respect to different frame classes, such as image-finite frames and arbitrary frames. Drawing inspiration from existing works, we employ a similar proof strategy that uses the characterization of binary relations on finite Boolean algebras capable of representing generalized probability measures or finite (respectively arbitrary) cardinality measures. Our main result shows that any formula not provable in the Hilbert system can be refuted within a finite (respectively arbitrary) cardinality measure Kripke frame with a finite domain. We then transform this finite (respectively arbitrary) cardinality measure Kripke frame into a Kripke frame in the corresponding class, refuting the unprovable formula.