Despite the fast pace at which technology is spreading and communication networks are growing, some environments remain a challenge for communication service providers. In areas characterized by intermittent connectivity, long propagation delays, and high interference, connectionoriented communication protocols do not provide the optimal solution. These limitations increased the interest in developing delay-tolerant networks that can provide the basic means of communication without a strict demand for connectivity, network capacity, or regular mobility patterns of communicating nodes. A possible application of delay-tolerant networks is communication in the presence of oppressive governments. In this paper, we attempt to develop a secure delay-tolerant network system that enables citizens to communicate freely in an environment where public communication methods, such as mobile networks and the Internet, are intercepted and used by the authorities to monitor civilian activities. The proposed system is composed of several disconnected zones in which data marshals between Private Key Generators and normal nodes in different zones through mobile gateway nodes that carry messages between those zones. We simulate the system using GrooveNet, and describe the effects of different parameters on overall performance and security. In order to establish a communication network, we need to make that its nodes are able to communicate. Mobile network operators, for example, create coverage plans to distribute their sites in a way that enables a subscriber to place phone calls to any location within the mobile network. In challenged environments, however, it is not always possible to guarantee continuous connectivity for networking entities. In mountainous terrains, rural plantations, and war zones, communication using wireless networks is prone to disruption and long delays. This increased the interest in developing delay-tolerant networks (DTNs) that do not have strict requirements for connectivity, network capacity and mobility patterns of communicating nodes. Delay-Tolerant Networking was first considered for deep-space communications, due to the huge propagation delays experienced during data transfer between different planets of the solar system [1]. Interplanetary environments are also subject to high bit error rates and long disconnections, which added the term “disruption” to this research field. DTN deployment was later extended to include some terrestrial networks characterized by intermittent connectivity, such as wireless networks in rural areas, military networks, and vehicular networks [14]. However, no “killer” DTN application has been identified yet. DTN models and architectures are being developed for several possible applications including low-cost, minimum infrastructure social networking. Possible DTN applications include e-governance, telemedicine and citizen journalism in rural areas [3] which impose strict security and privacy requirements. Therefore, DTNs are expected to consider providing the necessary security services to applications and subscribers. Securing a DTN has to take into consideration the various challenges encountered in such networks. The main challenge is the lack of end-to-end sustained connectivity, which imposes large communication delays and pushes network entities towards opportunistic communication over the intermittent links [4]. DTN nodes are usually characterized by high mobility with undetermined mobility patterns [1]. These nodes could range from laptop computers to tablets, cell phones, or even tiny sensors. Thus, storage capacity and battery life vary considerably among different types of nodes, and could become scarce in some of them. These challenges, particular to the disruption-prone environment of DTNs, render traditional security mechanisms inapplicable [5]. Similar to other networks, DTNs are subject to several security threats. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks could happen at any layer of the DTN. Malicious nodes could launch masquerading attacks by pretending to be valid nodes and intercepting communications.