The spate of controversy and the flurry of charges surrounding the allocation of spectrum for the second generation (2G) mobile telephony services on a First Come First Served (FCFS) basis stands out in stark contrast to the near universal acclaim for the allocation of spectrum for the Third Generation (3G) and Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) services by an open and a transparent auction process. Prima facie, the obvious inference is that auction should be a preferred route to allocate scarce resources such as spectrum. However, such an unqualified conclusion warrants an important caveat: that this is conditional upon getting the auction design right. There have been several instances of ill-designed auctions that had unintended consequences of allocating resources at throwaway prices or having fetched such high revenues as to impede the roll-out of services, besides endangering the financial health of the entire sector. Thus the strategic choices made in the auction design have an important bearing on the ends that one seeks to achieve vide the auctions viz. revenue realization, efficient allocation, a more competitive post auction market structure resulting in lower cost of access for the consumers.In this paper, we analyze the design employed in the auctions for spectrum to roll out Third Generation mobile services (3G) & Broadband Wireless Access services (BWA) in India and its success or otherwise on the above mentioned parameters. We find that while the auction has been successful in mobilizing revenue for the government, has created little adverse impact for the consumers by maintaining the level of competitiveness in the mobile services market but the gains seem to have been partially offset by compromising the efficiency parameter. It is argued that, in making the Lowest Accepted Bid as a preferred pricing rule, the Government accorded primacy to the revenue realization motive over maximization of allocational efficiencies although the reverse has been stated as policy objective in going for the auction. A few alternative design elements have been suggested that would have served the stated objective of enhancing allocational efficiencies better