Mixed-motive Interactions Research Articles

A Human Behaviour Perspective on Horizontal Collaboration to Reduce the Climate Impact of Logistics

The transport sector needs to drastically reduce its carbon footprint to comply with the Paris Agreement. In today’s sharing economy, an emerging strategy to contribute to this goal is horizontal collaboration. However, most studies on horizontal collaboration or resource pooling are approached from a theoretical Operations Research perspective, and case studies are usually stylised. At the same time, the uptake of horizontal collaboration in practice is limited. An important explanation for this is that compared to traditional vertical collaboration, coalition formation is much more complex under horizontal collaboration, as some players will be included in the collaborative coalition, while others will be excluded. We conjecture that this renders human behaviour much more important than in more traditional vertical supply chain relations. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a research agenda for an interdisciplinary approach that integrates human behavioural aspects in studies on horizontal supply chain collaboration. We review some vital concepts from social psychology and discuss the importance to the success or failure of horizontal collaboration initiatives to reduce the environment footprint of the logistics sector. We conclude that social psychological insights on mixed-motive interactions are pivotal to understand wicked problems such as Sustainable Development Goal 13 on Climate Action, and that interdisciplinary approaches should therefore receive more attention in academic literature.

The effect of the influential power of partner on the failure of coopetitive joint ventures

PurposeWhy do collaborations between direct competitors fail and what are the risks? To enhance our understanding about the sources that generate diverse risks of failure of coopetition (cooperation between competitors), this study examined the effect of influential power each partner exercise in the industry on the unexpected dissolution of joint venture (JV) between direct competitors.Design/methodology/approachThis study employed event history analysis to test the hypotheses using a sample of 188 coopetitive JVs between 2001 and 2010 and data on their survival for the following 5-year window.FindingsThe results show that as firms become more powerful within the industry, they have more incentives to cooperate with competitors to maintain their current JVs than to pursue their self-interest through opportunistically dissolving collaborations, which ultimately reduces the risk of failure of coopetition.Originality/valueScholars have often considered why firms cooperate with competitors and how coopetition creates value for firms but paid less attention regarding why coopetition unexpectedly dissolves. Based on transaction cost economics and the situational assumption of mixed-motive interaction, this study provides insight into how the different levels of influence each partner can exercise within the industry cause firms to have different incentives to cooperate with competitors.

Handshaking promotes deal-making by signaling cooperative intent.

We examine how a simple handshake-a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions-can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive interactions, a handshake is viewed as a signal of cooperative intent, increasing people's cooperative behavior and affecting deal-making outcomes. In Studies 1a and 1b, pairs who chose to shake hands at the onset of integrative negotiations obtained better joint outcomes. Study 2 demonstrates the causal impact of handshaking using experimental methodology. Study 3 suggests a driver of the cooperative consequence of handshaking: negotiators expected partners who shook hands to behave more cooperatively than partners who avoided shaking hands or partners whose nonverbal behavior was unknown; these expectations of cooperative intent increased negotiators' own cooperation. Study 4 uses an economic game to demonstrate that handshaking increased cooperation even when handshakes were uninstructed (vs. instructed). Further demonstrating the primacy of signaling cooperative intent, handshaking actually reduced cooperation when the action signaled ill intent (e.g., when the hand-shaker was sick; Study 5). Finally, in Study 6, executives assigned to shake hands before a more antagonistic, distributive negotiation were less likely to lie about self-benefiting information, increasing cooperation even to their own detriment. Together, these studies provide evidence that handshakes, ritualistic behaviors imbued with meaning beyond mere physical contact, signal cooperative intent and promote deal-making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Reciprocate or Compensate: Ingroup Identification Determines Response to Defection

The rational and common response to defection in mixed-motive interactions is to reciprocate it. However, in some cases, group members not only cooperate in the face of defection, but also compensa...

Children’s Trust Beliefs in Others and Trusting Behavior in Peer Interaction

The relation between children’s trust beliefs and trusting behavior in peer interaction was examined. One hundred and 5 Italian children (54 boys; mean age = 10 years-7 months) completed standardized scales of reliability (i.e., promise keeping) trust beliefs in parents and peers. The children participated in mixed-motive interactions with classmates which assessed behavior-dependent reliability trust on peers. The children’s reliability trustworthiness towards peers/classmates was assessed by peer reports. The SEM analyses supported the hypothesized model by showing: (1) a path between trust beliefs in parents and trust beliefs in peers; (2) paths between both types of trust beliefs and behavior-dependent trust on peers; (3) a path between behavior-dependent trust in peers and trustworthiness towards peers. Trust beliefs in peers were found to mediate the relation between trust beliefs in parents and behavior-dependent trust in peers. The findings yielded support for the basis, domain, and target trust framework and attachment theory.

Resisting the temptation to compete: Self-control promotes cooperation in mixed-motive interactions

This article provides a self-control analysis of mixed-motive interactions, including 2-person social dilemmas and bargaining encounters. We propose that mixed-motive interactions pose a self-control conflict between pursuing immediate benefits through competition and pursuing long-term benefits through cooperation. As such, anticipating high (vs. low) barriers to successful outcomes triggers counteractive self-control operations that increase cooperation, so long as people believe that by doing so they can influence others to reciprocate.

Resisting the Temptation to Retaliate: Self-Control Promotes Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Interactions

This article provides a self-control analysis of mixed-motive interactions, including 2-person social dilemmas and bargaining encounters. We propose that mixed-motive interactions pose a self-control conflict between pursuing immediate benefits through competition and pursuing long-term benefits through cooperation. As such, anticipating high (vs. low) barriers to successful outcomes triggers counteractive self-control operations that increase cooperation, so long as people believe that by doing so they can influence others to reciprocate.

Competitive Members in Cooperative Groups

The present study was designed to bridge previous research on cooperative decision making and on mixed-motive interactions. The structure of the group tasks studied in the mixed-motive literature is such that all group members simultaneously experience motives to compete and to cooperate and that all members accurately recognize that the mixed-motive reward structure is the same for everyone. In contrast, the present study considers that members' motives can also vary on a task that on the surface appears purely cooperative. We conducted a laboratory experiment using a cooperative group decision-making task and we varied the number of members who were also given competitive incentives (0, 1, 2, or all 3 members). We found that the preferences of competitive members were often adopted by the group. Competitive members reported engaging in more strategic information sharing and presenting their preferred alternative in a more favorable way; they also trusted other group members less than did cooperative members. The results of this study are consistent with studies of mixed-motive interaction that showed that in the absence of information about members' motives, group members often assume that other members have similar motives and engage in similar behaviors.

Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Several models of prisoner's dilemma interactions were tested in a series of twelve games whose termination point was determined probabilistically. A new model was introduced to discriminate among equilibrium and nonequilibrium situations on the basis of a player's expected benefits or losses for cooperating. The experiment included twelve payoff matrices, three probabilities for continuing, two opponent strategies, and the player's sex as independent variables. Results showed that both the game payoffs and the probability that the game would continue interacted to affect the rates of cooperation observed, and that the equilibrium model predicted this outcome most accurately. While the predictions of each of the models were supported, the equilibrium models appeared to be superior to the others. The discussion highlights the importance of considering the likelihood of a game terminating as a major determinant of the cooperation that can be expected in mixed—motive interactions.

Attribution Processes in a Mixed-Motive Interaction: The Role of Active Observer’s Behavior

This report investigates attribution processes using 68 students in a cooperation-noncooperation modified prisoner's dilemma game. The attribution processes of the subjects were explored in a 2 × 2 factorial design (subject's high or low cooperation and target's high or low cooperation). Experimental results showed that subjects attributed the target's high cooperation significantly less to an internal cause when the subject's own cooperation was high than when it was low. There was no significant difference in the subject's ratings of the internal attribution for the target's low cooperation between the subject's cooperation conditions. When subjects attributed the less to the internal cause, the subjects had a tendency to attribute the cooperation to subject's own cooperation. These results confirmed that an active observer in a social interaction perceives the causes of another person's behavior dependent on observer's own behavior toward the other. Adjective ratings of the target's dispositions gave further evidence.

The Social Psychology of Small Groups: Cooperative and Mixed-Motive Interaction

A revolution in the science of emotion has emerged in recent decades, with the potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories. The research reveals that emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and sometimes ...Read More

Motivational bases in mixed-motive interactions: The effects of comparison levels

The relationship between reward level and the basic motives which underlie strategic choices (competitive and noncompetitive) in a mixed-motive game was examined from two theoretical perspectives. The “regret” interpretation proposed by McClintock and McNeel was compared to an approach based upon Thibout and Kelley's concept of comparison level (CL). Two independent variables, CL and Reward, were manipulated by varying the payoff rates in two playing series of the MDG. Initially, 50 iterations were played for high (4¢ per point) or low ( 1 5¢ per point) incentive to provide subjects with outcomes upon which to base their CL's. The Reward manipulation was introduced in 150 subsequent trials of the game with subjects playing for 8¢ or 1¢ per point. The results show that the absolute magnitude of reward did not influence the extent of cooperative or competitive behavior. On the other hand, the magnitude of reward relative to CL was significantly associated with the degree of cooperative behavior—supra-CL outcomes yielding a higher frequency of cooperative behavior than infra-CL outcomes.

Attraction and reactions to noncontingent promises

In a 2 by 2 factorial design, high or low attraction for a simulated player (SP) was induced in 40 female college Ss. During a mixed-motive interaction, the SP sent intermittent promises of cooperation to Ss; the promises were either 10% or 90% credible. Results indicated a main effect of promise credibility on S cooperativeness on message-relevant trials. Liking for and evaluation of the SP were inversely related to perceived potency. Changes in attraction from pre- to postmeasures supported an expectancy theory of attraction.

The effects of referent and reward power upon social conflict

Intermittent contingent promises were sent to male Ss during a mixed-motive interaction by either a liked or disliked simulated player,. The S compliance was rewarded either 10% or 90% of the time. Although neither factor affected compliance, liking for the promisor did induce more behavioral trust, more cooperation on power-irrelevant interactions, and caused Ss to evaluate the promisor more favorably after the interaction.