Mixed-member Proportional Systems Research Articles

Even in the best of both worlds, you can't have it all: How German voters navigate the trilemma of mixed-member proportionality

The growing fragmentation of party systems confronts mixed-member proportional electoral systems with a trilemma. Combining the goals of proportionality and of a guaranteed representation of district winners makes it ever more difficult to also achieve a third goal: the fixed size of parliament. Against the background of electoral reform in Germany, this paper studies how citizens position themselves in this trilemma. Using original survey data, we find that all goals are popular and no combination of goals commands majority support. In a context where institutional reform becomes politicized, the trilemma is thus not only a logical, but also an empirical constraint. Moreover, abstract preferences in the trilemma systematically predict how voters evaluate the status quo and specific reform proposals. At the same time, voters are receptive to the logical constraints of the system: Informing respondents about the trilemma trade-offs in an experimental setting makes them more accepting of reform proposals.

Mind the gap(s): Winning, losing, and perceptions of electoral integrity in mixed-member proportional systems

This study investigates whether and how experiences of winning and losing at the ballot box shape voters' views about the integrity of the electoral process in Germany's mixed-member proportional system. Relying on comprehensive data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2021, the analysis provides evidence for a consistent winner-loser gap in voters' electoral-integrity perceptions, with electoral losers evaluating the electoral process systematically more negative than electoral winners. Moreover, the analysis shows that the winner-loser gap is particularly pronounced for voters who lost in two consecutive federal elections (‘repeated losers’) as well as for those who suffered electoral defeat with both their list and district votes (‘double losers’). These findings provide novel insights on how voters in mixed-member proportional systems cope with winning and losing at the ballot box, highlighting that electoral losers place (part of) the blame for their electoral defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such. In addition, the findings point to the relevance of specific features of electoral systems in shaping winner-loser gaps in electoral-integrity beliefs.

Balancing district and party seats: The arithmetic of mixed-member proportional electoral systems

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMP) are widely praised because they combine the direct, personal election of MPs from single-seat constituencies with a proportional seat allocation. However, the size of the proportional tier matters for the question of whether the system's overall proportionality is preserved. Hence, a key challenge for constitution-makers and scholars is finding the right balance between district and proportional seats, so as to maximise district representation and guarantee proportional representation.This paper develops the first theoretical model that helps to locate this sweet spot for district and party seats. The novel solution builds on Taagepera's “logical models” about party sizes. The model is tested on 58 national parliamentary elections under MMP rules.

Electoral Systems and Party Systems in Germany on the Local Level

ABSTRACT The question of how electoral systems should be designed has already been broadly discussed. One of the most promising electoral system types are mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems. However, the positive evaluation of MMP systems strongly depends on the most prominent case applying such a system, Germany. In order to better understand the performance of MMP systems, we focus on this case and research to what extend German party systems are affected by electoral system designs. For this purpose, an examination of the local level is most fruitful. This level provides important variation in electoral systems in terms of two important factors – the general system type (MMP or proportional representation) and the prevalence or absence of a legal threshold. Our results show that (effective) thresholds affect the proportionality of election results whereas the general system type does not. The fragmentation of German local party systems is largely independent of both variables.

Career lengths of members of parliament in mixed-member proportional electoral systems

ABSTRACT Mixed-member proportional electoral systems are characterised by having two types of members of parliament (MPs): district MPs elected directly in a district and list MPs elected via a party list. While it has been suggested that district MPs have a more prestigious and safe position than list MPs, little is known about possible differences between list and district MPs in terms of the length of their parliamentary careers. Using data on all New Zealand parliamentary elections between 1996 and 2017, the authors investigate to what extent the mode in which MPs are elected throughout their careers relates to the length of their careers. The authors’ descriptive and multivariate Cox Proportional-Hazards analyses show that those entering parliament as list MPs have shorter careers than those entering parliament as district MPs. However, when list MPs ‘move on’ to becoming district MPs during their parliamentary career, they have the longest careers of all MPs.

REVIEW OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 2020

A large number of different electoral systems operate in the world in 2020. The main types of electoral systems are majoritarian, mixed and proportional, but the division is imperfect. In the group of countries using the FPTP system, a political scene with two parties is most often created, similar to the Alternative Vote. The situation is different in the STV, Mixed-Member Proportional and Parallel systems, where different party systems can arise. Pure multiparty is most often achieved in the List Proportional system. The comparison of the electoral systems proves that even within the same group, the party system can be significantly differentiated due to the essential details of electoral law, the population of the state, and even the degree of maturity of its democracy.

Seat enlargements in mixed-member proportional systems: evidence from the German Länder

The German mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is considered a role model worldwide. Nevertheless, it has a neglected side-effect: it may produce greatly enlarged parliaments, like the 2017 Bundestag with 111 additional seats. Thus, it is highly relevant to know under which conditions MMP systems lead to such seat enlargements. The article explores this question for the German Länder that have used various MMP versions and seen occasional parliamentary inflations. The analysis demonstrates that a two-stage model of party-system features and institutional factors explain enlargements under MMP systems in 156 Länder elections from 1947 to 2019. Concerning the party system features, enlargements are driven by high seat concentrations in single-member districts and low list-vote shares of the largest party. Institutionally, high ratios of SMD seats and full levelling of surplus seats affect parliamentary oversize. These results have important implications for MMP systems in Germany and other countries.

Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary

I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.

Understanding people’s choice when they have two votes

ABSTRACT This paper introduces a model of vote choice in mixed-member proportional representation systems where electors cast two votes. Despite the growing popularity of mixed systems around the world, a recent stream of literature suggests that the candidate vote contaminates the list vote, inducing the type of behavior observed under majority rule. We propose a new approach to account for these so-called “contamination” effects, a phenomenon that we define as a causal influence making choices more similar across the vote decisions. Since causality entails a time ordering, we argue that contamination arises only when voters choose sequentially. By making use of new survey questions asking respondents about the timing of vote decisions, we can estimate the magnitude of these contamination effects directly. The model is tested using Bayesian multinomial probit models with survey data from the 2013 federal election in Germany. A key contribution of this paper is to show that contamination effects are present only among voters with lower levels of education, and work primarily from the list vote to the candidate vote. We also test a number of predictions about the determinants of the two vote choices in mixed systems.

MPs’ Representational Focus in MMP Systems. A Comparison Between Germany and New Zealand

This paper examines how Members of Parliament (MPs) in Germany and New Zealand (NZ), two countries with a similar Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system, define their representational focus and how they perceive the representational focus and prestige of list and district MPs. Relying on interviews with 25 German and 27 NZ MPs, it shows that there are differences in the representational focus of list and district MPs, but that they are limited. In particular, most list MPs also campaign in a district, and therefore—similar to district MPs—also argue that they primarily represent their district. More striking, however, is list MPs’ greater likelihood of also mentioning a social group (e.g., families, single people, ethnic group) as the group that they primarily represent compared with district MPs. This was more often the case in NZ compared with Germany. When asking MPs about their perceptions of the representational focus and prestige of list and district MPs, list MPs see little difference. District MPs, by contrast, argue that district MPs’ representational focus is more on their district and that district MPs also have more prestige than list MPs. This pattern is particularly strong in NZ.

Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional systems

How does competition for first (candidate) and second ballot (party-list) votes affect the strategic positioning of parties in mixed-member proportional systems? We study this question in a simulation study of multiparty competition in the two tiers. In the first step, we use data from elections for the German Bundestag to estimate individual vote function for each tier based on ideology, policy, and valence incentives. We then use these parameter estimates to calibrate a model in which parties compete for either first- or second-tier votes. Results suggest that parties may face a dilemma when adopting a positional strategy. When national parties and their candidates hold significantly different valences, large valence advantages generate centripetal incentives whereas smaller valences exert a centrifugal pull. Overall, centrifugal incentives dominate the German mixed-member system.

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems – the best of both worlds?

ABSTRACTMixed electoral systems are often associated with the hope of combining proportional election outcomes with a concentrated party system, and thus achieving the best of both worlds in electoral system design. It is especially the mixed-member proportional (MMP) variant that has retained a good reputation in this regard. Via a comparative analysis, we analyze whether or not the general praise for MMP systems is corroborated empirically. Our results show that the performance of MMP systems is heavily influenced by technical details, and elections conducted under MMP vary broadly with regard to possible proportionality–concentration combinations.

Who Runs at the Top of Party Lists? Determinants of Parties’ List Ranking in the 2013 German Bundestag Election

In mixed-member proportional systems with closed party lists, such as the German Bundestag election, candidates’ electoral fate is widely determined by their placement on party lists. Despite its importance for the final composition of parliaments, candidates’ list placement in such systems is still under-researched. The literature on political careers has revealed a number of prevalent recruitment factors, but how these factors actually affect candidates’ placement on party lists has rarely been tested. This paper puts forward the question of what recruitment factors affected candidates’ chances to be allocated viable list positions in the 2013 German Bundestag election. The findings suggest that in particular candidates’ incumbency status, their number of prior candidacies and district nominations play key roles in shaping candidates’ electoral viability.

Which electoral systems succeed at providing proportionality and concentration? Promising designs and risky tools

Electoral systems are typically faced with the problem of being asked to provide both proportional representation and party system concentration leading to accountable government. Which electoral system designs are able to successfully deliver on both these challenges and thus optimize the representativeness – accountability trade-off? This paper investigates the performance of different general electoral system designs as well as their specific technical details (such as legal threshold, tier linkages, and compensation mechanisms) based on a data set of 590 elections in 57 countries. The key results are that both proportional representation systems with moderate district magnitudes and mixed-member proportional systems are able to optimize performance. Going to the level of details confirms these results and deepens our understanding further: while different technical changes are able to improve the chances of reaching the best of both worlds, some of these (e.g. raising the legal threshold) also increase the risk of ending up with the worst.

Who brings home the pork? Parties and the role of localness in committee assignments in mixed-member proportional systems

The assignment of seats to specialized standing committees is a most consequential choice in legislative contexts. Distributive theories of legislative organization suggest that electoral incentives to cultivate personal votes result in the self-selection of legislators to committees best suited to please their constituents and, thus, to secure reelection. However, these theories discard the partisan basis of European parliaments and therefore fail to adequately assess the politics of committee assignments in these particular contexts. This article aims to explore the significance of distributive theories for the German case in differentiated ways and on the basis of a new and rich data set including statistical data for five legislative terms (1983, 1987, 1998, 2005, and 2009). It argues that in partisan assemblies, political parties might develop an interest in distributive politics themselves and might assign distinct types of legislators to distinct committees to seek personal votes contingent upon distinct electoral incentives. Particularly, we argue that Germany’s mixed proportional system provides incentives to parties to assign legislators with profound local roots to district committees best suited to please geographic constituents.

Voter turnout and district-level competitiveness in mixed-member electoral systems

ABSTRACTIt has been suggested that one of the reasons why majoritarian electoral systems are associated with lower voter turnout in comparison to proportional electoral systems is that citizens in uncompetitive districts (“safe seats”) are not motivated to vote. This study brings this thesis into a new context and tests it with unique data. Mixed-member electoral systems have both majoritarian and proportional components. The relative importance of these components differs between mixed-member proportional (MMP) and mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems. I argue that, due to this difference, the impact of district-level competitiveness on turnout is stronger in MMM than in MMP. An analysis of district-level electoral data from four countries confirms this hypothesis. Findings from this study advance our theoretical understanding of voter participation and also of the functioning of mixed-member electoral systems.

WHEN YOUR NAME IS ON THE LIST, IT IS TIME TO PARTY: THE CANDIDACY DIVIDE IN A MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM

Mixed-member proportional systems have been implemented assuming a mandate divide. Using individual-level voting data from the 15th to 17th Bundestag (2002–13), this article argues that the divide occurs according to candidacy strategy (pure district, pure party list or dual) and re-election probability rather than the type of electoral mandate obtained. Emphasising votes of constituency interests, it questions the assumption that the motivation behind deviating from the parliamentary party group line is rooted in serving the respective MP's constituency.

WHICH MIXED-MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL FORMULA FITS YOU BEST? ASSESSING THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE OF POSITIVE VOTE TRANSFER SYSTEMS

Mixed-member proportional systems (MMP) are a family of electoral systems which combine district-based elections with a proportional seat allocation. Positive vote transfer systems belong to this family. This article explains why they might be better than their siblings, and examines under which conditions full proportionality is reached. A formal model shows that full proportionality depends on the number of compensation mandates available, and on the degree of coordination among voters and parties. The model is applied to six elections in Hungary.

Sistemi elettorali e comportamento di voto: una comparazione fra Germania e Nuova Zelanda

The article analyses the impact of mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMP) on the party systems and electoral behaviors in Germany and New Zealand. The MMP grants proportional representation while reducing party fragmentation. The latter effect is stronger in Germany than in New Zealand, due to a difference in the electoral thresholds. Mixed member systems that allow citizens to cast two ballots for two different competitive arenas are much interesting for analyzing the impact of electoral systems on electoral behaviors. A voter can choose to split her vote, thus supporting a party in the multimember constituency and the candidate of another party in the single-mandate constituency. MMP is not theoretically supposed to strongly favor such choice. Yet, in the two countries many citizens split their votes; thus, in single-mandate constituencies votes typically concentrate on fewer candidates than in the proportional arena. This seems to be particularly the case in New Zealand. Voters act strategically while splitting their vote. There are evidences that this can be due both to a seat maximizing and to a localistic logic. Evidences are stronger for the latter.

Politics is Still an Adversarial Business: Minority Government and Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in Scotland and in New Zealand

Both Scotland and New Zealand, small nations with a British political heritage, implemented mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems in the 1990s. Minority government characterises most of the New Zealand experience since the introduction of MMP in 1996, while Scotland's only such experience occurred between 2007 and 2011. The Scottish experience differed significantly from that of New Zealand because Scotland has a different party system (characterised by two major cleavages) and exists in a system of multi-level governance, resulting in a more conflict-laden relationship between parties. The centre-periphery cleavage in the Scottish case results from being part of the United Kingdom, while New Zealand is an independent state. Both nations introduced MMP as part of an effort to bring about a ‘new politics’, but the impact of institutional engineering upon the behaviour of politicians has been limited.