Mixed Member Proportional System Research Articles

The major parties: National’s and Labour’s employment relations policies

The past two decades have seen new directions in New Zealand employment relations (ER) with ongoing shifts away from previous neo-liberal models. Most recently, two Labour-led governments have introduced a number of significant moves, ranging from changes to improved statutory minima and conditions, through to gender pay equity provisions and new protections for workers with labour-hire agencies. Another set of longer-term programmes were initiated but not completed, including holidays, protections for contractors and income insurance. Legislation providing for sector-wide Fair Pay Agreements was passed but no agreements have been concluded yet.
 The future directions of ER will largely be determined by the outcome of the 2023 General Election. The policies of the two main political parties, Labour and National, will be influential, although one week out from the election close, some policy areas have not yet been made available to the public. The situation will be further complicated by the MMP (mixed-member proportional) system which may see coalition or support arrangements negotiated with minor parties who have their own, separate ER policies.

Does Changing an Electoral System to a Mixed System (Really) Affect Voter Turnout and the Party System?

Abstract In this study the authors aim to add to the understanding of whether, and if so how, a change of electoral system affects factors such as voter turnout and the party system, and the authors’ focus has been on changes that result in mixed electoral systems. They used three country cases (Japan, Italy, and New Zealand) to explore patterns in a before-and-after design. The findings suggest that a country cannot expect a significant effect on voter turnout if it decides to change its electoral system to a mixed system. Regarding party system fragmentation, the results show that the change of the electoral system in New Zealand from a plurality system to a mixed member proportional system had a clear and immediately positive effect on the party system. However, the results do not indicate that the changes of electoral systems in Japan and Italy have had any significant effect on the party system.

Mind the gap(s): Winning, losing, and perceptions of electoral integrity in mixed-member proportional systems

This study investigates whether and how experiences of winning and losing at the ballot box shape voters' views about the integrity of the electoral process in Germany's mixed-member proportional system. Relying on comprehensive data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) 2021, the analysis provides evidence for a consistent winner-loser gap in voters' electoral-integrity perceptions, with electoral losers evaluating the electoral process systematically more negative than electoral winners. Moreover, the analysis shows that the winner-loser gap is particularly pronounced for voters who lost in two consecutive federal elections (‘repeated losers’) as well as for those who suffered electoral defeat with both their list and district votes (‘double losers’). These findings provide novel insights on how voters in mixed-member proportional systems cope with winning and losing at the ballot box, highlighting that electoral losers place (part of) the blame for their electoral defeat on the electoral process and procedures as such. In addition, the findings point to the relevance of specific features of electoral systems in shaping winner-loser gaps in electoral-integrity beliefs.

Examination of New Zealand’s Use of Mixed-Member Proportional System

Examination of New Zealand’s Use of Mixed-Member Proportional System

Reconciling Parliamentary Size with Personalised Proportional Representation? Frontiers of Electoral Reform for the German Bundestag

In the 2017 Bundestag election, the recently reformed mixed-member proportional system (MMP) produced an enlarged parliament with 111 additional seats. As could happen in the future, the Bundestag may even increase in size, so the parliamentary parties committed themselves to a renewed reform in order to curb seat enlargements. This was nonetheless to be done without major changes of the existing MMP. The article analyses the frontiers of such “minimally invasive” reform. Each modification of “personalised PR” that reliably maintains the Bundestag size would compromise one or other of its fundamental features: personalisation or proportionality. We illustrate this by exploring the effects of various single-member district (SMD) reforms that are widely considered the “least harmful” minimally invasive approach. Comprehensive simulations based on survey data demonstrate that the SMD share would have to decrease substantially for maintaining parliamentary size as reliably as two-member districts would do. Thus, any SMD reform would either substantially affect the MMP’s conventional personalisation or curb seat enlargement less effectively.

Seat enlargements in mixed-member proportional systems: evidence from the German Länder

The German mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is considered a role model worldwide. Nevertheless, it has a neglected side-effect: it may produce greatly enlarged parliaments, like the 2017 Bundestag with 111 additional seats. Thus, it is highly relevant to know under which conditions MMP systems lead to such seat enlargements. The article explores this question for the German Länder that have used various MMP versions and seen occasional parliamentary inflations. The analysis demonstrates that a two-stage model of party-system features and institutional factors explain enlargements under MMP systems in 156 Länder elections from 1947 to 2019. Concerning the party system features, enlargements are driven by high seat concentrations in single-member districts and low list-vote shares of the largest party. Institutionally, high ratios of SMD seats and full levelling of surplus seats affect parliamentary oversize. These results have important implications for MMP systems in Germany and other countries.

왜 연동형 비례대표제 하에서도 통합이 이루어지는가?: 준연동형 비례대표제의 작동원리와 정당들의 구심적 선거 전략을 중심으로

왜 연동형 비례대표제 하에서도 통합이 이루어지는가?: 준연동형 비례대표제의 작동원리와 정당들의 구심적 선거 전략을 중심으로

Study on the Reduction and Abolition of Proportional Representation System

최근 우리나라는 연동형 비례대표제 도입을 중심으로 하는 선거제도 개혁에 대하여 정치권의 갈등과 학계의 상호 의견차이가 심하게 나타나고 있다. 평등선 거원칙에 좀 더 부합하다는 비례대표제가 확대된다면, 단순다수 소선거구제보다 정치적 소수자의 등원이 쉬워지고, 지역주의 해소에 긍정적 영향을 끼치는 등의 장점이 있을 것으로 예상은 된다. 그러나 공천 헌금으로 대표되는 비례대표 선출 과정의 불투명성 및 공무담임권 침해가능성 등 비례대표제는 단점 역시 상당하 다. 물론 독일과 뉴질랜드와 같이 연동형 비례대표제가 성공적으로 안착한 사례도 있으나, 위 두 나라는 의원내각제이기에 대통령 5년 단임 직선제를 기본으로 하는 우리나라 통치구조에 연동형 비례대표제는 제대로 조응하지 않을 수 있다. 즉, 현행 5년 단임제의 역사적 정통성을 고려한다면 우리나라의 선거제도 개혁은 대통령 직선제라는 큰 틀 안에서 논의가 이뤄져야 한다. 이는 합의제로의 전환보 다는 다수제 민주주의 원칙의 존속이 타당함을 의미하며, 구체적으로는 현행 비례대표제의 점진적 축소 및 개헌을 통한 완전 폐지와 미국식 순수대통령제로의 체제 변형을 뜻한다.Conflicts between political circles and differences of opinion among academic world are so severe these days with election reform which mainly deals with mixed-member proportional representation system. If proportional representation system which seems to be accord with the principle of equal election expands, it is likely that political minorities can come to the assembly much easier and positive impacts will be on dissolving resionalism. However, proportional representation system has quite a few flaws such as the opacity of nomination process infamous for nomination donate and a potential infringe on the right to equal access to public service. Of course there are some cases in which mixed-member proportional representation system was successfully settled such as Germany and New Zealand, but those two countries are parliamentary republics. Mixed-member proportional representation system may fail to accord with Korea’s single five-year presidential term and direct presidential election system. Hence, election system reform in korea must be discussed within the scheme of direct presidential election system considering the historical legitimacy of the existing system. This indicates that the maintenance of the current principle of majoritarian democracy is far reasonable than the switch to consensus democracy, which means a gradual reduction and a complete abolition of current proportional representation system and switch to pure-presidentialism like America.

연동형비례대표제와 주권의 재구성: 한국 선거제도 변화에 대한 정치철학적 고찰

지금 우리가 선거제도를 개혁하고자 한다면 논쟁의 핵심은 사표를 줄이고 정당의 비례성을 높이는 차원이 아니라, ‘사실상의 대표’를 넘어 ‘실제의 대표’를 어떻게 구현할 것인가에 있다. 정치적 대표성의 주된 근거를 지역에 둘 것인지, 아니면 서로 다른 계층, 성별, 연령, 직업에 둘 것인지, 각각의 중요도를 어느 정도로 배분할 것인지의 문제에 대해 먼저 논의해야 한다. 이처럼 정치적 대표의 원리를 어떻게 세울 것인가를 먼저 구성하고, 그에 따라 선거제도와 권력구조, 정당의 공천제도 등을 그 원리에 따라 설계해야 한다. 이것은 촛불 이후에 국민주권의 대표방식을 어떻게 재구성할 것인가의 문제다. 중요한 질문들은 다음과 같다. 정치적 대표를 선출할 때 그들이 대표해야 할 책임성의 근거를 어떤 유권자성(constituency)에 둘 것인가? 지역인가, 계급인가, 정체성인가, 가치의 주장인가? 정치적 대표들은 그 유권자성으로부터 얼마나 자유로워야 하나? 선거제도의 유의미한 변화는 이러한 질문에 답하는 과정을 통해서만 가능하다.

The servant of two masters: Electoral incentives in the Scottish Parliament

ABSTRACTScholars have pointed out the potential impact of different electoral systems on the incentives for representatives to cultivate personal versus party reputations. The mixed-member proportional system (MMP) allows us to examine the effects of electoral systems on legislators’ incentives. Scholars have argued that MMP may be the ‘best of both worlds’; however, MMP may lead to competing demands on list representatives if they are also allowed to run as constituency candidates, as happens in the Scottish Parliament. I show that this leads to different levels of committee activity—which I use as a surrogate for party activity—from constituency Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs), pure-list MSPs (who are elected via the party list and do not run in constituencies), and dual-candidate list MSPs (list MSPs who also run in constituencies), and that the proximity of elections also affects committee activity for those who run in constituencies.

Private Member Bills and Electoral Connection in Wales

The ‘best of both worlds’ thesis contends that mixed-member electoral systems should provide individual legislator accountability via single-member district (SMD) elections, as well as collective party accountability via a multi-member district (MMD) tier. This study evaluates the mandate divide and electoral connection under the Welsh mixed-member proportional system of representation during the 3rd (2007–11) and 4th (2011–16) Assemblies. Consistent with the best of both worlds thesis, electorally vulnerable SMD legislators are found to make more member bill attempts, and those whose member bills are randomly selected for introduction enjoy a significant boost in their electoral margin of victory. There is some evidence that MMD legislators are rewarded by their party selectorates for member bill efforts with a move up the party list, although this result is less robust. An additional check confirms the absence of contamination across electoral tiers.

The Never-ending Story of Law and Electoral System in Lesotho

While electoral discontent has been the enduring feature of constitutional democracy in Lesotho since independence, disagreement over electoral system is a fairly recent phenomenon. When the country attained independence in 1966 from Britain, electoral system was not necessarily one of the topical issues of pre-independence constitutional negotiations. The major issues were the powers of the monarch, the office of prime minister, the command of the army and many more. It was taken for granted that the country would use the British-based plurality electoral system. This is the system which the country used until early 2000s when the electoral laws were reformed to anchor a new mixed electoral system. When the new electoral laws were ultimately passed in 2001, the country transitioned from a plurality electoral system to a two-ballot mixed member proportional system. By this time, electoral system had acquired prominence in politico-legal discourse in Lesotho. In the run-up to 2007 elections, bigger political parties orchestrated the manipulation of electoral laws which culminated in clearly distorted electoral outcomes. The manipulations motivated further reforms in the run-up to 2012 election which resulted in the single-ballot mixed member proportional system. The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate how electoral laws have anchored electoral system reforms throughout the various historical epochs in Lesotho since independence. The paper contends that while the country has been courageous, unlike most of its peers, to introduce far-reaching electoral system changes, the reform of electoral laws has not been so helpful in attaining the higher objectives of political inclusivity, constitutionalism and stability in Lesotho.

Rational Choice Meets the New Politics: Choosing the Scottish Parliament’s Electoral System

AbstractAlthough there has been extensive research on electoral system choice at the national level, we know relatively little about the dynamics of deciding the rules of the game for sub-state institutions. This article examines the factors that influenced the choice of a proportional electoral system for the new Scottish Parliament in 1999. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with key participants, we challenge the conventional rational choice explanation for the adoption of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Although rational considerations on the part of the Labour Party were involved in the choice of MMP, our findings suggest that, as at the national level, theories of electoral system choice need to consider normative values as well.

Back from Holyrood: How mixed-member proportional representation and ballot structure shape the personal vote

Research on mixed-member legislatures demonstrates that members face different incentive structures when cultivating a personal vote. In this article, we examine how Scotland’s adoption of a mixed-member proportional system (MMP) and a change in ballot structure affect the legislative activities undertaken and emphasised by Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Utilising a range of measures of legislative behaviour, we find that MSPs representing constituencies spend less time legislating and more time engaged in constituent service work. Regional members, conversely, lodge more parliamentary motions when not listed on the ballot and sponsor more members’ bills than constituency-based colleagues when on the ballot. We conclude that electoral structures directly affect the representational styles MSPs adopt, while calling for conceptual reconsideration of the personal vote.

Political Stability and Peace through Party Engineering: The Case of Lesotho

ABSTRACTComparative scholarship suggests that sustainable democracy and conflict management are dependent on the existence of well-functioning political parties and institutionalized party systems. Surprisingly little attention has been given to how to strengthen parties by institutional means. Drawing on Lesotho, this article will discuss two different approaches of political party engineering: electoral system reform and banning party switching in parliament. Since reintroduction of multiparty politics, elections in Lesotho were marked by post-election conflict and violence. Following violent clashes after the elections in 1998 Lesotho adopted a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system to deal with electoral conflicts. The article argues that the introduction of Africa's first MMP system produced an inclusive parliament that mitigates violent conflict and the simultaneous introduction of a regulation of party switching was useful in preventing party system instability and could set an example for democracy building in other post-conflict societies in Africa.

Parliamentary government in New Zealand: Lines of continuity and moments of change

This article addresses one particular feature of New Zealand’s constitution: the continuing combination within a highly centralized system of government of formally unlimited legislative power and strong executive dominance of the activities of the nation’s Parliament. An observer schooled in the orthodoxies of constitutional-design best practice might expect to see some significant problems in terms of how public power in New Zealand is authorized and imposed. However, contrary to such expectations, New Zealand has managed to combine unified and intensive forms of public power with a genuinely free and open society, which has an unbroken history of fairly contested democratic elections and subsequent peaceful transfers of governmental power dating back to the 1850s. This article explores the particularly idiosyncratic nature of New Zealand’s form of parliamentary government, and in particular the effect that the adoption of a mixed-member proportional voting system has had.

Referendum Resource Officers in the 2007 Ontario Referendum on Electoral Reform

On October 10th, 2007, Ontarians overwhelmingly rejected a proposed change to their electoral system in a province-wide referendum on a new mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Many commentators and academics blamed this failure of MMP on the quality of Election Ontario’s public education campaign, which was comprised of advertisements, an information hotline, a website, and public outreach activities. Elections Ontario’s public outreach element contained a unique program of grassroots education through local liaison officers. Elections Ontario chose to hire one Referendum Resource Officer (RRO) for each electoral district, who was tasked with providing referendum information through presentations and public meetings in their communities.
 
 This paper examines the feedback of one-third of these RROs collected through telephone and email interviews. Many of these RROs felt that the referendum education program fell short of its aim to provide local education on the referendum question and made suggestions as to the reasons behind the shortcomings of Elections Ontario’s referendum education campaign. They commented that their work was not supported by appropriate timelines, budgets and materials. In addition, many were displeased with the restrictions placed on RROs in efforts of keep the Elections Ontario campaign neutral. This case study supports previous referendum education and voting research that demonstrates that referendum education campaigns should not only provide timely and accessible information, but also encourage debate in order to provide citizens with the competence needed to make their “big decision.”

Party system change and negative campaigning in New Zealand

Political campaigns are much more attack-filled in some countries than in others. What accounts for it? One answer hinges on the country’s party system. We propose that two-party systems encourage more negativity than multiparty systems because parties in a multiparty system (1) must maintain good relationships with parties with which they may want to enter into coalition and (2) run the risk of supporters of the attacked party moving to support a third party. We test the relationship between party system and attack behaviour in New Zealand, which in 1996 changed from a single-member district, first-past-the-post system to a mixed-member proportional system. The result was a more fragmented party system, resulting in coalition and minority governments. Analysing over 250 adverts and party election broadcasts aired from 1969 to 2011, we find that advertising has become more positive since 1996, suggesting that party systems affect the tone of election campaigns.

Voting systems in parallel and the benefits for small parties

In simple plurality voting systems smaller parties facing resource constraints may struggle to field candidates, particularly when the number of electoral districts is large. In the absence of a strong coordinating party organization, the pattern of contestation may also be sub-optimal – the small party fields candidates where support is minimal, ignoring other electoral districts where voters would support the party if it had stood a candidate. This article considers how and whether the separate operation of an Additional Member voting system running parallel to a simple plurality system assists smaller parties by providing low-cost information about the spatial distribution of voter support. Using aggregate voting data collected at the London ward level for both simple plurality local council elections and the separate mixed-member proportional system used to elect the Greater London Assembly we test whether the Green Party demonstrated an ability to modify and optimize its pattern of contestation. There appears to be little evidence of either a contagion or learning effect in respect of the location of Green candidates, suggesting that a free but valuable data source is unexploited.

Reverse Contamination

Why would a candidate in a mixed-member electoral system willingly forego the chance to be dual listed in the party list tier along with the single-member district tier? Mixed-member systems create a “reverse contamination effect” through which list rankings provide important information to voters and thus influence behavior in the nominal tier. Rankings signal importance of the candidate within the party and also constitute information about the likelihood that the candidate will be elected off the list tier. Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems create different incentives for parties and candidates to send voters different signals. Candidates in Japan’s MMM “burned their bridges” successfully and gained more votes. In New Zealand’s MMP system, parties instead built “bridges” between the proportional representation and nominal tiers by sending different signals to voters through list rankings.