Mixed-member Proportional Representation Research Articles

Time to Move On

The reform of Canada’s federal electoral system was a key platform promise of the Liberal party throughout the 2015 election campaign. Justin Trudeau famously proclaimed that the 2015 federal election would be the last in Canada under a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system; but, as several years followed, there was no change, and discourse surrounding the issue has largely fizzled out (Small, 41). Canada’s FPTP system has not changed since confederation, and it remains among only four other democracies worldwide that use “this archaic electoral system” (Rebick). FPTP is considered to create two main issues in Canadian politics: distortion of votes, and heightened regionalism. Voting behaviour and outcomes are currently distorted through unequal vote weight, ‘wasted votes’, and the phenomenon of strategic voting. Regionalism leads to national division, skews which issues are considered electorally important, negatively alters party behaviour, and changes how political preferences are perceived in Canada. Together, these effects are disengaging the Canadian public from political participation. This paper will explain the ways in which vote distortion and regionalism plague Canada’s current electoral system and the health of its democracy, and demonstrate how a shift towards a mixed-member proportional representation (MMPR) electoral system can alleviate those issues. Specifically, MMPR’s provision of a broader second vote nullifies the effect of wasted votes and strategic voting, while discouraging political parties from engaging in behaviour that targets specific electoral regions and produces political polarization.

The Effects of Proportional Representation on Election Lawmaking: Evidence from New Zealand

ABSTRACT It is widely recognised that politicians are self-interested and desire election rules beneficial to their re-election. Although partisanship in electoral system reform is well-understood, the factors that affect partisan manipulation of other democratic ‘rules of the game’ – including election administration, franchise laws, and campaign finance – has received little attention to date. New Zealand is so far the only established democracy to shift from a non-proportional to a proportional electoral system and thus presents an ideal case to test the effects of electoral system change on the politics of election reform. This article examines partisan and demobilising election reforms passed between 1970 and 1993 under first-past-the-post and between 1997 and 2020 under mixed-member proportional representation. Moving to a proportional system has failed to diminish the amount of partisan election lawmaking, though voting restrictions have become less common. These results should caution against claims that reforming a country’s electoral system will necessarily curtail the passage of normatively undesirable election reforms.

Study on the Reduction and Abolition of Proportional Representation System

최근 우리나라는 연동형 비례대표제 도입을 중심으로 하는 선거제도 개혁에 대하여 정치권의 갈등과 학계의 상호 의견차이가 심하게 나타나고 있다. 평등선 거원칙에 좀 더 부합하다는 비례대표제가 확대된다면, 단순다수 소선거구제보다 정치적 소수자의 등원이 쉬워지고, 지역주의 해소에 긍정적 영향을 끼치는 등의 장점이 있을 것으로 예상은 된다. 그러나 공천 헌금으로 대표되는 비례대표 선출 과정의 불투명성 및 공무담임권 침해가능성 등 비례대표제는 단점 역시 상당하 다. 물론 독일과 뉴질랜드와 같이 연동형 비례대표제가 성공적으로 안착한 사례도 있으나, 위 두 나라는 의원내각제이기에 대통령 5년 단임 직선제를 기본으로 하는 우리나라 통치구조에 연동형 비례대표제는 제대로 조응하지 않을 수 있다. 즉, 현행 5년 단임제의 역사적 정통성을 고려한다면 우리나라의 선거제도 개혁은 대통령 직선제라는 큰 틀 안에서 논의가 이뤄져야 한다. 이는 합의제로의 전환보 다는 다수제 민주주의 원칙의 존속이 타당함을 의미하며, 구체적으로는 현행 비례대표제의 점진적 축소 및 개헌을 통한 완전 폐지와 미국식 순수대통령제로의 체제 변형을 뜻한다.Conflicts between political circles and differences of opinion among academic world are so severe these days with election reform which mainly deals with mixed-member proportional representation system. If proportional representation system which seems to be accord with the principle of equal election expands, it is likely that political minorities can come to the assembly much easier and positive impacts will be on dissolving resionalism. However, proportional representation system has quite a few flaws such as the opacity of nomination process infamous for nomination donate and a potential infringe on the right to equal access to public service. Of course there are some cases in which mixed-member proportional representation system was successfully settled such as Germany and New Zealand, but those two countries are parliamentary republics. Mixed-member proportional representation system may fail to accord with Korea’s single five-year presidential term and direct presidential election system. Hence, election system reform in korea must be discussed within the scheme of direct presidential election system considering the historical legitimacy of the existing system. This indicates that the maintenance of the current principle of majoritarian democracy is far reasonable than the switch to consensus democracy, which means a gradual reduction and a complete abolition of current proportional representation system and switch to pure-presidentialism like America.

A Constitutional Review on a so-called 'Quasi Mixed-Member Proportional Representation'

A Constitutional Review on a so-called 'Quasi Mixed-Member Proportional Representation'

연동형비례대표제와 주권의 재구성: 한국 선거제도 변화에 대한 정치철학적 고찰

지금 우리가 선거제도를 개혁하고자 한다면 논쟁의 핵심은 사표를 줄이고 정당의 비례성을 높이는 차원이 아니라, ‘사실상의 대표’를 넘어 ‘실제의 대표’를 어떻게 구현할 것인가에 있다. 정치적 대표성의 주된 근거를 지역에 둘 것인지, 아니면 서로 다른 계층, 성별, 연령, 직업에 둘 것인지, 각각의 중요도를 어느 정도로 배분할 것인지의 문제에 대해 먼저 논의해야 한다. 이처럼 정치적 대표의 원리를 어떻게 세울 것인가를 먼저 구성하고, 그에 따라 선거제도와 권력구조, 정당의 공천제도 등을 그 원리에 따라 설계해야 한다. 이것은 촛불 이후에 국민주권의 대표방식을 어떻게 재구성할 것인가의 문제다. 중요한 질문들은 다음과 같다. 정치적 대표를 선출할 때 그들이 대표해야 할 책임성의 근거를 어떤 유권자성(constituency)에 둘 것인가? 지역인가, 계급인가, 정체성인가, 가치의 주장인가? 정치적 대표들은 그 유권자성으로부터 얼마나 자유로워야 하나? 선거제도의 유의미한 변화는 이러한 질문에 답하는 과정을 통해서만 가능하다.

Understanding people’s choice when they have two votes

ABSTRACT This paper introduces a model of vote choice in mixed-member proportional representation systems where electors cast two votes. Despite the growing popularity of mixed systems around the world, a recent stream of literature suggests that the candidate vote contaminates the list vote, inducing the type of behavior observed under majority rule. We propose a new approach to account for these so-called “contamination” effects, a phenomenon that we define as a causal influence making choices more similar across the vote decisions. Since causality entails a time ordering, we argue that contamination arises only when voters choose sequentially. By making use of new survey questions asking respondents about the timing of vote decisions, we can estimate the magnitude of these contamination effects directly. The model is tested using Bayesian multinomial probit models with survey data from the 2013 federal election in Germany. A key contribution of this paper is to show that contamination effects are present only among voters with lower levels of education, and work primarily from the list vote to the candidate vote. We also test a number of predictions about the determinants of the two vote choices in mixed systems.

Смешанная избирательная система: новое содержание основных характеристик

Смешанная избирательная система: новое содержание основных характеристик

Back from Holyrood: How mixed-member proportional representation and ballot structure shape the personal vote

Research on mixed-member legislatures demonstrates that members face different incentive structures when cultivating a personal vote. In this article, we examine how Scotland’s adoption of a mixed-member proportional system (MMP) and a change in ballot structure affect the legislative activities undertaken and emphasised by Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Utilising a range of measures of legislative behaviour, we find that MSPs representing constituencies spend less time legislating and more time engaged in constituent service work. Regional members, conversely, lodge more parliamentary motions when not listed on the ballot and sponsor more members’ bills than constituency-based colleagues when on the ballot. We conclude that electoral structures directly affect the representational styles MSPs adopt, while calling for conceptual reconsideration of the personal vote.

Mixed-Member Proportional Representation and the Ensuing Politics of Coalition-Making : Germany and New Zealand Compared

Mixed-Member Proportional Representation and the Ensuing Politics of Coalition-Making : Germany and New Zealand Compared

ANGER AND CONSTRAINT? NEW ZEALAND'S ELECTORAL POLITICS 1992 TO 2014

New Zealand's electoral referendum in 1993—at which New Zealand abandoned first-past-the-post in favour of mixed member proportional representation—has been described as ‘an electoral earthquake’ after ‘generations of dormancy’ [Norris, P. 1995. Introduction: the politics of electoral reform. International Political Science Review 16 (1): 3–8, p. 4]. Alan Renwick [2010. The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] has argued that the referendum is an example of electoral reform by elite–mass interaction, which is very rare in Western democratic nations. New Zealand is, therefore, a valuable case for analysis of electoral reform. Even more exceptional by international standards was the follow-up referendum New Zealand held in 2011/2012 on the electoral system. This article brings analysis of New Zealand's electoral politics up-to-date to include these recent events; it specifically asks whether Renwick's theory of elite–mass interaction also explains the outcomes of New Zealand's electoral politics in 2011/2012. It reveals that the 2011 referendum does not fit easily with the stages in Renwick's model (and New Zealand's previous experience) because the 2011 referendum was manufactured by government elites, not demanded by the New Zealand public. But the principle underpinning Renwick's model—that mass discontent with the general state of politics acts as a legitimacy constraints on elites—still has important analytical value in explaining the New Zealand case; unlike in 1992/1993, in 2011/2012 the New Zealand government was able to ignore the (complacent) public's electoral system preferences without fear of being punished at the polls.

Rethinking electoral reform in New Zealand: the benefits of citizens' assemblies

In 2011, New Zealanders decided by referendum to retain the mixed member proportional representation voting system. This article investigates the benefits of including a deliberative, participatory process in electoral reform to encourage collective debate and an informed choice by voters. In the last decade, Canada and the Netherlands have used citizens' assemblies, a form of participatory democracy, for electoral reform. This paper argues that a similar process would have been appropriate and valuable for New Zealand. Moreover, the discussion highlights the value of citizens' assemblies for minorities who can be outvoted in a referendum. This is considered with specific reference to voters in the Māori seats who had much at stake in the electoral reform. In addition to the general benefit of citizens' assemblies for electoral reform, a New Zealand assembly would have allowed for collective deliberation that ensured the inclusion of the perspectives of voters in the Māori seats.

Tensions Between Constituency and Regional Members of the Scottish Parliament Under Mixed-Member Proportional Representation: A Failure of the New Politics

About a decade after devolution in the UK created a Scottish Parliament elected by mixed-member proportional (MMP) representation, tensions between those representatives elected by the two different routes (single-member constituency and multimember region) remained. This article shows how controversies in 2008 over the level of office allowances, as well as the wording of the code of conduct, demonstrate that Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) held differing views on the constituency role of MSPs, and that the partisan animosity between the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Scottish Labour has been exacerbated by the competition at the constituency level facilitated by MMP. This deeply partisan outcome, while reflecting the successful operation of rational choice logic on the part of individual politicians, worked against the larger attempt to engineer a less adversarial post-devolution politics in Scotland.

Politics is Still an Adversarial Business: Minority Government and Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in Scotland and in New Zealand

Both Scotland and New Zealand, small nations with a British political heritage, implemented mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral systems in the 1990s. Minority government characterises most of the New Zealand experience since the introduction of MMP in 1996, while Scotland's only such experience occurred between 2007 and 2011. The Scottish experience differed significantly from that of New Zealand because Scotland has a different party system (characterised by two major cleavages) and exists in a system of multi-level governance, resulting in a more conflict-laden relationship between parties. The centre-periphery cleavage in the Scottish case results from being part of the United Kingdom, while New Zealand is an independent state. Both nations introduced MMP as part of an effort to bring about a ‘new politics’, but the impact of institutional engineering upon the behaviour of politicians has been limited.

Executive power 60 years on: has anything changed?

When New Zealand changed its electoral system from first-past-the-post (FPP) to mixed member proportional representation (MMP), the move was heralded as the end of old politics. Prime ministers and their Cabinet would no longer be the ‘elected dictatorship’. The executive would now be constrained by greater checks and balances. The two-party system that had held New Zealand politics hostage for at least 60 years would end and instead a greater diversity of interests would be represented in the House of Representatives, a House that could better hold the executive to account. This was the aim, but has it happened? This article examines recent instances of executive actions that are akin to those taken in the FFP era that MMP has been unable to eliminate. It also offers suggestions for how to increase the accountability of the executive by strengthening the constitution and other branches and offices of state.

Second-Class Representatives? Mixed-Member Proportional Representation in Britain

This article compares the constituency roles of the members of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales to their counterparts in two German federal states using postal survey data and interviews. Representatives elected in single-member constituencies spend more time than their list-elected counterparts on constituency service, believing it to be important to their re-election effort, while list-elected representatives focus more strongly on interest groups. Competition between constituency and list representatives in Britain has caused more problems than in Germany. The results suggest that rational-choice considerations motivate the behaviour of politicians, and that the mixed-member electoral system contributes to role differentiation.

Ecological Inference and Entropy-Maximizing: An Alternative Estimation Procedure for Split-Ticket Voting

Publication of King's A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem has rekindled interest in the estimation of unknown cell values in two- and three-dimensional matrices from knowledge of the marginal sums. This paper outlines an entropy-maximizing (EM) procedure which employs more constraints than King's EI method and produces mathematical rather than statistical procedures: the estimates are maximum-likelihood values. The mathematics are outlined, and the procedure's use illustrated with a study of ticket-splitting at New Zealand's first (1996) general election using the mixed-member proportional representation system, for which official figures provide a check against the EM estimate of the number voting a straight party ticket in each constituency.

New Zealand's first MMP election

A new system of voting was used for the first time in New Zealand's 1996 general election as a result of popular enthusiasm to move away from the two‐party system. The author demonstrates how effective the Mixed Member Proportional representation (MMP) system was in reversing the tide of 132 years of the Westminster‐style first‐past‐the‐post system. While more than one MMP election will be needed to assess the effect with certainty, the elimination of the prospect of any party gaining a majority in New Zealand's single chamber created a new pre‐election atmosphere and guaranteed the complex horse‐trading between the minority parties that ensued. New Zealand First, the key minority party in determining the inevitable coalition government, is seen to have considerable policy differences with the Labour Party, and a greater affinity with the National Party, which was the patty of minority government before the election. While immediately after the election, a Labour‐dominated coalition seemed probable the eventual outcome, many weeks later, was that the National Party continued in power with support from New Zealand First.

Thinking Ahead to Mixed-Member Proportional Representation

When New Zealand's voters in 1993 approved the transformation of the nation's electoral system in 1996 from first-past-the-post to mixed-member proportional representation they brought about fundamental changes to the tactics, organization and technologies used by parties in their electoral campaigns, since parties' appeals and the techniques for conveying them reflect the constraints of the electoral law within which they occur. New Zealand's political practitioners, during the current 3-year interregnum between the old and the new system, have begun to contemplate those changes and a variety of alternative avenues for maximizing electoral gain. This essay, drawing from interviews with 18 individuals at the centre of electoral politics in New Zealand, examines the implications of the switch to mixed-member proportional representation on marginal seats, targeting, issue constituencies, mass media appeals and other aspects of electoral campaigns.