In a recent survey article on public enterprise, Harvey Feigenbaum asks, why should firms organized exactly as those in the private sector, responding independently to the incentives of highly imperfect markets, act any differently than those privately owned?1 Feigenbaum cites several western European cases in support of his argument that state ownership is no guarantee that a corporation will respond to different signals and pursue different goals than its privately owned counterparts. At the level of corporate decision-making, managerial autonomy and profitability insulated the state-owned corporations from government influence. Feigenbaum questions whether the corporate form of organization for the state's commercial activities, commonly assumed to combine features of business efficiency with policy objectives, does not in fact possess biases toward organizational autonomy and market (rather than government) responsiveness which render it problematic as an instrument of public policy. This paper addresses the question of whether the mixed ownership corporation, with equity divided between the state and private investors, is a viable means for the pursuit of public policy goals. Based on an examination of selected cases from Canada, Britain, and France, it identifies the factors which have determined the relationship of these corporations to the policy preferences of government. In order to do this, the analysis proceeds through a review of the theoretical literature on the partnership of public and private capital, an examination of several cases of mixed ownership, and a discussion of the conditions which have determined the tractability of the mixed ownership firm as an instrument of public policy. The practical importance of studying the relationship of mixed enterprise to public policy is demonstrated by the fact that, internationally, some of the largest corporations in the noncommunist world represent partnerships of state and private sector capital.2 Among the most prominent cases are British Petroleum (ranked 8 by sales, 1982), West Germany's VEBA (26, involved in the production of coal, gas, chemicals, and electricity), Compagnie Franqaise de Petroles (31), Elf-Aquitaine (42), Volkswagenwerk (44), and Renault (50).3 Below the level of these world giants, many of western Europe's largest firms are mixed enterprises. The list includes the Compagnie Generale d'Electricite (France, ranked 30 by sales among western European corporations in 1982), Montedison (Italy, 38, a holding company involved in the production of chemicals and pharmaceuticals), ENPETROL (Spain, 67, oil refining), Cockerill Sambre (Belgium, 96, iron and steel), Norsk Hydro (Norway, 98, nitrogen and magnesium products, plastic production), Enso-Gutzeit (Finland, 234, wood and paper products), and SEAT (Spain, 275, automobile manufacturing). Problems of inadequate information and cross-national differences in financial practices render impossible a precise measurement of the dimensions of the mixed enterprise sector.
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