When we contemplate the havoc which has been wrought in the field of English law by the enunciation of maxims of a rhetorical character —some of which are of uncertain origin and still more uncertain operation—it may, perhaps, seem strange that our law is so unreceptive when it comes to be a question of applying a broad general principle such as that of unjustified enrichment. The explanation seems to be that our law of quasi-contract, such as it is, has developed along a channel which was carved out for it by indebitatus assumpsit, and that this has proved to be too restricted to permit of the growth of remedies of a non-contractual nature, though it did not interfere with the destructive force of maxims of a negative character, as, for instance, when Lord Ellenborough applied the maxim of ignorantia iuris haud excusat in Bilbie v. Lumley to the case of money paid under a mistake of law.