Missile Technology Control Regime Research Articles

Popular geopolitics of ‘nuclear India’: tracing the evolution of India’s ‘regional’ and ‘global’ identities in the English daily The Hindu from 2011–2020

ABSTRACT Conventional wisdom on India’s nuclear geopolitics takes a top-down approach, foregrounding state perceptions of India’s nuclear role in regional and global politics. This conventional approach overlooks the bottom-up processes, such as media representations, which have been fundamental in shaping India’s nuclear identity. This is because media representations comprise common-sense knowledge, since media is the primary source of information in a democracy. Building on theoretical underpinnings of popular geopolitics, this article focuses on analyses of media representations in the Editorial of the English daily The Hindu from 2011–2020. This national newspaper boasts the second-largest readership among English dailies. The direct link between The Hindu Editorial’s representations of ‘nuclear India’ and India’s ‘regional’ and ‘global’ selfhood is crucial. The concerned period of 2011–2020 was pivotal in charting Indian geopolitical identity, as India partook in international negotiations after the US-India Nuclear Deal in 2008 and became a member of multilateral export control regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime. This article deconstructs the Editorial texts to elicit the intertextual links underpinning the ‘geopolitical cultural signifier’, ‘geospatial mythology’, and ‘self/other’ binary representation that operationalises India’s nuclear identity in regional and global settings.

Climbing the Ladder: Explaining the Vertical Proliferation of Cruise Missiles

Why do some states possess more advanced military technologies than others? Our study explores the vertical proliferation of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), seeking to understand which demand- and supply-side factors best explain why some countries acquire more sophisticated LACMs. We theorize that states’ security environments, regime types, possession of related strategic technologies, and membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) influence the possession of more sophisticated cruise missiles. Our analysis employs a unique new global dataset with granular data on every LACM national militaries have deployed. We use this dataset to evaluate the proliferation of LACMs across the international system from 1991–2015. Using a selection model that first controls for the horizontal proliferation of LACMs, we find that insecurity, scientific and technical expertise from related technologies, the possession of highly authoritarian and highly democratic regimes, and MTCR membership all have positive effects on the sophistication of LACM-possessors’ arsenals.

Pakistan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The arrival of nuclear weapons was detrimental in changing the nature of warfare; duringWWII, we used nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities. The catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons made the pioneers apprehensive about the spread of nuclear technology across the globe. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR) is a set of international rules, norms, initiatives, agreements, arrangements, bilateral and multilateral treaties to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of NNPR. This paper discusses the significance of NNPR and will focus on how Pakistan fits into the bigger picture of the NNPR as a nuclear state. This research study will further analyze the prospects and challenges for Pakistan viz a viz the NNPR. It will specifically focus on Pakistan's official position on joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and the two relevant Export Control Regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime). Moreover, the challenges Pakistan faces viz-a-viz these treaties and arrangements will be highlighted. Recommendations will be provided based on the prospects of how Pakistan can overcome these challenges.

International Legal Regulation of the Missile Technology Control Regime in the Aspect of Private Space Company Activities

International Legal Regulation of the Missile Technology Control Regime in the Aspect of Private Space Company Activities

US Strategic Propensity towards India in Perspective of Nuclear Bonding: Security Apprehensions for South Asian Region and Pakistan


 
 
 The Indo-US strategic bonding is shifting the security dynamics of the South Asian balance-of-power in Indian favour. From the signing of 123 US-India Nuclear Deal to the facilitation in becoming a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the US has clearly designated India as an instrumental element in the American grand strategy of devising a ‘new world order’. As a result, India has grabbed the opportunity of alleviating its status as a credible regional and global power. In this regard, the US tilt towards India is significantly paving grounds for a strategic imbalance in the South Asian region, thus creating challenges for Pakistan. Therefore, this paper argues that the growing bonhomie between the US and India is a destabilizing factor in the region which reinforces Pakistan’s fast falling into the Chinese orbit; thereby cementing the old friendship into a new strategic partnership. This dynamic certainly gives China and Pakistan an incentive to work together so as to keep the value of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence alive. In an effort to expand the horizon on the subject, the paper is dedicated to critically examine the existing cooperation between India and the US while equally foreseeing the possible implications for the region in the face of such destabilizing cooperation. More importantly, based on qualitative data, this paper explores how Indo-US strategic partnership is directly impacting Pakistan and its strategic partnership with China; thereby explaining how the growing relationship between the US and India has undermined the traditional balance-of-power in the South Asian region?
 
 

Features of the international legal regime for missile technology con

The massive development of missile systems and related technologies in the last decade of the 20th century has led to a collective effort to contain them. And therefore, by the end of the 90s of the twentieth century missile proliferation has once again become an important issue on the international security agenda whereas the effectiveness of the missile technology control regime has declined markedly. This article discusses in detail the existing legal regime for missile technology control, its achievements, advantages and disadvantages. This topic is a great relevance due to the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles and missile technologies, especially in light of the ongoing terrorist attacks around the world. When writing the article, methods of induction and deduction, historical-legal and analytical methods were used. The authors conclude that further efforts to tighten the regime are likely to require consideration of technologies associated with smaller missile systems that are regularly exported by regime member states to non-regime countries. The missile technology control regime is taking small steps towards missile non-proliferation, and we can see that most states are becoming committed to the idea of missile non-proliferation; the regulatory aspects of the missile technology control regime are increasing.

Ядерное сдерживание: концепции и риски

Among the existing forms of exchange of massive nuclear strikes between strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States (first disarming, launch-on-warning, and retaliation strikes), launch-on-warning is the one that poses the biggest risk. The decision to carry out this type of strike can be made within a few minutes based on data from an early warning system. Since there is no way to completely rule out the possibility of errors in generation of that data, the main focus in the concept of nuclear deterrence should be made on the retaliation strike. This strike posture has always been used as a rationale for the composition of Strategic Rocket Force and Navy forces which focus on ensuring that weapons can survive a disarmament first strike from a potential adversary. This would allow more time for decision-making regarding the use of nuclear forces; therefore, due to the increased vulnerability of informational systems, the principles of a retaliation strike should be given more attention in planning operations involving strategic nuclear forces. Early warning systems should be used first and foremost for the global monitoring of missile and carrier rocket launches, i.e. monitoring accidental (unintended) and provocative missile launches, as well as for assessing nations’ compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Walking Back Delusional Nuclear Policies

India’s ‘dual use’ nuclear policy has been strung out from the beginning between the peaceful atom and military atom as illustrated in Jawaharlal Nehru’s use of the phrase for the country’s nuclear energy programme—‘Janus-faced’. However, the Indian Government has been too influenced by its own rhetoric of peaceful use to equally emphasise the security aspects that the phrase implied.While Nehru championed disarmament, he did so in the 1950s in the United Nations’ First Committee as cover for the military capability being developed under Homi Bhabha’s astute leadership. But the myth about disarmament leadership meant that even after Indira Gandhi refrained from signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty because it sought to freeze the ‘have and have-not’ divide, Delhi has been pusillanimous about weaponisation but gung-ho about beefing up its non-proliferation credentials by joining or seeking to join the very technology denial regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenar Arrangement, Australia Group) that have victimised the country. The desire to please the US and the West has to end and national security aspects prioritised as all weapons states are doing.It is time for India to resume nuclear testing to equip the arsenal with proven, reliable and safe thermonuclear weapons/warheads, and limit damage and recover strategic space by ensuring that neither the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty happens.

India’s Membership of Missile Technology Control Regime: Implications for South Asia

India’s membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) affects strategic balance in South Asia particularly, Pakistan. India’s membership of the group would aid India’s missile and space programmes, providing it access to technologies and missile systems hitherto unavailable to it. This may include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) like Global Hawk and Predator, which the US has employed for reconnaissance and counter-terrorism along Pakistan Afghanistan border to strike targets within Pakistan’s territory, violating its sovereignty. India’s acquisition of these systems will pose a threat to Pakistan. The MTCR membership would accelerate India’s missile programme, thereby, exacerbating an arms race in South Asia. It would also further tilt the regional balance of power in India’s favour. However, the bigger threat is the quest to win India a place at the high tables in the world and to build it up as a regional and global power. After looking into the pros and cons of Pakistan joining the MTCR, this article concludes that presently it is not in Pakistan’s favour to join the group since it may help the US and the West to hinder or curtail Pakistan’s missile programme.

The Roles and Dimensions of Science and Technology in India’s Foreign Policy

The new millennium perspectives on science and technology and its role in India’s foreign policy can be ascertained from a variety of instances. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during his visit to the US in September 2000 talked about the ‘repositioning’ of India in regional and world affairs. In January 2015, during his address to the Indian Science Congress, Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked about a growing trend of international collaboration in research and development that India should be able to take advantage of. It was primarily for this reason that PM Modi had placed science and technology at the forefront of India’s diplomatic engagement. The fact that this address was made at the Indian Science Congress and not at a meeting of Indian ambassadors was in itself significant. Besides, the recent discourse in newspapers on India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has been led by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), rather than by the country’s scientific community. This substantive involvement is indicative of the noticeable diffusion of science and technology into India’s foreign policy-making.

Missiles, Money, and Power Politics: The Riyadh–Moscow–Kiev Triangle

ABSTRACTThis study examines the triangular political-military relationship revolving around missile sales involving Russia, Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia. Its principal thesis is that this development, if it comes to pass, could weaken further, and perhaps fatally, the Missile Technology Control Regime, which has always been a fragile instrument to control missile proliferation. A second thesis is that such a missile sale is a complex process, with political, economic, and psychological factors often as important as technical ones, and that all of these aspects must be taken into consideration in any analysis.

인도와 중국 우주발사체에 적용된 미국의 비확산정책 연구

1950-1960년 대 인도와 중국은 미국, 서방국가, 그리고 구소련에게서 받은 로켓 기술을 바탕으로 발사체 개발을 수월하게 이룰 수 있었다. MTCR이 출범한 1987년 이후, 1990년 대 초를 제외하고는 양국이 MTCR 체제 밖에 있었으며, 미국과의 주요 우주분야 협력 이력은 거의 없었다. 그러나 21세기 들어서며 인도는 미국과 우주협력 관계로 진입하고 미국의 비 상용 위성을 인도발사체를 이용한 발사가 가능하게 되었다. 반면 미국은 중국과의 우주발사체 협력은 물론 우주협력에 회의적이다. 본 논문에서는 인도와 중국 발사체에 적용된 미국의 미사일 비확산정책을 살펴보고 적용된 정책의 유사점과 상이점을 분석하여 우리나라 우주개발에 대한 시사점을 제시하고자 하였다. India and China are capable of developing indigenous space launch vehicles, with the rocket technology transferred from the U.S., Western countries, and the Soviet Union, in the 1950s and 1960s. Barring the early 1990s, both countries are absent in the missile nonproliferation regime, and have no major space cooperation records with the U.S., since the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1987. With the advent of the <TEX>$21^{st}$</TEX> century, historic progress has been made in the U.S.-India space cooperation, which includes using Indian launch vehicles to launch U.S.non-commercial satellites. However, the U.S. is skeptical with regards to space cooperation and using Chinese space launch vehicle services. In this paper, we present the U.S. nonproliferation policy applied on launch vehicles of India and China, and different aspects of the policy will be examined to draw implications on Korean space activities.

A European Dilemma: The EU Export Control Regime on Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Abstract Export controls for dual-use items are an important constituent element of both the security policies of state exporters and WMD non-proliferation efforts. Dual-use goods and technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes, which requires careful oversight over their export to countries that are considered unfriendly or have ambiguous foreign policy attitudes. By their very nature, dual-use items may be used both to further legitimate ends, like promoting technological development and strengthening economic ties, and to aid in unwarranted acts. State exporters are faced with the responsibility of balancing the security objectives pertaining to exports of dual-use items with the competitiveness of local economies. The paper discusses the EU export control regime and EU membership in international export control groups. In doing so, comparative and normative research methods are chosen to analyze existing literature on Council Regulation 428/2009 and other international export control groups, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The paper will conclude by identifying shortcomings and addressing possible amendments to the regulation.

Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations between India and U.S: Problems and Prospects

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Relationship between U.S. and India is at the best phase, especially after former unequivocal support in NSG (Nuclear Supply Group) and helping inclusion in MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). The relationship between two oldest and biggest democracies has matured under the headship of Mr. Barak Obama as President and Mr. Nardendra Modi as prime minister. In the recent visit of Indian prime minister, the warm gesture shown by U.S. congress members have further cemented the strength of tie up between two nations. However, despite great chemistry between two nation and its leaders from last many years, both have failed to enter into Bilateral Investment Treaty. India is having Bilateral Investment treaty with more than 80 countries including U.K. and Russia, of which 72 treaties are operational. &lt;a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftn1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; U.S. is having Bilateral Investment treaties with more than 46 countries including Russia and Bangladesh.&lt;a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftn2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; Since 2008, the two countries have been engaged in sporadic discussions to conclude the Investment treaty. Negotiations on its wording, based on each country’s revised model treaty texts, will begin soon. Both the leaders Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S President Barack Obama affirmed their mutual commitment to facilitating increased bilateral investment flows and fostering an open and predictable climate for investment many a times , But consensus has not been reached till today on certain term and conditions. In the absence of BIT , the rights of investors of both the countries are at the stake. Further, MFN or nationality treatment clause cannot be invoked or granted in the event of any regulatory or other action. Obligations imposed by BIT to protect interest of foreign investors are absent. Further, after losing its first Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) claim in 2012 against White Industries, an Australian company and pending 17 cases, India has recently adopted new BIT in 2015 . It also has reflections of pending claims of Vodafone and other cases involving Intellectual Property Rights( Hereinafter refereed as IPR) and the cases of compulsory licences. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;br clear="all" /&gt;&lt;hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftnref1"&gt;[1]&lt;/a&gt; Details Avaialble at &lt;a href="http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp"&gt;http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/SPub/Desktop/July%202016%20IRA%20Issues/IRAJEMS/IRAJEMS1.docx#_ftnref2"&gt;[2]&lt;/a&gt; Details Avialable at &lt;a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm"&gt;http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

The MTCR: staying relevant 25 years on

Twenty-five years after it was established, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) faces big challenges if it is to remain relevant in dealing with present-day technologies. It has had an important effect in containing the spread of long-range missiles. But it has not been as successful at curtailing the spread of cruise missiles, and nor is it structured to regulate the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Rumblings precede 25th missile-control meeting

As the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) prepares to open its 25th plenary meeting in Argentina on 11 April, partner states are conscious of the need to keep the organisation relevant in very different global circumstances to those when it was established by the G7 in 1987. With its aim of limiting the proliferation of ballistic-missile and unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons – broadened to include chemical and biological warheads in 1992 – the regime undoubtedly still addresses pressing issues. But it is more debatable whether some elements of the voluntary, informal regime itself remain appropriate.

The Limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime

The Limitations of the Missile Technology Control Regime

A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies

This article analyzes the system developed within Europe, more precisely within the European Union through European Community law, to address the security-sensitive issues involved in the export of hardware, software, and knowledge for the purpose of space activities and major space applications. The subject is introduced with reference to the far better known export control developments within the United States, such as those concerning International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the international understandings under the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement. European Community Regulations for export controls provide for a complex system of balances between national sovereignty and Europe-wide harmonization. This European Community regime, though ultimately still dependent upon individual state's sovereign controls, establishes an interesting measure of international harmonization in security-sensitive export controls. Although the European Community regime is fraught with many complexities, it manages to avoid some of the pitfalls evident in the United States and international regimes, notably the confusing discussions on discerning weaponry proper from other space items with dual-use potential. This is the result mainly of an approach characterized by a primary intention to harmonize, rather than to apply strict controls per se, resulting in a transparency and consistency that are not only valuable to commercial entrepreneurs, but also to those concerned primarily with the security risks posed by the international space industry. As for the space industry in particular, it is helpful that the European Community regime specifically carves out civil space activities, for example if conducted within the context of the European Space Agency or national space agency activities.

Reluctant restraint: the evolution of China's nonproliferation policies and practices, 1980-2004

1 Introduction: A Framework for Analyzing the Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Behavior 2 A Gradual Engagement: China and Nuclear Nonproliferation 30 3 Reluctant Participant: China, Missile Nonproliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime 97 4 Negative Feedback: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Missile Defense on Chinese Arms-Control and Nonproliferation Policies 175 5 A Cultural Evolution:The Development of China's Arms-Control and Nonproliferation Community 210

Ballistic Missile Proliferation

This analysis examines ballistic missile proliferation in the context of strategic interactions among neighboring states. The analysis finds that when faced with ballistic missile threats, nations respond rationally and acquire ballistic missiles as a deterrent. Using a panel data set of 119 countries from 1967 to 1997, this study shows that the probability of a country procuring ballistic missiles increases nonlinearly as the number of bordering states with ballistic missiles increases. Although international norms arising from the Missile Technology Control Regime reduced the probability of missile proliferation, these externalities did not offset a state's decision to arm in response to ballistic missile arsenals in neighboring states. This analysis also finds that surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) increased the probability of proliferation in two ways: first, because ballistic missiles provided states ``ensured penetration'' of a rival's air defenses; and second, because SAMs reduced the ability of a rival to retaliate against a ballistic missile attack.