T HE NOTION THAT DEMOCRACY necessarily implies majority rule continues to pose a most troublesome problem for democratic theorists. It is an uncomfortable problem, the sort that prompts vigorous discussion when it is first brought up, but which leaves its investigators in the final analysis frustrated and up in the air. Democracy, it is argued, surely involves majority rule, but a majority can support persecution and oppression and can bring, and so far as can be determined has brougkt, tyrants to power and can thereafter sustain them in office. But institutional limitations on majority rule do not satisfy either, for they necessarily involve some form of minority rule which is apparently antithetical to democracy. This fundamental puzzle presents itself in many contexts. The problem is by no means one of narrow academic interest, worthy of consideration only as a device with which to befuddle undergraduates in political theory. Clearly, it is a matter of considerable importance so far as the functioning of one of the highest decision-making bodies in American government is concerned. At least one justice of the United States Supreme Court seems to adopt a position of extreme self-restraint because he regards the institution of which he is a part as non-democratic and inherently oligarchic,1 a view which seems to presuppose an majority rule position. The whole question of the ultimate legitimacy of the institution of judicial review is tied very closely to the question of limited vs. absolute majority rule as a feature of democratic government. It is, of course, possible to argue that the institution of judicial review was established on the basis of a proper reading of the language of the Constitution of the United States as Charles L. Black of the Yale Law School has recently done,2 but it is still reasonable to contend that the Constitution is wrong, i.e., undemo-