Recognition Of Minority Languages Research Articles

Correction to: Ethnic Polarization and Human Development: The Conditional Effects of Minority Language Recognition

Correction to: Ethnic Polarization and Human Development: The Conditional Effects of Minority Language Recognition

Ethnic Polarization and Human Development: The Conditional Effects of Minority Language Recognition

The literature suggests ethnic diversity has a negative effect on development. Yet, we also know that government policies—e.g., recognizing multiple languages in minority-sizable areas—can attenuate these effects. In this paper, we ask: What are the socioeconomic implications of minority language recognition? We leverage a legal stipulation in Romania as a quasi-experiment: Minority languages are recognized as official in areas where the minority constitutes more than 20% of the population. We argue the recognition of minority languages builds social trust and facilitates efficiency in economic exchanges—mollifying the otherwise detrimental consequences of diversity. Using data at the municipality level, we find that in areas where only Romanian is recognized, ethnic diversity has a negative effect on development—a result consistent with the literature. This effect, however, is absent in areas where a minority language is recognized. The implications suggest that lowering the threshold for language recognition could promote even further development.

Minority Language Recognition and Political Trust in Authoritarian Regimes

While authoritarian regimes are often characterized by their civil liberty restrictions, some dictatorships acknowledge the ethnolinguistic diversity of their population. Are minorities in multiethnic authoritarian states more likely to trust the government when their language is recognized? In this paper, we argue while recognition of a group’s language improves trust in democracies through a substantive representation mechanism, the same cannot be said in authoritarian regimes. Instead, recognition is a mere symbolic gesture. Such window-dressing efforts call attention to the horizontal inequality between hegemon and minority groups—and such, minority language recognition is associated with negative political trust. We test our argument with the World Values Survey. By identifying which minority groups have been afforded linguistic recognition, we find evidence of a significant—but negative—link between recognition and political trust.

Democracy and minority language recognition: tyranny of the majority and the conditional effects of group size

ABSTRACTWhat explains minority language recognition? Why are some governments more responsive than others to minority linguistic demands? While there are reasons to believe democracies – as protectors of civil liberties – are generally more likely to recognize minority demands, I argue only those without a sizable majority extend such recognition to the highest levels. This is because the dominance of one large linguistic group electorally impedes a democratic government’s ability to grant such benefits to the smaller ones. I test this argument by using a newly constructed measure of minority language recognition. This variable identifies whether a minority language is used in public education, and if so, it differentiates between instruction of and instruction in a minority language. I find that while democracies are indeed more likely to acknowledge minority languages, the effects are conditional: only those without a majority are able or willing to accommodate minorities to the fullest extent. Otherwise, when there is a tyranny of the majority, democracies behave no differently than their dictatorial counterparts. The results – robust to different measurements of majoritarian politics – hold important implications for our understanding of democracy and its ability to satisfy demands in divided societies.

Beyond identity: the desirability and possibility of policies of multilingualism

ABSTRACTMany contributors to the normative literature on language policy argue that inclusive multilingual regimes are beneficial on several grounds. However, despite the professed advantages of multilingualism, most nation-states have been reluctant to equally recognise minority languages alongside the majority language. This reality raises three questions. First, why is this the case? Second, should the situation be remedied? Third, if yes, how can change be achieved? The present article contends that a large part of the problem stems from the emphasis scholars and activists alike have placed on the deep ties between a minority group’s language and its collective identity. Yet, advocating for multilingualism on grounds of identity is likely to encounter strong resistance by the majority group and, consequently, thwart attempts to promote the official recognition of minority languages. In response, this article advocates three alternative defences of policies of multilingualism, which circumvent the obstacles that generally accompany identity-based arguments. The first justification stems from the unique instrumental nature of language, the second from utilitarian considerations regarding democratic performance and the third emphasises moral considerations such as equality and access. Together, these non-identity arguments provide normative and efficient grounds to the adoption of multilingual policies in heterogeneous societies.

Minority Languages in Dictatorships: A New Measure of Group Recognition

What explains minority language recognition in dictatorships? In this paper, we argue that minority language groups in authoritarian regimes are morelikelyto have their languages recognized when their interests are represented by a party in the legislature. Moreover, thelevelof recognition is greater. We test this argument using original group-level and time-variant measures of minority party in legislatureandminority language policies for all Asian dictatorships from 1980 to 2000. The results are robust even when we shift the analysis to the country level globally and account for possible spurious correlations.

Differences in Language Policies of Chinese-inhabited Southeast Asian Countries

Language is a tool that governments use to create national identity. Language policies are not static and with the impact of several factors can shift over time. With the influx of new immigrants, both the ethnic and linguistic structures of countries change, as had been the case with the Chinese immigrants who arrived in Southeast Asia in two big waves, in the 15th/16th and later in the 19th/20th century and made it their new home. Today, some 30 million overseas Chinese live in Southeast Asia, most prominently in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and in Vietnam. Some of these countries pursue monolingual policies, while others have opted for multilingualism. This article explains the differences in regard of the presence or absence of the Chinese language in the language policies of Southeast Asian countries with a substantial Chinese minority. First of all, authoritarian regimes are generally associated with less minority language recognition, and thus the Chinese language is less likely to be included in the official language apparatus in a dictatorship. Second, if the Chinese minority is included in the government, it is more likely that the Chinese language be either one of the official languages, or one of the languages of instruction, or both. And third, the bigger and more coherent the Chinese minority, the bigger the chance of the Chinese language being part of the national language policy. The author has identified three variables that influence the Chinese language participation in the language policy of a country, namely the country’s regime type, the size and cohesion of the Chinese minority living in that country, and the Chinese minority’s access to the national government. The approach used in this article is both descriptive and analytical, and offers a comparative review of the language policy structures of various countries throughout Southeast Asia in regard of the Chinese language.

Confusion of Tongues: Constitutional Recognition of Languages and Language Rights in Australia

This article considers the YouMeUnity Report proposal for the inclusion of new language provisions in the Australian Constitution as part of a package of reforms for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The article outlines the important symbolic and substantive effects of recognising language rights in the Constitution. The article explains how the recognition of a national language and the recognition of minority languages are conceptually distinct — promoting a national language is aimed at promoting national unity and enhancing the political and economic participation of individuals in the state, whereas protecting minority languages is aimed at recognising linguistic diversity, enriching the cultural life of the State, maintaining connections with other nations, and recognising language choice as a basic human right. The article argues that there is a strong case for minority language recognition, and in particular, the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages, in the Australian Constitution, but warns against the recognition of English as the national language.

Confusion of Tongues: Constitutional Recognition of Languages and Language Rights in Australia

This article considers the YouMeUnity Report proposal for the inclusion of new language provisions in the Australian Constitution as part of a package of reforms for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. The article outlines the important symbolic and substantive effects of recognising language rights in the Constitution. The article explains how the recognition of a national language and the recognition of minority languages are conceptually distinct — promoting a national language is aimed at promoting national unity and enhancing the political and economic participation of individuals in the state, whereas protecting minority languages is aimed at recognising linguistic diversity, enriching the cultural life of the State, maintaining connections with other nations, and recognising language choice as a basic human right. The article argues that there is a strong case for minority language recognition, and in particular, the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages, in the Australian Constitution, but warns against the recognition of English as the national language.

Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions

What are the linguistic effects of political institutions? Are consensus-building, power-sharing democracies more likely to recognize minority languages? In this article, I argue (1) power-sharing institutions—proportional electoral rules, parliamentary systems, and federalism—are less likely to recognize minority languages than their moderation-inducing, power-concentrating counterparts; but (2) if there is recognition, the level of recognition is actually greater in the former than in the latter. By testing this argument using a newly constructed language-in-education barometer, I find a significant and robust relationship between political institutions and minority language recognition.

Local Responses to Decentralization Policy in Indonesia

Dans le contexte des politiques de decentralisations engagees en Indonesie, l'auteur aborde quelques questions majeures liees a cette transformation structurelle. Ainsi au depart, les enseignants eprouvaient-ils le besoin d'accroitre leur autonomie et leur influence au sein de l'ecole ? Possedaient-ils les competences requises et necessaires a la mise en place des changements et des transformations professionnelles selon la demande du Ministere de l'Education et de la Culture ? Quelles etaient les reactions lors de cette decentralisation, dans un pays traditionnellement centralise ? De quelle assistance pouvaient beneficier les enseignants dans l'implementation de ces mesures ? L'auteur en cherchant les reponses a ces interrogations, detaille la procedure de reforme de l'education entreprise en Indonesie, ainsi que les difficultes rencontrees.