Mining Attack Research Articles

Attack on the Belgian social dialogue system

FOCUS O WORKERS'RIGHTSINFORMALANDINFORMAL MINING Attack on the Belgian social dialogue system In Belgium. choose May who 2012 Every will social four represent elections years them workers were inthe held get workto in Belgium.Everyfouryears workersget to choosewhowillrepresent themintheworkerscouncilsand thecommittees forsafety and healthat work.The results are also decisivefor theweightof thedifferent tradeunionson the sectoral and national level.Apart from that, they are- almosttraditionally - used bythefarright as an occasionto criticise and attack thesystem ofsocialdialogue. Basics ofBelgian social dialogue The cause ofthoseattacks is thelaw of 29 May 1952 establishing the NationalLabourCouncil, whichforms a cornerstone ofthesocialdialogue inBelgium. Onlythe'mostrepresentative' unions sitintheNational LabourCouncil, andonlythose unionsare allowedto submit candidates forthe socialelections.1 A unionis one ofthe'mostrepresentative unions' ifitfulfils thefollowing criteria: beingestablished on thenational leveland operating acrossthedifferent sectors (i.e. inter-professional) representing theabsolutemajority ofsectors andcategories ofworkers intheprivate as wellas thepublicsector, on thecondition that thetrade unionalso encompasses themajority ofworkers during thefour years preceding the appointment ofmembers (inlinewith the quadrennial heldsocialelections), thetrade unioninquestion hastocountatleast125,000 contributing members, including themembers oftheaffiliated orassociated organisations, and thetrade unionmust haveas a statutory goal thedefence oftheinterests ofworkers. Thisis perfectly inlinewiththeILO guidelines (objective,pre-established and precisecriteria) and theneed ofhavinga functioning, adequate andstablesocialdialogue. Vlaamse solidairevakbond (Flemish SolidaryTrade Union) Attheoccasionof thesocial electionsin 2008, members oftheextreme right party Vlaams Belang, attacked thelaworganising theelections before the constitutional court, stating that itinfringed (among others) their freedom ofassociation andtheir politicalrights . The constitutional courtcountered all arguments (Judgement 9/2009, 15January 2009). Since thelawremained thesamethey hadtocome up withsomething newin2012. On 11July 2011(theFlemish national holiday) some members of theVlaamsBelang founded their own Flemish nationalist'trade union' VlaamseSolidaire VakbondCVSV). A couple of weekslater, theVSVwas adoptedbytheBritish nationalist tradeunionSolidarity ('STU'). A contract was madestating thattheVSVwouldpaya monthly feeofeuro25 'inreturn fortheservices offered by STU to thecandidatesforthesocial elections inBelgium'. In twocompaniestheVSVsubmitted a listof candidates(each listwithone candidate).Both wererefused bytheemployer, according to the law. Solidarity, theVSVand thecandidates subsequently wentto courtand demandedthatthe listswould be accepted.Theyused an urgent procedurebeforethe presidentof the labour court, based on theanti-discrimination law (Law of 10 May2007,B.S.30May2007). Theystated that thelaworganising thesocialelections should notbe applied,sinceitdiscriminates on grounds oftradeunionaffiliation. Apart from that, they askedthepresident ofthe courtto questionthe Courtof Justiceof the European Union as to the conformity of the national legislation with EU law.TheCourt would have to considerwhether the condition thata tradeunionmustbe represented in theNational LabourCouncil tosubmit candidates for thesocial elections, iscontrary tothefree movement ofservicesintheEuropean Union(Directive 2006/123). TheVSVarguedthat advicegivenbytrade unions in legaland taxation matters, are services in the scope of the directive and thusnationallimitationstoEU trade unionsoffering theseservices in Belgium arecontrary totheEU law. The president of the labourcourtin Bruges stressed theparticular character oftheprocedure: an urgent procedure tostopan ongoingdiscrimination . To makea longstory short, thepresident ofthecourtpointedoutthattherealaimofthe VSVwas to attack thelegislation, and thatthere are properproceduresforthis,whichhad not been followedin thiscase. As a consequence there was no need toponderaboutthequestion whether thelegislation would be in accordance withEU law.In Ghentthepresident ofthecourt made a slightly different reasoning, butcame to thesameconclusion. In bothcases theVSVand Solidarity werecondemned toa fineforfrivolous andvexatious proceedings. The VSVand Solidarity filedan appeal against bothdecisions.Theyinsist on an intervention of theEuropeanCourtto decide whether thediscrimination law and thelaw on social elections contain illegallimitations tothefree movement of services intheEU. The cases arestill pending. Conclusion It is stilluncertain whether theEuropeanCourt willhave to handlethiscase. However,in our opinionitseemsclearthat theBelgianlegislation is inlinewiththeILO principles. Minority orfor- ...continued onPage13 ASTRID THIENP0NT and LANDER VANDER LINDEN are Advisers with the ABW-FGTB trade union centre in Belgium. Page 19Volume 19Issue 32012 INTERNATIONAL union rights ...

Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg (review)

Reviewed by: Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg Robert Gudmestad (bio) Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg. By Earl J. Hess. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010. Pp. 352. Cloth, $44.95.) The Battle of the Crater is best remembered both for the massacre of African American troops and as a golden opportunity to end the war that slipped through Ulysses S. Grant’s fingers. In Into the Crater, Earl Hess examines the action at the Crater in great detail and puts to rest controversies, including persistent claims that without Ambrose Burnside’s egregious bungling, the war might have ended nearly a year before it did. Hess’s account proceeds chronologically from the first notion of detonating explosives beneath Confederate lines, when Henry Pleasants, a lieutenant colonel in the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, persuaded his superior officers that an underground attack held more promise than an assault on the Confederate trenches, to the disposition of the site after the war. From the beginning the plan was plagued with weaknesses, from the choice of a less than ideal location—Pegram’s Salient—to a haphazard execution. But the Federals were not alone in committing costly errors of judgment, for when the Confederates dug a countermine, they aimed their shaft too high and missed an opportunity to intercept the Union soldiers. Hess discusses in great detail how the miners of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania overcame difficulties as they tunneled beneath the Confederates lines, and the engineering involved in the process is interesting. Nonspecialists might encounter some difficulty defining unfamiliar terms, such as “gallery” (a mine shaft) and “cavalier” (a walled entrenchment), and some context surrounding the siege of Petersburg would have been useful. Once the digging was completed, Union soldiers packed four tons of gunpowder into small, hollowed-out rooms at the end of the gallery and pieced together three long fuse lines. Hess rightly blames Burnside for many of the problems with the execution of the plan, as he put an incompetent officer in charge of the attack and then evaded responsibility for its failure. Whereas Burnside originally [End Page 431] wanted African American troops to lead the attack, George Meade was reluctant, for should it fail, he would be accused of using the men as cannon fodder. As a result, Burnside cast lots to determine who would lead the attack, leaving Brigadier General James H. Ledlie, “one of the worst division commanders of the war,” in charge of leading the ambitious and unprecedented attack on Confederate lines (60). In great detail, Hess describes the debacle that became the Battle of the Crater. After a false start where the fuses fizzled out, the Union bomb detonated at about 4:44 a.m. on July 30, 1864. The problems were legion: the breach was too small for the number of Union troops, Ledlie stayed behind the lines rather than lead his men, and the cohesion of his unit broke down under the novel and confusing circumstances. As one Union officer put it after returning from the Crater, “It was as utterly impracticable to re-form a brigade in that crater as it would be to marshal bees to hold a dress parade after upsetting the hive” (96). With no division or corps commanders on sight, few Union troops ventured out of the crater to widen the breach and complete the penetration of Confederate lines. Hess notes that the United States Colored Troops made the most strenuous efforts to move forward, but they faced long odds. The Confederates quickly recovered their wits and counterattacked. Hess correctly praises Brigadier General William Mahone for understanding the situation and pressing Confederates troops into the breach. He also notes that, contrary to general knowledge about the battle, the Confederates had also established a strong artillery presence and used their cannons to pound the Union troops. It was during this phase of the fighting that Confederate troops slaughtered African American soldiers after they surrendered. Hess suggests that because the Army of Northern Virginia was first exposed to African American soldiers in blue in the smoldering crater, their response was as much an expression of shock as it was of rage. Hess has written...

The Right of Self-Defence: The Gravity of the Use of Force and Isolated Incidents as Armed Attack

In two significant Judgments (Nicaragua Case and Iranian Oil Platforms Case), International Court of Justice explicitly held that “it is necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms”. Once it is seen that the Court observed the criterion of armed attack in this manner, the question is that: what, then, is an armed attack? Moreover, what is the required degree of gravity to constitute an armed attack? In Iranian Oil Platforms Case, the Court by concluding that the actions by Iran did not constitute an armed attack distinguished between the most grave uses of force and less grave forms. The Court similarly concluded that, although it would not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into play the “inherent right of self-defence”, due to the lack of evidence, it was “unable to hold” that the mine attack in this case constituted an armed attack. Hence, the next question is whether isolated uses of force may amount to armed attack. The purpose of this research is to examine the concept of “armed attack” under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Two research questions are formulated in order to address that purpose. The first question enquires whether uses of force have to be of a certain gravity to constitute and armed attack. The second research question focuses on the issue whether isolated uses of force can amount to an armed attack. In order to answer these questions, the paper is conducted in three main sections. Section I aims to analyse the historical developments of the creation of the right of self-defence. Section II will examine the notion of “armed attack” under the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Section III addresses the issue of the isolated uses of force on the basis of the States practice, International Court of justice’s decisions and academic debates.