Minimum-effort Game Research Articles

Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints

We study a coevolutionary model of network formation in minimum-effort games. Agents dynamically choose both their effort levels and their interaction partners, but face heterogeneous constraints on how many partners they can interact with. The dynamics under heterogeneity behaves very differently from the one in the homogeneous case, with gradual transitions spreading across the population stepwise instead of sudden adoptions. The long-run outcomes depend crucially on the distribution of interaction constraints. The efficient (highest-effort) convention prevails in the long run even when many agents have loose constraints, if enough agents have tight constraints. The lowest-effort convention dominates if too many agents have loose constraints. The coexistence of conventions is also possible for certain distributions of constraints.

Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks

We model economic coordination as a minimum-effort game played repeatedly on a network, with endogenous partner selection (network formation). Coordination on the high-effort equilibrium is achieved under global information provided the population size is large enough. In contrast, under local information, agents are too conservative when choosing unknown partners and the low-effort equilibrium prevails.

Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions

This paper develops a model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play minimum-effort games. The payoff for each agent depends on the minimum of the efforts of her partners and herself, and increases with the size of her interaction neighborhood. We show that when agents interact with everyone with whom they have a link, whoever forms it, coordination on the lowest effort will be (uniquely) selected in the long run.

Coordination under loss contracts

In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts—prepayments that can be clawed back later—have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. To do so, we investigate the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Contrary to most results in the loss contract literature, in our setup loss contracts backfire by reducing the minimum effort of groups and worsening the coordination between group members. Such results suggest that the success off loss contracts is context dependent and offer an explanation as to why loss contracts are not implemented more often in the wild.

Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment

This paper studies the effect of introducing an option of delay in coordination games—that is, of allowing players to wait and then choose between the risk-dominant and payoff-dominant actions. The delay option enables forward-induction reasoning to operate, whereby a player's waiting and not choosing the risk-dominant action right away signals an intention to choose the payoff-dominant action later. If players have ϵ-social preferences—they help others if they can do so at no cost to themselves—then iterated weak dominance yields a unique outcome in which everyone waits and then chooses the payoff-dominant action if everyone else waited. Thus, efficient coordination results. Experimental evidence from a binary-action minimum-effort game confirms that adding a delay option can significantly increase the occurrence of efficient outcomes. Moreover, consistent with our theory, the clear majority of subjects in our experiment take the unique iteratedly undominated strategy and not other strategies that are implied by equilibrium analysis.

Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of the game, each player's belief about the minimum-effort of other players in the group is elicited, in addition to the player's chosen effort level. We find that many agents choose effort levels systematically exceeding their beliefs of others' effort levels. We explain this in terms of such subjects taking the role of “leader” in an attempt to pull the group towards more efficient outcomes. We find that the propensity for leaders to emerge depends on individual traits such as trustfulness and cognitive ability. Furthermore, moving to a superior equilibrium is more likely under certain design features such as conditions relating to the cost of effort and the amount of information available to players.

Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation

We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. When the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. Furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected.

The effect of continuous-time cheap talk in the experimental minimum effort game

ABSTRACT We experimentally investigated whether continuous-time cheap talk improves the effort level in a minimal effort game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In each round of the game, a player freely changes the message before he or she makes decisions, and constantly monitors other members’ messages. We have two results. First, continuous-time cheap talk realizes a higher effort level than does one-shot cheap talk. Second, the group in which every member chooses the maximum effort in the first two rounds eventually achieves an efficient outcome.

Can loss framing improve coordination in the minimum effort game?

I study how framing payoffs as losses affects group coordination using the minimum effort game. The previous literature shows groups as small as four have a difficult time coordinating on an efficient outcome, even in the presence of higher payoffs for more efficient outcomes. Though penalties for inefficient coordination behavior have been studied in a variety of contexts, the role of losses on coordination behavior has not. Loss framing has been shown to induce more efficient actions in a variety of other areas, since individuals tend to be more sensitive to losses than gains. I examine the framing effect of losses, specifically if framing payoffs as losses can lead to payoff-dominant coordination, using three treatments. These treatments help tease out the effects and dynamics of coordination behavior when payoffs are framed as losses. I find that framing payoffs as losses leads to improvements in coordination, demonstrating the robustness of loss framing in the setting of the minimum effort game.

Counterfactual-based nudging and signaling promote more efficient coordination during group tasks

ABSTRACT Groups of people often find it challenging to coordinate on a single choice or option. Even when coordination is achieved, it may be inefficient because better outcomes were possible. Numerous researchers attempted to address this coordination problem with various manipulations ranging in complexity and generalizability, but results were mixed. Here, we use a more parsimonious and generalizable method – counterfactuals – to nudge (i.e. indirectly guide and allow for free choice) individuals towards choosing options that are more likely to result in efficient coordination. We used a modified version of an existing coordination game, the minimum effort game (MEG), where we added actual effort (i.e. solving an arithmetic problem) and counterfactuals (i.e. statements highlighting the hypothetical outcomes had they or other players chosen differently). Based on previous literature and promising results from a pilot experiment using bidirectional counterfactuals (i.e. both upward and downward), we designed and preregistered a follow-up experiment to directly assess the effectiveness of counterfactuals. We replicated the pilot study with a bidirectional counterfactual condition, then added an upward, downward, and control (no counterfactuals) condition. We found weak evidence for counterfactual nudging and clear evidence that players can effectively nudge the group towards higher efficiency.

Narrative based information: is it the facts or their packaging that matters?

People typically do not acquire new information about the facts of the economy through consulting official statistics; they read or listen to mediatype reports/stories on the economy where the facts are packaged in a story. This paper tests with an experiment whether the explanatory style used in such media-type stories affects individual decision making. We also compare this particular narrative influence with that of the actual facts contained in the story. Our subjects receive a media-type story about the economy before they play a minimum effort game. The media story has either good or bad background facts about the economy and we use the psychological theory of explanatory styles to present these facts in a narrative style designed to engender either optimism or pessimism. We find evidence that the explanatory style matters more than facts in the sense that optimistic styles support higher equilibria than pessimistic ones while the influence of the facts itself is weaker.

How Special Is Democracy? <i>An Experimental Study of Recommendations in the Minimum Effort Game<i></i></i>

Democratic institutions aggregate voters’ preferences about policy options and thereby help determine which policies are implemented. Previous research has, however, suggested that such institutions can also have a direct, positive effect on cooperative and efficient behavior. In a laboratory experiment, we test this suggestion by comparing the effect of recommendations on how to play that are generated through a group vote to expert-generated recommendations, on play in a minimum effort game. We find no difference between the two: both expert recommendations and democratically generated recommendations increase the efficiency of choices. In addition, we find that merely considering potential recommendations, and knowing that others have done so as well, can help enhance efficient coordination.

Feedback and Continuous-Time Cheap Talk in Minimum Effort Game: An Experimental Study

We experimentally investigated whether feedback received by participants improves the effort level in a minimum effort game involving continuous-time cheap talk. Continuous-time cheap talk allows participants to freely change and constantly monitor other group members’ messages. We used two treatments: Full Feedback, in which participants are informed of the distribution of effort levels in the group, and Limited Feedback, in which participants are informed of only the minimum effort level in the group. Our main findings are as follows. The average and minimum effort level in the Full Feedback treatment are not significantly different from those in the Limited Feedback treatment. In addition, participants who choose the lowest effort level are not likely to increase the effort level in the next round, despite receiving feedback.

Inequality in minimum-effort coordination

Successful coordination is key for economic and societal wealth. The rich literature on the minimum-effort game (MEG) has provided valuable insights into coordination, both theoretically and empirically. Yet, although real-world scenarios often involve asymmetric benefits and/or costs from coordination, most previous studies rely on symmetric MEGs. We investigate the effect of unequal equilibrium payoffs in the MEG. In two experiments, we observe that players are better able to coordinate on an equal rather than an unequal Pareto-dominant equilibrium. We find that the ability to coordinate on the unequal Pareto-dominant equilibrium critically hinges on the costs of miscoordination for the player who benefits most from successful coordination: when her costs are low, she seems able to stabilize the Pareto-dominant equilibrium even if payoffs are highly unequal, whereas coordination success worsens substantially when her costs are high.

How special is democracy?: An experimental study of recommendations in the minimum effort game

Democratic institutions aggregate voters’ preferences about policy options and thereby help determine which policies are implemented. Previous research has, however, suggested that such institutions can also have a direct, positive effect on cooperative and efficient behavior. In a laboratory experiment, we test this suggestion by comparing the effect of recommendations on how to play that are generated through a group vote to expert-generated recommendations, on play in a minimum effort game. We find no difference between the two: both expert recommendations and democratically generated recommendations increase the efficiency of choices. In addition, we find that merely considering potential recommendations, and knowing that others have done so as well, can help enhance efficient coordination.

Using social connections and financial incentives to solve coordination failure: A quasi-field experiment in India's manufacturing sector

Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30–39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams.

I (Don’t) Like You! But Who Cares? Gender Differences in Same-Sex and Mixed-Sex Teams

Abstract We study the effect of likeability on women’s and men’s team behaviour in a lab experiment. Extending a two-player public goods game and a minimum effort game by an additional pre-play stage that informs team members about their mutual likeability, we find that female teams lower their contribution to the public good in the event of low likeability, while male teams achieve high levels of co-operation irrespective of the level of mutual likeability. In mixed-sex teams, both women’s and men’s contributions depend on mutual likeability. Similar results are found in the minimum effort game. Our results offer a new perspective on gender differences in labour market outcomes: mutual dislikeability impedes team behaviour, except in all-male teams.

Efficiency Gains through Social Influence in a Minimum Effort Game

In this paper we explore the role of social influence for the coordination of effort choice in a game with strategic complementarities. Players are repeatedly randomly partitioned in groups to play a minimum effort game and choose their effort based on their beliefs about the minimal effort among the other members of their group. Individual expectations about this minimal effort is influenced by own experience as well as by communication of beliefs within a social network. We show that increasing the importance of social influence in the expectation formation process has positive effects on the emerging (long run) effort level, thereby improving the efficiency of the outcome. Furthermore, a more centralized social network leads to higher average efficiency, but also to increased variance of outcomes. Finally, communication of actual minimum effort cannot replace the communication of beliefs as a device fostering the emergence of high long run effort.

The Effect of Continuous-Time Cheap Talk in the Experimental Minimum Effort Game

We experimentally investigated whether continuous-time cheap talk improves the effort level in a minimal effort game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In each round of the game, a player freely changes the message before he or she makes decisions, and constantly monitors other members' messages. We have two results. First, continuous-time cheap talk realizes a higher effort level than does one-shot cheap talk. Second, the group in which every member chooses the maximum effort in the first two rounds eventually achieves an efficient outcome.