Abstract
This paper develops a model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play minimum-effort games. The payoff for each agent depends on the minimum of the efforts of her partners and herself, and increases with the size of her interaction neighborhood. We show that when agents interact with everyone with whom they have a link, whoever forms it, coordination on the lowest effort will be (uniquely) selected in the long run.
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