Minimum Number Of Individuals Research Articles

Minimum Numbers and Sample Size in Vertebrate Faunal Analysis

Of the measures currently available for quantifying the abundance of taxa within archaeological and paleontological vertebrate faunas, the minimum number of individuals per taxon is most frequently employed. This paper explores the relationship between the minimum number of individuals (MNI) calculated for a given taxon and the number of specimens (E) from which these values were calculated. Several approaches for controlling for the complex interrelationships between MNI and E are advanced and discussed.

On the Methodology of Faunal Analysis

AbstractAlthough faunal analysis has a long history in archaeological studies, little emphasis has been placed upon the development of methodologies which would allow the valid and reliable analysis of animal remains from archaeological sites. The most crucial decision which a faunal analyst must make as regards the statistical manipulation of his data concerns the proper unit to use in that manipulation. The 2 units which seem to have gained most popularity in faunal studies are discussed, as are the generally non-comparable results which stem from the various ways in which 1 of these units—the minimum number of individuals—has been applied. Finally, suggestions for the standardization of the use of minimum numbers in faunal analysis are made.

Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice

Once a political community has decided which of its members are to participate directly in the making of collective policy, an important question remains: “How many of them must agree before a policy is imposed on the community?” Only if participation is limited to one man does this question become trivial. And this choice of decision-rules may seem only a little less important than the choice of rules in a world so largely governed by committees, councils, conventions, and legislatures. This paper is about the consequences of these rules for individual values.Both the oral and written traditions of political theory have generally confined the search for optimal (or “best”) decision-rules to three alternatives. The rule of consensus tells us that all direct participants must agree on a policy which is to be imposed. Majority-rule tells us that more than half must concur in a policy if it is to be imposed. And the rule of individual initiative (as we may call it), holds that a policy is imposed when any single participant approves of it. These three decision-rules—“everyone,” “most of us,” and “anyone”—are terribly important, but they cannot be said to exhaust the available alternatives.The list of alternatives is just as long as a committee's roster. Only for a committee of three would ‘consensus,’ ‘majority’ and ‘individual initiative’ exhaust the possibilities. In a committee of n members, we have n possible rules. Let the decision-rule be a minimum number of individuals (k) required to impose a policy.

Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice

Once a political community has decided which of its members are to participate directly in the making of collective policy, an important question remains: “How many of them must agree before a policy is imposed on the community?” Only if participation is limited to one man does this question become trivial. And this choice of decision-rules may seem only a little less important than the choice of rules in a world so largely governed by committees, councils, conventions, and legislatures. This paper is about the consequences of these rules for individual values.Both the oral and written traditions of political theory have generally confined the search for optimal (or “best”) decision-rules to three alternatives. The rule of consensus tells us that all direct participants must agree on a policy which is to be imposed. Majority-rule tells us that more than half must concur in a policy if it is to be imposed. And the rule of individual initiative (as we may call it), holds that a policy is imposed when any single participant approves of it. These three decision-rules—“everyone,” “most of us,” and “anyone”—are terribly important, but they cannot be said to exhaust the available alternatives.The list of alternatives is just as long as a committee's roster. Only for a committee of three would ‘consensus,’ ‘majority’ and ‘individual initiative’ exhaust the possibilities. In a committee of n members, we have n possible rules. Let the decision-rule be a minimum number of individuals (k) required to impose a policy.

The Restrictive Law of Population

IN his Huxley Memorial Lecture under this title, delivered on May 4, Prof. Johan Hjort, of the University of Oslo, dealt with a subject which exercised a decisive influence upon the thought of Huxley: the question of over-population (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. Is. net). Prof. Hjort assumes that human society can be studied as a historical group of diverse individuals living in a restricted complex environment, and shows that biology has disclosed the many and various factors which influence the vital processes of the individuals comprising a population and determine the quantity and quality of the population as a whole. He defines an optimum population as the minimum number of individuals who can utilise to the full the vital possibilities made available by one or other of these factors. Incidentally, he surveys the fishing and whaling industries as examples, and illustrates his point that the conditions in both depend upon the power of regeneration shown by the stock. In the case of the whale, technical developments have produced a grave disharmony between the reproductive rate and the death rate, and the problem before the industry is that of defining the optimum catch. Restriction of the numbers killed is urgently demanded, but this requires both State intervention and international agreement.