Mind-independent Reality Research Articles

Mulla Sadra's Realism on The Principle of Ittihad al-'Aqil wa al-Ma'qul: A Response to Modern Realism

<span id="docs-internal-guid-6eb786c7-7fff-c73a-b069-03c5ca0fb7a1"><span>This article attempts to show Mulla Sadra’s model of realism by tracing it through his philosophical principles, especially the principle of </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> (subject-object unity). Furthermore, the study of the Sadra realism model, which is based on the principle of </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul,</span><span> is presented to respond to fundamental epistemic-ontological issues, namely the relationship between the subject’s consciousness and external objects, in order to strengthen belief in the nature and existence of external reality, which is independent of contamination of the subject's mental decisions (mind-independent reality). How does the subject's consciousness relate to external objects? This problem is still an anxiety and has not been resolved by modern philosophers who focus on the discourse of perception, giving rise to various schools of realism, which are represented by two major schools: direct realism and indirect realism. By overcoming these epistemic problems, ultimately, this effort leads to the confirmation of Mulla Sadra's more original and comprehensive model of realism. This paper is attempted using a critical-analytical method, namely analyzing Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas on the </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> principles and the views of modern realism by focusing on the issue of perception. The conclusions drawn from the results of the analysis of the </span><span>Ittihad 'Aqil wa Ma'qul</span><span> were used as a basis for responding to modern realism as well as an affirmation of Mulla Sadra's style of realism.</span></span>

Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers

Reviewed by: Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers Anand Jayprakash Vaidya (bio) Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. By David J. Chalmers. New York, NY: W.W Norton & Company, 2022. Pp. xi + 520. Hardcover $22.49, isbn 978-0-393635-80-5. It isn't uncommon to think that virtual worlds, the worlds we engage with in video games, for example, are not real or at least less real than the ordinary world. After all, they are worlds that are created by us, and thus are less real than the world we didn't create, mind-independent reality. However, in Reality+, David Chalmers argues for the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality. Reality+ is the twenty-first century equivalent of Bertrand Russell's twentieth century The Problems of Philosophy, published 110 years prior. Like Russell, Chalmers' goal is to explain the basic problems of philosophy to a wide audience. The book's twenty-four chapters are organized into seven different parts: virtual worlds, knowledge, reality, real virtual reality, mind, value, and foundations. Each section has about three to four chapters. Having taught the book in an upper-division philosophy of mind course, I would say that the first nine chapters should be read together to get a good sense of the whole project, because they give shape and structure to Chalmers' basic arguments and positions. The following fifteen self-explanatory, self-contained, chapters, are independently engaging, and can be taught separately, as standalone works of philosophy. Chalmers engages in what he terms technophilosophy, which is the combination of (1) asking philosophical questions about technology and (2) using technology to help answer traditional questions of philosophy. He claims that he draws inspiration for the project from Patricia Churchland's 1986 Neurophilosophy, where she does the equivalent of (1) and (2) with neuroscience. Reality+ delivers clear arguments, referencing historical and contemporary philosophical work, while frequently drawing from science fiction, including several outstanding Rick and Morty -style illustrations. The use of science fiction helps to connect students to abstract ideas, while the robustly constructed arguments serve to instruct students on how to go about critically examining the ideas. My students found the book accessible and engaging. I imagine the book [End Page 1] will become even more relevant to successive classes, as the issues Chalmers discusses grow more dominant in the future. Chapter 1, "Is this the real life?", begins by discussing Indian and Chinese philosophy in relation to Greek philosophy with respect to theme of illusion/dreams vs. reality. In all three traditions, one finds discussion of the nature of reality and whether we can know it. Chalmers thinks that each of these traditions helps to formulate the basic questions of his book: the knowledge question, the reality question, and the value question. The knowledge question: can we know whether or not we are living in a virtual world? In part 2, Chalmers argues that we cannot know that we are not living in a virtual world. He does so by defending his own version of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument (2003), which very roughly goes as follows: (1) If there is nothing (technological or otherwise) that would serve to block the creation of a perfect simulation of a humanlike being into existence (what he calls a sim blocker), then most humanlike beings are simulations. (2) if most humanlike beings are simulations, we are probably simulations. So, (3) if there are no sim blockers, we are probably sims. The reality question: are virtual worlds real? He argues that virtual worlds are genuinely real by examining a variety of definitions of what makes something real in chapter 6. I will examine this argument in more detail in the following section. The value question: can you lead a good life in a virtual world? He argues that one can, in parts 5 and 6. He says: "In principle, life in virtual reality can have the same sort of value as life in nonvirtual reality. To be sure, life in virtual reality can be good or bad" (p. 311). As successful as Reality+ is, philosophical counterpoints arose in my mind. In the next section, I present...

Social ontology in metaethics

This article enriches discussions about the metaphysics of normative facts with conceptual resources from social ontology that metaethics has neglected so far: the resources of Haslanger’s critical realism as social constructionism. By pointing out the viability of understanding reasons as socially constructed facts, the article shows how normative facts can be understood as features of mind-independent reality that are, however, not features of the universe independently of social practices. The move into social ontology allows us to understand normative facts as mind-independent in a more substantial sense than deflationists do, by stressing individual mind-independence, while denying collective mind-independence – the subsistence independently of established human cultures. The new position can fruitfully mediate between realism, error theory and constructivism. Finally, the metaphysical nuances provided by social ontology pave the way for novel approaches to normative change and progress – thereby indicating pathways to normative theorising that many traditional metaethical positions lack.

Philosophy, metaphilosophy and ideology-critique: an interview with Ruth Porter Groff

ABSTRACT In this interview, Ruth Groff discusses how she came to be a realist, her role as a community organizer, her relationship to critical realism, and various issues arising from her published work over the years. Discussion ranges across the nature of positivism and its legacy, the concept of falsehood, realism about causal powers, mind-independent reality, the history of philosophy, and the underlying interest in ideology-critique that runs through her thinking.

The ‘onto-logics’ of perspectival multi-naturalism: A realist critique

In this article, I argue for a realist anthropology based on the recognition of mind-independent reality; pitching this premise against concerted anti-dualist tendencies in contemporary anthropological thinking. I spell out core analytical entailments of these, in my view, profoundly conflicting premises. In particular, I focus on perspectival multi-naturalism, arguing that despite adherents’ claims to reinvigorate studies of ‘ontology’, this approach instead exaggerates epistemological dimensions. When assessed from a realist stance, its ground position engenders a series of epistemic fallacies by which the ontological is, effectively, subordinated under epistemology. Advocates’ reluctance to appreciate a distinction between mind and mind-independent reality entails a profound contraction of perspective in terms of empirical and methodological scope, and, analytically, a disregard for ontological complexity and depth, thus curtailing the importance of anthropology in wider academic discourse.

Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation

1 Jizang’s Anti-realist Theory of Truth: A Modal Logical Understanding of Universal Affirmation through Universal Negation Sangyop Lee Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Universität Heidelberg sangyoplee@alumni.stanford.edu In the writings of the Chinese Madhyamaka master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) we often see arguments that run as follows: Because there is nothing that is obtained (wu suode), there is nothing that is not obtained (wu suo bu de).1 Because everything is equally wrong (bing fei), it is possible for everything to be equally right (bing shi).2 The dharmakāya … although it is without speech (wu yan), there is nothing it does not say (wu bu yan).3 Although there is nothing that exists, there is nothing that does not exist. Therefore, both self (wo) and non-self (wu wo) are taught.4 This distinctive logic of deducing universal affirmation from universal negation is often cited as an example of the influence of Daoist monism on Chinese Buddhist thought. Jörg Plassen, for example, points out that similar arguments are employed in the writings of xuanxue 2 thinkers such as Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249 CE) and Guo Xiang 郭象 (252?–312 CE), and traces their origin further to ancient Daoist literature.5 He furthermore writes that such claims of universal affirmation and universal negation are designed “to overcome all dichotomies” and “lead back to an underlying unitary source.”6 Matsumoto Shirō, one of the main proponents of Critical Buddhism,7 similarly argues that this unique logic was possible on the basis of Jizang’s subscription to a Daoist-style emanationist monism, and concludes his analysis as follows: Thus, [in Jizang’s thought,] all statements are recognized as equally true to the extent that they are all references to the ineffable one substance (fukasetsu no tanissha 不可説の単一 者) that is named as “principle” (li 理), “way” (dao 道), and “source” (yuan 源). And the differences between all philosophies, all [systems of] thought, and all arguments are reconciled under the premise of this monistic substance.8 To elaborate, Matsumoto thinks that Jizang’s seemingly paradoxical universal affirmation is supported by his monistic metaphysics, according to which the phenomenal world of multiple existents emanated from the singular ineffable substance. Since any statement about a phenomenal existent thus indirectly corresponds to some aspect of this singular transcendent reality, all statements about anything equally share a certain degree of truthfulness. More recently, Yasuo Deguchi refined this kind of monist reading of Jizang’s philosophy by proposing that Jizang’s paradoxical arguments could be an indication that he was tinkering with some type of dialethism (i.e. the view that there are true contradictions).9 More specifically, Deguchi proposes that Jizang’s philosophy could be understood in relation to Nishitani’s theory of emptiness (śūnyatā; kong 空), according to which emptiness is the monistic level of reality 3 that transcends the ordinary dichotomy of affirmation and negation. Deguchi furthermore compares Jizang’s embrace of contradictions to Nishitani’s exploration of the possibility of “true contradictions” that correctly describe the transcendent, monistic level of reality and make it accessible to us. The present paper, however, argues against these readings of Jizang, which I propose to refer to as the “transcendental monist” interpretation. I will show that Jizang’s deduction of universal affirmation from universal negation does not have to be based on the premise of some monistic totality that transcends ordinary reason and language, and that it is possible to understand this deduction without introducing any dialethic logic or the notion of “true contradictions.”10 I begin by showing that one of the competing theories of truth in Jizang’s time was the realist correspondence theory espoused by the group collectively referred to as the Chengshi masters (Chengshi shi 成實師), the major philosophical rival of Jizang’s Madhyamaka School in medieval China.11 I then discuss why such a theory of truth was at odds with Jizang’s thought. As I argue, Jizang’s Madhyamaka philosophy closely approached what modern scholars call the “semantic” or “anti-realist” interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness, which, on the basis of the refutation of the validity of the very notion of mind-independent reality, denies the possibility of there being ultimately true statements...

A QBist Ontology

This paper puts forward an ontology that is indebted to QBism, Kant, Bohr, Schr\"odinger, the philosophy of the Upanishads, and the evolutionary philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Central to it is that reality is relative to consciousness or experience. Instead of a single mind-independent reality, there are different poises of consciousness, including a consciousness to which ``we are all really only various aspects of the One'' (Schr\"odinger). This ontology helps clear up unresolved issues in the philosophy of science, such as arise from the reification of either instruments or calculational tools, or from a disregard of the universal context of science, which is human experience. It further helps clear up unresolved issues in the philosophy of mind, among them the problem of intentionality and the dilemma posed by the mutual inclusion of self and world (Husserl's paradox of human subjectivity).

Quantum reality: A pragmaticized neo-Kantian approach

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that “quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events”, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that “quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world”. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately embrace a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles.

Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt: A Response to George Berkeley in Twentieth-Century Danish Philosophy

Abstract Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a challenge to epistemologists. Do we experience a mind-independent reality, even though we do it with the help of senses bound to give us subjective experiences? Berkeley – or a straw man by that name (i.e. Berkeley without God) – played an important part as sparring partner for an influential development of Danish theoretical philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. The protagonists here are Peter Zinkernagel (1921–2003) and David Favrholdt (1931–2012). Zinkernagel held an extraordinary appointment as research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. Favrholdt was the founding father of the Philosophical Institute at Odense University (today: University of Southern Denmark). This essay focuses on the constructive moments in Zinkernagel’s alternative to immaterialism, being based on a distinction between perception and action, and on Favrholdt’s development of a reconstruction of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Reality and Evangelism in the Lives and Works of C.S. Lewis and Francis Schaeffer

The thesis of this paper is that the shared commitment of C.S. Lewis and Francis A. Schaeffer to metaphysical realism formed the basis of their development and practice of pre-evangelism. Pre-evangelism is defined as a work to be done prior to evangelism. It appears each developed his views independent of the other suggesting it was their mutual commitment to metaphysical realism that accounts for their similar views of pre-evangelism. These shared ontological commitments led Lewis and Schaeffer to ask defining questions of the naturalists (Lewis) and the existentialists (Schaeffer to lead the non-believer to consider held beliefs in light of the way things are. In this way, the non-believers’ beliefs were not first measured against Christian beliefs, but against the way creation presents itself to everybody. As Schaeffer would say, allow the non-believer to see the conclusions of his own beliefs. Put another way, Lewis would say that it was to show a person that he was wrong before showing him why he was wrong. Both believed mind independent reality as precisely the way to do this. The conclusion here is that metaphysical realism offers the same advantages for evangelism in the post Christian and atheistic atmosphere of the 21st Century.

The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology

A question that is often asked of analytic theologians is: what, if anything, distinguishes analytic theology from philosophy of religion? In this essay, I consider two approaches to what is called “analytic theology.” I argue that the first approach, which I associate with the common practice of analytic theology in the university, is very difficult to distinguish consistently from philosophy of religion. I also argue, however, that there is another approach that can be more clearly distinguished from philosophy of religion (generally understood). Following Aquinas, I associate this with a scientific approach to analytic theology: an approach that is distinguished by a specific commitment to understanding the mind-independent reality of God and all things in relation to God. The primary aim of this essay is to present an account of this latter approach and ask whether it might be possible to take such an approach in the contemporary university.

Sartre’s critique of Husserl

ABSTRACTThis paper articulates a new understanding of Sartre’s philosophical methodology in his early publications up to and including Being and Nothingness. Through his critique of Husserl across these works, Sartre develops an original and sophisticated variety of transcendental phenomenology. He was attracted to Husserl’s philosophy for its promise to establish the foundations of empirical psychology but ultimately concluded that it could not fulfil this promise. Through the analyses that led him to this conclusion, Sartre formulated a new kind of phenomenological reduction and a distinctive kind of transcendental argument to draw conclusions about mind-independent reality from phenomenological premises. His aims were to dissolve the traditional distinction between mind and world, to establish that the mind is accessible to empirical study, and to formulate the conceptual framework required to study the mind systematically. Sartre’s philosophy of psychology, therefore, drove the philosophical development of the methodological foundation of his philosophical project.

Are all observations measurements?

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility of soft science measurement of motivation under strict hard science criteria from observations of individual animals and to suggest the conditions under which an observation can be classified as a measurement. Design/methodology/approach The methodology starts from reconciling second-order cybernetics/radical constructivism (SOC/RC) understanding of the central role of the observer with physical measurements, which accepts the existence of a mind-independent reality. As a result of the reconciliation, parallels were identified between the SOC/RC experiences of as_is and as_if, on the one hand, and the measurement concepts of accuracy and resolution, on the other hand. The scales of physical measurement are defined by criteria of varying strictness, and the scales that meet the strict criterion of concatenation are generally considered hard science and lead to well-defined accuracy and precision. The similarity between SOC/RC and physical measurement suggests that if accuracy and precision can be computed from observations, then the observations can be classified as measurements in a strict hard science fashion; otherwise, the observations are just observations. Findings A nonlinear dynamic model of motivation is reintroduced as an example for reference in measurements of motivation. If there was an agreement on its use among observers (Ethologists), which in reality is not the case, then empirical data may be collected, and the averages and spreads of parameter estimations will define a reference for an animal species. Later, observers with their own data will calibrate with the reference model, so that new observers will have calculated values of accuracy and precision for their data. Research limitations/implications Unlike hard science whose scales of measurement are practically unambiguous, measuring the purpose of behaviour of an animal has inherent ambiguity according to the reintroduced model. The ambiguity cannot be resolved from instantaneous readings. The necessary existence of ambiguity renders the criticism of hard science invalid, that of expecting to measure motivation with a static scale as if it were temperature. Practical implications Human observers can be treated as measuring devices of motivation from observing behaviour. Each observer can have characteristic accuracy/precision, or validity/reliability, calculated from empirical data. Social implications This is an inductive, rather than deductive, study of individual animal behaviour; the author believes it is extensible to individual human behaviour and personality studies. However, group behaviour studies are beyond its scope. Originality/value The author believes that the suggestion of ambiguity of scales of animal motivation is original, and the suggested link between SOC/RC and a mainstream hard science is new.

Martha Kneale on Why Metaphysical Necessities Are NotA Priori

AbstractIn her 1938 paper ‘Logical and Metaphysical Necessity’, Martha Kneale introduces the necessarya posteriori. I present a critical summary of Kneale's argument that so-called ‘metaphysical propositions’ are necessary but nota priori. I argue that Kneale is well placed to offer a template for reconciling conceivability approaches to modal epistemology with the post-Kripkean trend for taking metaphysical necessities to have their source in mind-independent reality.

Rethinking naive realism

Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependent—their phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive realism, often called “selectionism”, does indeed struggle with internal-dependence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin’s, accommodates the internal-dependence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject’s neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions.

Learning that Reflects the Living: Aligning Anticipation and Edusemiotics

Joining educational philosophy with theoretical biology has come to form an important part of the growing edusemiotic movement. Edusemiotics has followed the example of biosemiotics (the understanding that the emergence of life is coextensive with the emergence of semiosis) to describe the process of learning itself as being coextensive with semiosis (or, sign-action). Following this recent turn in scholarship this paper argues for a perspective of learning rooted in the dynamics of the living. By ‘living’, I am referring to the integrated dynamics of reaction and anticipation that is definitional of living organisms, as distinguished from (non-living) inanimate matter. This calls for a theoretical perspective that transcends the realist/idealist divides often inherent in educational theory; offering a possible middle way between the constructivist emphasis on mind dependent reality, and the positivist emphasis on mind independent reality. Such a theoretical approach must be able to account for interactions in states of becoming, and thus calls for a broader causality than reductionist methods or computationalist accounts allow. To approach this re-conceptualization, I attempt to explore the combined relevance of two theoretical perspectives --- anticipatory biology, and the edusemiotic understanding of learning-as-semiosis. To address how anticipatory systems research from biology can be applied to learning theory, I first explore Nadin and Rosen’s notion of (Gödelian) G-complexity, and how this contributes to an understanding of the living as complex. Secondly, I address Peirce's notion of semiosis as it is embedded in his categorical system and overarching cosmology. In conclusion, I consider the confluences and differences between the concept of semiosis and the triadic relations that Peirce saw as fundamental to the origins of life, and the anticipatory processes that these theoretical biologists use to define living organisms, and examine how and if these two conceptions (taken in union) can potentially enrich theoretical accounts of learning. In this final analysis, the combined relevance of these two perspectives is applied to understanding the process of improvisation as an anticipatory/semiotic dynamic, to demonstrate the possible pedagogical relevance of this theoretical alignment

Was Quine Right About Subjunctive Conditionals?

Given his hostility to intensional locutions, it is not surprising that Quine was suspicious of the subjunctive conditional. Although he admitted its usefulness as a heuristic device, in order to introduce dispositional terms, he held that it had no place in a finished scientific theory. In this paper I argue in support of something like Quine’s position. Many contemporary philosophers are unreflectively realist about subjunctives, regarding them as having objective truth values. I contest this. “Moderate realist” theorists, such as Lewis and Stalnaker, admit that subjunctives are context-relative and often indeterminate; I argue, using some examples from the contemporary literature on conditionals, that these features are deeper and more widespread than they think. “Ultra-realist” theories, which deny any indeterminacy, are not credible. Hence subjunctives are unsuitable for certain purposes, in particular the description of mind-independent reality.

Anti-Realism

Abstract According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial assumptions.

The Holy Grail of Semiotics

Abstract This article reviews the first volume of Deely’s Poinsot trilogy. It argues that what comes across with unique force in Augustine and Poinsot is Deely’s use of the technical notion of signum formale to explain how “only through the absence of formal signs (species expressae)” is it possible for there to be any “grounding in the real”: i.e., that holy grail sought for by the proponents of “realism” in philosophy. Only thanks to species impressae, rather, which ground the existence of mind-independent reality, can critically controlled objectivity be possible for human knowledge and communication.

Behavioral Pragmatism: Making A Place for Reality and Truth.

In "Behavioral Pragmatism: No Place for Reality and Truth," Barnes-Holmes (2000) proposed a behavior-analytic version of philosophical pragmatism he called behavioral pragmatism (BP), a perspective which challenges two bedrock tenets of Western culture: (1) metaphysical realism, the view that an external, physical reality exists which is mind-independent and (2) the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), a theory which maintains that true statements are those which correspond to mind-independent reality. Many (perhaps most) behavior analysts accept both of these tenets (though they typically name and describe these tenets using different terms). By contrast, in lieu of the first, BP offers, as a replacement tenet, nonrealism, in place of the second, the pragmatic truth criterion. The account of reality and truth of BP has gained increasing prominence within behavior analysis because of its inclusion within relational frame theory, a perspective with a growing number of adherents. In this paper, I first argue that the realism/pragmatism dispute needs to be resolved because it threatens the coherence of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Next, I present a detailed account of the differing conceptions of reality and truth as articulated within: (1) metaphysical realism, (2) behavioral pragmatism, and (3) Richard Rorty's version of pragmatism (Rortian pragmatism). Finally, using the insights of Rortian pragmatism (RP), I offer three proposals for modifying the core tenets of behavioral pragmatism. If adopted, these proposals would help narrow the realism/pragmatism divide, thereby reducing the threat to radical behaviorism's coherence.