Mind-brain Relationship Research Articles

The Reality of the Soul in an Age of Neuroscience

The Reality of the Soul in an Age of Neuroscience Michael J. Dodds O.P. Introduction Does it never give thee pause, … that men then had a soul—not by hearsay alone, and as a figure of speech; but as a truth that they knew, and practically went upon! Verily it was another world then. … But yet it is pity we had lost tidings of our souls—actually we shall have to go in quest of them again, or worse in all ways will befall!1 Such were the thoughts of Thomas Carlyle in 1843 as he pondered the ruins of the ancient monastery of St. Edmundsbury. He marvels that the monks had not just known about the soul, but acted on that knowledge. Theirs was indeed "another world," he muses, one that, unlike his own, could still hear the "tidings of the soul." What of our world? Is it still possible to affirm the reality of the soul in this age of neuro-science? To explore that question, we will first have to discover something about the soul. We can then consider the problems and questions that neuroscience poses for the soul and look at some possible approaches and answers, especially in the thought of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. [End Page 893] Ancient Greek philosophers understood the soul as the source of movement in living things. Democritus believed it was composed of spherical fire atoms, while Anaximenes said it was air.2 Plato emphasized the difference between soul and body, while Aristotle and his disciples, including Aquinas, began with the unity of the human person and saw the soul as the source of that unity. When Descartes rebooted philosophy in the seventeenth century, he tended to speak of "mind" rather than "soul." The mind was a thinking thing (res cogitans), while the body was an extended thing (res extensa). English-speaking philosophy has largely followed his example, using the word "mind" rather than "soul."3 So current neuroscience ponders the mind–brain relation. The methodology of neuroscience leaves no place for the soul, as cognitive scientist William Uttal notes: "Two fundamental assumptions are likely to remain constant as the enterprise [of neuroscience] goes forward. The first is the basic idea of materialism. … The second is that all mental processes … are functions of that material reality. … Without at least an implicit acceptance of these assumptions, it would be meaningless to pursue work in the field of cognitive neuroscience; we would have to accept the existence of a set of supernatural and uncontrolled variables that would make any experimental results meaningless."4 Established firmly on such methodological assumptions, neuroscience has flourished. Beyond its home base in biology, where it studies the brain and nervous system, it now partners with fields such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, medicine, computer science, and psychology. Its discoveries are described in mind-boggling numbers: "The brain consists of some 1010 neurons with their many branching dendrites and axons all interconnected by networks of unfathomable complexity, in which one neuron may be connected with tens or hundreds of thousands … of other [End Page 894] neurons. In each cubic mm of cortex there are one billion synapses!"5 The brain is both complex and plastic, developing new structures and connections in response to personal experience.6 Conscious activities have been mapped to specific brain areas, allowing for the discovery of previously unknown brain regions.7 The discoveries of neuroscience have been used to treat numerous neural pathologies, from the effects of stroke to obsessive compulsive disorder.8 The Dilemmas of Neuroscience Despite these achievements, some basic questions still baffle neuroscientists. One is to explain how the observable activities of the brain result in consciousness. As Michael O'Shea observes: "We have no idea how consciousness arises from a physical machine and in trying to understand how the brain does that, we may well be up against the most awkward of scientific challenges."9 Uttal sees this as "an intractable problem that neither new measuring devices nor computational engines can ever begin to unravel."10 One source of the dilemma may be neuroscience's own materialistic, methodological assumptions. As David Chalmers explains: "Any account given in purely physical terms...

Toward a postmaterialist psychology: Theory, research, and applications

Abstract The majority of mainstream psychologists still adopt a materialist stance toward nature. They believe that science is synonymous with materialism; further, they are convinced that the view that mind and consciousness are simply by-products of brain activity is an incontrovertible fact that has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. This is an incomplete view of what humans are. In this article, we review two categories of empirical evidence that support a shift toward a postmaterialist psychology. The first category of evidence includes mental events that seem to occur outside the spatial confines of the brain, whereas the second category includes mental events that seem to occur when the brain has ceased to function. Taken together, the two bodies of empirical evidence examined here indicate that the idea that the brain creates mind and consciousness is both incomplete and flawed. In the Discussion section, we argue that the transmission hypothesis of the mind-brain relationship can account for all the evidence presented in this article. We also discuss the emerging postmaterialist paradigm and its potential implications for the evolution of psychology.

How Many Light Bulbs Will it Take to Change Cognitive Neuroscience?

The relationship between economically dominant technologies and fashionable scientific paradigms, including theories of mind-brain relations, is presented in historical context. Inferences are made about the possible future impact of quantum computing upon cognitive neuroscience.

Brain disease, connectivity, plasticity and cognitive therapy: A neurological view of mental disorders

IntroductionOur conception of the mind-brain relationship has evolved from the traditional idea of dualism to current evidence that mental functions result from brain activity. This paradigm shift, combined with recent advances in neuroimaging, has led to a novel definition of brain functioning in terms of structural and functional connectivity. The purpose of this literature review is to describe the relationship between connectivity, brain lesions, cerebral plasticity, and functional recovery. DevelopmentAssuming that brain function results from the organisation of the entire brain in networks, brain dysfunction would be a consequence of altered brain network connectivity. According to this approach, cognitive and behavioural impairment following brain damage result from disrupted functional organisation of brain networks. However, the dynamic and versatile nature of these circuits makes recovering brain function possible. Cerebral plasticity allows for functional reorganisation leading to recovery, whether spontaneous or resulting from cognitive therapy, after brain disease. ConclusionsCurrent knowledge of brain connectivity and cerebral plasticity provides new insights into normal brain functioning, the mechanisms of brain damage, and functional recovery, which in turn serve as the foundations of cognitive therapy.

The Academy for the Advancement of Postmaterialist Sciences: Integrating Consciousness into Mainstream Science

The majority of mainstream psychologists still adopt a materialist stance toward nature. They believe that science is synonymous with materialism; further, they are convinced that the view that mind and consciousness are simply by-products of brain activity is an incontrovertible fact that has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. This is an incomplete view of what humans are. In this article, we review two categories of empirical evidence that support a shift toward a postmaterialist psychology. The first category of evidence includes mental events that seem to occur outside the spatial confines of the brain, whereas the second category includes mental events that seem to occur when the brain has ceased to function. Taken together, the two bodies of empirical evidence examined here indicate that the idea that the brain creates mind and consciousness is both incomplete and flawed. In the Discussion section, we argue that the transmission hypothesis of the mind-brain relationship can account for all the evidence presented in this article. We also discuss the emerging postmaterialist paradigm and its potential implications for the evolution of psychology.

Hughlings Jackson and the “doctrine of concomitance”: mind-brain theorising between metaphysics and the clinic

John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) is a major figure at the origins of neurology and neuroscience in Britain. Alongside his contributions to clinical medicine, he left a large corpus of writing on localisation of function in the nervous system and other theoretical topics. In this paper I focus on Jackson's "doctrine of concomitance"-his parallelist theory of the mind-brain relationship. I argue that the doctrine can be given both an ontological and a causal interpretation, and that the causal aspect of the doctrine is especially significant for Jackson and his contemporaries. I interpret Jackson's engagement with the metaphysics of mind as an instance of what I call meta-science-the deployment by scientists of metaphysical positions and arguments which help streamline empirical investigations by bracketing off unanswerable questions and focussing attention on matters amenable to the current tools of experimental research.

A double face view on mind-brain relationship: the problem of mental causation

Abstract: Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by him pointed. To ask "how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?", is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking "how does mind could act causally on the brain?", as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask "how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?". To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a "double face view", which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - "conscious mind as brain" - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - "brain as conscious mind".

Enfermedad cerebral, conectividad, plasticidad y terapia cognitiva. Una visión neurológica del trastorno mental

IntroductionOur conception of the mind-brain relationship has evolved from the traditional idea of dualism to current evidence that mental functions result from brain activity. This paradigm shift, combined with recent advances in neuroimaging, has led to a novel definition of brain functioning in terms of structural and functional connectivity. The purpose of this literature review is to describe the relationship between connectivity, brain lesions, cerebral plasticity, and functional recovery. DevelopmentAssuming that brain function results from the organisation of the entire brain in networks, brain dysfunction would be a consequence of altered brain network connectivity. According to this approach, cognitive and behavioural impairment following brain damage result from disrupted functional organisation of brain networks. However, the dynamic and versatile nature of these circuits makes recovering brain function possible. Cerebral plasticity allows for functional reorganisation leading to recovery, whether spontaneous or resulting from cognitive therapy, after brain disease. ConclusionsCurrent knowledge of brain connectivity and cerebral plasticity provides new insights into normal brain functioning, the mechanisms of brain damage, and functional recovery, which in turn serve as the foundations of cognitive therapy.

Characteristics of memories for near-death experiences.

Near-death experiences are vivid, life-changing experiences occurring to people who come close to death. Because some of their features, such as enhanced cognition despite compromised brain function, challenge our understanding of the mind-brain relationship, the question arises whether near-death experiences are imagined rather than real events. We administered the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire to 122 survivors of a close brush with death who reported near-death experiences. Participants completed Memory Characteristics Questionnaires for three different memories: that of their near-death experience, that of a real event around the same time, and that of an event they had imagined around the same time. The Memory Characteristics Questionnaire score was higher for the memory of the near-death experience than for that of the real event, which in turn was higher than that of the imagined event. These data suggest that memories of near-death experiences are recalled as "realer" than real events or imagined events.

On the Science of Consciousness: Epistemological Reflections and Clinical Implications

Consciousness has been one of the most important and tantalizing issues ever since the origin of philosophy and medicine. The concept of consciousness and the so-called "hard problem" (i.e., the mind-brain relationship) are highly complex topics that have yet to be elucidated, involving the realms of both science and philosophy with profound epistemological implications. In the lively debate on the foundations of the science of consciousness there are several potential biases of an essentially philosophical nature, such as those related to the paradigm and axioms adopted, and the ostensible logical contradiction between monism and dualism. Their origin dates back largely to Descartes' thinking and the birth of the new sciences as a compromise with the Inquisition, but they have been handed down through the Enlightenment and Positivism. A proper investigation of consciousness and the world of subjectivity demands a careful reflection on the paradigm of scientific medicine to identify possible flaws and overcome the limits of the mechanistic-reductionist approach.

Exploring the Computational Explanatory Gap

While substantial progress has been made in the field known as artificial consciousness, at the present time there is no generally accepted phenomenally conscious machine, nor even a clear route to how one might be produced should we decide to try. Here, we take the position that, from our computer science perspective, a major reason for this is a computational explanatory gap: our inability to understand/explain the implementation of high-level cognitive algorithms in terms of neurocomputational processing. We explain how addressing the computational explanatory gap can identify computational correlates of consciousness. We suggest that bridging this gap is not only critical to further progress in the area of machine consciousness, but would also inform the search for neurobiological correlates of consciousness and would, with high probability, contribute to demystifying the “hard problem” of understanding the mind–brain relationship. We compile a listing of previously proposed computational correlates of consciousness and, based on the results of recent computational modeling, suggest that the gating mechanisms associated with top-down cognitive control of working memory should be added to this list. We conclude that developing neurocognitive architectures that contribute to bridging the computational explanatory gap provides a credible and achievable roadmap to understanding the ultimate prospects for a conscious machine, and to a better understanding of the mind–brain problem in general.

Elizabeth Valentine’s ‘Philosophy and History of Psychology’

Elizabeth Valentine’s work is a testament to an open-minded and inclusive psychologist seeking to find meaningful insights into human nature wherever she can. For Valentine, psychology is a hybrid science, it must make reference to human subjectivity, whilst still maintaining objectivity in its findings. Precisely this is the challenge that psychology as a science faces: how to do justice to human subjectivity in a reliably objective way. Yet, it is precisely because of this subjective element to human reality that psychology is so apt for conversation with insights from other domains – particularly philosophy. The relationship here is mutually beneficial. Philosophy requires psychology to keep it empirically grounded in reality; but psychology needs philosophy to broaden and enrich its conceptual landscape. By way of example, this paper will critically reflect on Valentine’s views of consciousness, and how psychologists should deal with the metaphysical problems surrounding the mind-brain relationship.

Mediumship: review of quantitatives studies published in the 21st century

Background Mediumship can be defined as the alleged ability to communicate with deceased persons. The last decade has been particularly productive for this field of research and the study of mediumship can help the understanding of the human mind-brain relationship and provide objective data to the scientific community and to the general population. Objective The aim of this review is to summarize and discuss the results found on recent studies investigating mediumship. Furthermore, we aim to discuss the psychophysiology underlying mediumship and future perspectives for this study topic. Methods A literature search for articles in English, Portuguese and Spanish published from January 2000 up to June 2015 was conducted using three electronic databases (PubMed, Lilacs and Web of Science). Review articles, qualitative studies and studies investigating altered states of consciousness caused by psychoactive substances were excluded. The original search returned 150 articles, but the application of exclusion criteria resulted in the inclusion of 19 articles for final analysis. Results The general findings were: (1) an association of mediumship with good mental health, predominantly in experienced mediums, (2) heterogeneous findings regarding the ability of mediums to provide accurate information what may be due to different study methodologies and (3) incipient studies assessing physiological correlations during mediumistic communications (i.e. hypoactivation of brain regions responsible for cognitive processing and writing planning during psychography compared to a control task; electroencephalographic (EEG) changes and a slight predominance of the sympathetic nervous system). Discussion There is a paucity of empirical data available in this controversial research field. New studies employing rigorous design (e.g.triple-blind protocols to test accuracy of mediumistic communications), and sensitive methods are required.

Does the brain produce the mind? A survey of psychiatrists’ opinions

Background Psychiatrists’ views on the mind-brain relationship (MBR) have marked clinical and research implications, but there is a lack of studies on this topic. Objectives To evaluate psychiatrists’ opinions on the MBR, and whether they are amenable to change or not. Methods We conducted a survey of psychiatrists’ views on the MBR just before and after a debate on the MBR at the Brazilian Congress of Psychiatry in 2014. Results Initially, from more than 600 participants, 53% endorsed the view that “the mind (your “I”) is a product of brain activity”, while 47% disagreed. Moreover, 72% contested the view that “the universe is composed only of matter”. After the debate, 30% changed from a materialist to a non-materialist view of mind, while 17% changed in the opposite way. Discussion Psychiatrists are interested in debates on the MBR, do not hold a monolithic view on the subject and their positions are open to reflection and change, suggesting the need for more in-depth studies and rigorous but open-minded debates on the subject.

From “Somatic Scandals” to “a Constant Potential for Violence”? The Culture of Dissection, Brain-Based Learning, and the Rewriting/Rewiring of “the Child”

Within educational research across Europe and the US, one of the most rapidly traveling discourses and highly funded pursuits of the moment is brain-based learning (BBL). BBL is an approach to curriculum and pedagogical decision-making that is located within the new field of educational neuroscience. In some strands of BBL research the structure and function of the brain is located causally, as providing the sole and/or most important basis for making decisions about what and how to teach children. This article analyzes the “messy and numberless beginnings” of the hope placed upon neurological foundationalism to provide a solution to the “problem” of differences between students and to the achievement of educational goals. Rather than arguing for or against educational neuroscience, the article moves through five levels to examine the conditions of possibility for subscribing to the brain as a causal organological locus of learning. It maps pertinent historical conditions, including the relationship between technologies of self, histories and cultures of dissection, and arcs of discourse from soul-body to mind-body relations, as well as surveys more recent and pivotal examples of the movement from squeezing to scanning in modern mind-brain relation debates that have redefined “the ideal child.” A range of contemporary fantasies, projections, and contestations of some of the central assumptions within “Western” conceptions of Being that sustain the conditions of possibility for BBL research are outlined. This includes the thorny problem of human-centrism even in those accounts that claim to question scientific materialist approaches to the nature of reality.

Epistemological implications of near-death experiences and other non-ordinary mental expressions: Moving beyond the concept of altered state of consciousness

During the last decades an increasing interest has developed in the so-called altered state of consciousness (ASCs); among these, near-death experiences (NDEs) are one of the most intriguing and debated examples. NDEs are deep and universal experiences with a clear phenomenology and incidence, while some of their features challenge the current views of human consciousness (focused on neural circuits and based on the concept of mind as a byproduct of brain circuitry) with relevant epistemological and historical implications.The origin of the ruling mechanist–reductionist paradigm can be traced back to Descartes’ radical separation of res cogitans and res extensa and the conflict between the nascent science and the Inquisition; this led to removing the subjective properties of mind from the field of scientific interest, relegating them to philosophy and theology in order to enable the development of modern science. However, the physics of the 20th century has eventually moved beyond the classical paradigm, permitting a profound renewal of scientific interest in the mind.Modern research on NDEs has contributed to reopening the debate surrounding the Cartesian separation, the mind–brain relationship and the nature of consciousness. It is now time to reappraise the relevance, strengths, and weaknesses of the available scientific interpretations of NDEs, their relationship with other ASCs, as well as the very concept of ASC; the latter looks to be ill-founded, suggesting the need for: (a) a revision of the conventional approach to subjective phenomena, including both the third- and first-person perspective; and (b) a deep reflection on the possible links between different non-ordinary mental expression, as regards both their phenomenology and mechanisms from a non-pathological perspective.

Neuromodulation and the mind-brain relation.

Many investigators now consider psychiatric disorders to be neural circuit disorders (Lozano and Lipsman, 2013). Cognitive, emotional and volitional symptoms of major depression, generalized anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder and other conditions are traceable to dysfunction in critical nodes of circuits in cortical, limbic and subcortical pathways of the brain. Guided by functional imaging, the ability of deep-brain stimulation (DBS) to probe and modulate specific circuits in real-time has elucidated the pathogenesis of these disorders. DBS has validated the neurobiological underpinning of normal and abnormal states of mind. This and other developments in clinical neuroscience discredit a dualist theory of mind and brain that takes psychological properties to be conceptually distinct from and capable of functioning independently of neural properties. Instead, they support a materialist theory of mind that explains mental phenomena in terms of their neural correlates.

The Neuroscience Literacy of Teachers in Greece

There is concern amongst neuroscientists and educators about the prevalence of neuromyths in education, which are often associated with poor or unevaluated practices in the classroom. The present study surveyed 217 primary and secondary school teachers in Greece. Analysis revealed that Greek school teachers held many misconceptions about concepts related to brain-based educational programs that have been observed elsewhere in Europe. These include believing that differences in hemispheric dominance (left brain, right brain) can help explain individual differences amongst learners, and the effectiveness of teaching to learning styles. However, international comparison with other studies also revealed some interesting differences reflecting the influence of cultural forces on teachers’ ideas about brain function. For example, teachers in Greece appear to possess a more complex construction of the mind-brain relationship than observed in the UK and Netherlands, with most considering that this relationship is mediated by the soul. A relationship was also observed between attributing educational outcomes to genetics and a belief in a biological limit to student achievement.

La relación mente-cerebro: Una propuesta de solución basada en formas de neguentropía intra y extra individuales

It is proposed that the problem of the mind-brain relationship can be overcome by a non-classical materialistic model of personality based on the information defined as a special form of negentropy with a structure and activity, which in five intra-individual categories, organizes all and each of the levels of the personality, and, in an extra-individual category organizes the society. This concept of information leads to a monistic view of the universe and turns into conceptions of society, personality, consciousness, and mental activity based on a theoretical framework that explains the nature of the social individual.

A Preparatory Neuroethical Approach to Assessing Developments in Neurotechnology

The unknowns of the brain-mind relationship and the novelty of neurologic techniques and technologies give rise to ethical questions that can be described, analyzed, and answered using a preparatory neuroethical framework to mitigate potential problems.