Mill's Concept Research Articles

A Discourse on the American Neoconservatives' Approach in the Context of Postmodernism

Multiple concepts are compatible between the Neocons and postmodernists. i.e., The concept presented by Leo Strauss of "Noble Lie," if we further dissect this concept, shows how compatible and similar with the reality-free world of the postmodern philosophers. According to postmodernism, we have no objective reality exists in this world as it is relative, and everyone sees it according to his understanding. This thesis becomes apparent when studying Nietzsche's critique against Juan Stuart Mill. Nietzsche has denounced Mill's concept of a universal and objective Moral system. As Nietzsche says, I abhor this man's vulgarity when he says, "what is right for one man is right for another man." It shows that all postmodern philosophers and Nietzsche were of the same view.

SOCIJALISTIČKA MISAO I „ŽENSKO PITANjE“ – SVETOZAR MARKOVIĆ I DIMITRIJE TUCOVIĆ

To understand the discourse that the socialists had towards the Woman Question, the texts of Svetozar Markovic, Oslobođenje ženskinja and Pevanje i mišljenje were analyzed, as well as a couple of newspaper articles by Dimitrije Tucovic. Svetozar Marković, under the influence of John Stuart Mill, was the first in Serbia to raise the issue of women's liberation, accepting Mill's concept of gender equality. This author pays special attention to the economic position of women, finding in it all the weight of their social position. On the other hand, on the initiative of Dimitrije Tucović, the newspaper Jednakost was founded, as a newspaper of women-social democrats and at the same time as the first women's political newspaper in the Balkans. In this newspaper Tucović was presented as a key figure that led to the emancipation of women within the Social Democratic Party. Both Marković and Tucović saw the Woman Question as a political issue. What is perhaps most striking and important to point out is the connection between the Woman Question and complete social transformation.

Wouldn't It Be the Active Euthanasia Instead of Passive? An Analysis on the Basis of J. S. Mill's Liberty

Abatement of suicide is a penal offence in India. After the Supreme Court's decision in Aruna Shanbaug (2011) case, voluntary passive euthanasia is applicable in certain cases. This article is analyzing the relevancy of legalizing the active euthanasia over the application of passive euthanasia on the basis of J. S. Mill's concept of Liberty.

Ｊ・Ｓ・ミルの幸福論再論

Ｊ・Ｓ・ミルの幸福論再論

Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics (review)

Reviewed by: Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics Francesca di Poppa Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, editors. Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. Pp. vii + 318. Cloth, $75.00 This book contains sixteen essays, presented at the seventh Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in 2005. It includes historical topics, ranging from ancient Greek thought to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, and contemporary topics, including causal pluralism, epiphenomenalism, and causality in disciplines as different as physics and economics. The concept of causation has been elaborated in many ways, with many different philosophical functions, including its problematic relations to the concept of explanation. The essays cover a variety subjects, and the results are quite disparate. McCord Adams's discussion of medieval philosophers on sacramental causation and Norton's challenge to "causal fundamentalism" in contemporary physics are both about "causes," but their concepts of cause are only tangentially related. Despite its stated aim of bringing "unusual aspects of the history of causality to contemporary attention," the book offers no hint of a historical narrative (although a few of the essays do). Even so, I find this book a valuable addition to a philosophical library. Most of the essays are interesting, although some suffer from lack of detail, probably because of editorial constraints (among the exceptions are Inwood's "Moral Causes" and Shapiro's and Sober's "Epiphenomenalism: The Dos and the Don'ts"). One of the most interesting essays is Marilyn McCord Adams's "Powerless Causes." Medieval philosophers attempted to use the conceptual apparatus of causation to explain how sacramental rituals have some real power to produce grace, in cooperation with divine agency. The attempts collapsed, McCord Adams shows, because of difficulties in making a supernatural event (grace in the soul) even partially dependent on the efficacy of created causes. Throughout the discussion, McCord Adams shows the interconnection, and sometimes confusion, between the causal and the explanatory role of sacraments. It is an interesting, clearly written and fascinating overview of a complex debate, which took place in terms quite different from debates about causation in contemporary metaphysics or philosophy of science. In "From Scholasticism to Modern Physics—and Back?", Robert Schnepf argues that Descartes opens the door to a new argument for occasionalism by introducing a notion of cause that does the work of both formal and efficient causation. He does so by introducing what Schnepf calls the "epistemic approach": causes must meet the epistemic criterion of being clearly and distinctly perceived in their necessary relations to their effects. This is problematic because, as Malebranche remarks, no such necessity can be perceived except between an omnipotent will and its effects. Hence, the only real efficient cause is God. I wish that Schnepf had been more generous with textual quotes and references, and I found his discussion of the conflation between formal and efficient cause insufficient. However, the summary of the Scholastic background and the discussion of the Cartesian metaphysical shift between the Regulae and his more mature philosophy are interesting, and Schnepf's case for how Descartes helped revive occasionalism is persuasive. Both Laura Snyder's "Freedom from Necessity" and Paolo Parrini's "Mill on Causation and Historical Turn in Philosophy of Science" start from a reading of Mill's theory of causation [End Page 243] in the context of his anti-intuitionism and his political struggle for individual liberty against the tyranny of custom. Snyder concludes with an invitation to include historical considerations in interpretation, under penalty of reading an "artificial construction" rather than the actual philosopher. Parrini argues that the textual evidence is certainly compatible with Snyder's conclusion that Mill's discussion of causation was influenced by his political agenda, but it is also compatible with a different interpretation, i.e. that a political agenda initially influenced Mill's discussion of causation, which later took an autonomous turn. Parrini then warns against the excesses of the "historical turn": there is room for evaluating a philosopher's ideas outside of their immediate background, especially if we are to compare them to alternative systems or examine their internal coherence. Both discussions of Mill's concept of causation are very interesting...

Revisiting “what is a document?”

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to provide a reconsideration of Michael Buckland's important question, “What is a document?”, analysing the point and purpose of definitions of “document” and “documentation”.Design/methodology/approachTwo philosophical notions of the point of definitions are contrasted: John Stuart Mill's concept of a “real” definition, purporting to specify the nature of the definiendum; and a concept of definition based upon a foundationalist philosophy of language. Both conceptions assume that a general, philosophical justification for using words as we do is always in order. This assumption is criticized by deploying Hilary Putnam's arguments against the orthodox Wittgensteinian interpretation of criteria governing the use of language. The example of the cabinets of curiosities of the sixteenth‐century English and European virtuosi is developed to show how one might productively think about what documents might be, but without a definition of a document.FindingsOther than for specific, instrumentalist purposes (often appropriate for specific case studies), there is no general philosophical reason for asking, what is a document? There are good reasons for pursuing studies of documentation without the impediments of definitions of “document” or “documentation”.Originality/valueThe paper makes an original contribution to the new interest in documentation studies by providing conceptual resources for multiplying, rather than restricting, the areas of application of the concepts of documents and documentation.

International Relations after the Cold War

This article, based on Adam Roberts's valedictory lecture as Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, reconsiders the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War. It argues that a key to understanding these developments is acceptance of pluralism—of theories, of political systems, of cultures, of methods of analysis, and of academic disciplines. Pluralism in at least some of these senses is a recognized strength of International Relations studies in the UK. The long tradition of acceptance of a plural international system, and a plural approach to understanding it, includes figures as varied as John Stuart Mill, Maxim Litvinoff, Alastair Buchan and Hedley Bull. The end of the Cold War was the result of a plural mix of factors: both force and diplomacy; both pressure and detente; both belief and disbelief in the reformability of communism; both civil resistance in some countries and guerrilla resistance in others; both elite action and street politics; both nuclear deterrence and the ideas of some of its critics; both threat and reassurance; both nationalism in the disparate parts of the Soviet empire and supranationalism in the European Community. Paradoxically, the specialists in politics and International Relations who came closest to foreseeing the end of the Cold War were those who made few if any claims to a ‘scientific’ approach, and whose idea of forecasting was based, at the very most, on Mill's modest concept of ‘a certain order of possible progress’. Since the end of the Cold War, simplistic interpretations of how it ended have contributed to narrow understandings of international order. The spirit of imposed universalism having fed from Moscow, has flourished as never before in its other favourite haunt, Washington DC. There is a need to recognize the plurality of perspectives that endure in the post-Cold War world.

A sustainable perspective on the knowledge economy: A critique of Austrian and mainstream views

This paper proposes that the current growth-oriented exposition of the knowledge economy in literature is not only monistic but also partial. The mainstream's persistent emphasis on knowledge and economic growth and its neglect of knowledge and other critical issues (such as promoting wealth equalities and environmental conservation) lead to a paucity in terms of the variety of knowledge in the global knowledge commons, which will not fulfill the goal of sustainable development. To maintain a sustainable society with an efficient use of resources, it is necessary to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. This type of question, however, continues to be ignored and remains unanswered in both the Austrian analysis of the knowledge problem and the mainstream exposition of the knowledge economy. In this regard, John Stuart Mill's concept of the stationary state is in line with contemporary analysis of a sustainable society and is worth further review.

Inside the Whale: the Media from Parliament

Book synopsis: Spin doctor, soundbite, press secretary, digital, global village, cool Britannia. Politics today is saturated with the jargon and buzzwords of the mass media. How important are they for the way we are governed? How can the ever-expanding impact of the media be controlled? In this up-to-the-minute book, a group of Britain's best-known journalists and media analysts tackle one of the most testing issues facing the nation in the next century. Each essay focuses on the central role of newspapers, broadcasting and information technology in our political life. Peter Riddell shows how the demands of the press and broadcasting have drained Parliament of much of its democratic purpose. Tony Wright gives a fascinating insider's account of the politician-journalist nexus. Andrew Graham points to the monopolistic pressures of the new technology. Colin Seymour-Ure discusses the effects of the end of the party-political allegiances of newspapers. Philip Schlesinger considers the impact of the Scottish media as catalyst for a political micro-climate. Steve Barnett examines the concept of tabloidization. Eric Barendt weighs up the law as a tool for guarding press impartiality. Ben Pimlott takes a post-Diana look at the monarchy's media dealings. Martin Rowson satiries the press-politician embrace. Finally, Jean Seaton reassesses J. S. Mill's concept of media freedom. Edited by Jean Seaton (co-author of the classic media study Power Without Responsibility) this thought-provoking, intensely readable and often witty collection applies expertise and common sense to complex problems, and shows how dated many assumptions about the mass media have become. The book is essential reading for students of the media and politics, as well as for journalists, politicians and all those concerned about the fast-changing role of mass communications in our democracy.

Privacy and Sexuality in a Society Divided Over Moral Culture

In this article, I develop an individuality-based conception of the right to privacy that can be used to protect the freedoms of sexual choice and inti mate association. In doing so, I draw on John Stuart Mill's concept of indi viduality and his celebration of lifestyle experimentation. This formulation of the right to privacy is defended against a critic, Jed Rubenfeld, who uses Michel Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis to argue that an individuality-based conception of the right to privacy will inevitably im pose standardized sexual identities on individuals. In response to Rubenfeld, I argue that the position that sexuality is central to self-definition does not depend on the assumption that speaking the truth about sex will set us free. The aim of the individuality-based conception of the right to privacy that I am advocating is not to fix identities, but to open up greater room for lifestyle experimentation.

J. S. Mill's Concept of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights

Journal Article J. S. Mill's Concept of Maturity as the Criterion in Determining Children's Eligibility for Rights Get access Ki Su Kim Ki Su Kim Correspondence: Dr Ki Su Kim, Faculty of Education, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John's, Newfoundland, Canada A1B 3X8. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, December 1990, Pages 235–244, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1990.tb00236.x Published: 30 May 2006

Mill and Millians on Liberty and Moral Character

This essay critically explores the efforts of John Stuart Mill and contemporary Millian scholarship to provide a utilitarian justification for a categorical principle of personal liberty. What is distinctive about Mill's argument is its pronounced emphasis upon character development as an essential constituent of happiness; the heart of the argument is that freedom of choice promotes a kind of elevated or worthy human character upon which happiness ultimately depends. Hence, society must be prevented from imposing any conventional or customary morality which would restrict individual autonomy. This case for the sovereignty of personal autonomy is infected with a number of difficulties and ambiguities. Central among these are weighty problems associated with Mill's crucial concept of individuality and its relation to human excellence or nobility of character. The refinements upon Millian doctrine introduced by his current supporters do not, and cannot, resolve its inherent ambiguities.

John Stuart Mill's Concept of Utility

I offer here an interpretation and defense of John Stuart Mill's qualitative hedonism. One of the results of Mill's well-known mental crisis was a concept of utility substantially different from the orthodox Benthamite quantitative hedonism which Mill came to regard as being fraught with difficulties. He saw Bentham's concept as being excessively narrow, and he sought to overcome its limitations by enlarging his own concept of utility. He did this by including the quality of pleasures along with the quantity in the estimation of their worth. At the same time, Mill was highly critical of the intuitionist ethical theories of his day, and propounded utilitarianism as the rational, objective, and scientific alternative. So if Mill is to succeed in his enterprise of countering intuitionism while avoiding the pitfalls of Benthamite utilitarianism, he must retain the objectivity of Benthamism while repudiating its narrowness. Mill's critics have argued that when he opened up his concept of utility to include quality, he modified his theory so radically that he can no longer be called a hedonistic utilitarian, and that he relinquished the consis- tency and objectivity of Benthamite utilitarianism along with its weak- nesses. I argue here that Mill abandons neither hedonism nor utilitarianism, and that the objectivity and consistency of his theory are not undermined.

J. S. Mill's concept of liberty and the principle of utility

Looked at on these three levels — the definitional, the justificatory, the dimensional — Mill's concept of liberty does not appear to be rooted in the principle of utility in any meaningful sense of this principle. It appears rather to be based on a consideration of the social benefits liberty would conduce to combined with an implicit and at times explicit theory of natural rights. Liberty is neither defined nor justified relative to any felicific, sensory pleasure-pain calculus or Greatest Happiness estimate. The limits of individual or collective interference in individual action are not prescribed with the utility principle as the guide.