Privacy and Sexuality in a Society Divided Over Moral Culture

Abstract

In this article, I develop an individuality-based conception of the right to privacy that can be used to protect the freedoms of sexual choice and inti mate association. In doing so, I draw on John Stuart Mill's concept of indi viduality and his celebration of lifestyle experimentation. This formulation of the right to privacy is defended against a critic, Jed Rubenfeld, who uses Michel Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis to argue that an individuality-based conception of the right to privacy will inevitably im pose standardized sexual identities on individuals. In response to Rubenfeld, I argue that the position that sexuality is central to self-definition does not depend on the assumption that speaking the truth about sex will set us free. The aim of the individuality-based conception of the right to privacy that I am advocating is not to fix identities, but to open up greater room for lifestyle experimentation.